AMERICAN SCIENCE SERIES— AD VANCED COURSE

THE PRINCIPLES

OF

PSYCHOLOGY

WILLIAM JAMES

PROFESSOR OF PSYCHOLOGY IN HARVARD UNIVERSITY

IN TWO VOLUMES

VOL. II

NEW YORK

HENRY HOLT AND COMPANY
1905

Ul

V * £-»

Copyright, 1P90

BY

HENRY HOLT & CO.

HOBERT DRTIMMOND, ELECTROTYPER AND PRINTER, NEW YORE

CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XVII.

PAOK

SENSATION, . . . . ' . . . . .1

Its distinction from perception, 1. Its cognitive function —
acquaintance with qualities, 3. No pure sensations after the first
days of life, 7. The 'relativity of knowledge/ 9. The law of
contrast, 13. The psychological and the physiological theories
of it, 17. Bering's experiments, 20. The ' eccentric projection '
of sensations, 31.

CHAPTER XVIII.

IMAGINATION, 44

Our images are usually vague, 45. Vague images not neces
sarily general notions, 48. Individuals differ in imagination ;
Gallon's researches, 50, The 'visile' type, 58. The 'audile'
type, 60. The 'motile' type, 61. Tactile images. 65. The neural
process of imagination, 68. Its relations to that of sensation, 72.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE PERCEPTION OF ( THINGS/ 76

Perception and sensation, 76. Perception is of definite and
probable things, 82. Illusions, 85 ;— of the first type, 86 ;— of
the second type, 95. The neural process in perception, 103.
'Apperception,' 107. Is perception an unconscious inference?
111. Hallucinations, 114. The neural process in hallucination,
122. Binet's theory, 129. ' Perception-time/ 131.

CHAPTER XX.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE, 134

The feeling of crude extensity, 134. The perception of spatial
order, 145. Space-' relations,' 148. The meaning of localization,
153. 'Local signs.' 155. The construction of ' real ' space, 166.
The subdivision of the original sense-spaces, 167. The sensation

iii

iv CONTENTS.

PAGS

of motion over surfaces, 171. The measurement of the sense-
spaces by each other, 177. Their summation, 181. Feelings of
movement in joints, 189. Feelings of muscular contraction, 197.
Summary so far, 202. How the blind perceive space, 203.
Visual space, 211. Helmholtz and Reid on the test of a sensation,
216. The theory of identical points, 222. The theory of projection,
228. Ambiguity of retinal impressions, 231 ; — of eye-movements,
234. The choice of the visual reality, 237. Sensations which
we ignore, 240. Sensations which seem suppressed, 243. Dis
cussion of Wundt's and Helmholtz's reasons for denying that
retinal sensations are of extension, 248. Summary, 268. His
torical remarks, 270.

CHAPTER XXL

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY, 283

Belief and its opposites, 283. The various orders of reality,
287. ' Practical ' realities, 293. The sense of our own bodily
existence is the nucleus of all reality, 297. The paramount reality
of sensations, 299. The influence of emotion and active impulse
on belief, 307. Belief in theories, 311. Doubt, 318. Relations
of belief and will, 320.

CHAPTER XXII.

REASONING, 323

' Recepts,' 327. In reasoning, we pick out essential qualities,
329. What is meant by a mode of conceiving, 332. What is
involved in the existence of general propositions, 337. The two
factors of reasoning, 340. Sagacity, 343. The part played by
association by similarity, 345. The intellectual contrast between
brute and man : association by similarity the fundamental human
distinction, 348. Different orders of human genius, 360.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT, 373

The diffusive wave, 373. Every sensation produces reflex
effects on the whole organism, 374.

CHAPTER XXIV.
INSTINCT, 383

Its definition, 383 Instincts not always blind or invariable,
389. Two principles of non -uniformity in instincts : 1) Their
inhibition by habits, 394 ; 2) Their transitoriness, 398. Man has

CONTENTS. V

PAGE

more instincts than any other mammal, 403. Reflex impulses,
404. Imitation, 408. Emulation, 409. Pugnacity, 409. Sym
pathy, 410. The hunting instinct, 411. Fear, 415. Acquisitive
ness, 422. Constructiveness, 426. Play, 427. Curiosity, 429.
Sociability and shyness, 430. Secretiveness, 432. Cleanliness,
434. Shame, 435. Love, 437. Maternal love, 439.

CHAPTEK XXV.

THE EMOTIONS, 442

Instinctive reaction and emotional expression shade imper
ceptibly into each other, 442. The expression of grief, 443 ; of
fear, 446 ; of hatred, 449. Emotion is a consequence, not the
cause, of the bodily expression, 449. Difficulty of testing this
view, 454. Objections to it discussed, 456. The subtler emotions,
468. No special brain-centres for emotion, 472. Emotional dif
ferences between individuals, 474. The genesis of the various
emotions, 477.

CHAPTER XXVI.

WILL, . . 486

Voluntary movements : they presuppose a memory of invol
untary movements, 487. Kinaesthetic impressions, 488. No need
to assume feelings of innervation, 503. The ' mental cue ' for a
movement may be an image of its visual or auditory effects as
well as an image of the way it feels, 518. Ideo motor action, 522.
Action after deliberation, 528. Five types of decision, 531. The
feeling of effort, 535. Unhealthiness of will : 1) The ex
plosive type, 537 ; 2) The obstructed type, 546. Pleasure and
pain are not the only springs of action, 549. All consciousness is
impulsive, 551. What we will depends on what idea dominates
in our mind, 559. The idea's outward effects follow from the
cerebral machinery, 560. Effort of attention to a naturally
repugnant idea is the essential feature of willing, 562. The
free-will controversy, 571. Psychology, as a science, can safely
postulate determinism, even if free-will be true, 576. The edu
cation of the Will, 579. Hypothetical brain-schemes, 582.

CHAPTER XXVII.

HYPNOTISM, , 594-616

Modes of operating and susceptibility, 594. Theories about
the hypnotic state, 596. The symptoms of the trance, 601.

vi CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXVIIL

PAOK

NECESSARY TRUTHS AND THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE, . 617

Programme of the chapter, 617. Elementary feelings are
innate, 618. The question refers to their combinations, 619.
What is meant by 'experience,' 620. Spencer on ancestral ex
perience, 620. Two ways in which new cerebral structure arises :
the 'back-door' and the 'front-door' way, 625. The genesis of
the elementary mental categories, 631. The genesis of the
natural sciences, 633. Scientific conceptions arise as accidental
variations, 636. The genesis of the pure sciences, 641. Series of
evenly increasing terms, 644. The principle of mediate compari
son, 645. That of skipped intermediaries, 646. Classification,
646. Predication, 647. Formal logic, 648. Mathematical
propositions, 652. Arithmetic, 653. Geometry, 656. Our doc
trine is the same as Locke's, 661. Relations of ideas v. couplings
of things, 663. The natural sciences are inward ideal schemes
with which the order of nature proves congruent, 666. Meta
physical principles are properly only postulates, 669. ^Esthetic
and moral principles are quite incongruent with the order of
nature, 672. Summary of what precedes, 675. The origin of
instincts, 678. Insufficiency of proof for the transmission to the
next generation of acquired habits, 681. Weismann's views, 683.
Conclusion, 688.

PSYCHOLOGY.

CHAPTER XVII.
SENSATION.

AFTEB inner perception, outer perception ! The next
three chapters will treat of the processes by which we cog
nize at all times the present world of space and the mate
rial things which it contains. And first, of the process
called Sensation.

SENSATION AND PEKCEPTION DISTINGUISHED.

The ivords Sensation and Perception do not carry very
definitely discriminated meanings in popular speech, and in
Psychology also their meanings run into each other. Both
of them name processes in which we cognize an objective
world; both (under normal conditions) need the stimula
tion of incoming nerves ere they can occur ; Perception
always involves Sensation as a portion of itself ; and Sensa
tion in turn never takes place in adult life without Percep
tion also being there. They are therefore names for dif
ferent cognitive functions, not for different sorts of mental
fact. The nearer the object cognized comes to being a
simple quality like 'hot,' 'cold,' 'red,' 'noise,' 'pain,' ap
prehended irrelatively to other things, the more the state
of mind approaches pure sensation. The fuller of relations
the object is, on the contrary ; the more it is something
classed, located, measured, compared, assigned to a func
tion, etc., etc.; the more unreservedly do we call the state
of mind a perception, and the relatively smaller is the part
in it which sensation plays.

Sensation, then, so long as we take the analytic point of

2 PSYCHOLOGY.

view differs from Perception only in the extreme simplicity of its
Meet or content* Its function is that of mere acquaintance
with a fact. Perception's function, on the other hand, is
knowledge about t a fact; and this knowledge admits of
numberless degrees of complication. But in both sensa
tion and perception we perceive the fact as an immediately
present outward reality, and this makes them differ from
•thought' and 'conception,' whose objects do not appeal-
present in this immediate physical way. From the physio-

* Some persons will say that we never have a really simple object or
content My definition of sensation does not require the simplicity to be
absolutely but only relatively, extreme. It is worth while in passing,
fowever^o warn the reader against a couple of inferences that are often
made One is that because we gradually learn to analyze so many quali
ties we ouzht to conclude that there are no really indecomposable feelings
i the mind The other is that because the processes that produce our sen
sations are multiple, the sensations regarded as subjective facts must also
Te compound. To take an example, to a child the taste of lemonade comes
at first as a simple quality. He later learns both that many stimuli and
manv nerves are involved in the exhibition of this taste to his mind, and
he also learns to perceive separately the sourness, the coolness, the sweet
the lemon aroma, etc., and the several degrees of strength of each and all
of these things.-the experience falling into a large number of aspects,
each of which is abstracted, classed, named, etc., and all of which appear
to be the elementary sensations into which the original 'lemonade flavor
is decomposed. It is argued from this that the latter never was tne simple
thing which it seemed. I have already criticised this sort of reasoning
in Chapter VI (see pp. 170 ff.). The mind of the child enjoying the simple
lemonade flavor and that of the same child grown up and analyzing it are
in two entirely different conditions. Subjectively considered, the two
states of mind are two altogether distinct sorts of fact. The later mental
state says ^this is the same flavor (or fluid) which that earlier state per
ceived as simple/but that does not make the two states themselves identical.
Tt is nothing but a case of learning more and more about the same topics
of discourse or things. -Many of these topics, however, must be confessed
to resist all analysis, the various colors for example. He who sees blue and
yellow 'in 'a certain green means merely that when green is confront.
with these other colors he sees relations of similarity. He who sees abstract
•color ' in it means merely that he sees a similarity between it and all the
other objects known as colors. (Similarity itself cannot ultimately be ac
counted for by an identical abstract element buried in all the similars, as
has been already shown, p. 492 ff .) He who sees abstract paleness, inten
sity, purity, in the green means other similarities still. These are all out
ward determinations of that special green, knowledges about it, zufalligeAn-
tichten, as Herbart would say, not elements of its composition. Compare
the article by Meinong in the Vierteljahrschrift filr wiss. Phil., xn. 324.
f See above, p. 221.

SENSATION. 3

logical point of view both sensations and perceptions differ from
1 thoughts ' (in the narrower sense of the word) in the fact that
nerve-currents coming in from tJie periphery are involved in their
production. In perception these nerve-currents arouse volumi
nous associative or reproductive processes in the cortex; but ivhen
sensation occurs alone, or with a minimum of perception, the ac
companying reproductive processes are at a minimum too.

I shall in this chapter discuss some general questions
more especially relative to Sensation. In a later chapter
perception will take its turn. I shall entirely pass by the
classification and natural history of our special * sensa
tions,' such matters finding their proper place, and being
sufficiently well treated, in all the physiological books.*

THE COGNITIVE FUNCTION OF SENSATION.

A pure sensation is an abstraction; and when we adults
talk of our ' sensations ' we mean one of two things : either
certain objects, namely simple qualities or attributes like
hard, hot, pain; or else those of our thoughts in which
acquaintance with these objects is least combined with
knowledge about the relations of them to other things. As
we can only think or talk about the relations of objects
with which we have acquaintance already, we are forced to
postulate a function in our thought whereby we first become
aware of the bare immediate natures by which our several
objects are distinguished. This function is sensation.
And just as logicians always point out the distinction
between substantive terms of discourse and relations found
to obtain between them, so psychologists, as a rule, are
ready to admit this function, of the vision of the terms or
matters meant, as something distinct from the knowledge
about them and of their relations inter se. Thought with
the former function is sensational, with the latter, intellec
tual. Our earliest thoughts are almost exclusively sensa
tional. They merely give us a set of thats, or its, of subjects

* Those who wish a fuller treatment than Martin's Human Body affords
may be recommended to Bernstein's * Five Senses of Man, 'in the Interna
tional Scientific Series, or to Ladd's or Wundt's Physiological Psychology.
The completest compendium is L. Hermann's Handbuch der Physiologic,
vol. m.

4 PSYCHOLOGY.

of discourse, with their relations not brought out. The first
time we see light, in Condillac's phrase we are it rather
rather than see it. But all our later optical knowledge is
about what this experience gives. And though we were
struck blind from that first moment, our scholarship in the
subject would lack no essential feature so long as our mem
ory remained. In training-institutions for the blind they
teach the pupils as much about light as in ordinary schools
Keflection, refraction, the spectrum, the ether-theory, etc.,
are all studied. But the best taught born-blind pupil of
such an establishment yet lacks a knowledge which the
least instructed seeing baby has. They can never show him
what light is in its ' first intention ' ; and the loss of that
sensible knowledge no book-learning can replace. All this
is so obvious that we usually find sensation * postulated '
as an element of experience, even by those philosophers who
are least inclined to make much of its importance, or to
pay respect to the knowledge which it brings.*

* " The sensations which we postulate as the signs or occasions of our
perceptions" (A. Seth: Scottish Philosophy, p. 89). "Their existence is
supposed only because, without them, it would be impossible to account
for the complex phenomena which are directly present in consciousness "
(J. Dewey: Psychology, p. 34). Even as great an enemy of Sensation as.
T. H. Green has to allow it a sort of hypothetical existence under protest.
" Perception presupposes feeling " (Contemp. Review, vol. xxxi. p. 747)»
Cf. also such passages as those in his Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 48, 49. —
Physiologically, the sensory and the reproductive or associative processes,
may wax and wane independently of each other. Where the part directly
due to stimulation of the sense-organ preponderates, the thought has a
sensational character, and differs from other thoughts in the sensational
direction. Those thoughts which lie farthest in that direction we call sen
sations, for practical convenience, just as we call conceptions those which
lie nearer the opposite extreme. But we no more have conceptions pure
than we have pure sensations. Our most rarefied intellectual states involve
some bodily sensibility, just as our dullest feelings have some intellectual
scope. Common-sense and common psychology express this by saying
that the mental state is composed of distinct fractional parts, one of which
is sensation, the other conception. We, however, who believe t!very
mental state to be an integral thing (p. 276) cannot talk thus, but must
speak of the degree of sensational or intellectual character, or function, oJ
the mental state. Professor Bering puts, as usual, his finger better upon
the truth than anyone else. Writing of visual perception, he says: "It
is inadmissible in the present state of our knowledge to assert that first
and last the same retinal picture arouses exactly the same pure sensation.

SENSATION. 0

But the trouble is that most, if not all, of those who
admit it, admit it as a fractional part of the thought, in the
old-fashioned atomistic sense which we have so often criti
cised.

Take the pain called toothache for example. Again
and again we feel it and greet it as the same real item in
the universe. We must therefore, it is supposed, have a
distinct pocket for it in our mind into which it and nothing
else will fit. This pocket, when filled, is the sensation of
toothache ; and must be either filled or half-filled whenever
and under whatever form toothache is present to our
thought, and whether much or little of the rest of the
mind be filled at the same time. Thereupon of course
comes up the paradox and mystery : If the knowledge of
toothache be pent up in this separate mental pocket, how
can it be known cum olio or brought into one view with
anything else ? This pocket knows nothing else ; no other
part of the mind knows toothache. The knowing of tooth
ache cum olio must be a miracle. And the miracle must
have an Agent. And the Agent must be a Subject or Ego
' out of time,' — and all the rest of it, as we saw in Chapter
X. And then begins the well-worn round of recrimination
between the sensationalists and the spiritualists, from which
we are saved by our determination from the outset to accept
the psychological point of view, and to admit knowledge
whether of simple toothaches or of philosophic systems as
an ultimate fact. There are realities and there are ' states
of mind,' and the latter know the former ; and it is just as
wonderful for a state of mind to be a ' sensation ' and know
a simple pain as for it to be a thought and know a system

but that this sensation, in consequence of practice and experience, is differ
ently interpreted the last time, and elaborated into a different perception
from the first. For the only real data are, on the one hand, the physical
picture on the retina, — and that is both times the same; and, on the other
hand, the resultant state of consciousness (ausgeloste Empjindungscomplex)
— and that is both times distinct. Of any third thing, namely, a pure sen
sation thrust between the retinal and the mental pictures, we know nothing.
We can then, if we wish to avoid all hypothesis, only say that the nervous appa
ratus reacts upon the same stimulus differently the last time from the first, and
that in consequence the consciousness is different too." (Hermann's Hdbch.,
ni. i. 567-8.)

6 PSYCHOLOGY.

of related things.* But there is no reason to suppose that
when different states of mind know different things about
the same toothache, they do so by virtue of their all con
taining faintly or vividly the original pain. Quite the re
verse. The by -gone sensation of my gout was painful, as
Keid somewhere says ; the thought of the same gout as by
gone is pleasant, and in no respect resembles the earlier
mental state.

Sensations, then, first make us acquainted with innu
merable things, and then are replaced by thoughts which
know the same things in altogether other ways. And
Locke's main doctrine remains eternally true, however
hazy some of his language may have been, that

" though there be a great number of considerations wherein things may
be compared one with another, and so a multitude of relations ; yet
they all terminate in, and are concerned about, those simple ideas f
either of sensation or reflection, which I think to be the whole materials
of all our knowledge. . . . The simple ideas we receive from sensation
and reflection are the boundaries of our thoughts ; beyond which, the
mind whatever efforts it would make, is not able to advance one jot ; nor
can it make any discoveries when it would pry into the nature and
hidden causes of those ideas." |

The nature and hidden causes of ideas will never be
unravelled till the nexus between the brain and conscious
ness is cleared up. All we can say now is that sensations
me first things in the way of consciousness. Before con
ceptions can come, sensations must have come ; but before
sensations come, no psychic fact need have existed, a nerve-
current is enough. If the nerve-current be not given,
nothing else will take its place. To quote the good Locke
again :

"It is not in the power of the most exalted wit or enlarged under
standing, by any quickness or variety of thoughts, to invent or frame

* Yet even writers like Prof. Bain will deny, in the most gratuitous
way, that sensations know anything. "It is evident that the lowest or
most restricted form of sensation does not contain an element of knowl
edge. The mere state of mind called the sensation of scarlet is not knowl
edge, although a necessary preparation for it. " ' Is not knowledge about
scarlet ' is all that Professor Bain can rightfully say.

f By simple ideas of sensation Locke merely means sensations.

j Essay c. H. U., bk. n. ch. xxm. § 29 ; ch. xxv. § 9.

SENSATION. 7

one new simple idea [i.e. sensation] in the mind. ... I would have
any one try to fancy any taste which had never affected his palate, or
frame the idea of a scent he had never smelt ; and when he can do this,
I will also conclude that a blind man hath ideas of colors, and a deaf
man true distinct notions of sounds." *

The brain is so made that all currents in it run one way.
Consciousness of some sort goes with all the currents, but
it is only when new currents are entering that it has the
sensational tang. And it is only then that consciousness
directly encounters (to use a word of Mr. Bradley 's) a real
ity outside itself.

The difference between such encounter and all concep
tual knowledge is very great. A blind man may know all
about the sky's blueness, and I may know all about your
toothache, conceptually ; tracing their causes from primeval
chaos, and their consequences to the crack of doom. But
so long as he has not felt the blueness, nor I the toothache,
our knowledge, wide as it is, of these realities, will be hollow
and inadequate. Somebody must feel blueness, somebody
must have toothache, to make human knowledge of these
matters real. Conceptual systems which neither began nor
left off in sensations would be like bridges without piers.
Systems about fact must plunge themselves into sensation
as bridges plunge their piers into the rock. Sensations are
the stable rock, the terminus a quo and the terminus ad quern
of thought. To find such termini is our aim with all our
theories — to conceive first when and where a certain sensa
tion may be had, and then to have it. Finding it stops dis
cussion. Failure to find it kills the false conceit of
knowledge. Only when you deduce a possible sensation
for me from your theory, and give it to me when and where
the theory requires, do I begin to be sure that your thought
has anything to do with truth.

Pure sensations can only be realized in the earliest days of life.
They are all but impossible to adults with memories and
stores of associations acquired. Prior to all impressions
on sense-organs the brain is plunged in deep sleep and con
sciousness is practically non-existent. Even the first weeks

* Op. cit. bk. ii. ch. ii. § 2.

8 PSYCHOLOGY.

after birth are passed in almost unbroken sleep by human
infants. It takes a strong message from the sense-organs to
break this slumber. In a new-born brain this gives rise to
an absolutely pure sensation. But the experience leaves
its ' unimaginable touch ' on the matter of the convolutions,
and the next impression which a sense-organ transmits
produces a cerebral reaction in which the awakened vestige
of the last impression plays its part. Another sort of feel
ing and a higher grade of cognition are the consequence ;
and the complication goes on increasing till the end of life,
no two successive impressions falling on ?,A identical brain,
and no two successive thoughts being exactly the same.
(See above, p. 230 ff.)

The first sensation which an infant gets is for him thz Uni
verse. And the Universe which he later comes to know is
nothing but an amplification and an implication of that first
simple germ which, by accretion on the one hand and in
tussusception on the other, has grown so big and complex
and articulate that its first estate is unrememberable. In
his dumb awakening to the consciousness of something there,
a mere this as yet (or something for which even the term
this would perhaps be too discriminative, and the intellec
tual acknowledgment of which would be better expressed
by the bare interjection ' lo ! '), the infant encounters an ob
ject in which (though it be given in a pure sensation) all
the * categories of the understanding ' are contained. It has
objectivity, unity, substantiality, causality, in the full sense in
ivhich any later object or system of objects has these things.
Here the young knower meets and greets his world ; and
the miracle of knowledge bursts forth, as Voltaire says, as
much in the infant's lowest sensation as in the highest
achievement of a Newton's brain. The physiological con
dition of this first sensible experience is probably nerve-
currents coming in from many peripheral organs at once.
Later, the one confused Fact which these currents cause to
appear is perceived to be many facts, and to contain many
qualities.* For as the currents vary, and the brain-paths

* " So far is it from being true that we necessarily have as many feel
ings in consciousness at one time as there are inlets to the sense then played
upon, that it is a fundamental law of pure sensation that each momentary

SENSATION. 9

are moulded by them, other thoughts with other * objects '
come, and the ' same thing ' which was apprehended as a
present this soon figures as a past that, about which many
unsuspected things have come to light. The principles of
this development have been laid down already in Chapters
XII and XIII, and nothing more need here be added to
that account.

"THE KELATIVITY OF KNOWLEDGE."

To the reader who is tired of so much Erkenntnisstheorie
I can only say that I am so myself, but that it is indispen
sable, in the actual state of opinions about Sensation, to try
to clear up just what the word means. Locke's pupils seek
to do the impossible with sensations, and against them we
must once again insist that sensations ' clustered together '
cannot build up our more intellectual states of mind.
Plato's earlier pupils used to admit Sensation's existence,
grudgingly, but they trampled it in the dust as something
corporeal, non-cognitive, and vile.* His latest followers

state of the organism yields but one feeling, however numerous may be its
parts and its exposures. ... To this original Unity of consciousness it makes
no difference that the tributaries to the single feeling are beyond the organ,
ism instead of within it, in an outside object with several sensible proper
ties, instead of in the living body with its several sensitive functions. . . .
The unity therefore is not made by ' association ' of several components;
but the plurality is formed by dissociation of unsuspected varieties within
the unity ; the substantive thing being no product of synthesis, but the
residuum of differentiation. " (J. Martineau : A Study of Religion (1888),
p. 193-4.) Compare also F. H. Bradley, Logic, book i. chap. n.

* Such passages as the following abound in anti -sensationalist literature:
*' Sense is a kind of dull, confused, and stupid perception obtruded upon
the soul from without, whereby it perceives the alterations and motions
within its own body, and takes cognizance of individual bodies existing
round about it, but does not clearly comprehend what they are nor pene
trate into the nature of them, it being intended by nature, as Plotinus speaks,
not so properly for knowledge as for the use of the body. For Ihe soul suf
fering under that which it perceives by way of passion cannot master or
Oonquer it, that is to say, know or understand it. For so Anaxagoras in Aris
totle very fitly expresses the nature of knowledge and intellection under
the notion of Conquering. Wherefore it is necessary, since the mind under
stands all things, that it should be free from mixture and passion, for this
find, as Anaxagoras speaks, that it may be able to master and conquer its
objects, that is to say, to know and understand them. In like manner Plo
tinus, in his book of Sense and Memory, makes to suffer and to be conquered
nil one, as also to know and to conquer; for which reason he concludes that

10 PSYCHOLOGY.

seem to seek to crowd it out of existence altogether. The
only reals for the neo-Hegelian writers appear to be rela
tions, relations without terms, or whose terms are only
speciously such and really consist in knots, or gnarls of
relations finer still in infinitum.

"Exclude from what we have considered real all qualities consti
tuted by relation, we find that none are left." "Abstract the many
relations from the one thing and there is nothing. . . . Without the
relations it would not exist at all." * "The single feeling is nothing

that which suffers doth not know. . . . Sense that suffers from external
objects lies as it were prostrate under them, and is overcome by them.
. Sense therefore is a certain kind of drowsy and somnolent percep
tion of that passive part of the soul which is as it were asleep in the body,
and acts concretely with it. ... It is an energy arising from the body and
a certain kind of drowsy or sleeping life of the soul blended together
with it. The perceptions of which compound, or of the soul as it were half
asleep and half awake, are confused, indistinct, turbid, and encumbered
cogitations very different from the energies of the noetical part, . . . which
are free, clear, serene, satisfactory, and awakened cogitations. That is to
say, knowledges." Etc., etc., etc. (R. Cudworth: Treatise concerning
Eternal and Immutable Morality, bk in. chap, n.) Similarly Male-
branche: "THEODORE.— Oh, oh, Ariste! God knows pain, pleasure, warmth,
and the rest. But he does not feel these things. He knows pain, since he
knows what that modification of the soul is in which pain consists. He
knows it because he alone causes it in us (as I shall presently prove), and he
knows what he does. In a word, he knows it because his knowledge has
no bounds. But he does not feel it, for if so he would be unhappy. To
know pain, then, is not to feel it. ARISTE.— That is true. But to feel it
is to know it, is it not ? THEODORE.— No indeed, since God does not feel
it in the least, and yet he knows it perfectly. But in order not to quibble
about terms, if you will have it that to feel pain is to know it, agree at least
that it is not to know it clearly, that it is not to know it by light and by
evidence— in a word, that it is not to know its nature; in other words and to
speak exactly, it is not to know it at all. To feel pain, for example, is to
feel ourselves unhappy without well knowing either what we are or what
is this modality of our being which makes us unhappy. . . . Impose silence
on your senses, your imagination, and your passions, and you will hear the
pure voice of inner truth, the clear and evident replies of our common mas
ter. Never confound the evidence which results from the comparison of
ideas with the liveliness of the sensations which touch and thrill you. The
livelier our sensations and feelings (sentiments) are, the more darkness do
they shed. The more terrible or agreeable are our phantoms, and the more
body and reality they appear to have, the more dangerous are they and fit
to lead us astray." (Entretiens sur la Metaphysique, 3me Entretien, ad
mil.} Malebranche's Theodore prudently does not try to explain how
God's 'infinite felicity ' is compatible with his not feeling joy.
* Green: Prolegomena, §§ 20, 28.

SENSATION. 11

real." "On the recognition of relations as constituting the nature of
vieas, rests the possibility of any tenable theory of their reality."

Such quotations as these from the late T. H. Green*
would be matters of curiosity rather than of importance,
were it not that sensationalist writers themselves believe in
a so-called 'Belativity of Knowledge,' which, if they only
understood it, they would see to be identical with Professor
Green's doctrine. They tell us that the relation of sensa
tions to each other is something belonging to their essence,
and that no one of them has an absolute content :

"That, e.g., black can only be felt in contrast to white, or at least
in distinction from a paler or a deeper black; similarly a tone or a sound
only in alternation with others or with silence; and in like manner a
smell, a taste, a touch, only, so to speak, in statu nascendi, whilst, when
the stimulus continues, all sensation disappears. This all seems at first
sight to be splendidly consistent both with itself and with the facts.
But looked at more closely, it is seen that neither is the case." t

* Introd. to Hume, §§ 146, 188. It is hard to tell just what this aposto
lic human being but strenuously feeble writer means by relation. Some
times it seems to stand for system of related fact. The ubiquity of the
4 psychologist's fallacy ' (see p. 196) in his pages, his incessant leaning on
the confusion between the thing known %the thought that knows it, and the
farther things known about that thing and about that thought by later and
additional thoughts, make it impossible to clear up his meaning. Compare,
however, with the utterances in the text such others as these: " The wak
ing of Self-consciousness from the sleep of sense is an absolute new begin
ning, and nothing can come within the ' crystal sphere ' of intelligence
except as it is determined by intelligence. What sense is to sense is noth
ing for thought. What sense is to thought, it is as determined by thought.
There can, therefore, be no 'reality 'in sensation to which the world of
thought can be referred." (Edward Caird's Philosophy of Kant, 1st ed.
pp. 393-4.) "When," says Green again, "feeling a pa"in or pleasure of
heat, I perceive it to be connected with the action of approaching the fire,
am I not perceiving a relation of which one constituent, at any rate, is a
simple sensation? TJie true answer is, No." "Perception, in its simplest
form . . . —perception as the first sight or touch of an object in which
nothing but what is seen or touched is recognized— neither is nor contains
sensation" (Conterap. Rev., xxxi. pp. 746, 750.) "Mere sensation is in
truth a phrase that represents no reality." " Mere feeling, then, as a mat.
ter unformed by thought, has no place in the world of facts, in the cosmos
of possible experience." (Prolegomena to Ethics, §§ 46, 50.)— I have ex
pressed myself a little more fully on this subject in Mind, x. 27 ff.

f Stumpf: Tonpsychologie, i. pp. 7, 8. Hobbes's phrase, sentire semper
idem et non sentire ad idem recidunt, is generally treated as the original state
ment of the relativity doctrine. J. S. Mill (Examn. of Hamilton, p. 6)

12 PSYCHOLOGY.

The two leading facts from which the doctrine of uni
versal relativity derives its wide-spread credit are these :

1) The psychological fact that so much of our actual
knowledge is of the relations of things — even our simplest
sensations in adult life are habitually referred to classes
as we take them in ; and

2) The physiological fact that our senses and brain must
have periods of change and repose, else we cease to feel and
think.

Neither of these facts proves anything about the
presence or non-presence to our mind of absolute quali
ties with which we become sensibly acquainted. Surely
not the psychological fact ; for our inveterate love of
relating and comparing things does not alter the intrin
sic qualities or nature of the things compared, or undo
their absolute givenness. And surely not the physio-.,
logical fact ; for the length of time during which we can
feel or attend to a quality is altogether irrelevant to the!
intrinsic constitution of the quality felt. The time, more
over, is long enough in many instances, as sufferers from
neuralgia know.* And the doctrine of relativity, not proved
by these facts, is flatly disproved by other facts even more
patent. So far are we from not knowing (in the words of
Professor Bain) " any one thing by itself, but only the dif
ference between it and another thing," that if this were true
the whole edifice of our knowledge would collapse. If all
we felt were the difference between the C and D, or c and d,
on the musical scale, that being the same in the two pairs
of notes, the pairs themselves would be the same, and lan
guage could get along without substantives. But Professor
Bain does not mean seriously what he says, and we need
spend no more time on this vague and popular form of the
doctrine, t The facts which seem to hover before the minds

and Bain (Senses and Intellect, p. 321; Emotions and Will, pp. 550, 570-2;
Logic, i. p. 2; Body and Mind, p. 81) are subscribers to this doctrine. Of.
also J. Miirs Analysis, J. S. Mill's edition, n. 11, 12.

* We can steadily hear a note for half an hour. The differences be
tween the senses are marked. Smell and taste seem soon to get fatigued.

f In the popular mind it is mixed up with that entirely different doc
trine of the ' Relativity of Knowledge ' preached by Hamilton and Spencer.
This doctrine says that our knowledge is relative to us, and is not of the

SENSATION. 13

of its champions are those which are best described under
the head of a physiological law.

THE LAW OF CONTBAST.

I will first enumerate the main facts which fall under
this law, and then remark upon what seems to me their sig
nificance for psychology.*

[Nowhere are the phenomena of contrast better exhib
ited, and their laws more open to accurate study, than in
connection with the sense of sight. Here both kinds —
simultaneous and successive — can easily be observed, for
they are of constant occurrence. Ordinarily they remain
unnoticed, in accordance with the general law of economy
which causes us to select for conscious notice only such
elements of our object as will serve us for aesthetic or prac
tical utility, and to neglect the rest ; just as we ignore the
double images, the mouches volantes, etc., which exist for
everyone, but which are not discriminated without careful
attention. But by attention we may easily discover the
general facts involved in contrast. We find that in general
the color and brightness of one object always apparently affect the
color and brightness of any other object seen simultaneously with
it or immediately after.

In the first place, if we look for a moment at any surface
and then turn our eyes elsewhere, the complementary color
and opposite degree of brightness to that of the first surface
tend to mingle them selves wilFTEe color and the brightness
of the second. This is successive contrast. It finds its ex
planation in the fatigue of the organ of sight, causing it to
respond to any particular stimulus less and less readily the
longer such stimulus continues to act. This is shown clearly
in the very marked changes which occur in case of contin
ued fixation of one particular point of any field. The field
darkens slowly, becomes more and more indistinct, and
finally, if one is practised enough in holding the eye per-

object as the latter is in itself. It has nothing to do with the question
which we have been discussing, of whether our objects of knowledge con
tain absolute terms or consist altogether of relations.

* What follows in brackets, as far as p. 27, is from the pen of my friend
and pupil Mr. E. B. Delabarre.

14 PSYCHOLOGY.

fectly steady, slight differences in shade and color may
entirely disappear. If we now turn aside the eyes, a nega
tive after-image of the field just fixated at once forms, and
mingles its sensations with those which may happen to
come from anything else looked at. This influence is dis
tinctly evident only when the first surface has been ' fixated '
without movement of the eyes. It is, however, none the
less present at all times, even when the eye wanders from
point to point, causing each sensation to be modified more
or less by that just previously experienced. On this ac
count successive contrast is almost sure to be present in
cases of simultaneous contrast, and to complicate the
phenomena.

A visual image is modified not only by other sensations just
previously experienced, but also by all those experienced simul
taneously with it, and especially by such as proceed from con
tiguous portions of the retina. This is the phenomenon of
simultaneous contrast. In this, as in successive contrast, both
brightness and hue are involved. A bright object appears
still brighter when its surroundings are darker than itself,
and darker when they are brighter than itself. Two colors
side by side are apparently changed by the admixture, with
each, of the complement of the other. And lastly, a gray
surface near a colored one is tinged with the complement
of the latter. *

The phenomena of simultaneous contrast in sight are so
complicated by other attendant phenomena that it is diffi-

* These phenomena have close analogues in the phenomena of contrast
presented by the temperature-sense (see W. Preyer in Archiv f. d. ges.
Phys., Bd. xxv. p. 79 ff.). Successive contrast here is shown in the fact
that a warm sensation appears warmer if a cold one has just previously
been experienced ; and a cold one colder, if the preceding one was warm.
If a finger which has been plunged in hot water, and another which has
been in cold water, be both immersed in lukewarm water, the same water
appears cold to the former finger and warm to the latter. In simultaneous
contrast, a sensation of warmth on any part of the skin tends to induce the
sensation of cold in its immediate neighborhood ; and vwe versa. This
may be seen if we press with the palm on two metal surfaces of about an
inch and a half square and three-fourths inch apart ; the skin between them
appears distinctly warmer. So also a small object of exactly the tempera
ture of the palm appears warm if a cold object, and cold if a warm object,
touch the skin near it,

SENSATION. 15

cult to isolate them and observe them in their purity. Yet
it is evidently of the greatest importance to do so, if one
would conduct his investigations accurately. Neglect of
this principle has led to many mistakes being made in
accounting for the facts observed. As we have seen, if the
eye is allowed to wander here and there about the field as
it ordinarily does, successive contrast results and allowance
must be made for its presence. It can be avoided only by
carefully fixating with the well-rested eye a point of one
field, and by then observing the changes which occur in
this field when the contrasting field is placed by its side.
Such a course will insure pure simultaneous contrast. But
even thus it lasts in its purity for a moment only. It
reaches its maximum of effect immediately after the intro
duction of the contrasting field, and then, if the fixation is
continued, it begins to weaken rapidly and soon disappears ;
thus undergoing changes similar to those observed when
any field whatever is fixated steadily and the retina becomes
fatigued by unchanging stimuli. If one continues still
further to fixate the same point, the color and brightness
of one field tend to spread themselves over and mingle with
the color and brightness of the neighboring fields, thus
substituting ' simultaneous induction ' for simultaneous con
trast.

Not only must we recognize and eliminate the effects of
successive contrast, of temporal changes due to fixation,
and of simultaneous induction, in analyzing the phenomena
of simultaneous contrast, but we must also take into account
various other influences which modify its effects. Under favor
able circumstances the contrast-effects are very striking,
and did they always occur as strongly they could not fail
to attract the attention. But they are not always clearly
apparent, owing to various disturbing causes which form no
exception to the laws of contrast, but which have a modi
fying effect on its phenomena. When, for instance, the
ground observed has many distinguishable features — a
coarse grain, rough surface, intricate pattern, etc. — the con
trast effect appears weaker. This does not imply that the
effects of contrast are absent, but merely that the resulting
sensations are overpowered by the many other stronger sen-

It) PSYCHOLOGY.

sations which entirely occupy the attention. On such a
ground a faint negative after-image— undoubtedly due to
retinal modifications— may become invisible ; and even
weak objective differences in color may become imper
ceptible. For example, a faint spot or grease-stain on
woollen cloth, easily seen at a distance, when the fibres are
not distinguishable, disappears when closer examination
reveals the intricate nature of the surface.

Another frequent cause of the apparent absence of con
trast is the presence of narrow dark intermediate fields, such
as are formed by bordering a field with black lines, or by the
shaded contours of objects. When such fields interfere with
the contrast, it is because black and white can absorb much
color without themselves becoming clearly colored ; and
because such lines separate other fields too far for them to
distinctly influence one another. Even weak objective
differences in color may be made imperceptible by such
means.

A third case where contrast does not clearly appear is
where the color of the contrasting fields is too weak or too in
tense, or where there is much difference in brightness between the
two fields. In the latter case, as can easily be shown, it is
the contrast of brightness which interferes with the color-
contrast and makes it imperceptible. For this reason con
trast shows best between fields of about equal brightness.
But the intensity of the color must not be too great, for then
its very darkness necessitates a dark contrasting field which
is too absorbent of induced color to allow the contrast to
appear strongly. The case is similar if the fields are too
light.

To obtain the best contrast-effects, therefore, the contrasting f
fields should be near together, should not be separated by shadowsj
or black lines, should be of homogeneous texture, and should be o/f
about equal brightness and medium intensity of color. Such!
conditions do not often occur naturally, the disturbing in
fluences being present in case of almost all ordinary objects,
thus making the effects of contrast far less evident. To
eliminate these disturbances and to produce the conditions
most favorable for the appearance of good contrast-effects,

SENSATION. 17

various experiments have been devised, which will be ex
plained in comparing the rival theories of explanation. ,\

There are two theories — the psychological and the physio
logical — which attempt to explain the phenomena of con
trast.

Of these the psychological one was the first to gain prom
inence. Its most able advocate has been Helmholtz. It explains
contrast as a DECEPTION OF JUDGMENT. In ordinary life our
sensations have interest for us only so far as they give
us practical knowledge. Our chief concern is to recognize
objects, and we have no occasion to estimate exactly their
absolute brightness and color. Hence we gain no facility
in so doing, but neglect the constant changes in their shade,
and are very uncertain as to the exact degree of their
brightness or tone of their color. When objects are near
one another " we are inclined to consider those differences
which are clearly and surely perceived as greater than
those which appear uncertain in perception or which must
be judged by aid of memory," * just as we see a medium-
sized man taller than he really is when he stands beside a
short man. Such deceptions are more easily possible in
the judgment of small differences than of large ones ;
also where there is but one element of difference instead of
many. In a large number of cases of contrast, in all
of which a whitish spot is surrounded on all sides by
a colored surface — Meyer's experiment, the mirror experi
ment, colored shadows, etc., soon to be described — the
contrast is produced, according to Helmholtz, by the fact
that " a colored illumination or a transparent colored cover
ing appears to be spread out over the field, and obser
vation does not show directly that it fails on the white
spot."t We therefore believe that we see the latter
through the former color. Now

" Colors have their greatest importance for us in so far as they are
properties of bodies and can serve as signs for the recognition of
bodies. . . . We have become accustomed, in forming a judgment in
regard to the colors of bodies, to eliminate the varying brightness and

* Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 392.
t Loc. cit. p. 407.

18 PSYCHOLOGY.

color of the illumination. We have sufficient opportunity to investigate
the same colors of objects in full sunshine, in the blue light of the clear
sky, in the weak white light of a cloudy day, in the reddish-yellow light
of the sinking sun or of the candle. Moreover the colored reflections
of surrounding objects are involved. Since we see the same colored
objects under these varying illuminations, we learn to form a correct
conception of the color of the object in spite of the difference in illumi
nation, i.e. to judge how such an object would appear in white illumi
nation ; and since only the constant color of the object interests us,
we do not become conscious of the particular sensations on which our
judgment rests. So also we are at no loss, when we see an object
through a colored covering, to distinguish what belongs to the color of
the covering and what to the object. In the experiments mentioned we
do the same also where the covering over the object is not at all colored,
because of the deception into which we fall, and in consequence of which
we ascribe to the body a false color, the color complementary to the
colored portion of the covering. " *

We think that we see the complementary color through
the colored covering, — for these two colors together would
give the sensation of white which is actually experienced.
If, however, in any way the white spot is recognized as an
independent object, or if it is compared with another ob
ject known to be white, our judgment is no longer deceived
and the contrast does not appear.

"As soon as the contrasting field is recognized as an independent
body which lies above the colored ground, or even through an ade
quate tracing of its outlines is seen to be a separate field, the contrast
disappears. Since, then, the judgment of the spatial position, the
material independence, of the object in question is decisive for the
determination of its color, it follows that the contrast-color arises not
through an act of sensation but through an act of judgment." f

In short, the apparent change in color or brightness
through contrast is due to no change in excitation of the
organ, to no change in sensation ; but in consequence of a
false judgment the unchanged sensation is wrongly inter
preted, and thus leads to a changed perception of the bright
ness or color.

In opposition to this theory has been developed one
h attempts to explain all cases of contrast as depend-

* LOG. cit. p. 408.
f Loc. cit. p. 406.

SENSATION. 19

ing purely on physiological action of the terminal apparatus of
vision. Hering is the most prominent supporter of this view.
By great originality in devising experiments and by insist
ing on rigid care in conducting them, he has been able to
detect the faults in the psychological theory and to practi
cally establish the validity of his own. Every visual sensa
tion, he maintains, is correlated to a physical process in the
nervous apparatus. Contrast is occasioned, not by a false
idea resulting from unconscious conclusions, but by the
fact that the excitation of any portion of the retina — and
the consequent sensation — depends not only on its own
illumination, but on that of the rest of the retina as well.

" If this psycho-physical process is aroused, as usually happens, by
light- rays impinging on the retina, its nature depends not only on the
nature of these rays, but also on the constitution of the entire nervous
apparatus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on the state
in which it finds itself." *

When a limited portion of the retina is aroused by ex
ternal stimuli, the rest of the retina, and especially the
immediately contiguous parts, tends to react also, and in
such a way as to produce therefrom the sensation of the
opposite degree of brightness and the complementary color
to that of the directly-excited portion. When a gray spot
is seen alone, and again when it appears colored through
contrast, the objective light from the spot is in both cases
the same. Helmholtz maintains that the neural process
and the corresponding sensation also remain unchanged, but
are differently interpreted ; Hering, that the neural process
and the sensation are themselves changed, and that the
* interpretation ' is the direct conscious correlate of the
altered retinal conditions. According to the one, the con
trast is psychological in its origin ; according to the other,
it is purely physiological. In the cases cited above where
the contrast-color is no longer apparent — on a ground with
many distinguishable features, on a field whose borders are
traced with black lines, etc., — the psychological theory, as
we have seen, attributes this to the fact that under these
circumstances we judge the smaller patch of color to be an

* E. Hering, in Hermann's Handbuch d. Physiologic, in. 1, p. 565.

20 PSYCHOLOGY.

independent object on the surface, and are no longer de
ceived in judging it to be something over which the color
of the ground is drawn. The physiological theory, on the
other hand, maintains that the contrast-effect is still pro
duced, but that the conditions are such that the slight
changes in color and brightness which it occasions become
imperceptible.

The two theories, stated thus broadly, may seem equally
plausible. Hering, however, has conclusively proved, by
experiments with after-images, that the process on one part
of the retina does modify that on neighboring portions,
under conditions where deception of judgment' is impossi
ble.* A careful examination of the facts of contrast will
show that its phenomena must be due to this cause. In all
the cases which one may investigate it will be seen that the up
holders of the psychological theory have failed to conduct their
experiments with sufficient care. They have not excluded
successive contrast, have overlooked the changes due to

* Hering : 'Zur Lehre vom Lichtsinne.' — Of these experiments the fol
lowing (found on p. 24 ff.) may be cited as a typical one : "From dark
gray paper cut two strips 3-4 cm. long and ^ cm. wide, and lay them on a
background of which one half is white and the other half deep black, in
such a way that one strip lies on each side of the border-line and parallel
to it, and at least 1 cm. distant from it. Fixate £ to 1 minute a point on
the border-line between the strips. One strip appears much brighter than
the other. Close and cover the eyes, and the negative after-image appears.
. . . The difference in brightness of the strips in the after-image is in gen
eral much greater than it appeared in direct vision. . . . This difference
in brightness of the strips by no means always increases and decreases with
the difference in brightness of the two halves of the background. ... A
phase occurs in which the difference in brightness of the two halves of
the background entirely disappears, and yet botfr after-images of the strips
are still very clear, one of them brighter and one darker than the back
ground, which is equally bright on both halves. Here can no longer be
any question of contrast-effect, because the conditio sine qua non of con
trast, namely, the differing brightness of the ground, is no longer pres
ent. This proves that the different brightness of the after-images of the
strips must have its ground in a different state of excitation of the corre
sponding portions of the retina, and from this follows further that botli
these portions of the retina were differently stimulated during the original
observation ; for the different after-effect demands here a different fore-
effect. . In the original arrangement, the objectively similar strips
appeared of different brightness, because both corresponding portions of
the retina were truly differently excited."

SENSATION. 21

steady fixation, and have failed to properly account for the
various modifying influences which have been mentioned
above. We can easily establish this if we examine the most
striking experiments in simultaneous contrast.

Of these one of the best known and most easily arranged
is that known as Meyer's experiment. A scrap of gray paper
is placed on a colored background, and both are covered
by a sheet of transparent white paper. The gray spot then
assumes a contrast-color, complementary to that of the
background, which shines with a whitish tinge through the
paper which covers it. Helmholtz explains the phenome
non thus :

" If the background is green, the covering-paper itself appears to be
of a greenish color. If now the substance of the paper extends without
apparent interruption over the gray which lies under it, we think that
we see an object glimmering through the greenish paper, and such an
object must in turn be rose-red, in order to give white light. If, how
ever, the gray spot has its limits so fixed that it appears to be an inde
pendent object, the continuity with the greenish portion of the surface
fails, and we regard it as a gray object which lies on this surface." *

The contrast-color may thus be made to disappear by
tracing in black the outlines of the gray scrap, or by plac
ing above the tissue paper another gray scrap of the same
degree of brightness, and comparing together the two grays.
On neither of them does the contrast-color now appear.

Hering t shows clearly that this interpretation is incor
rect, and that the disturbing factors are to be otherwise
explained. In the first place, the experiment can be so
arranged that we could not possibly be deceived into be
lieving that we see the gray through a colored medium.
Out of a sheet of gray paper cut strips 5 mm. wide in such
a way that there will be alternately an empty space and a
bar of gray, both of the same width, the bars being held to
gether by the uncut edges of the gray sheet (thus presenting
an appearance like a gridiron). Lay this on a colored back
ground — e.g. green — cover both with transparent paper,
and above all put a black frame which covers all the edges,
leaving visible only the bars, which are now alternately

* Helmholtz, Physiolog. Optik, p. 407.

f In Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 1 ff.

22 PSYCHOLOGY.

green and gray. The gray bars appear strongly colored
by contrast, although, since they occupy as much space as
the green bars, we are not deceived into believing that we
see the former through a green medium. The same is true
if we weave together into a basket pattern narrow strips of
green and gray and cover them with the transparent paper.

Why, then, if it is a true sensation due to physiological
causes, and not an error of judgment, which causes the
contrast, does the color disappear when the outlines of the
gray scrap are traced, enabling us to recognize it as an
independent object ? In the first place, it does not neces
sarily do so, as will easily be seen if the experiment is
tried. The contrast-color often remains distinctly visible
in spite of the black outlines. In the second place, there
are many adequate reasons why the effect should be modi
fied. Simultaneous contrast is always strongest at the
border-line of the two fields ; but a narrow black field now
separates the two, and itself by contrast strengthens the
whiteness of both original fields, which were already little
saturated in color ; and on black and on white, contrast-
colors show only under the most favorable circumstances.
Even weak objective differences in color may be made to
disappear by such tracing of outlines, as can be seen if we
place on a gray background a scrap of faintly- colored
paper, cover it with transparent paper and trace its out
lines. Thus we see that it is not the recognition of the
contrasting field as an independent object which interferes
with its color, but rather a number of entirely explicable
physiological disturbances.

The same may be proved in the case of holding above the
tissue paper a second gray scrap and comparing it with that
underneath. To avoid the disturbances caused by using
papers of different brightness, the second scrap should
be made exactly like the first by covering the same gray
with the same tissue paper, and carefully cutting a piece
about 10 mm. square out of both together. To thoroughly
guard against successive contrast, which so easily compli
cates the phenomena, we must carefully prevent all previ
ous excitation of the retina by colored light. This may be
done by arranging thus : Place the sheet of tissue paper

SENSATION. 23

on a glass pane, which rests on four supports ; under the
paper put the first gray scrap. By means of a wire, fasten
the second gray scrap 2 or 3 cm. above the glass plate.
Both scraps appear exactly alike, except at the edges
Gaze now at both scraps, with eyes not exactly accommo
dated, so that they appear near one another, with a very
narrow space between. Shove now a colored field (green)
underneath the glass plate, and the contrast appears at
once on both scraps. If it appears less clearly on the
upper scrap, it is because of its bright and dark edges, its
inequalities, its grain, etc. When the accommodation is
exact, there is no essential change, although then on the
upper scrap the bright edge on the side toward the light,
and the dark edge on the shadow side, disturb somewhat.
By continued fixation the contrast becomes weaker and
finally yields to simultaneous induction, causing the scraps
to become indistinguishable from the ground. Remove
the green field and both scraps become green, by succes
sive induction. If the eye moves about freely these last-
named phenomena do not appear, but the contrast continues
indefinitely and becomes stronger. When Helmholtz found
that the contrast on the lower scrap disappeared, it was
evidently because he then really held the eye fixed. This
experiment may be disturbed by holding the upper scrap
wrongly and by the differences in brightness of its edges,
or by other inequalities, but not by that recognizing of it
' as an independent body lying above the colored ground,'
on which the psychological explanation rests.

In like manner the claims of the psychological explana
tion can be shown to be inadequate in other cases of con
trast. Of frequent use are revolving disks, which are
especially efficient in showing good contrast-phenomena,
because all inequalities of the ground disappear and leave
a perfectly homogeneous surface. On a white disk are ar
ranged colored sectors, which are interrupted midway by
narrow black fields in such a way that when the disk is re
volved the white becomes mixed with the color and the
black, forming a colored disk of weak saturation on which
appears a gray ring. The latter is colored by contrast with

24 PSYCHOLOGY.

the field which surrounds it. Helmholtz explains the fact
thus :

" The difference of the compared colors appears greater than it really
is either because this difference, when it is the only existing one and
draws the attention to itself alone, makes a stronger impression than
when it is one among many, or because the different colors of the sur
face are conceived as alterations of the one ground-color of the surface
such as might arise through shadows falling on it, through colored
reflexes, or through mixture with colored paint or dust. In truth, to
produce an objectively gray spot on a green surface, a reddish coloring
would be necessary." *

This explanation is easily proved false by painting the
disk with narrow green and gray concentric rings, and giv
ing each a different saturation. The contrast appears
though there is no ground-color, and no longer a single dif
ference, but many. The facts which Helmholtz brings for
ward in support of his theory are also easily turned against
him. He asserts that if the color of the ground is too in
tense, or if the gray ring is bordered by black circles, the
contrast becomes" weaker; that no contrast appears on a
white scrap held over the colored field ; and that the gray
ring when compared with such scrap loses its contrast-color
either wholly or in part. Hering points out the inaccuracy
of all these claims. Under favorable conditions it is impos
sible to make the contrast disappear by means of black en
closing lines, although they naturally form a disturbing
element ; increase in the saturation of the field, if disturb
ance through increasing brightness-contrast is to be avoid
ed, demands a darker gray field, on which contrast-colors
are less easily perceived ; and careful use of the white scrap
leads to entirely different results. The contrast-color does
appear upon it when it is first placed above the colored
field; but if it is carefully fixated, the contrast-color di
minishes very rapidly both on it and on the ring, from causes
already explained. To secure accurate observation, all
complication through successive contrast should be avoided
thus : first arrange the white scrap, then interpose a gray
screen between it and the disk, rest the eye, set the wheel
in motion, fixate the scrap, and then have the screen re-

* Helmholtz, loc. cit. p. 412.

SENSATION. 25

moved. The contrast at once appears clearly, and its dis
appearance through continued fixation can be accurately
watched.

Brief mention of a few other cases of contrast must suf
fice. The so-called mirror experiment consists of placing
at an angle of 45° a green (or otherwise colored) pane of
glass, forming an angle with two white surfaces, one hori
zontal and the other vertical. On each white surface is a
black spot. The one on the horizontal surface is seen through
the glass and appears dark green, the other is reflected
from the surface of the glass to the eye, and appears by
contrast red. The experiment may be so arranged that we
are not aware of the presence of the green glass, but think
that we are looking directly at a surface with green and red
spots upon it ; in such a case there is no deception of judg
ment caused by making allowance for the colored medium
through which we think that we see the spot, and therefore
the psychological explanation does not apply. On exclud
ing successive contrast by fixation the contrast soon disap
pears as in all similar experiments.*

Colored shadows have long been thought to afford a con
vincing proof of the fact that simultaneous contrast is
psychological in its origin. They are formed whenever an
opaque object is illuminated from two separate sides by
lights of different colors. When the light from one source
is white, its shadow is of the color of the other light, and
the second shadow is of a color complementary to that of
the field illuminated by both lights. If now we take a tube,
blackened inside, and through it look at the colored shadow,
none of the surrounding field being visible, and then have
the colored light removed, the shadow still appears colored,
although ' the circumstances which caused it have disap
peared.' This is regarded by the psychologists as con
clusive evidence that the color is due to deception of judg
ment. It can, however, easily be shown that the persistence
of the color seen through the tube is due to fatigue of the
retina through the prevailing light, and that when the
colored light is removed the color slowly disappears as the

* See Hering : Archiv. f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 358 ff.

26 PSYCHOLOGY.

equilibrium of the retina becomes gradually restored. When
successive contrast is carefully guarded against, the simul
taneous contrast, whether seen directly or through the tube,
never lasts for an instant on removal of the colored field.
The physiological explanation applies throughout to all the
phenomena presented by colored shadows. *

If we have a small field whose illumination remains con
stant, surrounded by a large field of changing brightness,
an increase or decrease in brightness of the latter results
in a corresponding apparent decrease or increase respect
ively in the brightness of the former, while the large field
seems to be unchanged. Exner says :

' ' This illusion of sense shows that we are inclined to regard as con
stant the dominant brightness in our field of vision, and hence to refer
the changing difference between this and the brightness of a limited field
to a change in brightness of the latter."

The result, however, can be shown to depend not on
illusion, but on actual retinal changes, which alter the sen
sation experienced. The irritability of those portions of
the retina lighted by the large field becomes much reduced
in consequence of fatigue, so that the increase in brightness
becomes much less apparent than it would be without this
diminution in irritability. The small field, however, shows
the change by a change in the contrast-effect induced upon
it by the surrounding parts of the retina, t

The above cases show clearly that" physiological processes,
and not deception of judgment, are responsible for contrast of
color. To say this, however, is not to maintain that our
perception of a color is never in any degree modified by
our judgment of what the particular colored thing before us
may be. We have unquestionable illusions of color due to
wrong inferences as to what object is before us. Thus Von
Kries;|: speaks of wandering through evergreen forests cov
ered with snow, and thinking that through the interstices of
the boughs he saw the deep blue of pine-clad mountains, cov-

*Hering: Archiv f. d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XL. S. 172 ff. ; Delabarre r
American Jourual of Psychology, n. 636.

f Hering : Archiv f . d. ges. Physiol., Bd. XLI. S. 91 ff.
i D'e Gesichtsempfindungen u. ihre Analyse, p. 128.

SENSATION. 27

ered with snow and lighted by brilliant sunshine ; whereas
what he really saw was the white snow on trees near by,
lying in shadow]. *

Such a mistake as this is undoubtedly of psychological
origin. It is a wrong classification of the appearances,
due to the arousal of intricate processes of association
amongst which is the suggestion of a different hue from
that really before the eyes. In the ensuing chapters such
illusions as this will be treated of in considerable detail.
But it is a mistake to interpret the simpler cases of con
trast in the light of such illusions as these. These illu
sions can be rectified in an instant, and we then wonder
how they could have been. They come from insufficient
attention, or from the fact that the impression which we
get is a sign of more than one possible object, and can be
interpreted in either way. In none of these points do they
resemble simple color-contrast, which unquestionably is a
phenomenon of sensation immediately aroused.

I have dwelt upon the facts of color-contrast at such
great length because they form so good a text to comment
on in my struggle against the view that sensations are im
mutable psychic things which coexist with higher mental
functions. Both sensationalists and intellectualists agree
that such sensations exist. They fuse, say the pure sen
sationalists, and make the higher mental function ; they
are combined by activity of the Thinking Principle, say the
intellectualists. I myself have contended that they do not
exist in or alongside of the higher mental function when
that exists. The things which arouse them exist ; and the
^ \ higher mental function also knows these same things. But
just as its knowledge of the things supersedes and displaces
their knowledge, so it supersedes and displaces them,
when it comes, being as much as they are a direct result
ant of whatever momentary brain-conditions may obtain.
The psychological theory of contrast, on the other hand,
holds the sensations still to exist in themselves unchanged
before the mind, whilst the ' relating activity ' of the latter

* Mr. Delabarre's contribution ends here.

28 PSYCHOLOGY.

deals with them freely and settles to its own satisfaction
what each shall be, in view of what the others also are.
Wundt says expressly that the Law of Relativity is " not a
law of sensation but a law of Apperception ;" and the word
Apperception connotes with him a higher intellectual spon
taneity.* This way of taking things belongs with the phi
losophy that looks at the data of sense as something earth-
born and servile, and the * relating of them together' as
something spiritual and free. Lo ! the spirit can even
change the intrinsic quality of the sensible facts themselves
if by so doing it can relate them better to each other ! But
(apart from the difficulty of seeing how changing the sen
sations should relate them better) is it not manifest that
the relations are part of the ' content ' of consciousness,
part of the 'object,' just as much as the sensations are?
Why ascribe the former exclusively to the knower and the
latter to the known? The knower is in every case a unique
pulse of thought corresponding to a unique reaction of the
brain upon its conditions. All that the facts of contrast
show us is that the same real thing may give us quite
different sensations when the conditions alter, and that we
must therefore be careful which one to select as the thing's
truest representative.

There are many other fads beside the phenomena of contrast
which prove that ivhen two objects act together on us the
sensation which either would give alone becomes a different
sensation. A certain amount of skin dipped in hot water
gives the perception of a certain heat. More skin immersed
makes the heat much more intense, although of course the
water's heat is the same. A certain extent as well as in
tensity, in the quantity of the stimulus is requisite for any
quality to be felt. Fick and Wunderli could not distin
guish heat from touch when both were applied through a

* Physiol. Psych., i. 351, 458-60. The full inanity of the law of rela
tivity is best to be seen in Wundt's treatment, where the great ' allgemeinei'
Oesetz der Beziehung,' invoked 10 account for Weber's law as well as for
the phenomena of contrast and many other matters, can only be defined as
a tendency to feel all things in relation to each other! Bless its little soul!
But why does it change the things so, when it thus feels them in relation?

SENSATION. 29

hole in a card, and so confined to a small part of the skin.
Similarly there is a chromatic minimum of size in objects.
The image they cast on the retina must needs have a cer
tain extent, or it will give no sensation of color at all. In
versely, more intensity in the outward impression may
make the subjective object more extensive. This happens,
as will be shown in Chapter XIX, when the illumination
is .increased : The whole room expands and dwindles ac
cording as we raise or lower the gas-jet. It is not easy
to explain any of these results as illusions of judgment
due to the inference of a wrong objective cause for the sen
sation which we get. No more is this easy in the case of
Weber's observation that a thaler laid on the skin of the
forehead feels heavier when cold than when warm ; or of
Szabadfoldi's observation that small wooden disks when
heated to 122° Fahrenheit often feel heavier than those
which are larger but not thus warmed;* or of Hall's ob
servation that a heavy point moving over the skin seems
to go faster than a lighter one moving at the same rate of
speed, f

Bleuler and Lehmann some years ago called attention
to a strange idiosyncrasy found in some persons, and con
sisting in the fact that impressions on the eye, skin, etc.,
were accompanied by distinct sensations of sound.\ Colored
hearing is the name sometimes given to the phenomenon,
which has now been repeatedly described. Quite lately the
Viennese aurist Urbantschitsch has proved that these cases
are only extreme examples of a very general law, and that
all our sense-organs influence each other's sensations. §
The hue of patches of color so distant as not to be recog
nized was immediately, in U.'s patients, perceived when a
tuning-fork was sounded close to the ear. Sometimes, on
the contrary, the field was darkened by the sound. The
acuity of vision was increased, so that letters too far off to
be read could be read when the tuning-fork was heard.
Urbantschitsch, varying his experiments, found that their

* Ladd : Physiol. Psych., p. 348.

f Mind, x. 567.

| Zwangsmassige Lichtempfindung durch Schall (Leipzig, 1881).

§ Pfliiger's Archiv, XLII. 354

30 PSYCHOLOGY.

results were mutual, and that sounds which were on the
limits of audibility became audible when lights of various
colors were exhibited to the eye. Smell, taste, touch, sense
of temperature, etc., were all found to fluctuate when lights
were seen and sounds were heard. Individuals varied much
in the degree and kind of effect produced, but almost every
one experimented on seems to have been in some way
affected. The phenomena remind one somewhat of the
' dynamogenic ' effects of sensations upon the strength of
muscular contraction observed by M. Fere, and later to be
described. The most familiar examples of them seem to be
the increase of pain by noise or light, and the increase of
nausea by all concomitant sensations. Persons suffering in
any way instinctively seek stillness and darkness.

Probably every one will agree that the best way of for
mulating all such facts is physiological : it must be that the
cerebral process of the first sensation is reinforced or other
wise altered by the other current which comes in. No one,
surely, will prefer a psychological explanation here. Well,'
\ it s^em^jfco^nje^that^ all cases of mental reaction to a plural-
\ i tLHL s *'i ™ " ^ i mns Q>e_JjgeJl3jese_^^ the^ phy- >

| siological formulation is every where_the simplest and the
V best. When simultaneous red and green light make us see
yellow, when three notes of the scale make us hear a chord,
it is not because the sensations of red and of green and of
each of the three notes enter the mind as such, and there
' combine ' or ' are combined by its relating activity ' into
the yellow and the chord, it is because the larger sum of
light- waves and of air- waves arouses new cortical processes,
to which the yellow and the chord directly correspond.
Even when the sensible jg^ialities of things enter into the
objects of our highest thinking, it is surely the same? Their
several jsensations do not continue to exist there tucked
away. They are replaced by the HgFeFlhought jwhich,
although a different psychic unitTrom thm^ Trrmwa iliA
same sensible qualities which they know.

The principles laid down in Chapter VI seem then to
be corroborated in this new connection. You cannot build
up one thought or one sensation out of many; and only direct

SENSATION. 31

experiment can inform us of what we shall perceive when we
get many stimuli at once.

THE 'ECCENTRIC PROJECTION' OF SENSATIONS.

We often hear the opinion expressed that all our sensa
tions at first appear to us as subjective or internal, and are
afterwards and by a special act on our part ' extradited ' or
'projected' so as to appear located in an outer world.
Thus we read in Professor Ladd's valuable work that

" Sensations . . . are psychical states whose place — so far as they can
be said to have one— is the mind. The transference of these sensations
from mere mental states to physical processes located in the periphery
of the body, or to qualities of things projected in space external to the
body, is a mental act. It may rather be said to be a mental achievement
[cf. Cudworth, above, as to knowledge being conquering], for it is an act
which in its perfection results from a long and intricate process of de
velopment. . . . Two noteworthy stages, or 'epoch-making' achieve
ments in the process of elaborating the presentations of sense, require
a special consideration. These are ' localization,' or the transference
of the composite sensations from mere states of the mind to processes
or conditions recognized as taking place at more or less definitely fixed
points or areas of the body; and ' eccentric projection ' (sometimes called
4 eccentric perception ') or the giving to these sensations an objective
existence (in the fullest sense of the word * objective ') as qualities of
objects situated within a field of space and in contact with, or more or
less remotely distant from, the body." *

It seems to me that there is not a vestige of evidence for
this view. It hangs together with the opinion that our sen
sations are originally devoid of all spatial content, t an
opinion which I confess that I am wholly at a loss to under
stand. As I look at my bookshelf opposite I cannot frame
to myself an idea, however imaginary, of any feeling which
I could ever possibly have got from it except the feeling of

* Physiological Psychology, 385, 387. See also such passages as that in
Bain ; The Senses and the Intellect, pp. 364-6.

f ' ' Especially must we avoid all attempts, whether avowed or concealed,
to account for the spatial qualities of the presentations of sense by merely
describing the qualities of the simple sensations and the modes of their
combination. It is position and extension in space which constitutes the
very peculiarity of the objects as no longer mere sensations or affections of
the mind. As sensations, they are neither out of ourselves nor possessed of
the qualities indicated by the word spread-out." (Ladd, op. cit. p. 391.)

32 PSYCHOLOGY.

the same big extended sort of outward fact which I now
perceive. So far is it from being true that our first way of
feeling things is the feeling of them as subjective or men
tal, that the exact opposite seems rather to be the truth.
Our earliest, most instinctive, least developed kind of con
sciousness is the objective kind ; and only as reflection be
comes developed do we become aware of an inner world at
all. Then indeed we enrich it more and more, even to the
point of becoming idealists, with the spoils of the outer
world which at first was the only world we knew. But
subjective consciousness, aware of itself as subjective, does
not at first exist. Even an attack of pain is surely felt at
first objectively as something in space which prompts to
motor reaction, and to the very end it is located, not in the
mind, but in some bodily part.

"A sensation which should not awaken an impulse to move, nor
any tendency to produce an outward effect, would manifestly be use
less to a living creature. On the principles of evolution such a sensa
tion could never be developed. Therefore every sensation originally
refers to something external and independent of the sentient creature.
Rhizopods (according to Engeimann's observations) retract their pseudo-
podia whenever these touch foreign bodies, even if these foreign bodies
are the pseudopodia of other individuals of their own species, whilst
the mutual contact of their own pseudopodia is followed by no such
contraction. These low animals can therefore already feel an outer
world— even in the absence of innate ideas of causality, and probably
without any clear consciousness of space. In truth the conviction that
something exists outside of ourselves does not come from thought. It
comes from sensation; it rests on the same ground as our conviction of
our own existence. ... If we consider the behavior of new-born
animals, we never find them betraying that they are first of all con
scious of their sensations as purely subjective excitements. We far
more readily incline to explain the astonishing certainty with which
they make use of their sensations (and which is an effect of adaptation
and inheritance) as the result of an inborn intuition of the outer world.

. Instead of starting from an original pure subjectivity of sensa
tion, and seeking how this could possibly have acquired an objective
signification, wsmust, on the contrary, begin by the possession of objec
tivity by the sensation and then show how for reflective consciousness
the latter becomes interpreted as an effect of the object, how in short
the original immediate objectivity becomes changed into a remote
one."*

* A. Riehl: Der Philosophischer Kriticismus, Bd. n. Theil n. p. 64.

SENSATION. 33

Another confusion, much more common than the denial
of all objective character to sensations, is the assumption
that they are all originally located inside the body and are pro
jected outward by a secondary act. This secondary judg
ment is always false, according to M. Taine, so far as the
place of the sensation itself goes. But it happens to hit a
real object which is at the point towards which the sensation
is projected ; so we may call its result, according to this
author, a veridical hallucination.* The word Sensation, to

* On Intelligence, part n. bk. n. chap. n. §g vn, vm. Compare such
statements as these : "The consequence is that when a sensation has for
its usual condition the presence of an object more or less distant from our
bodies, and experience has once made us acquainted with this distance, we
shall situate our sensation at this distance. — This, in fact, is the case
with sensations of hearing and sight. The peripheral extremity of the
acoustic nerve is in the deep-seated chamber of the ear. That of the
optic nerve is in the most inner recess of the eye. But still, in our
present state, we never situate our sensations of sound or color in these
places, but without us, and often at a considerable distance from us. ...
All our sensations of color are thus projected out of our body, and clothe
more or less distant objects, furniture, walls, houses, trees, the sky, and the
rest. This is why, when we afterwards reflect on them, we cease to at
tribute them, to ourselves; they are alienated and detached from us, so far
as to appear different from us. Projected from the nervous surface in
which we localize the majority of the others, the tie which connected
them to the others and to ourselves is undone. . . . Thus, all our sensa
tions are wrongly situated, and the red color is no more extended on the
arm chair than the sensation of tingling is situated at my fingers' ends.
They are all situated in the sensory centres of the encephalon; all appear
situated elsewhere, and a common law allots to each of them its apparent
situation." (Vol. ii. pp. 47-53.) — Similarly Schopenhauer: "I will now
show the same by the sense of sight. The immediate datum is here
limited to the sensation of the retina which, it is true, admits of con
siderable diversity, but at bottom reverts to the impression of light
and dark with their shades, and that of colors. This sensation is
through and through subjective, that is, inside of the organism and
under the skin." (Schopenhauer: Satz vom Grunde, p. 58.) This philoso
pher then enumerates seriatim what the Intellect does to make the origi
nally subjective sensation objective: 1) it turns it bottom side up; 2) it
reduces its doubleness to singleness; 3) it changes its flatness to solidity; and
.x) it projects it to a distance from the eye. Again: "Sensations are
what we call the impressions on our senses, in so far as they come to our
consciousness as states of our own body, especially of our nervous
apparatus; we call them perceptions when we form out of them the repre
sentation of outer objects." (Helmholtz: Tonempfindungen, 1870, p. 101.)
—Once more : " Sensation is always accomplished in the psychic centres,
but it manifests itself at the excited part of the periphery. In other words,

34 PSYCHOLOGY,

begin with, is constantly, in psychological literature, used
as if it meant one and the same thing with the physical im
pression either in the terminal organs or in the centres,
which is its antecedent condition, and this notwithstanding
that by sensation we mean a mental, not a physical, fact.
But those who expressly mean by it a mental fact still
leave to it a physical place, still think of it as objectively
inhabiting the very neural tracts which occasion its appear
ance when they are excited ; and then (going a step farther)
they think that it must place itself where they place it, or be
subjectively sensible of that place as its habitat in the
first instance, and afterwards have to be moved so as to
appear elsewhere.

All this seems highly confused and unintelligible. Con- j
sciousness, as we saw in an earlier chapter (p. 214) canno, )
properly be said to inhabit any place. It has dynamic re
lations with the brain, and cognitive relations with every- j
thing and anything. From the one point of view we may
say that a sensation is in the same place with the brain (if
we like), just as from the other point of view we may say
that it is in the same place with whatever quality it may be
cognizing. But the supposition that a sensation primi- \1
tively/eeZs either itself or its object to be in the same place with \
the brain is absolutely groundless, and neither a priori
probability nor facts from experience can be adduced to
show that such a deliverance forms any part of the original
cognitive function of our sensibility.

Where, then, do we feel the objects of our original sensa
tions to be ?

Certainly a child newly born in Boston, who gets a sen
sation from the candle-flame which lights the bedroom, or
from his diaper-pin, does not feel either of these objects to

one is conscious of the phenomenon in the nervous centres, ... but one
perceives it in the peripheric organs. This phenomenon depends on the
experience of the sensations themselves, in which there is a reflection of
the subjective phenomenon and a tendency on the part of perception to
return as it were to the external cause which has roused the mental state
because the latter is connected with the former." (Sergi : Psychologic
Physiologique (Paris, 1888), p. 189.)-The clearest and best passage I know
is in Liebmaun: Der Objective Anblick (1869), pp, 67-72, but it is unfortu
nately too long to quote.

SENSATION. 35

be situated in longitude 72° W. and latitude 41° N. He
does not feel them to be in the third story of the house. He
does not even feel them in any distinct manner to be to the
right or the left of any of the other sensations which he
may be getting from other objects in the room at the same
time. He does not, in short, know anything about their
space-relations to anything else in the world. The flame
fills its own place, the pain fills its own place ; but as yet
these places are neither identified with, nor discriminated
from, any other places. That comes later. For the places
thus first sensibly known are elements of the child's space-
world which remain with him all his life ; and by memory
and later experience he learns a vast number of things about
those places which at first he did not know. But to the
end of time certain places of the world remain defined for
him as the places where those sensations ivere ; and his only
possible answer to the question where anything is will be to
say ' there,' and to name some sensation or other like those
first ones, which shall identify the spot. Space means but
the aggregate of all our possible sensations. There is no
duplicate space known aliunde, or created by an ' epoch-
making achievement ' into which our sensations, originally
spaceless, are dropped. They bring space and all its places
to our intellect, and do not derive it thence.

By his body, then, the child later means simply that place
where the pain from the pin, and a lot of other sensations
like it, were or are felt. It is no more true to say that he
locates that pain in his body, than to say that he locates his
body in that pain. Both are true : that pain is part of what
he means by the word body. Just so by the outer world the
child means nothing more than that place where the candle-
flame and a lot of other sensations like it are felt. He no
more locates the candle in the outer world than he locates
the outer world in the candle. Once again, he does both ;
for the candle is part of what he means by 'outer world.'

This (it seems to me) will be admitted, and will (I trust)
be made still more plausible in the chapter on the Percep
tion of Space. But the later developments of this percep
tion are so complicated that these simple principles get

36 PSYCHOLOGY.

easily overlooked. One of the complications comes from
the fact that things move, and that the original object which
we feel them to be splits into two parts, one of which re
mains as their whereabouts and the other goes off as their
quality or nature. We then contrast where they ivere with
where they are. If we do not move, the sensation of where
they ivere remains unchanged ; but we ourselves presently
move, so that that also changes ; and ' where they were '
becomes no longer the actual sensation which it was origi
nally, but a sensation which we merely conceive as possible.
Gradually the system of these possible sensations, takes
more and more the place of the actual sensations. ' Up '
and ' down ' become ' subjective ' notions ; east and west
grow more ' correct ' than ' right ' and ' left ' etc.; and things
get at last more ' truly ' located by their relation to certain
ideal fixed co-ordinates than by their relation either to
our bodies or to those objects by which their place was
originally denned. Now this revision of our original locali
zations is a complex affair; and contains some facts ivhich may
very naturally come to be described as translocations ivhereby
sensations get shoved farther off than they originally appeared.
1 Few things indeed are more striking than the change
able distance which the objects of many of our sensations
may be made to assume. A fly's humming may be taken
for a distant steam-whistle ; or the fly itself, seen out of
focus, may for a moment give us the illusion of a distant
bird. The same things seem much nearer or much farther,
according as we look at them through one end or another of
an opera-glass. Our whole optical education indeed is
largely taken up with assigning their proper distances to the
objects of our retinal sensations. An infant will grasp at the
moon ; later, it is said, he projects that sensation to a dis
tance which he knows to be beyond his reach. In the
much quoted case of the 'young gentleman who was born
blind,' and who was ' couched ' for the cataract by Mr.
Chesselden, it is reported of the patient that " when he first
saw, he was so far from making any judgment about dis
tances, that he thought all objects whatever touched his
eyes (as he expressed it) as what he felt did his skin."
And other patients born blind, but relieved by surgical op-

SENSATION. 37

eration, have been described as bringing their hand close
to their eyes to feel for the objects which they at first saw,
and only gradually stretching out their hand when they
found that no contact occurred. Many have concluded
from these facts that our earliest visual objects must seem
in immediate contact with our eyes.

But tactile objects also may be affected with a like am
biguity of situation.

If one of the hairs of our head be pulled, we are pretty
accurately sensible of the direction of the pulling by the
movements imparted to the head.* But the feeling of the
pull is localized, not in that part of the hair's length which
the fingers hold, but in the scalp itself. This seems con
nected with the fact that our hair hardly serves at all as a
tactile organ. In creatures with vibrissce, however, and in
those quadrupeds whose whiskers are tactile organs, it can
hardly be doubted that the feeling is projected out of the
root into the shaft of the hair itself. We ourselves have an
approach to this when the beard as a whole, or the hair as
a whole, is touched. We perceive the contact at some dis
tance from the skin.

When fixed and hard appendages of the body, like the
teeth and nails, are touched, we feel the contact where it
objectively is, and not deeper in, where the nerve-termina
tions lie. If, however, the tooth is loose, we feel two
contacts, spatially separated, one at its root, one at its
top.

From this case to that of a hard body not organically
connected with the surface, but only accidentally in contact
with it, the transition is immediate. With the point of a
cane we can trace letters in the air or on a wall just as with
the finger-tip ; and in so doing feel the size and shape of
the path described by the cane's tip just as immediately as,
without a cane, we should feel the path described by the
tip of our finger. Similarly the draughtsman's immediate\
perception seems to be of the point of his pencil, the sur-|

* This is proved by Weber's device of causing the head to be firmly
pressed against a support by another person, whereupon the direction of
traction ceases to be perceived.

38 PSYCHOLOGY.

geon's of the end of his knife, the duellist's of the tip of his
rapier as it plunges through his enemy's skin. When on
the middle of a vibrating ladder, we feel not only our feet
on the round, but the ladder's feet against the ground far
below, If we shake a locked iron gate we feel trie middle,
on which our hands rest, move, but we equally feel the sta
bility of the ends where the hinges and the lock are, and
we seem to feel all three at once.* And yet the place
where the contact is received is in all these cases the skin,
whose sensations accordingly are sometimes interpreted as
objects on the surface, and at other times as objects a long
distance off.

We shall learn in the chapter on Space that our feelings
of our own movement are principally due to the sensibility
of our rotating joints. Sometimes by fixing the attention,
say on our elbow-joint, we can feel the movement in the
joint itself; but we always are simultaneously conscious
of the path which during the movement our finger-tips
describe through the air, and yet these same finger-tips
themselves are in no way physically modified by the motion.
A blow on our ulnar nerve behind the elbow is felt both
there and in the fingers. Eefrigeration of the elbow pro
duces pain in the fingers/ Electric currents passed through
nerve-trunks, whether of cutaneous or of more special sen
sibility (such as the optic nerve), give rise to sensations
which are vaguely localized beyond the nerve-tracts
traversed. Persons whose legs or arms have been ampu
tated are, as is well known, apt to preserve an illusory
feeling of the lost hand or foot being there. Even when
they do not have this feeling constantly, it may be occa
sionally brought back. This sometimes is the result of
exciting electrically the nerve- trunks buried in the stump.

" I recently faradized," says Dr. Mitchell, " a case of disarticulated
shoulder without warning my patient of the possible result. 7 ''or two
years he had altogether ceased to feel the limb. As the current affected
the brachial plexus of nerves he suddenly cried aloud, ' Oh the hand,—
the hand ! ' and attempted to seize the missing member. The phantom

*Lotze: Med. Psych., 428-433; Lipps: Grundtatsachen des Seelenle
bens, 582.

SENSATION. 39

T had conjured up swiftly disappeared, but no spirit could have more
amazed the man, so real did it seem." *

Now the apparent position of the lost extremity varies.
Often the foot seems on the ground, or follows the position
of the artificial foot, where one is used. Sometimes where
the arm is lost the elbow will seem bent, and the hand in a
fixed position on the breast. Sometimes, again, the position
is non-natural, and the hand will seem to bud straight out
of the shoulder, or the foot to be on the same level with the
knee of the remaining leg. Sometimes, again, the position
is vague ; and sometimes it is ambiguous, as in another
patient of Dr. Weir Mitchell's who

"lost his leg at the age of eleven, and remembers that the foot by
degrees approached, and at last reached the knee. When he began to
wear an artificial leg it reassumed in time its old position, and he is
never at present aware of tha leg as shortened, unless for some time he
talks and thinks of the stump, and of the missing leg, when . . . the
direction of attention to the part causes a feeling of discomfort, and the
subjective sensation of active and unpleasant movement of the toes.
With these feelings returns at once the delusion of the foot as being
placed at the knee."

All these facts, and others like them, can easily be de
scribed as if our sensations might be induced by circum
stances to migrate from their original locality near the brain
or near the surface of the body, and to appear farther off ;
and (under different circumstances) to return again after
having migrated. But a little analysis of what happens
shows us that this description is inaccurate.

The objectivity with which each of our sensations originally
comes to us, the roomy and spatial character ivhich is a primi
tive part of its content, is not in the first instance relative to any
other sensation. The first time we open our eyes we get an
optical object which is a place, but which is not yet placed in
relation to any other object, nor identified with any place
otherwise known. It is a place with which so far we are
only acquainted. When later we know that this same place
is in ' front ' of us, that only means that we have learned
Something about it, namely, that it is congruent with that

* Injuries to Nerves (Philadelphia, 1872), p. 350 ff.

40 PSYCHOLOGY.

other place, called 'front,' which is given us by certain sen
sations of the arm and hand or of the head and body. But
at the first moment of our optical experience, even though
we already had an acquaintance with our head, hand, and
body, we could not possibly know anything about their
relations to this new seen object. It could not be immedi
ately located in respect of them. How its place agrees with
the places which their feelings yield is a matter of which
only later experience can inform us; and in the next
chapter we shall see with some detail how later experience
does this by means of discrimination, association, selection,
and other constantly working functions of the mind. When,
therefore, the baby grasps at the moon, that does not mean
that what he sees fails to give him the sensation which he
afterwards knows as distance ; it means only that he has
not learned at what tactile or manual distance things which ap
pear at that visual distance are.* And when a person just
operated for cataract gropes close to his face for far-off
objects, that only means the same thing. All the ordinary
optical signs of differing distances are absent from the poor
creature's sensation anyhow. His vision is monocular
(only one eye being operated at a time); the lens is gone,
and every thing is out of focus; he feels photophobia, lachry-
mation, and other painful resident sensations of the eyeball
itself, whose place he has long since learned to know in
tactile terms ; what wonder, then, that the first tactile reac
tion which the new sensations provoke should be one
associated with the tactile situation of the organ itself?
And as for his assertions about the matter, what wonder,
again, if, as Prof. Paul Janet says, they are still expressed
in the tactile language which is the only one he knows.
" To be touched; means for him to receive an impression with
out first making a movement." His eye gets such an
impression now ; so he can only say that the objects are
* touching it.'

" All his language, borrowed from touch, but applied to the objects
of his sight, make us think that he perceives differently from ourselves,

* In reality it probably means only a restless movement of desire, which
he might make even after he had become aware of his impotence to touch
the object.

SENSATION. 41

whereas, at bottom, it is only his different way of talking about the same
experience. " *

The other cases of translocation of our sensations are
equally easily interpreted without supposing any ' projec
tion ' from a centre at which they are originally perceived.
Unfortunately the details are intricate ; and what I say now
can only be made fully clear when we come to the next
chapter. We shall then see that we are constantly select
ing certain of our sensations as realities and degrading
others to the status of signs of these. When we get one of
the signs we think of the reality signified ; and the strange
thing is that then the reality (which need not be itself a
sensation at all at the time, but only an idea) is so interest
ing that it acquires an hallucinatory strength, which may
even eclipse that of the relatively uninteresting sign and en
tirely divert our attention from the latter. Thus the sen
sations to which our joints give rise when they rotate are
signs of what, through a large number of other sensations,
tactile and optical, we have come to know as the movement
of the whole limb. This movement of the whole limb is
what we think of when the joint's nerves are excited in that
way ; and its place is so much more important than the
joint's place that our sense of the latter is taken up, so to
speak, into our perception of the former, and the sensation
of the movement seems to diffuse itself into our very fingers
and toes. But by abstracting our attention from the sug
gestion of the entire extremity we can perfectly well per
ceive the same sensation as if it were concentrated in one
spot. We can identify it with a differently located tactile
and visual image of * the joint ' itself.

Just so when we feel the tip of our cane against the
ground. The peculiar sort of movement of the hand (im
possible in one direction, but free in every other) which
we experience when the tip touches 'the ground,' is a sign
to us of the visual and tactile object which we already

* Revue Philosophique, vii. p. 1 ff., an admirable critical article, in the
course of which M. Janet gives a bibliography of the cases in question.
See also Dunan: iMd. xxv. 165-7. They are also discussed and similarly
interpreted by T. K. Abbot : Sight and Touch (1864), chapter x.

42 PSYCHOLOGY.

know under that name. We think of 'the ground ' as being;
there and giving us the sensation of this kind of movement.
The sensation, we say, comes from the ground. The ground's
place seems to be its place ; although at the same time,
and for very similar practical reasons, we think of another
optical and tactile object, ' the hand ' namely, and consider
that us place also must be the place of our sensation. In
other words, we take an object or sensible content A, and
confounding it with another object otherwise known, B, or
with two objects otherwise known, B and C, we identify its
place with their places. But in all this there is no 'project
ing ' (such as the extradition-philosophers talk of) of A out
of an original place ; no primitive location which it first
occupied, away from these other sensations, has to be con
tradicted ; no natural ' centre,' from which it is expelled,
exists. That would imply that A aboriginally came to us
in definite local relations with other sensations, for to be
out of B and C is to be in local relation with them as much
as to be mthem is so. But it was no more out of B and C
than it was in them when it first came to us. It simply
had nothing to do with them. To say that we feel a sen
sation's seat to be ' in the brain ' or ' against the eye ' or
' under the skin ' is to say as much about it and to deal
with it in as non-primitive a way as to say that it is a mile
off. These are all secondary perceptions, ways of defining
the sensation's seat per aliud. They involve numberless
associations, identifications, and imaginations, and admit a
great deal of vacillation and uncertainty in the result.*

/ conclude, then, that there is no truth in the f eccentric pro
jection ' theory. It is due to the confused assumption that
the bodily processes which cause a sensation must also be
its seat, f But sensations have no seat in this sense. They

* The intermediary and shortened locations of the lost hand and foot in
the amputation cases also show this. It is easy to see why the phantom
foot might continue to follow the position of the artificial one. But I
confess that I cannot explain its half way -positions.

f It is from this confused assumption that the time-honored riddle
comes, of how, with an upside-down picture on the retina, we can see
things right-side up. Our consciousness is naively supposed to inhabit the

SENSATION. 43

become seats for each other, as fast as experience associates
them together ; but that violates no primitive seat possessed
by any one of them. And though our sensations cannot
then so analyze and talk of themselves, yet at their very
first appearance quite as much as at any later date are they
cognizant of all those qualities which we end by extracting
and conceiving under the names of objectivity, exteriority,
and extent. It is surely subjectivity and interiority which
are the notions latest acquired by the human mind. *

picture and to feel the picture's position as related to other objects of space.
But the truth is that the picture is non-existent either as a habitat or as any
thing else, for immediate consciousness. Our notion of it is an enormous
ly late conception. The outer object is given immediately with all those
qualities which later are named and determined in relation to other sensa
tions. The ' bottom ' of this object is where we see what by touch we
afterwards know as OUT feet, the ' top ' is the place in which we see what
we know as other people's heads, etc., etc. Berkeley long ago made this
matter perfectly clear (see his Essay towards a new Theory of Vision,
§§ 93-98, 113-118).

* For full justification the reader must see the next chapter. He may
object, against the summary account given now, that in a babe's immediate
field of vision the various things which appear are located relatively to each
other from the outset. I admit that if discriminated, they would appear so
located. But they are parts of the content of one sensation, not sensations
separately experienced, such as the text is concerned with. The fully de
veloped 'world,' in which all our sensations ultimately find location, is
nothing but an imaginary object framed after the pattern of the field of
vision, by the addition and continuation of one sensation upon another in
an orderly and systematic way. In corroboration of my text I must refer
to pp. 57-60 of RiehPs book quoted above on page 32, and to Uphues :
Wahrnehmung und Empfindung (1888), especially the Einleitung and
pp. 51-61.

CHAPTEK XVIII.

IMAGINATION.

Sensations, once experienced, modify the nervous organism,
%o that copies of them arise again in the mind after the orig
inal outward stimulus is gone. No mental copy, however,
can arise in the mind, of any kind of sensation which has
never been directly excited from without.

The blind may dream of sights, the deaf of sounds,
for years after they have lost their vision or hearing ; * but
the man born deaf can never be made to imagine what sound
is like, nor can the man born blind ever have a mental
vision. In Locke's words, already quoted, " the mind can
frame unto itself no one new simple idea." The originals
of them all must have been given from without. Fantasy, or
Imagination, are the names given to the faculty of repro
ducing copies of originals once felt. The imagination is
called * reproductive ' when the copies are literal ; * pro
ductive ' when elements from different originals are recom-
bined so as to make new wholes.

After-images belong to sensation rather than to imagi
nation ; so that the most immediate phenomena of imagi
nation would seem to be those tardier images (due to what
the Germans call Sinnesgeddchtniss) which were spoken of
in Vol. I, p. 647, — coercive hauntings of the mind by echoes
of unusual experiences for hours after the latter have taken
place. The phenomena ordinarily ascribed to imagination,
however, are those mental pictures of possible sensible

* Prof. Jastrow has ascertained by statistical inquiry among the blind
that if their blindness have occurred before a period embraced between the
fifth and seventh years the visual centres seem to decay, and visual dreams
and images are gradually outgrown. If sight is lost after the seventh
year, visual imagination seems to survive through life. See Prof. J. 's in
teresting article on the Dreams of the Blind, in the New Princeton Review
for January 1888.

44

IMAGINATION. 45

experiences, to which the ordinary processes of associa
tive thought give rise.

When represented with surroundings concrete enough
to constitute a date, these pictures, when they revive, form
recollections. We have already studied the machinery of
recollection in Chapter XVI. When the mental pictures
are of data freely combined, and reproducing no past com
bination exactly, we have acts of imagination properly
so called.

OUK IMAGES ABE USUALLY VAGUE.

For the ordinary * analytic ' psychology, each sensibly
discernible element of the object imagined is repre
sented by its own separate idea, and the total object
is imagined by a ' cluster ' or * gang ' of ideas. We have
seen abundant reason to reject this view (see p. 276 ff.). An
imagined object, however complex, is at any one moment
thought in one idea, which is aware of all its qualities to-
gether. If I slip into the ordinary way of talking, and
speak of various ideas * combining,' the reader will under
stand that this is only for popularity and convenience, and
he will not construe it into a concession to the atomistic
theory in psychology.

Hume was the hero of the atomistic theory. Not only
were ideas copies of original impressions made on the sense-
organs, but they were, according to him, completely ade
quate copies, and were all so separate from each other as
to possess no manner of connection. Hume proves ideas
in the imagination to be completely adequate copies, not
by appeal to observation, but by a priori reasoning, as fol
lows:

' ' The mind cannot form any notion of quantity or quality, without
forming a precise notion of the degrees of each,1' for "'tis confessed
that no object can appear to the senses ; or in other words, that no im
pression* can become present to the mind, without being determined in
its degrees both of quantity and quality. The confusion in which im
pressions are sometimes involved proceeds only from their faintness
and unsteadiness, not from any capacity in the mind to receive any im
pression, which in its real existence has no particular degree nor pro
portion. That is a contradiction in terms; and even implies the flattest

* Impression means sensation for Hume.

46 PSYCHOLOG T.

of all contradictions, viz. , that 'tis possible for the same thing both to
be and not to be. Now since all ideas are derived from impressions,
and are nothing but copies and representations of them, whatever is
true of the one must be acknowledged concerning the other. Impres
sions and ideas differ only in their strength and vivacity. The forego
ing conclusion is not founded on any particular degree of vivacity. It
-cannot therefore be affected by any variation in that particular. An
idea is a weaker impression ; and as a strong impression must neces
sarily have a determinate quantity and quality, the case must be the
same with its copy or representative." *

The slightest introspective glance will show to anyone
the falsity of this opinion. Hume surely had images of
his own works without seeing distinctly every word and
letter upon the pages which floated before his mind's eye.
His dictum is therefore an exquisite example of the way in
which a man will be blinded by a priori theories to the
most flagrant facts. It is a rather remarkable thing, too,
that the psychologists of Hume's own empiricist school
have, as a rule, been more guilty of this blindness than
their opponents. The fundamental facts of consciousness
have been, on the whole, more accurately reported by the
spiritualistic writers. None of Hume's pupils, so far as I
know, until Taine and Huxley, ever took the pains to con
tradict the opinion of their master. Prof. Huxley in his
brilliant little work on Hume set the matter straight in the
following words :

"When complex impressions or complex ideas are reproduced as
memories, it is probable that the copies never give all the details of the
originals with perfect accuracy, and it is certain that they rarely do so.
No one possesses a memory so good, that if he has only once observed
a natural object, a second inspection does not show him something that
he has forgotten. Almost all, if not all, our memories are therefore
sketches, rather than portraits, of the originals — the salient features
are obvious, while the subordinate characters are obscure or unrepre
sented.

"Now, when several complex impressions which are more or less
different from one another — let us say that out of ten impressions in
each, six are the same in all, and four are different from all the rest —
are successively presented to the mind, it is easy to see what must be
the nature of the result. The repetition of the six similar impressions
will strengthen the six corresponding elements of the complex idea,

* Treatise on Human Nature, part i. § YII.

IMAGINATION, 47

which will therefore acquire greater vividness ; while the four differing
impressions of each will not only acquire no greater strength than they
had at first, but, in accordance with the law of association, they will
all tend to appear at once, and will thus neutralize one another.

' ' This mental operation may be rendered comprehensible by consid
ering what takes place in the formation of compound photographs —
when the images of the faces of six sitters, for example, are each re
ceived on the same photographic plate, for a sixth of the time requisite
to take one portrait. The final result is that all those points in which
the six faces agree are brought out strongly, while all those in which
they differ are left vague ; and thus what may be termed a generic por
trait of the six, in contradistinction to a specific portrait of any one, is
produced.

' ' Thus our ideas of single complex impressions are incomplete in
one way, and those of numerous, more or less similar, complex im
pressions are incomplete in another way ; that is to say, they are gen
eric, not specific. And hence it follows that our ideas of the impres
sions in question are not, in the strict sense of the word, copies of those
impressions ; while, at the same time, they may exist in the mind in
dependently of language.

1 ' The generic ideas which are formed from several similar, but not
identical, complex experiences are what are called abstract or general
ideas ; and Berkeley endeavored to prove that all general ideas are
nothing but particular ideas annexed to a certain term, which gives
them a more extensive signification, and makes them recall, upon oc
casion, other individuals which are similar to them. Hume says that
he regards this as ' one of the greatest and the most valuable discover
ies that has been made of late years in the republic of letters,' and en
deavors to confirm it in such a manner that it shall be ' put beyond
all doubt and controversy. '

" I may venture to express a doubt whether he has succeeded in his
object ; but the subject is an abstruse one ; and I must content my
self with the remark, that though Berkeley's view appears to be largely
applicable to such general ideas as are formed after language has been
acquired, and to all the more abstract sort of conceptions, yet that gen
eral ideas of sensible objects may nevertheless be produced in the way
indicated, and may exist independently of language. In dreams, one
sees houses, trees, and other objects, which are perfectly recognizable as
such, but which remind one of the actual objects as seen ' out of the
corner of the eye,' or of the pictures thrown by a badly-focussed magic
lantern. A man addresses us who is like a figure seen in twilight ; or
we travel through countries where every feature of the scenery is vague ;
the outlines of the hills are ill-marked, and the rivers have no defined
banks. They are, in short, generic ideas of many past impressions of
men, hills, and rivers. An anatomist who occupies himself intently
with the examination of several specimens of some new kind of animal,
in course of time acquires so vivid a conception of its form and struc-

48 PSYCHOLOGY.

ture that the idea may take visible shape and become a sort of waking
dream. But the figure which thus presents itself is generic, not spe
cific. It is no copy of any one specimen, but, more or less, a mean of
the series ; and there seems no reason to doubt that the minds of chil
dren before they learn to speak, and of deaf-mutes, are peopled wifh
similarly generated generic ideas of sensible objects.1' *

Are Vague Images * Abstract Ideas ' ?
The only point which I am tempted to criticise in this
account is Prof. Huxley's identification of these generic images
with * abstract or general ideas ' in the sense of universal concep
tions. Taine gives the truer view. He writes :

"Some years ago I saw in England, in Kew Gardens, for the first
time, araucarias, and I walked along the beds looking at these strange
plants, with their rigid bark and compact, short, scaly leaves, of a
sombre green, whose abrupt, rough, bristling form cut in upon the fine
softly-lighted turf of the fresh grass-plat. If I now inquire what this
experience has left in me, I find, first, the sensible representation of an
araucaria ; in fact, I have been able to describe almost exactly the form
and color of the plant. But there is a difference between this represen
tation and the former sensations, of which it is the present echo. The
internal semblance, from which I have just made my description, is
vague, and my past sensations were precise. For, assuredly, each of
the araucarias I saw then excited in me a distinct visual sensation ;
there are no two absolutely similar plants in nature ; I observed perhaps
twenty or thirty araucarias ; without a doubt each one of them differed
from the others in size, in girth, by the more or less obtuse angles of its
branches, by the more or less abrupt jutting out of its scales, by the style
of its texture ; consequently, my twenty or thirty visual sensations were
different. But no one of these sensations has completely survived in its
echo ; the twenty or thirty revivals have blunted one another ; thus,
upset and agglutinated by their resemblance they are confounded
together, and my present representation is their residue only. This is
the product, or rather the fragment, which is deposited in us, when we
have gone through a series of similar facts or individuals. Of our
numerous experiences there remain on the following day four or five
more or less distinct recollections, which, obliterated themselves, leave
behind in us a simple colorless, vague representation, into which enter
as components various reviving sensations, in an utterly feeble, incom
plete, and abortive state. — But this representation is not the general and
abstract idea. It is but its accompaniment, and, if I may say so, the-
ore from which it is extracted. For the representation, though badly
sketched, is a sketch, the sensible sketch of a distinct individual. . . .
But my abstract idea corresponds to the whole class ; it differs, thenr
from the representation of an individual. — Moreover, my abstract idea

* Huxley's Hume, pp. 92-94.

IMAGINATION. 4&

is perfectly clear and determinate ; now that I possess it, I never fail
to recognize an araucaria among the various plants which may be shown
me ; it differs then from the confused and floating representation I have
of some particular araucaria." *

In other words, a blurred picture is just as much a single
mental fact as a sharp picture is ; and the use of either picture
by the mind to symbolize a whole doss of individuals is a new
mental function, requiring some other modification of con
sciousness than the mere perception that the picture is
distinct or not. I may bewail the indistinctness of my
mental image of my absent friend. That does not prevent
my thought from meaning him alone, however. And I may
mean all mankind, with perhaps a very sharp image of one
man in my mind's eye. The meaning is a function of the
more 'transitive' parts of consciousness, the 'fringe' of
relations which we feel surrounding the image, be the latter
sharp or dim. This was explained in a previous place (see
p. 473 ff., especially the note to page 477), and I would not
touch upon the matter at all here but for its historical
interest.

Our ideas or images of past sensible experiences may
then be either distinct and adequate or dim, blurred, and
incomplete. It is likely that the different degrees in which
different men are able to make them sharp and complete
has had something to do with keeping up such philosophic
disputes as that of Berkeley with Locke over abstract ideas.
Locke had spoken of our possessing ' the general idea of a,
triangle ' which " must be neither oblique nor rectangle,
neither equilateral, equicrural, nor scalenon, but all and
none of these at once." Berkeley says :

44 If any man has the faculty of framing in his mind such an idea of
a triangle as is here described, it is in vain to pretend to dispute him
out of it, nor would I go about it. All I desire is that the reader would
fully and certainly inform himself whether he has such an idea or no." f

Until very recent years it was supposed by all philoso-'
phers that there was a typical human mind which all indi- i
vidual minds were like, and that propositions of universal I
validity could be laid down about such faculties as ' the

* On Intelligence (N. Y.), vol. n. p. 139.

t Principles, Introd. § 13. Compare also the passage quoted above,
p. 469

50

PSYCHOLOGY.

Imagination.' Lately, however, a mass of revelations have '
poured in, which make us see how false a view this is.
There are imaginations, not 'the Imagination,' and they
must be studied in detail.

INDIVIDUALS DIFPEB IN IMAGINATION.

The first breaker of ground in this direction was Fechner,
in 1860. Feehner was gifted with unusual talent for sub
jective observation, and in chapter XLIV of his * Psychophy-
sik' he gave the results of a most careful comparison of his
own optical after-images, with his optical memory-pictures,
together with accounts by several other individuals of their
optical memory-pictures.* The result was to show a great

* The differences noted by Fechner between after-images and images
of imagination proper are as follows :

Imagination-images.

Feel subject to our spontaneity ;

Have, as it were, more body ;

Are blurred ;

Are darker than even the darkest
black of the% after-images ;

Have lively coloration ;

Incessantly disappear, and have to
be renewed by an effort of will.
At last even this fails to revive
them.

Can be exchanged at will for others.

Cannot violate the necessary laws of
appearance of their originals— e. g. ,
a man cannot be imagined from
in front and behind at once. The
imagination must walk round him,
so to speak ;

Are more easily had with open than
with shut eyes ;

Need not follow movements of head
or eyes.

The field is extensive in three dimen
sions, and objects can be imagined
in it above or behind almost as
easily as in front.

In imagining, the attention feels at
if drawn backwards towards th&
brain.

Feel coercive ;

Seem unsubstantial, vaporous ;

Are sharp in outline ;

Are bright ;

Are almost colorless ;

Are continuously enduring ;

Cannot be voluntarily changed.
Are exact copies of originals.

Are more easily got with shut than
with open eyes ;

Seem to move when the head or eyes
move ;

The field within which they appear
(with closed eyes) is dark, con
tracted, flat, close to the eyes, in
front, and the images have no
perspective ;

The attention seems directed for
wards towards the sense-organ, in
observing after-images

Finally, Fechner speaks of the impossibility of attending to both after.

IMAGINATION. 61

personal diversity. " It would be interesting," he writes,
" to work up the subject statistically ; and I regret that
other occupations have kept me from fulfilling my earlier
intention to proceed in this way."

1 echner's intention was independently executed by Mr.
Galton, the publication of whose results in 1880 may be
said to have made an era in descriptive Psychology.

" It is not necessary," says Galton, " to trouble the reader with my
early tentative steps. After the inquiry had been fairly started it took
the form of submitting a certain number of printed questions to a large
number of persons. There is hardly any more difficult task than that
of framing questions which are not likely to be misunderstood, which
admit of easy reply, and which cover the ground of inquiry. I did my
best in these respects, without forgetting the most important part of
all — namely, to tempt my correspondents to write freely in fuller ex
planation of their replies, and on cognate topics as well. These sepa
rate letters have proved more instructive and interesting by far than the
replies to the set questions.

" The first group of the ratbei long series of queries related to the
illumination, definition, and coloring of the mental image, and were
framed thus :

" l Before addressing yourself to any of the Questions on the opposite
page, think of some definite object — suppose it is your breakfast- table
as you sat down to it this morning— and consider carefully the picture
that rises before your mind's eye.

" ' 1. Illumination. — Is the image dim or fairly clear ? Is its bright
ness comparable to that of the actual scene ?

" * 2. Definition. — Are all the objects pretty well defined at the same
time, or is the place of sharpest definition at any one moment more con
tracted than it is in a real scene ?

" ' 3. Coloring. — Are the colors of the china, of the toast, bread-crust,
mustard, meat, parsley, or whatever may have been on the table, quite
distinct and natural ? '

" The earliest results of my inquiry amazed me. I had begun by
questioning friends in the scientific world, as they were the most likely
class of men to give accurate answers concerning this faculty of visual-

iinages and imagination -images at once, even when they are of the
object and might be expected to combine. All these differences are true of
Fechner ; but many of them would be untrue of other persons. I quote
them as a type of observation which any reader with sufficient patience
may repeat. To them may be added, as a universal proposition, that after-
images seem larger if we project them on a distant screen, and smaller If
we project them on a near one, whilst no such change takes place in mental
pictures.

-W5*trxJtov^l*4 W^ttvX fyptf'lf

* -i. - \ . I. .£.+** i~*i»4£^-i

0V PSYCHOLOGY.

izing, to which novelists and poets continually allude, which has left,
an abiding mark on the vocabularies of every language, and which,
supplies the material out of which dreams and the well-known halluci
nations of sick people are built.

'-To my astonishment, I found that the great majority of the men
of science to whom I first applied protested that mental imagery was
unknown to them, and they looked on me as fanciful and fantastic in
supposing that the words ' mental imagery ' really expressed what I
believed everybody supposed them to mean. They had no more notion
of its true nature than a color-blind man, who has not discerned his
defect, has of the nature of color. They had a mental deficiency of
which they were unaware, and naturally enough supposed that those
who affirmed they possessed it were romancing. To illustrate their
mental attitude it will be sufficient to quote a few lines from the letter
of one of my correspondents, who writes :

" * These questions presuppose assent to some sort of a proposition re
garding the "mind's eye," and the "images" which it sees. . . . This
points to some initial fallacy. ... It is only by a figure of speech that
I can describe my recollection of a scene as a " mental image " which
lean "see "with my "mind's eye." . . . I do not see it . . . anymore
than a man sees the thousand lines of Sophocles which under due
pressure he is ready to repeat. The memory possesses it,' etc.

' ' Much the same result followed inquiries made for me by a friend
among members of the French Institute.

" On the other hand, when I spoke to persons whom I met in gen
eral society, I found an entirely different disposition to prevail. Many
men and a yet larger number of women, and many boys and girls,
declared that they habitually saw mental imagery, and that it was-
perfectly distinct to them and full of color. The more I pressed and
crossed-questioned them, professing myself to be incredulous, the more
obvious was the truth of their first assertions. They described
their imagery in minute detail, and they spoke in a tone of surprise at
my apparent hesitation in accepting what they said. I felt that I my
self should have spoken exactly as they did if I had been describing a
scene that lay before my eyes, in broad daylight, to a blina man who
persisted in doubting the reality of vision. Reassured by this happier
experience, I recommenced to inquire among scientific men, and soon
found scattered instances of what I sought, though in by no means the
same abundance as elsewhere. I then circulated my questions more
generally among my friends and through their hands, and obtained re
plies . . . from persons of both sexes, and of various ages, and in the
end from occasional correspondents in nearly every civilized country.

" I have also received batches of answers from various educational
establishments both in England and America, which were made after
the masters had fully explained the meaning of the questions, and in
terested the boys in them. These have the merit of returns derived
from a general census, which my other data lack, because I cannot for

IMAGINATION. 53

a moment suppose that the writers of the latter are a haphazard pnv
portion of those to whom they were sent. Indeed I know of some who,
disavowing all possession of the power, and of many others who, pos
sessing it in too faint a degree to enable them to express what their
experiences really were, in a manner satisfactory to themselves, sent no
returns at all. Considerable statistical similarity was, however, ob
served between the sets of returns furnished by the schoolboys and
those sent by my separate correspondents, and I may add that they ac
cord in this respect with the oral information I have elsewhere obtained.
The conformity of replies from so many different sources which was
clear from the first, the fact of their apparent trustworthiness being on
the whole much increased by cross-examination (though I could give
one or two amusing instances of break-down), and the evident effort
made to give accurate answers, have convinced me that it is a much
easier matter than I had anticipated to obtain trustworthy replies to
psychological questions. Many persons, especially women and intelli
gent children, take pleasure in introspection, and strive their very best
to explain their mental processes. I think that a delight in self -dissec
tion must be a strong ingredient in the pleasure that many are said to
take in confessing themselves to priests.

" Here, then, are two rather notable results : the one is the proved
facility of obtaining statistical insight into the processes of other per
sons' minds, whatever a priori objection may have been made as to its
possibility ; and the other is that scientific men, as a class, have feeble
powers of visual representation. There is no doubt whatever on the
latter point, however it may be accounted for. My own conclusion is
that an over-ready perception of sharp mental pictures is antagonistic
to the acquirement of habits of highly-generalized and abstract thought,
especially when the steps of reasoning are carried on by words as
symbols, and that if the faculty of seeing the pictures was ever possessed
by men who think hard, it is very apt to be lost by disuse. The highest
minds are probably those in which it is not lost, but subordinated, and
is ready for use on suitable occasions. I am, however, bound to say
that the missing faculty seems to be replaced so serviceably by other
modes of conception, chiefly, I believe, connected with the incipient
motor sense, not of the eyeballs only but of the muscles generally, that
men who declare themselves entirely deficient in the power of seeing
mental pictures can nevertheless give lifelike descriptions of what they
have seen, and can otherwise express themselves as if they were gifted
with a vivid visual imagination. They can also become painters of the
rank of Royal Academicians* . . .

* [I am myself a good draughtsman, and have a very lively interest in
pictures, statues, architecture and decoration, and a keen sensibility to
artistic effects. But I am an extremely poor visualizer, and find myself
often unable to reproduce in my mind's eye pictures which I have most
carefully examined. — W. J.]

54 PSYCHOLOGY.

"It is a mistake to suppose that sharp sight is accompanied by clear
visual memory. I have not a few instances in which the independence
of the two faculties is emphatically commented on ; and I have at least
one clear case where great interest in outlines and accurate appreciation
of straightness, squareness, and the like, is unaccompanied by the
power of visualizing. Neither does the faculty go with dreaming. I
have cases where it is powerful, and at the same time where dreams
are rare and faint or altogether absent. One friend tells me that his
dreams have not the hundredth part of the vigor of his waking fancies.

tk The visualizing and the identifying powers are by no means nec
essarily combined. A distinguished writer on metaphysical topics as
sures me that he is exceptionally quick at recognizing a face that he
has seen before, but that he cannot call up a mental image of any face
With clearness.

" Some persons have the power of combining in a single perception
more than can be seen at any one moment by the two eyes. . . .

"I find that a few persons can, by what they often describe as a
kind of touch -sight, visualize at the same moment all round the image
of a solid body. Many can do so nearly, but not altogether round that
of a terrestrial globe. An eminent mineralogist assures me that he is
able to imagine simultaneously all the sides of a crystal with which he
is familiar. I may be allowed to quote a curious faculty of my own in
respect to this. It is exercised only occasionally and in dreams, or
rather in nightmares, but under those circumstances I am perfectly
conscious of embracing an entire sphere in a single perception. It ap
pears to lie within my mental eyeball, and to be viewed centripetally.

' ' This power of comprehension is practically attained in many cases
by indirect methods. It is a common feat to take in the whole sur
roundings of an imagined room with such a rapid mental sweep as to
leave some doubt whether it has not been viewed simultaneously. Some
persons have the habit of viewing objects as though they were partly
transparent ; thus, if they so dispose a globe in their imagination as to
see both its north and south poles at the same time, they will not be
able to see its equatorial parts. They can also perceive all the rooms of
an imaginary house by a single mental glance, the walls and floors being
as if made of glass. A fourth class of persons have the habit of recall
ing scenes, not from the point of view whence they were observed, but
from a distance, and they visualize their own selves as actors on the
mental stage. By one or other of these ways, the power of seeing the
whole of an object, and not merely one aspect of it, is possessed by
many persons.

"The place where the image appears to lie differs much. Most per
sons see it in an indefinable sort of way, others see it in front of the eye,
others at a distance corresponding to reality. There exists a power
which is rare naturally, but can, I believe, be acquired without much
difficulty, of projecting a mental picture upon a piece of paper, and of

IMAGINATION. 55

holding it fast there, so that it can be outlined with a pencil. To this
I shall recur.

"Images usually do not become stronger by dwelling on them; the
first idea is commonly the most vigorous, but this is not always the case.
Sometimes the mental view of a locality is inseparably connected with
the sense of its position as regards the points of the compass, real or
imaginary. I have received full and curious descriptions from very
different sources of this strong geographical tendency, and in one or
two cases I have reason to think it allied to a considerable faculty of
geographical comprehension.

" The power of visualizing is higher in the female sex than in the male,
and is somewhat, but not much, higher in public-school boys than in
men. After maturity is reached, the further advance of age does not
seem to dim the faculty, but rather the reverse, judging from numerous
statements to that effect; but advancing years are sometimes accom
panied by a growing habit of hard abstract thinking, and in these cases
— not uncommon among those whom I have questioned — the faculty
undoubtedly becomes impaired. There is reason to believe that it is very
high in some young children, who seem to spend years of difficulty in
distinguishing between the subjective and objective world. Language
and book-learning certainly tend to dull it.

"The visualizing faculty is a natural gift, and, like all natural gifts,
has a tendency to be inherited. In this faculty the tendency to inheri
tance is exceptionally strong, as I have abundant evidence to prove,
especially in respect to certain rather rare peculiarities, . . . which,
when they exist at all, are usually found among two, three, or more
brothers and sisters, parents, children, uncles and aunts, and cousins.

" Since families differ so much in respect to this gift, we may suppose
that races would also differ, and there can be no doubt that such is the
case. I hardly like to refer to civilized nations, because their natural
faculties are too much modified by education to allow of their being
appraised in an off-hand fashion. I may, however, speak of the French,
who appear to possess the visualizing faculty in a high degree. The
peculiar ability they show in prearranging ceremonials and fetes of all
kinds, and their undoubted genius for tactics and strategy, show that
they are able to foresee effects with unusual clearness. Their ingenuity
in all technical contrivances is an additional testimony in the same direc
tion, and so is their singular clearness of expression. Their phrase
' figurez-vous,' or ' picture to yourself ,' seems to express their dominant
mode of perception. Our equivalent of ' imagine ' is ambiguous.

"I have many cases of persons mentally reading off scores when
playing the pianoforte, or manuscript when they are making speeches.
One statesman has assured me that a certain hesitation in utterance
which he has at times is due to his being plagued by the image of his

56 PSYCHOLOGY.

manuscript speech with its original erasures and corrections. He can
not lay the ghost, and he puzzles in trying to decipher it.

44 Some few persons see mentally in print every word that is uttered;
they attend to the visual equivalent and not to the sound of the words,
and they read them off usually as from a long imaginary strip of paper,
such as is unwound from telegraphic instruments."

The reader will find further details in Mr. Galton's
'Inquiries into Human Faculty,' pp. 83-114.* I have
myself for many years collected from each and all of my
psychology-students descriptions of their own visual
imagination ; and found (together with some curious idio
syncrasies) corroboration of all the variations which Mr.
Galton reports. As examples, I subjoin extracts from two
cases near the ends of the scale. The writers are first cous
ins, grandsons of a distinguished man of science. The one
who is a good visualizer says :

" This morning's breakfast-table is both dim and bright; it is dim if
I try to think of it when my eyes are open upon any object; it is per
fectly clear and bright if I think of it with my eyes closed. —All the
objects are clear at once, yet when I confine my attention to any one
object it becomes far more distinct. — I have more power to recall color
than any other one thing: if, for example, I were to recall a plate deco
rated with flowers I could reproduce in a drawing the exact tone, etc.
The color of anything that was on the table is perfectly vivid. — There
is very little limitation to the extent of my images: I can see all four
sides of a room, I can see all four sides of two, three, four, even more
rooms with such distinctness that if you should ask me what was in any
particular place in any one, or ask me to count the chairs, etc. , I could
do it without the least hesitation.— The more I learn by heart the more
clearly do I see images of my pages. Even before I can recite the lines
I see them so that I could give them very slowly word for word, but
my mind is so occupied in looking at my printed image that I have no
idea of what I am saying, of the sense of it, etc. When I first found
myself doing this I used to think it was merely because I knew the lines
imperfectly; but I have quite convinced myself that I really do see an
image. The strongest proof that such is really the fact is, I think, the
following:

"I can look down the mentally seen page and see the words that
commence all the lines, and from any one of these words I can continue

* See also McCosh and Osborne, Princeton Review, Jan. 1884. There
are some good examples of high development of the Faculty in the London
Spectator, Dec. 28, 1878, pp. 1631, 1634, Jan. 4, 11, 25, and March 18, 1879.

IMAGINATION. 57

the line. I find this much easier to do if the words begin in a straight
line than if there are breaks. Example :

Etantfait

Tons

A des

Quefit

Ceres

Avec

Unfleur

Comme

(La Fontaine 8. iv.)"

The poor visualizer says :

" My ability to form mental images seems, from what I have studied
of other people's images, to be defective, and somewhat peculiar. The
process by which I seem to remember any particular event is not by a
series of distinct images, but a sort of panorama, the faintest impres
sions of which are perceptible through a thick fog.— I cannot shut my
eyes and get a distinct image of anyone, although I used to be able to a
few years ago, and the faculty seems to have gradually slipped away.
— In my most vivid dreams, where the events appear like the most real
facts, I am often troubled with a dimness of sight which causes the
images to appear indistinct.— To come to the question of the breakfast-
table there is nothing definite about it. Everything is vague. I can
not say what I see. I could not possibly count the chairs, but I happen
to know that there are ten. I see nothing in detail. — The chief thing is a
general impression that I cannot tell exactly what I do see. The color
ing is about the same, as far as I can recall it, only very much washed
out. Perhaps the only color I can see at all distinctly is that of the table
cloth, and I could probably see the color of the wall-paper if I could
remember what color it was."

A person whose visual imagination is strong finds it
hard to understand how those who are without the faculty
can think at all. Some people undoubtedly have no visual
images at aU worthy of the name* and instead of seeing their
breakfast-table, they tell you that they remember it or know
what was on it. This knowing and remembering takes

* Take the following report from one of my students : "I am unable
to form in my mind's eye any visual likeness of the table whatever. After
many trials, I can only get a hazy surface, with nothing on it or about it.
I can see no variety in color, and no positive limitations in extent, while I
cannot see whaf T see well enough to determine its position in respect to
my eye, or to endow it with any quality of size. I am in the same position
as to the word dog. I cannot see it in my mind's eye at all ; and so cannot
tell whether I should have to run my eye along it, if I did see it. "

58 PSYCHOLOGY.

place undoubtedly by means of verbal images, as was ex
plained already in Chapter IX, pp. 265-6.

The study of Aphasia (see p. 54) has of late years shown
how unexpectedly great are the differences between individuals in
respect of imagination. And at the same time the discrepan
cies between lesion and symptom in different cases of
the disease have been largely cleared up. In some indi-1
viduals the habitual ' thought-stuff,' if one may so call it, j
is visual ; in others it is auditory, articulatory, or motor ; 1
in most, perhaps, it is evenly mixed. The same local cerebral
injury must needs work different practical results in per
sons who differ in this way. In one it will throw a much-
used brain-tract out of gear ; in the other it may affect an
unimportant region. A particularly instructive case was
published by Charcot in 1883.* The patient was

Mr. X., a merchant, born in Vienna, highly educated, master of
German, Spanish, French, Greek, and Latin. Up to the beginning of
the malady which took him to Professor Charcot, he read Homer at
sight. He could, starting from any verse out of the first book of the
Iliad, repeat the following verses without hesitating, by heart. Virgil
and Horace were familiar. He also knew enough of modern Greek for
business purposes. Up to within a year (from the time Charcot saw
him) he enjoyed an exceptional visual memory. He no sooner thought
of persons or things, but features, forms, and colors arose with the
same clearness, sharpness, and accuracy as if the objects stood before
him. When he tried to recall a fact or a figure in his voluminous
polyglot correspondence, the letters themselves appeared before him
with their entire content, irregularities, erasures and all. At school he
recited from a mentally seen page which he read off line by line and
letter by letter. In making computations, he ran his mental eye down
imaginary columns of figures, and performed in this way the most
varied operations of arithmetic. He could never think of a passage in
a play without the entire scene, stage, actors, and audience appearing
to him. He had been a great traveller. Being a good draughtsman,
he used to sketch views which pleased him; and his memory always
brought back the entire landscape exactly. If he thought of a conver
sation, a saying, an engagement, the place, the people, the entire scene
rose before his mind.

His auditory memory was always deficient, or at least secondary
He had no taste for music.

* Progres Medical, 21 juillet. I abridge from the German report ot
the case in Wilbrand: Die Seelenblindheit (1887).

LdAUlNATION. 59

A year aud a half previous to examination, after business-anxieties,
loss of sleep, appetite, etc., he noticed suddenly one day an extraordi
nary change in himself. After complete confusion, there came a violent
contrast between his old and his new state. Everything about him
seemed so new and foreign that at first he thought he must be going
mad. He was nervous and irritable. Although he saw all things dis
tinct, he had entirely lost his memory for forms and colors. On ascer
taining this, he became reassured as to his sanity. He soon discovered
that he could carry on his affairs by using his memory in an altogether
new way. He can now describe clearly the difference between his two
conditions.

Every time he returns to A., from which place business often calls
him, he seems to himself as if entering a strange city. He views the
monuments, houses, and streets with the same surprise as if he saw
them for the first time. Gradually, however, his memory returns, and
he finds himself at home again. When asked to describe the principal
public place of the town, he answered, " I know that it is there, but it
is impossible to imagine it, and I can tell you nothing about it. " He has
often drawn the port of A. To-day he vainly tries to trace its principal
outlines. Asked to draw a minaret, he reflects, says it is a square
tower, and draws, rudely, four lines, one for ground, one for top, and
two for sides. Asked to draw an arcade, he says, ' ' I remember that it
contains semi-circular arches, and that two of them meeting at an angle
make a vault, but how it looks I am absolutely unable to imagine." The
profile of a man which he drew by request was as if drawn by a little
child; and yet he confessed that he had been helped to draw it by look
ing at the bystanders. Similarly he drew a shapeless scribble for a
tree.

He can no more remember his wife's and children's faces than he
can remember the port of A. Even after being with them some time
they seem unusual to him. He forgets his own face, and once spoke
to his image in a mirror, taking it for a stranger. He complains of his
loss of feeling for colors. " My wife has black hair, this I know; but
I can no more recall its color than I can her person and features.'*
This visual amnesia extends to dating objects from his childhood's
years — paternal mansion, etc., forgotten.

No other disturbances but this loss of visual images. Now when he
seeks something in his correspondence, he must rummage among the
letters like other men, until he meets the passage. He can recall only
the first few verses of the Iliad, and must grope to read Homer, Virgil,
and Horace. Figures which he adds he must now whisper to himself.
He realizes clearly that he must help his memory out with auditory
images, which he does with effort. The words and expressions which
he recalls seem now to echo in his ear, an altogether novel sensation for
him. If he wishes to learn by heart anything, a series of phrases for
example, he must read them several times aloud, so as to impress his
ear. When later he repeats the thing in question, the sensation of in-

60 PSYCHOLOGY.

ward hearing which precedes articulation rises up in his mind. This
feeling was formerly unknown to him. He speaks French fluently; but
affirms that he can no longer think in French; but must get his French
words by translating them from Spanish or German, the languages of
his childhood. He dreams no more in visual terms, but only in words,
usually Spanish words. A certain degree of verbal blindness affects
him— he is troubled by the Greek alphabet, etc.*

If this patient had possessed the auditory type of imag
ination from the start, it is evident that the injury, what
ever it was, to his centres for optical imagination, would
have affected his practical life much less profoundly.

u The auditory type" says M. A. Binet,f " appears to be rarer than
the visual. Persons of this type imagine what they think of in the
language of sound. In order to remember a lesson they impress upon
their mind, not the look of the page, but the sound of the words.
They reason, as well as remember, by ear. In performing a mental ad
dition they repeat verbally the names of the figures, and add, as it
were, the sounds, without any thought of the graphic signs. Imag
ination also takes the auditory form. 'When I write a scene,' said
Legouve to Scribe, ' I hear ; but you see. In each phrase which I write,
the voice of tiie personage who speaks strikes my ear. Vous, qui etes le
theatre meme, your actors walk, gesticulate before your eyes ; I am a
listener, you a spectator.'— ' Nothing more true,1 said Scribe ; ' do you
know where I am when I write a piece ? In the middle of the parterre.'
It is clear that the pure audile, seeking to develop only a single one of
his faculties, may, like the pure visualizer, perform astounding feats
of memory— Mozart, for example, noting from memory the Miserere of
the Sistine Chapel after two hearings ; the deaf Beethoven, composing
and inwardly repeating his enormous symphonies. On the other hand,
the man of auditory type, like the visual, is exposed to serious dangers ;
for if he lose his auditory images, he is without resource and breaks
do"Wn completely.

" It is possible that persons with hallucinations of hearing, and in-

* In a letter to Charcot this interesting patient adds that his character
also is changed : "I was formerly receptive, easily made enthusiastic, and
possessed a rich fancy. Now I am quiet and cold, and fancy never carries
my thoughts away. ... I am much less susceptible than formerly to
anger »r sorrow. I lately lost my dearly-beloved mother; but felt far less
grief at the bereavement than if I had been able to see in my mind's eye
her physiognomy and the phases of her suffering, and especially less than
if 1 had been able to witness in imagination the outward effects of her un
timely loss upon the members of the family. "
f Psychologie du Raisonneinent (1886), p. 25.

IMAGINATION. 61

dividuals afflicted with the mania that they are victims of persecution,
may all belong to the auditory type ; and that the predominance of a
certain kind of imagination may predispose to a certain order of hal
lucinations, and perhaps of delirium.

: The motor type remains — perhaps the most interesting of all,
and certainly the one of which least is known. Persons who belong to
this type [les moteurs, in French, motiles, as Mr. Galton proposes to
call them in English] make use, in memory, reasoning, and all their
intellectual operations, of images derived from movement. In order to
understand this important point, it is enough to remember that ' all
our perceptions, and in particular the important ones, those of sight
and touch, contain as integral elements the movements of our eyes and
limbs ; and that, if movement is ever an essential factor in our really
seeing an object, it must be an equally essential factor when we see the
same object in imagination ' (Ribot).* For example, the complex im
pression of a ball, which is there, in our hand, is the resultant of optical
impressions of touch, of muscular adjustments of the eye, of the move
ments of our fingers, and of the muscular sensations which these yield.
When we imagine the ball, its idea must include the images of these
muscular sensations, just as it includes those of the retinal and epider
mal sensations. They form so many motor images. If they were not
earlier recognized to exist, that is because our knowledge of the muscu
lar sense is relatively so recent. In older psychologies it never was
mentioned, the number of senses being restricted to five.

' ' There are persons who remember a drawing better when they have
followed its outlines with their finger. Lecoq de Boisbaudran used this
means in his artistic teaching, in order to accustom his pupils to draw
from memory. He made them follow the outlines of figures with a
pencil held in the air, forcing them thus to associate muscular with
visual memory. Galton quotes a curious corroborative fact. Colonel
Moncrieff often observed in North America young Indians who, visit
ing occasionally his quarters, interested themselves greatly in the
engravings which were shown them. One of them followed with care
with the point of his knife the outline of a drawing in the Illustrated
London News, saying that this was to enable him to carve it out the
better on his return home. In this case the motor images were to

* [I am myself a very poor visualizer, and find that I can seldom call to
mind even a single letter of the alphabet in purely retinal terms. I must
trace the letter by running my mental eye over its contour in order that
the image of it shall have any distinctness at all. On questioning a large
number of other people, mostly students, I find that perhaps half of them
say they have no such difficulty in seeing letters mentally. Many affirm
that they can see an entire word at once, especially a short one like ' dog,'
with no such feeling of creating the letters successively by tracing them
with the eye.— W. J.]

62 PSYCHOLOGY.

reinforce the visual ones. The young savage was a motor* . . . When
one's motor images are destroyed, one loses one's remembrance of move
ments, and sometimes, more curiously still, one loses the power of exe
cuting them. Pathology gives us examples in motor aphasia, agraphia,
etc. Take the case of agraphia. An educated man, knowing how to
write, suddenly loses this power, as a result of cerebral injury. His
hand and arm are in no way paralytic, yet he cannot write. Whence
this loss of power ? He tells us himself : he no longer knows how. He
has forgotten how to set about it to trace the letters, he has lost the
memory of the movements to be executed, he has no longer the motor
images which, when formerly he wrote, directed his hand. . . . Other
patients, affected with word-blindness, resort to these motor images
precisely to make amends for their other deficiency. . . . An individ
ual affected in this way cannot read letters which are placed before his
eyes, even although his sight be good enough for the purpose. This loss
of the power of reading by sight may, at a certain time, be the only
trouble the patient has. Individuals thus mutilated succeed in reading
by an ingenious roundabout way which they often discover themselves :
it is enough that they should trace the letters with their finger to under
stand their sense. What happens in such a case ? How can the hand
supply the place of the eye? The motor image gives the key to the
problem. If the patient can read, so to speak, with his fingers, it is
because in tracing the letters he gives himself a certain number of mus
cular impressions which are those of writing. In one word, the patient
reads by writing (Charcot): the feeling of the graphic movements sug
gests the sense of what is being written as well as sight would." f

The imagination of a blind-deaf mute like Laura Bridg-
man must be confined entirely to tactile and motor material.
All blind persons must belong to the l tactile ' and 'motile* types of
the French authors. When the young man whose cataracts
were removed by Dr. Franz was shown different geometric
figures, he said he " had not been able to form from them
the idea of a square and a disk until he perceived a sensa
tion of what he saw in the points of his fingers, as if he
really touched the objects." %

Professor Strieker of Vienna, who seems to have the
motile form of imagination developed in unusual strength,

* It is hardly needful to say that in modern primary education, in which
the blackboard is so much used, the children are taught their letters, etc.,
by all possible channels at once, sight, hearing, and movement.

f See an interesting case of a similar sort, reported by Farges, in l'En«
cephale, 7me An nee, p. 545.

| Philosophical Transactions, 1841, p. 65.

IMAGINATION. 63

given a very careful analysis of "his own case in a
couple of monographs with which all students should be
come familiar.* His recollections both of his own move
ments and of those of other things are accompanied
invariably by distinct muscular feelings in those parts of
his body which would naturally be used in effecting or in
following the movement. In thinking of a soldier march
ing, for example, it is as if he were helping the image to
march by marching himself in his rear. And if he sup
presses this sympathetic feeling in his own legs, and con
centrates all his attention on the imagined soldier, the latter
becomes, as it were, paralyzed. In general his imagined
movements, of whatsoever objects, seem paralyzed the
moment no feelings of movement either in his own eyes or
in his own limbs accompany them.f The movements of
articulate speech play a predominant part in his mental
life.

"When after my experimental work I proceed to its description,
as a rule I reproduce in the first instance only words, which I had
already associated with the perception of the various details of the ob
servation whilst the latter was going on. For speech plays in all my
observing so important a part that I ordinarily clothe phenomena in
words as fast as I observe them. " \

Most persons, on being asked in what sort of terms they
imagine ivords, will say ' in terms of hearing.' It is not until
their attention is expressly drawn to the point that they
find it difficult to say whether auditory images or motor
images connected with the organs of articulation predomi
nate. A good way of bringing the difficulty to consciousness
is that proposed by Strieker : Partly open your mouth and
then imagine any word with labials or dentals in it, such as
' bubble,' * toddle.' Is your image under these conditions
distinct ? To most people the image is at first * thick,' as
the sound of the word would be if they tried to pronounce
it with the lips parted. Many can never imagine the words

* Studien tlber die Sprachvorstellungen (1880), and Studien ilber die
Bewegungsvorstellungen (1882).

f Prof. Strieker admits that by practice he has succeeded in making
his eye-movements ' act vicariously ' for his leg-movements in imagining
men walking.

t Bewegungsvorstellungen, p. 6.

64 PSYCHOLOGY.

clearly with the mouth open ; others succeed after a few
preliminary trials. The experiment proves how dependent
our verbal imagination is on actual feelings in lips, tongue,
iaroat, larynx, etc.

' " When we recall the impression of a word or sentence, if we do not
speak it out, we feel the twitter of the organs just about to come to
that pc'nt. The articulating parts — the larynx, the tongue, the lips —
are all sensitly excited ; a suppressed articulation is in fact the mate
rial of our recollection, the intellectual manifestation, the idea of
speech."*

The open mouth in Strieker's experiment not only pre
vents actual articulation of the labials, but our feeling of
its openness keeps us from imagining their articulation,
just as a sensation of glaring light will keep us from
strongly imagining darkness. In persons whose auditory
imagination is weak, the articulatory image seems to con
stitute the whole material for verbal thought. Professor
Strieker says that in his own case no auditory image enters-
into the words of which he thinks. t Like most psycholo
gists, however, he makes of his personal peculiarities a rule,
and says that verbal thinking is normally and univer
sally an exclusively motor representation. I certainly get
auditory images, both of vowels and of consonants, in
addition to the articulatory images or feelings on which
this author lays such stress. And I find that numbers of
my students, after repeating his experiments, come to this
conclusion. There is at first a difficulty due to the open
mouth. That, however, soon vanishes, as does also the
difficulty of thinking of one vowel whilst continuously
sounding another. What probably remains true, however, j
is that most men have a less auditory and a more articu-l
latory verbal imagination than they are apt to be aware of./

* Ba;a : Senses and Intellect, p. 339.

7 Studien iibe Sprachvorstellungen, 28, 31, etc. Cf. pp. 49-50, etc.
A.gaiust Strieker, see Stumpf, Tonpsychol., 155-162, and Revue Phi-
losophique, xx. 617. See also Paulhan, Rev. Philosophique, xvi. 405
Strieker replies to Paulhan in vol. xvm. p. 685. P. retorts in vol. xix
p. 118. Strieker reports that out of 100 persons questioned he found only
one who had no feeling in his lips when silently thinking the letters M B,
P; and out of 60 only two who were conscious of no internal articulation
whilst reading (pp 59-60).

IMAGINATION. 65

Professor Strieker himself has acoustic images, and can
imagine the sounds of musical instruments, and the pecul
iar voice of a friend. A statistical inquiry on a large scale,
into the variations of acoustic, tactile, and motor imagina
tion, would probably bear less fruit than Galton's inquiry
into visual images. A few monographs by competent ob
servers, like Strieker, about their own peculiarities, would
give much more valuable information about the diversities
which prevail.*

Toitch-images are very strong in some people. The most
vivid touch-images come when we ourselves barely escape
local injury, or when we see another injured. The place

* I think it must be admitted that some people have no vivid substan
tive images in any department of their sensibility. One of my students,
an intelligent youth, denied so pertinaciously that there was anything in his
mind at all when he thought, that I was much perplexed by his case. I my
self certainly have no such vivid play of nascent movements or motor images
as Professor Strieker describes. When I seek to represent a row of soldiers
marching, all I catch is a view of stationary legs first in one phase of
movement and then in another, and these views are extremely imperfect
and momentary. Occasionally (especially when I try to stimulate my
imagination, as by repeating Victor Hugo's lines about the regiment,
" Leur pas est si correct, sans tarder ni courir,

Qu'on croit voir des ciseaux se fermer et s'ouvrir,")

I seem to get an instantaneous glimpse of an actual movement, but it is to
the last degree dim and uncertain. All these images seem at first as if
purely retinal. 1 think, however, that rapid eye-movements accompany
them, though these latter give rise to such slight feelings that they are
almost impossible of detection. Absolutely no leg-movements of my own
are there ; in fact, to call such up arrests my imagination of the soldiers.
My optical images are in general yery dim, dark, fugitive, and contracted.
It would be utterly impossible to draw from them, and yet I perfectly well
distinguish one from the other. My auditory images are excessively inade
quate reproductions of their originals. I have no images of taste or smell.
Touch-imagination is fairly distinct, but comes very little into play with
most objects thought of. Neither is all my thought verbalized; for I have
shadowy schemes of relation, as apt to terminate in a nod of the head or an
expulsion of the breath as in a definite word. On the whole, vague images
or sensations of movement inside of my head towards the various parts of
space in which the terms I am thinking of either lie or are momentarily sym
bolized to lie together with movements of the breath through my pharynx
and nostrils, form a by no means inconsiderable part of my thought-stuff.
I doubt whether my difficulty in giving a clearer account is wholly a mat
ter of inferior power of introspective attention, though that doubtless pluya
its part. Attention, ceteris pcvribu*, must always be inferior in proportion
to the feebleness of the internal images which are offered it to hold on to

66 PSYCHOLOGY.

may then actually tingle with the imaginary sensation—
perhaps not altogether imaginary, since goose-flesh, pal
ing or reddening, and other evidences of actual muscular
contraction in the spot may result.

" An educated man," says a writer who must always be quoted when
it is question of the powers of imagination,* " told me once that on
entering his house one day he received a shock from crushing the finger
of one of his little children in the door. At the moment of his fright
he felt a violent pain in the corresponding finger of his own body,
and this pain abode with him three days."

The same author makes the following discrimination,
which probably most men could verify :

" On the skin I easily succeed in bringing out suggested sensation*
wherever I will. But because it is necessary to protract the mental ef
fort I can only awaken such sensations as are in their nature prolonged,
as warmth, cold, pressure. Fleeting sensations, as those of a prick, a
cut, a blow, etc., I am unable to call up, because I cannot imagine them
ex abrupto with the requisite intensity. The sensations of the former
order I can excite upon any part of the skin; and they may become so
lively that, whether I will or not, I have to pass my hand over the place
just as if it were a real impression on the skin." \

Meyer's account of his own visual images is very interest
ing ; and with it we may close our survey of differences be
tween the normal powers of imagining in different indi
viduals.

" With much practice," he says, " I have succeeded in making it
possible for me to call up subjective visual sensations at will. I tried
all my experiments by day or at night with closed eyes. At first it
was very difficult. In the first experiments which succeeded the whole
picture was luminous, the shadows being given in a somewhat less strong
bluish light. In later experiments I saw the objects dark, with
bright outlines, or rather I saw outline drawings of them, bright on a
dark ground. I can compare these drawings less to chalk drawings on
a blackboard than to drawings made with phosphorus on a dark wall
at night, though the phosphorus would show luminous vapors which
were absent from my lines. If I wished, for example, to see a face,
without intending that of a particular person, I saw the outline of a
profile against the dark background. When I tried to repeat an ex-

* Geo. Herm. Meyer, Untersuchungen ub. d. Physiol. d. Nervenf:
(1848), p. 233. For other cases see Tuke's Influence of Mind upon Body
chaps, n and vn.

f Meyer, op. dt. p. 238.

IMAGINATION. 67

periment of the elder Darwin I saw only the edges of the die as bright
lines on a dark ground. Sometimes, however, I saw the die really white
and its edges black ; it was then on a paler ground. I could soon at
will change between a white die with black borders on a light field, and
a black die with white borders on a dark field ; and I can do this at any
moment now. After long practice . . . these experiments succeeded
better still. I can now call before my eyes almost any object which I
please, as a subjective appearance, and this in its own natural color and
illumination. I see them almost always on a more or less light or dark,
mostly dimly changeable ground. Even known faces I can see quite
sharp, with the true color of hair and cheeks. It is odd that I see
these faces mostly in profile, whereas those described [in the previous
extract] were all full-face. Here are some of the final results of these
experiments :

" 1) Some time after the pictures have arisen they vanish or change
into others, without my being able to prevent it.

1 ' 2) When the color does not integrally belong to the object, I cannot
always control it. A face, e.g., never seems to me blue, but always in
its natural color ; a red cloth, on the other hand, I can sometimes
change to a blue one.

" 3) I have sometimes succeeded in seeing pure colors without objects;
they then fill the entire field of view.

" 4) I often fail to see objects which are not known to me, mere fic
tions of my fancy, and instead of them there will appear familiar ob
jects of a similar sort ; for instance, I once tried to see a brass sword-
hilt with a brass guard, instead of which the more familiar picture of a
rapier-guard appeared.

44 5) Most of these subjective appearances, especially when they were
bright, left after-images behind them when the eyes were quickly
opened during their presence. For example, I thought of a silver stir
rup, and after I had looked at it a while I opened my eyes and for a
long while afterwards saw its after-image.

' k These experiments succeeded best when I lay quietly on my back
and closed my eyes. I could bear no noise about me, as this kept the
vision from attaining the requisite intensity. The experiments succeed
with me now so easily that I am surprised they did not do so at first,
and I feel as though they ought to succeed with everyone. The im
portant point in them is to get the image sufficiently intense by the ex
clusive direction of the attention upon it, and by the removal of all
disturbing impressions." *

The negative after-images ivhich succeeded upon Meyer's
imagination when he opened his eyes are a highly interest
ing, though rare, phenomenon. So far as I know there is

Meyer, op. cit. pp. 238-41.

68 PSYCHOLOGY.

only one other published report of a similar experience.* It
would seem that in such a case the neural process corre
sponding to the imagination must be the entire tract con
cerned in the actual sensation, even down as far as the
retina. This leads to a new question to which we may
now turn — of what is

THE NEURAL PROCESS "WHICH UNDERLIES IMAGINATION P

The commonly-received idea is that it is only a milder
degree of the same process which took place when the
thing now imagined was sensibly perceived. Professor
Bain writes:

" Since a sensation in the first instance diffuses nerve-currents
through the interior of the brain outwards to the organs of expression
and movement, — the persistence of that sensation, after the outward
exciting cause is withdrawn, can be but a continuance of the same dif
fusive currents, perhaps less intense, but not otherwise different. The
shock remaining in the ear and brain, after the sound of thunder, must
pass through the same circles, and operate in the same way as during
the actual sound. We can have no reason for believing that, in this
self-sustaining condition, the impression changes its seat, or passes into
some new circles that have the special property of retaining it. Every
part actuated after the shock must have been actuated by the shock,
only more powerfully. With this single difference of intensity, the mode
of existence of a sensation existing after the fact is essentially the same
as its mode of existence during the fact. . . . Now if this be the case
with impressions persisting when the cause has ceased, what view are
we to adopt concerning impressions reproduced by mental causes alone,
or without the aid of the original, as in ordinary recollection ? What
is the manner of occupation of the brain with a resuscitated feeling of
resistance, a smell or a sound ? There is only one answer that seems
admissable. The renewed feeling occupies the very same parts, and in
the same manner, as the original feeling, and no other parts, nor in
any other assignable manner. I imagine that if our present knowledge
of the brain had been present to the earliest speculators, this is the only

* That of Dr. Ch. Fere in the Revue Philosophique, xx. 364. Johannes
Mtiller's account of hypnagogic hallucinations floating before the eyes for
a few moments after these had been opened, seems to belong more to the
category of spontaneous hallucinations (see his Physiology, London, 1842,
p. 1394). It is impossible to tell whether the words in Wundt's Vorle-
sungen, i. 387, refer to a personal experience of his own or not ; probably
not. 11 va sans dire that an inferior visualizer like myself can get no such
after-images. Nor have I as yet succeeded in getting report of any from
my students.

IMAGINATION. 69

hypothesis that would have occurred to them. For where should a
past feeling be embodied, if not in the same organs as the feeling when
present ? It is only in this way that its identity can be preserved ; a
feeling differently embodied would be a different feeling." *

It is not plain from Professor Bain's text whether by
the * same parts ' he means only the same parts inside the
brain, or the same peripheral parts also, as those occupied by
the original feeling. The examples which he himself pro
ceeds to give are almost all cases of imagination of move
ment, in which the peripheral organs are indeed affected,
for actual movements of a weak sort are found to accom
pany the idea. This is what we should expect. All cur
rents tend to run forward in the brain and discharge into
the muscular system ; and the idea of a movement tends to
do this with peculiar facility. But the question remains :
Do currents run backward, so that if the optical centres
(for example) are excited by ' association ' and a visual ob
ject is imagined, a current runs down to the retina also,
and excites that sympathetically with the higher tracts ?
In other words, can peripheral sense-organs be excited from
above, or only from without ? Are they excited in imagi
nation ? Professor Bain's instances are almost silent as to
this point. All he says is this :

" We might think of a blow on the hand until the skin were actually
irritated and inflamed. The attention very much directed to any part
of the body, as the great toe, for instance, is apt to produce a distinct
feeling in the part, which we account for only by supposing a revived
nerve-current to flow there, making a sort of false sensation, an influ
ence from within mimicking the influences from without in sensation
proper. — (See the writings of Mr. Braid, of Manchester, on Hypnotism,
etc.)"

If I may judge from my own experience, all feelings of
this sort are consecutive upon motor currents invading the
skin and producing contraction of the muscles there, the
muscles whose contraction gives ' goose-flesh ' when it takes
place on an extensive scale. I never get a feeling in the;
skin, however strongly I imagine it, until some actual
change in the condition of the skin itself has occurred, j
The truth seems to be that the cases where peripheral

* Senses and Intellect, p. 338.

70 PSYCHOLOGY.

sense-organs are directly excited in consequence of imagi
nation are exceptional rarities, if they exist at all. In com
mon cases of imagination it tvould seem more natural to suppose
that the seat of the process is purely cerebral, and that the sense-
organ is left out. Reasons for such a conclusion would be
briefly these :

1) In imagination the starting-point of the process must
be in the brain. Now we know that currents usually flow
one way in the nervous system ; and for the peripheral sense-
organs to be excited in these cases, the current would have
to flow backward.

2) There is between imagined objects and felt objects
a difference of conscious quality which may be called al
most absolute. It is hardly possible to confound the live
liest image of fancy with the weakest real sensation. The
felt object has a plastic reality and outwardness which the
imagined object wholly lacks. Moreover, as Fechner says?
in imagination the attention feels as if drawn backwards to
the brain ; in sensation (even of after-images) it is directed
forward towards the sense-organ.* The difference between
the two processes feels like one of kind, and not like a mere
'more ' or 'less ' of the same.f If a sensation of sound
were only a strong imagination, and an imagination a weak
sensation, there ought to be a border-line of experience
where we never could tell whether we were hearing a weak
sound or imagining a strong one. In comparing a present
sensation felt with a past one imagined, it will be remem
bered that we often judge the imagined one to have been ike
stronger (see above, p. 500, note). This is inexplicable if
the imagination be simply a weaker excitement of the sen
sational process.

To these reasons the following objections may be made :
To 1) : The current demonstrably does flow backward

* See above, Vol. II. p. 50, note.

t V. Kandinsky (Kritische u. klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete der
Sinnestauschungen (Berlin, 1885), p. 135 if.) insists that in even the live
liest pseudo-hallucinations (see below, Chapter XX), which may be re
garded as the intensest possible results of the imaginative process, there
Is no outward objectivity perceived in the thing represented, and that a
garner Abgrund separates these ' ideas ' from true hallucination and objec
tive perception.

IMAGINATION. 71

down the optic nerve in Meyer's and Fere's negative after
image. Therefore it can flow backward ; therefore it may
flow backward in some, however slight, degree, in all imag
ination.*

To 2) : The difference alleged is not absolute, and sensa
tion and imagination are hard to discriminate where the
sensation is so weak as to be just perceptible. At m<?ht
hearing a very faint striking of the hour by a far-off clock,
our imagination reproduces both rhythm and sound, and it
is often difficult to tell which was the last real stroke. So
of a baby crying in a distant part of the house, we are un
certain whether we still hear it, or only imagine the sound
Certain violin-players take advantage of this in diminuendo
terminations. After the pianissimo has been reached
they continue to bow as if still playing, but are careful not
to touch the strings. The listener hears in imagination a

* It seems to also flow backwards in certain hypnotic hallucinations.
Suggest to a ' Subject ' in the hypnotic trance that a sheet of paper has a
red cross upou it, then pretend to remove the imaginary cross, whilst you
tell the Subject to look fixedly at a dot upon the paper, and he will pres
ently tell you that he sees a ' bluish-green ' cross. The genuineness of the
result has been doubted, but there seems no good reason for rejecting M
Binet's account (Le Maguetisme Animal, 1887, p. 188). M. Biuet, following
M. Parinaud, and on the faith of a certain experiment, atone time believed,
the optical brain-centres and not the retina to be the seat of ordinary nega
tive after-images. The experiment is this: Look fixedly, with one eye
open, at a colored spot on a white background. Then close that eye and
look fixedly with the other eye at a plain surface. A negative after-image
of the colored spot will presently appear. (Psychologic du liaison nement,
1886, p. 45.) But Mr. Delabarre has proved (American Journal of Psy
chology, ii. 326) that this after-image is due, not to a higher cerebral pro
cess, but to the fact that the retinal process in the closed eye affects
consciousness at certain moments, and that its object is then projected
into the field seen by the eye which is open. M. Binet informs me that
he is converted by the proofs given by Mr. Delabarre.

The fact remains, however, that the negative after-images of Herr Meyer,
M. Fere, and the hypnotic subjects, form an exception to all that we know
of nerve-currents, if they are due to a reilueut centrifugal current to the
retina. It may be that they will hereafter be explained in some other way.
Meanwhile we can only write them down as a paradox. Sig. Sergi's theory
thai there is always a refluent wave in perception hardly merits serious con
sideration (Psychologic Physiologique, pp. 99, 189). Sergi's theory has
recently been reaffirmed with almost incredible crudity by Lombroso and
Ottolenghi in the Revue Philosophique, xxix. 70 (Jan. 1890),

72 PSYCHOLOGY.

degree of sound fainter still than the preceding pianissimo,
This phenomenon is not confined to hearing :

" If we slowly approach our finger to a surface of water, we often
deceive ourselves about the moment in which the wetting occurs. The
apprehensive patient believes himself to feel the knife of the surgeon
whilst it is still at some distance." *

Visual perception supplies numberless instances in which
the same sensation of vision is perceived as one object or
another according to the interpretation of the mind. Many
of these instances will come before us in the course of the
next two chapters ; and in Chapter XIX similar illusions
will be described in the other senses. Taken together, all
these facts would force us to admit that the subjective
difference between imagined and felt objects is less absolute
than has been claimed, and that the cortical processes which
underlie imagination and sensation are not quite as discrete
as one at first is tempted to suppose. That peripheral sen
sory processes are ordinarily involved in imagination seems
improbable ; that they may sometimes be aroused from the cortex
downwards cannot, however, be dogmatically denied.

The imagination-process CAN then pass over into the sensa
tion-process. In other words, genuine sensations can be
centrally originated. When we come to study hallucina
tions in the chapter on Outer Perception, we shall see that
this is by no means a thing of rare occurrence. At present,
however, we must admit that normally the two processes do
KOT pass over into each other; and we must inquire why.
One of two things must be the reason. Either

1. Sensation-processes occupy a different locality from
imagination-processes ; or

2. Occupying the same locality, they have an intensity
which under normal circumstances currents from other
cortical regions are incapable of arousing, and to produce
which currents from the periphery are required.

It seems almost certain (after what was said in Chapter
II. pp. 49—51) that the imagination-process differs from the
sensation-process by its intensity rather than by its locality.
However it may be with lower animals, the assumption that

* Lotze, Med. Psych, p. 509.

IMAGINATION. 73

ideational and sensorial centres are locally distinct appears
to be supported by no facts drawn from the observation of
human beings. After occipital destruction, the hemianop-
sia which results in man is sensorial blindness, not mere
loss of optical ideas. Were there centres for crude optical
sensation below the cortex, the patients in these cases
would still feel light and darkness. Since they do not pre
serve even this impression on the lost half of the field, we
must suppose that there are no centres for vision of any
sort whatever below the cortex, and that the corpora quadri-
gemina and other lower optical ganglia are organs for reflex
movement of eye-muscles and not for conscious sight.
Moreover there are no facts which oblige us to think that,
within the occipital cortex, one part is connected with sen
sation and another with mere ideation or imagination. The
pathological cases assumed to prove this are all better ex
plained by disturbances of conduction between the optical
and other centres (see p. 50). In bad cases of hemianopsia
the patient's images depart from him together with his sen
sibility to light. They depart so completely that he does not
•even know what is the matter with him. To perceive that
•one is blind to the right half of the field of view one must
have an idea of that part of the field's possible existence.
But the defect in these patients has to be revealed to them
by the doctor, they themselves only knowing that there is
< something wrong ' with their eyes. What you have no idea
of you cannot miss ; and their not definitely missing this
great region out of their sight seems due to the fact that their
very idea and memory of it is lost along with the sensation.
A man blind of his eyes merely, sees darkness. A man blind
of his visual brain-centres can no more see darkness out of
the parts of his retina which are connected with the brain-
lesion ttian he can see it out of the skin of his back. He
cannot see at all in that part of the field ; and he cannot
think of the light which he ought to be feeling there, for the
very notion of the existence of that particular ' there ' is
cut out of his mind.*

* See an important article by Binet in the Revue Philosophique, xxn.
481 (1888) ; also Dufour, in Revue Med. de la Suisse Roinande, 1889, No.
S, cited in the Neurologisches Centralblatt, 1890, p. 48.

74 PSYCHOLOGY.

Now if we admit that sensation and imagination are due
to the activity of the same centres in the cortex, we can see a
very good teleological reason why they should correspond
to discrete kinds of process in these centres, and why the
process which gives the sense that the object is really there
ought normally to be arousable only by currents entering
from the periphery and not by currents from the neighbor
ing cortical parts. We can' see, in short, why the sensational
process OUGHT TO be discontinuous with all normal ideational
processes, however intense. For, as Dr. Miinsterberg justly
observes :

" Were there not this peculiar arrangement we should not distinguish
reality and fantasy, our conduct would not be accommodated to the
facts about us, but would be inappropriate and senseless, and we could
not keep ourselves alive. . . . That our thoughts and memories should
be copies of sensations with their intensity greatly reduced is thus a
consequence deducible logically from the natural adaptation of the
cerebral mechanism to its environment."*

Mechanically the discontinuity between the ideational
and the sensational kinds of process must mean that when
the greatest ideational intensity has been reached, an order
of resistance presents itself which only a new order of force
can break through. The current from the periphery is the
new order of force required ; and what happens after the
resistance is overcome is the sensational process. We may
suppose that the latter consists in some new and more vio
lent sort of disintegration of the neural matter, which now
explodes at a deeper level than at other times.

Now how shall we conceive of the * resistance ' which
prevents this sort of disintegration from taking place, this
sort of intensity in the process from being attained, so
much of the time ? It must be either an intrinsic resist
ance, some force of cohesion in the neural molecules them
selves ; or an extrinsic influence, due to other cortical cells.
When we come to study the process of hallucination we
shall see that both factors must be taken into account.
There is a degree of inward molecular cohesion in our
brain-cells which it probably takes a sudden inrush of

* Die Willenshandlung (1888), pp. 129-40.

IMAGINATION. 76

j destructive energy to spring apart. Incoming peripheral
j currents possess this energy from the outset. Currents
from neighboring cortical regions might attain to it if they
could accumulate within the centre which we are supposed
to be considering. But since during waking hours every
centre communicates with others by association-paths,
no such accumulation can take place. The cortical cur
rents which run in run right out again, awakening the next
ideas ; the level of tension in the cells does not rise to the
higher explosion-point ; and the latter must be gained by a
sudden current from the periphery or not at all.

CHAPTEE XIX.

THE PERCEPTION OF 'THINGS.'
PEKCEPTION AND SENSATION COMPAEED.

A PUKE sensation we saw above, p. 7, to be an abstrac
tion never realized in adult life. Any quality of a thing
which affects our sense-organs does also more than that :
it arouses processes in the hemispheres which are due to
the organization of that organ by past experiences, and the
result of which in consciousness are commonly described
as ideas which the sensation suggests. The first of these
ideas is that of the thing to which the sensible quality
belongs. The consciousness of particular material things
present to sense is nowadays called perception.* The con
sciousness of such things may be more or less complete ;
it may be of the mere name of the thing and its other essen
tial attributes, or it may be of the thing's various remoter
relations. It is impossible to draw any sharp line of dis
tinction between the barer and the richer consciousness,
because the moment we get beyond the first crude sensa
tion all our consciousness is a matter of suggestion, and
the various suggestions shade gradually into each other,
being one and all products of the same psychological
machinery of association. In the directer consciousness
fewer, in the remoter more, associative processes are
brought into play.

* The word Perception, however, has been variously used. For histor
ical notices, see Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics, n. 96. For Hamil
ton perception is the consciousness of external objects ' (ib. 28). Spencer
defines it oddly enough as "a discerning of the relation or relations be
tween states of consciousness partly presentative and partly representative ;
which states of consciousness must be themselves known to the extent in
volved in the knowledge of their relations " (Psychol., § 355).

76

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 77

Perception thus differs from sensation by the consciousness
of farther facts associated with the object of the sensation :

" When I lift my eyes from the paper on which I am writing I see
the chairs and tables and walls of my room, each of its proper shape
and at its proper distance. I see, from my window, trees and mead
ows, and horses and oxen, and distant hills. I see each of its proper
size, of its proper form, and at its proper distance ; and these particu
lars appear as immediate informations of the eye, as the colors which I
see by means of it. Yet philosophy has ascertained that we derive noth
ing from the eye whatever but sensations of color. . . . How, then, is it
that we receive accurate information, by the eye, of size and shape and
distance ? By association merely. The colors upon a body are different,
according to its figure, its shape, and its size. But the sensations of
color and what we may here, for brevity, call the sensations of ex
tension, of figure, of distance, have been so often united, felt in con
junction, that the sensation of the color is never experienced without
raising the ideas of the extension, the figure, the distance, in such inti
mate union with it, that they not only cannot be separated, but are ac
tually supposed to be seen. The sight, as it is called, of figure, cr dis
tance, appearing as it does a simple sensation, is in reality a complex
state of consciousness— a sequence in which the antecedent, a sensation
of color, and the consequent, a number of ideas, are so closely com
bined by association that they appear not one idea, but one sensation."

This passage from James Mill * gives a clear statement
of the doctrine which Berkeley in his Theory of Vision
made for the first time an integral part of Psychology.
Berkeley compared our visual sensations to the words of a
language, which are but signs or occasions for our intel
lects to pass to what the speaker means. As the sounds
called words have no inward affinity with the ideas they
signify, so neither have our visual sensations, according to
Berkeley, any inward affinity with the things of whose
presence they make us aware. Those things are tangibles;
their real properties, such as shape, size, mass, consistency,
position, reveal themselves only to touch. But the visible
signs and the tangible significates are by long custom so
" closely twisted, blended, and incorporated together, and
the prejudice is so confirmed and riveted in our thoughts
by a long tract of time, by the use of language, and want of
reflection," f that we think we see the whole object, tangible
and visible alike, in one simple indivisible act.

* Analysis, i. 97.

f Theory of Vision, 51.

' u£f! ^y^

78 PSYCHOLOGY.

Sensational and reproductive brain-processes combined, then,
are what give us the content of our perceptions. Every con
crete particular material thing is a conflux of sensible
qualities, with which we have become acquainted at vari
ous times. Some of these qualities, since they are more
constant, interesting, or practically important, we regard as
essential constituents of the thing. In a general way, such
are the tangible shape, size, mass, etc. Other properties,
being more fluctuating, we regard as more or less acciden
tal or inessential. We call the former qualities the reality,
the latter its appearances. Thus, I hear a sound, and say
* a horse-car ' ; but the sound is not the horse-car, it is
one of the horse-car's least important manifestations. The
real horse-car is a feelable, or at most a feelable and visi
ble, thing which in my imagination the sound calls up. So
when I get, as now, a brown eye-picture with lines not
parallel, and with angles unlike, and call it my big solid
rectangular walnut library-table, that picture is not the
table. It is not even like the table as the table is for vision,
when rightly seen. It is a distorted perspective view of three
of the sides of what I mentally perceive (more or less) in its
totality and undistorted shape. The back of the table, its
square corners, its size, its heaviness, are features of which
I am conscious when I look, almost as I am conscious of
its name. The suggestion of the name is of course due to
mere custom. But no less is that of the back, the size,
weight, squareness, etc.

Nature, as Reid says, is frugal in her operations, and
will not be at the expense of a particular instinct to give
us that knowledge which experience and habit will soon
produce. Reproduced sights and contacts tied together
with the present sensation in the unity of a thing with a
name, these are the complex objective stuff out of which
my actually perceived table is made. Infants must go
through a long education of the eye and ear before they
can perceive the realities which adults perceive. Every
perception is an acquired perception.*

* The educative process is particularly obvious in the case of the ear,
for all sudden sounds seem alarming to babies. The familiar noises of

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. . 79

Perception may then be defined, in Mr. Sully's words, as
that process by which the mind

" supplements a sense-impression by an accompaniment or escort of re
vived sensations, the whole aggregate of actual and revived sensations
being solidified or ' integrated ' into the form of a percept, that is, an
apparently immediate apprehension or cognition of an object now
present in a particular locality or region of space." *

Every reader's mind will supply abundant examples of
the process here described ; and to write them down would
be therefore both unnecessary and tedious. In the chapter
on Space we have already discussed some of the more inter
esting ones ; for in our perceptions of shape and position it
is really difficult to decide how much of our sense of the ob
ject is due to reproductions of past experience, and how
much to the immediate sensations of the eye. I shall ac
cordingly confine myself in the rest of this chapter to cer
tain additional generalities connected with the perceptive
process.

The first point is relative to that ' solidification ' or ' in
tegration,' whereof Mr. Sully speaks, of the present with
the absent and merely represented sensations. Cerebrally
taken, these words mean no more than this, that the pro
cess aroused in the sense-organ has shot into various
paths which habit has already organized in the hemi
spheres, and that instead of our having the sort of con
sciousness which would be correlated with the simple sen-
sorial process, we have that which is correlated with this
more complex process. This, as it turns out, is the con
sciousness of that more complex ' object,' the whole ' thing,'
instead of being the consciousness of that more simple
object, the few qualities or attributes which actually im
press our peripheral nerves. This consciousness must have!
the unity which every ' section ' of our stream of thought !
retains so long as its objective content does not sensibly

house and street keep them in constant trepidation until such time as they
have either learned the objects which emit them, or have become blunted
to them by frequent experience of their innocuity.
* Outlines, p. 153.

80 PSYCHOLOGY.

change. More than this we cannot say ; we certainly
ought not to say what usually is said by psychologists, and
treat the perception as a sum of distinct psychic entities,
the present sensation namely, plus a lot of images from the
past, all ' integrated ' together in a way impossible to de
scribe. The perception is one state of mind or nothing — as
I have already so often said.

In many cases it is easy to compare the psychic results
of the sensational with those of the perceptive process. We
then see a marked difference in the way in which the im
pressed portions of the object are felt, in consequence of
being cognized along with the reproduced portion, in the
higher state of mind. Their sensible quality changes un
der our very eye. Take the already-quoted catch, Pas de
lieu Rhone que nous : one may read this over and over again
without recognizing the sounds to be identical with those
of the words paddle your own canoe. As we seize the
English meaning the sound itself appears to change.
Verbal sounds are usually perceived with their meaning at
the moment of being heard. Sometimes, however, the
associative irradiations are inhibited for a few moments
(the mind being preoccupied with other thoughts) whilst
the words linger on the ear as mere echoes of acoustic sen
sation. Then, usually, their interpretation suddenly occurs.
But at that moment one may often surprise a change in the
very feel of the word. Our own language would sound
very different to us if we heard it without understanding,
as we hear a foreign tongue. Kises and falls of voice, odd
sibilants and other consonants, would fall on our ear in a
way of which we can now form no notion. Frenchmen say
that English sounds to them like the gazouillement des oiseaux
— an impression which it certainly makes on no native ear.
Many of us English would describe the sound of Russian
in similar terms. All of us are conscious of the strong in
flections of voice and explosives and gutturals of German
speech in a way in which no German can be conscious of
them.

This is probably the reason why, if we look at an isolated
printed word and repeat it long enough, it ends by assuming
an entirely unnatural aspect. Let the reader try this with

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 81

any word on this page. He will soon begin to wonder if it
can possibly be the word he has been using all his life with
that meaning. It stares at him from the paper like a glass
eye, with no speculation in it. Its body is indeed there, but
its soul is fled. It is reduced, by this new way of attending
to it, to its sensational nudity. We never before attended to
it in this way, but habitually got it clad with its meaning
the moment we caught sight of it, and rapidly passed from
it to the other words of the phrase. We apprehended it,
in short, with a cloud of associates, and thus perceiving it,
we felt it quite otherwise than as we feel it now divested
and alone.

Another well-known change is when we look at a land
scape with our head upside down. Perception is to a cer
tain extent baffled by this manoeuvre ; gradations of dis
tance and other space-determinations are made uncertain ;
the reproductive or associative processes, in short, decline ;
and, simultaneously with their diminution, the colors grow
richer and more varied, and the contrasts of light and shade
more marked. The same thing occurs when we turn a
painting bottom upward. We lose much of its meaning,
but, to compensate for the loss, we feel more freshly the
value of the mere tints and shadings, and become aware of
any lack of purely sensible harmony or balance which they
may show.* Just so, if we lie on the floor and look up at
the mouth of a person talking behind us. His lower lip
here takes the habitual place of the upper one upon our
retina, and seems animated by the most extraordinary and
unnatural mobility, a mobility which now strikes us be
cause (the associative processes being disturbed by the un
accustomed point of view) we get it as a naked sensation
and not as part of a familiar object perceived.

On a later page other instances will meet us. For the
present these are enough to prove our point. Once more
we find ourselves driven to admit that when qualities of an
object impress our sense and we thereupon perceive the
object, the sensation as such of those qualities does not

* Cf . Helmholtz, Optik, pp. 433, 723, 728, 772 , and Spencer. Psychol
ogy, vol. ii. p. 249, note.

^v«x^J
PSYCHOLOGY.

still exist inside of the perception and form a constituent
thereof. The sensation is one thing and the perception
another, and neither can take place at the same time with
the other, because their cerebral conditions are not the
same. They may resemble each other, but in no respect are
they identical states of mind.

PERCEPTION IS OF DEFINITE AND PROBABLE THINGS.

The chief cerebral conditions of perception are the paths
of association irradiating from the sense-impression, which
may have been already formed. If a certain sensation be
strongly associated with the attributes of a certain thing,
that thing is almost sure to be perceived when we get the
sensation. Examples of such things would be familiar
people, places, etc., which we recognize and name at a
glance. But where the sensation is associated with more than
one reality, so that either of two discrepant sets of resid-
ual properties may arise, the perception is doubtful and
vacillating, and the most that can then be said of it is that it
will be of a PROBABLE thing, of the thing which would most
usually have given us that sensation.

In these ambiguous cases it is interesting to note that
perception is rarely abortive ; some perception takes place.
The two discrepant sets of associates do not neutralize each
other or mix and make a blur. What we more commonly
get is first one object in its completeness, and then the other
in its completeness. In other words, all brain-processes are
such as give rise to ivhat we may call FIGURED consciousness. If
paths are irradiated at all, they are irradiated in consistent
systems, and occasion thoughts of definite objects, not mere
hodge-podges of elements. Even where the brain's func
tions are half thrown out of gear, as in aphasia or dropping
asleep, this law of figured consciousness holds good. A
person who suddenly gets sleepy whilst reading aloud will
read wrong ; but instead of emitting a mere broth of sylla
bles, he will make such mistakes as to read ' supper-time '
instead of ' sovereign,' ' overthrow ' instead of ' opposite,'
or indeed utter entirely imaginary phrases, composed of
several definite words, instead of phrases of the book. So
in aphasia : where the disease is mild the patient's inis-

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 83

takes consist in using entire wrong words instead of right
ones. Only in the gravest lesions does he become quite in
articulate. These facts show how subtle is the associative
link ; how delicate yet how strong that connection among
brain-paths which makes any number of them, once excited
together, thereafter tend to vibrate as a systematic whole. A
small group of elements, * this,' common to two systems, A
and B, may touch off A or B according as accident decides
the next step (see Fig. 47). If it happen that a single point
leading from * this ' to B is momentarily a little more per
vious than any leading from * this ' to A, then that little
advantage will upset the equilibrium in favor of the entire
system B. The currents will sweep first through that point

FIG. 47.

and thence into all the paths of B, each increment of ad
vance making A more and more impossible. The thoughts
correlated with A and B, in such a case, will have objects
different, though similar. The similarity will, however,
consist in some very limited feature if the * this ' be small.
Thus the faintest sensations ivill give rise to the perception
of definite things if only they resemble those ivhich the things
are wont to arouse. In fact, a sensation must be strong and
distinct in order not to suggest an object and, if it is a non
descript feeling, really to seem one. The aurse of epilepsy,
globes of light, fiery vision, roarings in the ears, the sensa
tions which electric currents give rise to when passed through
the head, these are unfigured because they are strong.
Weaker feelings of the same sort would probably suggest
objects. Many years ago, after reading Maury's book, Le
Sommeil et les R/ves, I began for the first time to observe
those ideas which faintly flit through the mind at all times,
words, visions, etc., disconnected with the main stream of
thought, but discernible to an attention on the watch for

84 PSYCHOLOGY.

them. A horse's head, a coil of rope, an anchor, are, for
example, ideas which have come to me unsolicited whilst I
have been writing these latter lines. They can often be
explained by subtle links of association, often not at all.
But I have not a few times been surprised, after noting
some such idea, to find, on shutting my eyes, an after
image left on the retina by some bright or dark object
recently looked at, and which had evidently suggested
the idea. ' Evidently,' I say, because the general shape,
size, and position of object thought-of and of after-image
were the same, although the idea had details which the
retinal image lacked. We shall probably never know just
what part retinal after-images play in determining the train
of our thoughts. Judging by my own experiences I should
suspect it of being not insignificant.*

*Tlie more or less geometrically regular phantasms which are pro
duced by pressure on the eyeballs, congestion of the head, inhalation of
anaesthetics, etc., might again be cited to prove that faint and vague excite
ments of sense-organs are transformed into figured objects by the brain,
only the facts are not quite clearly interpretable ; and the figuring may
possibly be due to some retinal peculiarity, as yet unexplored. Beautiful
patterns, which would do for wall-papers, succeed each other when the
eyeballs are long pressed. Goethe's account of his own phantasm of a
flower is well known. It came in the middle of his visual field whenever
he closed his eyes and depressed his head, "unfolding itself and develop
ing from its interior new flowers, formed of colored or sometimes green
leaves, not natural but of fantastic forms, and symmetrical as the rosettes
of sculptors," etc. (quoted in Miiller's Physiology, Baly's tr., p. 1397). The
fortification- and zigzag-patterns, which are well-known appearances in the
field of view in certain functional disorders, have characteristics (steadiness,
coerciveness, blotting out of other objects) suggestive of a retinal origin —
this is why the entire class of phenomena treated of in this note seem to me
still doubtfully connected with the cerebral factor in perception of which
the text treats. — I copy from Taiue's book on Intelligence (vol. i. p. 61)
the translation of an interesting observation by Prof. M. Lazarus, in which
the same effect of an after-image is seen. Lazarus himself proposes the
name of ' visionary illusions ' for such modifications of ideal pictures by
peripheral stimulations (Lehre von den Sinnestauschungeu, 1867, p. 19).
" I was on the Kaltbad terrace at Rigi, on a very clear afternoon, and
attempting to make out the Waldbruder, a rock which stands out from
the midst of the gigantic wall of mountains surrounding it, on whose sum
mits we see like a crown the glaciers of Titlis, Uri-Rothsdock, etc. 1 was
looking alternately with the naked eye and with a spy-glass ; but could not
distinguish it with the naked eye. For the space of six to ten minutes I
had gazed steadfastly upon the mountains, whose color varied according

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS 85

ILLUSIONS.

Let us now, for brevity's sake, treat A and B in Fig. 47
as if they stood for objects instead of brain-processes. And
let us furthermore suppose that A and B are, both of them,
objects which might probably excite the sensation which I
have called * this,' but that on the present occasion A and
not B is the one which actually does so. If, then, on this
occasion * this ' suggests A and not B, the result is a correct
perception. But if, on the contrary, ' this ' suggests B and
not A, the result is & false perception, or, as it is technically
called, an illusion. But the process is the same, whether
the perception be true or false.

to their several altitudes or declivities between violet, brown, and dark
green, and I had fatigued myself to no purpose, when I ceased looking
and turned away. At that moment I saw before me (I cannot recollect
whether. my eyes were shut or open) the figure of an absent friend, like a
corpse. ... I asked myself at once how I had come to think of my absent
friend. — In a few seconds I regained the thread of my thoughts, which
my looking for the Waldbruder had interrupted, and readily found that the.
idea of my friend had by a very simple necessity introduced itself among
them. My recollecting him was thus naturally accounted for. — But in
addition to this, he had appeared as a corpse. How was this ? — At this
moment, whether through fatigue or in order to think, I closed my eyes,
and found at once the whole field of sight, over a considerable extent,
covered with the same corpse-like hue, a greenish-yellow gray. I thought
at once that I had here the principle of the desired explanation, and
attempted to recall to memory the forms of other persons. And, in fact,
these forms too appeared like corpses ; standing or sitting, as I wished, all
had a corpse -like tint. The persons whom I wished to see did not all ap
pear to me as sensible phantoms ; and again, when my eyes were open, I
did not see phantoms, or at all events only saw them faintly, of no deter
mined color. — I then inquired how it was that phantoms of persons were
affected by and colored like the visual field surrounding them, how their
outlines were traced, and if their faces and clothes were of the same color.
But it was then too late, or perhaps the influence of reflection and exa^n-
nation had been too powerful. All grew suddenly pale, and the subjective
phenomenon, which might have lasted some minutes longer, had disap
peared. — It is plain that here an inward reminiscence, arising in accordance
with the laws of association, had combined with an optical after-image.
The excessive excitation of the periphery of the optic nerve. I mean the
long-continued preceding sensation of my eyes when contemplating the
color of the mountain, had indirectly provoked a subjective and durable
sensation, that of the complemenatry color ; and my reminiscence, incor
porating itself with this subjective sensation, became the corpse-like phan
tom I have described."

86 PSYCHOLOGY.

Note that in every illusion what is false is what is in
ferred, not what is immediately given. The 'this,' if it
were felt by itself alone, would be all right, it only becomes
misleading by what it suggests. If it is a sensation of
sight, it may suggest a tactile object, for example, which
later 'tactile experiences prove to be not there. The so-called
'fallacy of the senses,' of which the ancient sceptics made so
much account, is not fallacy of the senses proper, but rather of
the intellect, which interprets wrongly what the senses give.*

So much premised, let us look a little closer at these
illusions. They are due to two main causes. The wrong
object is perceived either because

1) Although not on this occasion the real cause, it is yet the
habitual, inveterate, or most probable cause of ' this ; ' or because

2) The mind is temporarily full of the thought of that object,
and therefore ' this ' is peculiarly prone to suggest it at this
moment.

I will give briefly a number of examples under each
head. The first head is the more important, because it
includes a number of constant illusions to which all men
are subject, and which can only be dispelled by much
experience.

Illusions of the First Type.

One of the oldest instances dates from Aristotle. Cross
two fingers and roll a pea, pen
holder, or other small object be
tween them. It will seem double.
Professor Groom Eobertson has
given the clearest analysis of this

illusion. He observes that if

FIG. 48. the object be brought into con

tact first with the forefinger and next with the second finger,
the two contacts seem to come in at different points of space.

* Cf. Th. Reid's Intellectual Powers, essay n. chap, xxn, and A. Binet,
in Mind, ix. 206. M. Binet points out the fact that what is fallaciously
inferred is always an object of some other sense than the ' this.' ' Optical
illusions 'are generally errors of touch and muscular sensibility, and the
fallaciously perceived object and the experiences which correct it are both
tactile in these cases.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 87

'ine forefinger-touch seems higher, though the finger is
really lower ; the second-finger-touch seems lower, though
the finger is really higher. " We perceive the contacts as
double because we refer them to two distinct parts of
space." The touched sides of the two fingers are normally
not together in space, and customarily never do touch one
thing ; the one thing which now touches them, therefore,
seems in two places, i.e. seems two things.*

There is a whole batch of illusions which come from
optical sensations interpreted by us in accordance with our
usual rule, although they are now produced by an unusual
object. The stereoscope is an example. The eyes see a
picture apiece, and the two pictures are a little disparate,
the one seen by the right eye being a view of the object
taken from a point slightly to the right of that from which
the left eye's picture is taken. Pictures thrown on the two
eyes by solid objects present this identical disparity.
Whence we react on the sensation in our usual way, and
perceive a solid. If the pictures be exchanged we perceive
a hollow mould of the object, for a hollow mould would
cast just such disparate pictures as these. Wheatstone's
instrument, the pseudoscope, allows us to look at solid
objects and see with each eye the other eye's picture. We
then perceive the solid object hollow, if it be an object which
might probably be hollow, but not otherwise. A human face,
e.g., never appears hollow to the pseudoscope. In this
irregularity of reaction on different objects, some seem
hollow, others not ; the perceptive process is true to its!
law, which is always to react on the sensation in a deter -\
minate and figured fashion if possible, and in as probable |
a fashion as the case admits. To couple faces and hollow

* The converse illusion is hard to bring about. The points a and b,
being normally in contact, mean to us the same space, and hence it might
be supposed that when simultaneously touched, as by a pair of callipers,
we should feel but one object, whilst as a matter of fact we feel two. It
should be remarked in explanation of this that an object placed between
the two fingers in their normal uncrossed position always awakens the sense
of two contacts. When the fingers are pressed together we feel one object to
be between them. And when the fingers are crossed, and their correspond
ing points a and b simultaneously pressed, we do get something like tha
illusion of singleness — that is, we get a very doubtful doubleness.

88 PSYCHOLOGY.

ness violates all our habits of association. For the same
reason it is very easy to make an intaglio cast of a face, or
the painted inside of a pasteboard mask, look convex, in
stead of concave as they are.

Our sense of the position of things with respect to our
eye consists in suggestions of how we must move our hand
to touch them. Certain places of the image on the retina,
certain actively-produced positions of the eyeballs, are
normally linked with the sense of every determinate posi
tion which an outer thing may come to occupy. Hence we
perceive the usual position, even if the optical sensation be
artificially brought from a different part of space. Prisms
warp the light-rays in this way, and throw upon the retina
the image of an object situated, say, at spot a of space in the
same manner in which (without the prisms) an object situ
ated at spot b would cast its image Accordingly we feel
for the object at b instead of a. If the prism be before one
eye only we see the object at b with that eye, and in its
right position a with the other — in other words, we see it
double. If both eyes be armed with prisms with their angle
towards the right, we pass our hand to the right of all objects
when we try rapidly to touch them. And this illusory
sense of their position lasts until a new association is fixed,
when on removing the prisms a contrary illusion at first
occurs. Passive or unintentional changes in the position
of the eyeballs seem to be no more kept account of by the
mind than prisms are ; so we spontaneously make no allow
ance for them in our perception of distance and movements.
Press one of the eyeballs into a strained position with the
finger, and objects move and are translocated accordingly,
just as when prisms are used.

Curious illusions of movement in objects occur whenever
the eyeballs move without our intending it. We shall learn
in the following chapter that the original visual feeling of
movement is produced by any image passing over the retina.
Originally, however, this sensation is definitely referred
neither to the object nor to the eyes. Such definite refer
ence grows up later, and obeys certain simple laws. We
believe objects to move : 1) whenever we get the retinal
movement-feeling, but think our eyes are still ; and 2) when-

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 89

ever we think that our eyes move, but fail to get the retinal
movement-feeling. We believe objects to be still, on the
contrary, 1) whenever we get the retinal movement-feeling,
but think jur eyes are moving ; and 2) whenever we neither
think our eyes are moving, nor get the retinal movement-
feeling. Thus the perception of the object's state of motion
or rest depends on the notion we frame of our own eye's
movement. Now many sorts of stimulation make our eyes
move without our knowing it. If we look at a waterfall,
river, railroad train, or any body which continuously passes
in front of us in the same direction, it carries our eyes with
it. This movement can be noticed in our eyes by a by
stander. If the object keep passing towards our left, our
eyes keep following whatever moving bit of it may have
caught their attention at first, until that bit disappears
from view. Then they jerk back to the right again, and
catch a new bit, which again they follow to the left, and so
on indefinitely. This gives them an oscillating demeanor,
slow involuntary rotations leftward alternating with rapid
voluntary jerks rightward. But the oscillations continue for
a while after the object has come to a standstill, or the
eyes are carried to a new object, and this produces the illu
sion that things now move in the opposite direction. For
we are unaware of the slow leftward automatic movements
of our eyeballs, and think that the retinal movement-sen
sations thereby aroused must be due to a rightward motion
of the object seen; whilst the rapid voluntary rightward
movements of our eyeballs we interpret as attempts to pur
sue and catch again those parts of the object which have
been slipping away to the left.

Exactly similar oscillations of the eyeballs are produced
in giddiness, with exatly similar results. Giddiness is easi
est produced by whirling on our heels. It is a feeling of
the movement of our own head and body through space,
and is now pretty well understood to be due to the irrita
tion of the semi-circular canals of the inner ear.* When,

* Purkinje, Mach, and Breuer are the authors to whom we mainly owe
the explanation of the feeling of vertigo. I have found (American Jour
nal of Otology, Oct. 1882) that in deaf-mutes (whose semi-circular canals
or entire auditory nerves must often be disorganized) there very frequently
exists no susceptibility to giddiness or whirling.

90 PSYCHOLOGY.

after whirling, we stop, we seem to be spinning in the reverse
direction for a few seconds, and then objects appear to con
tinue whirling in the same direction in which, a moment
previous, our body actually whirled. The reason is that
our eyes normally tend to maintain their field of view- If we
suddenly turn our head leftwards it is hard to make the
eyes follow. They roll in their orbits rightwards, by a
sort of compensating inertia. Even though we falsely
think our head to be moving leftwards, this consequence
occurs, and our eyes move rightwards — as may be observed
in any one with vertigo after whirling. As these move
ments are unconscious, the retinal movement-feelings which
they occasion are naturally referred to the objects seen.
And the intermittent voluntary twitches of the eyes towards
the left, by which we ever and anon recover them from the
extreme rightward positions to which the reflex movement
brings them, simply confirm and intensify our impression
of a leftward-whirling field of view : we seem to ourselves
to be periodically pursuing and overtaking the objects in
their leftward flight. The whole phenomenon fades out
after a few seconds. And it often ceases if we voluntarily
fix our eyes upon a given point. *

Optical vertigo, as these illusions of objective movement
are called, results sometimes from brain-trouble, intoxica
tions, paralysis, etc. A man will awaken with a weakness
of one of his eye-muscles. An intended orbital rotation
will then not produce its expected result in the way of
retinal movement-feeling — whence false perceptions, of
which one of the most interesting cases will fall to be
discussed in later chapters.

There is an illusion of movement of the opposite sort,
with which every one is familiar at railway stations. Habit
ually, when we ourselves move forward, our entire field of
view glides backward over our retina. When our move
ment is due to that of the windowed carriage, car, or boat

* The involuntary continuance of the eye's motions is not the only cause
of the false perception in these cases. There is also a true negative after
image of the original retinal movement-sensations, as we shall eee in
Chapter XX.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 91

in which we sit, all stationary objects visible through the
window give us a sensation of gliding in the opposite
direction. Hence, whenever we get this sensation, of a
window with all objects visible through it moving in one
direction, we react upon it in our customary way, and per
ceive a stationary field of view, over which the window, and
we ourselves inside of it, are passing by a motion of our
own. Consequently when another train comes alongside
of ours in a station, and fills the entire window, and, after
standing still awhile, begins to glide away, we judge that it
is our train which is moving, and that the other train is still.
If, however, we catch a glimpse of any part of the station
through the windows, or between the cars, of the other train,
the illusion of our own movement instantly disappears, and
we perceive the other train to be the one in motion. This,
again, is but making the usual and probable inference from
our sensation.*

Another illusion due to movement is explained by Helm-
holtz. Most wayside objects, houses, trees, etc., look small
when seen out of the windows of a swift train. This is be
cause we perceive them in the first instance unduly near.
And we perceive them unduly near because of their extra
ordinarily rapid parallactic flight backwards. When we
ourselves move forward all objects glide backwards, as
aforesaid ; but the nearer they are, the more rapid is this
apparent translocation. Relative rapidity of passage back
wards is thus so familiarly associated with nearness that
when we feel it we perceive nearness. But with a given
size of retinal image the nearer an object is, the smaller do
we judge its actual size to be. Hence in the train, the
faster we go, the nearer do the trees and houses seem, and
the nearer they seem, the smaller do they look.f

Other illusions are due to the feeling of convergence being
wrongly interpreted. When we converge our eyeballs we
perceive an approximation of whatever thing we may be
looking at. Whatever things do approach whilst we look

* We never, so far as I know, get the converse illusion at a railroad sta
tion and believe the other train to move v/hen it is still,
t Helmholtz : Physiol. Optik, 365.

92 PSYCHOLOGY.

at them oblige us, so long as they are not very distant, to
converge our eyes. Hence approach of the thing is the prob
able objective fact when we feel our eyes converging. Now in
most persons the internal recti muscles, to which converg
ence is due, are weaker than the others ; and the entirely
passive position of the eyeballs, the position which they
assume when covered and looking at nothing in particular,
is either that of parallelism or of slight divergence. Make
a person look with both eyes at some near object, and then
screen the object from one of his eyes by a card or book.
The chances are that you will see the eye thus screened
turn just a little outwards. Eemove the screen, and you
will now see it turn in as it catches sight of the object again.
The other eye meanwhile keeps as it was at first. To most
persons, accordingly, all objects seem to come nearer when,
after looking at them with one eye, both eyes are used ;
and they seem to recede during the opposite change. "With
persons whose external recti muscles are insufficient, the
illusions may be of the contrary kind.

The size of the retinal image is a fruitful source of illusions.
Normally, the retinal image grows larger as the object draws
near. But the sensation yielded by this enlargement is
also given by any object which really grows in size^with-
out changing its distance. Enlargement of retinal image
is therefore an ambiguous sign. An opera-glass enlarges
the moon. But most persons will tell you that she looks
smaller through it, only a great deal nearer and brighter.
They read the enlargement as a sign of approach ; and the
perception of approach makes them actually reverse the
sensation which suggests it— by an exaggeration of our
habitual custom of making allowance of the apparent en
largement of whatever object approaches us, and reducing
it in imagination to its natural size. Similarly, in the theatre
the glass brings the stage near, but hardly seems to mag
nify the people on it.

The well-known increased apparent size of the moon on the
horizon is a result of association and probability. It is seen
through vaporous air, and looks dimmer and duskier than
when it rides on high ; and it is seen over fields, trees,

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. . 93

hedges, streams, and the like, which break up the interven
ing space and make us the better realize the latter's extent.
Both these causes make the moon seem more distant from
us when it is low ; and as its visual angle grows no less, we
deem that it must be a larger body, and we so perceive it
It looks particularly enormous when it comes up directly
behind some well-known large object, as a house or tree,
distant enough to subtend an angle no larger than that of
the moon itself.*

The feeling of accommodation also gives rise to false per
ceptions of size. Usually we accommodate our.eyes for an
object as it approaches us. Usually under these circum
stances the object throws a larger retinal image. But
believing the object to remain the same, we make allowance
for this and treat the entire eye-feeling which we receive
as significant of nothing but approach. When we relax our
accommodation and at the same time the retinal image
grows smaller, the probable cause is always a receding
object. The moment we put on convex glasses, however,
the accommodation relaxes, but the retinal image grows
larger instead of less. This is what would happen if our
object, whilst receding, grew. Such a probable object we
accordingly perceive, though with a certain vacillation as
to the recession, for the growth in apparent size is also a
probable sign of approach, and is at moments interpreted
accordingly. — Atropin paralyzes the muscles of accommo
dation. It is possible to get a dose which will weaken
these muscles without laming them altogether. When a
known near object is then looked at we have to make the
same voluntary strain to accommodate, as if it were a great
deal nearer ; but as its retinal image is not enlarged in pro
portion to this suggested approach, we deem that it must
have grown smaller than usual. In consequence of this
so-called micropsy, Aubert relates that he saw a man ap
parently no larger than a photograph. But the small size
again made the man seem farther off. The real distance

* Cf . Berkeley's Theory of Vision, §§ 67-79 ; Helmholtz : Physiologische
Optik, pp. 630-1 ; Lechalas in Reuve Philosophique, xxvi. 49.

94 • PSYCHOLOGY.

was two or three feet, and he seemed against the wall of
the room.* Of these vacillations we shall have to speak
again in the ensuing chapter, t

Mrs. C. L. Franklin has recently described and explained
with rare acuteness an illusion of which the most curious
thing is that it was never noticed before. Take a single
pair of crossed lines (Fig. 49), hold them in a horizontal plane
1.2. before the eyes, and look along them, at such a
distance that with the right eye shut, 1, and with
the left eye shut, 2, looks like the projection of a
vertical line. Look steadily now at the point of
intersection of the lines with both eyes open, and
you will see a third line sticking up like a pin
through the paper at right angles to the plane of the
FIG. 49. two first lines. The explanation of this illusion is
very simple, but so circumstantial that I must refer for it to
Mrs. Franklin's own account.:): Suffice it that images of the
two lines fall on ' corresponding ' rows of retinal points,
and that the illusory vertical line is the only object capable
of throwing such images. A variation of the experiment
is this :

" In Fig. 50 the lines are all drawn so as to pass through a common
point. With a little trouble one eye can be put into the position of this
point— it is only necessary that the paper be held so that, with one eye
shut, the other eye sees all the lines leaning neither to the right nor to
the left. After a moment one can fancy the lines to be vertical staffs
standing out of the plane of the paper. . . . This illusion [says Mrs.
Franklin] I take to be of purely mental origin. When a line lies any
where in a plane passing through the apparent vertical meridian of one
eye, and is looked at with that eye only. ... we have no very good
means of knowing how it is directed in that plane. . . . Now of the
lines in nature which lie anywhere within such a plane, by far the

* Physiol. Optik, p. 602.

t It seems likely that the strains in the recti muscles have something to
do with the vacillating judgment in these atropin cases. The internal recti
contract whenever we accommodate. They squint and produce double
vision when the innervation for accommodation is excessive. To see
singly, when straining the atropinized accommodation, the contraction of
our internal recti must be neutralized by a correspondingly excessive con
traction of the external recti. But this is a sign of the object's recession, etc,

| American Journal of Psychology, i. 101 ff.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 95

greater number are vertical lines. Hence we are peculiarly inclined to
think that a line which we perceive to be in such a plane is a vertical
line. But to see a lot of lines at once, all ready to throw their images

FIG. 50.

upon the vertical meridian, is a thing that has hardly ever happened to
us, except when they all have been vertical lines. Hence when that
happens we have a still stronger tendency to think that what we see
before us is a group of vertical lines."

In other words, we see, as always, the most probable
object.

The foregoing may serve as examples of the first type
of illusions mentioned on page 86. I could cite of course
many others, but it would be tedious to enumerate all the
thaumatropes and zoetropes, dioramas, and juggler's tricks
in which they are embodied. In the chapter on Sensation
we saw that many illusions commonly ranged under this
type are, physiologically considered, of another sort al
together, and that associative processes, strictly so called,
have nothing to do with their production.

Illusions of the Second Type.

We may now turn to illusions of the second of the two
types discriminated on page 86. ' In this type we perceive a
wrong object because our mind is full of the thought of it
at the time, and any sensation which is in the least degree
connected with it touches off, as it were, a train already
laid, and gives us a sense that th 3 object is really before
us. Here is a familiar example :

"If a sportsman, while shooting woodcock in cover, sees a bird
about the size and color of a woodcock get up and fly through the foil-

96 PSYCHOLOGY.

age, not having time to see more than that it is a bird of such a size-
and color, he immediately supplies by inference the other qualities of a
woodcock, and is afterwards disgusted to find that he has shot a thrush.
I have done so myself, and could hardly believe that the thrush was the
bird I had fired at, so complete was my mental supplement to my visual
perception."*

As with game, so with enemies, ghosts, and the like.
Anyone waiting in a dark place and expecting or fearing
strongly a certain object will interpret any abrupt sensa
tion to mean that object's presence. The boy playing * I
spy,' the criminal skulking from his pursuers, the supersti
tious person hurrying through the woods or past the church
yard at midnight, the man lost in the woods, the girl who
tremulously has made an evening appointment with her
swain, all are subject to illusions of sight and sound which
make their hearts beat till they are dispelled. Twenty
times a day the lover, perambulating the streets with his
preoccupied fancy, will think he perceives his idol's bonnet
before him.

The Proof-reader's Illusion. I remember one night in
Boston, whilst waiting for a ' Mount Auburn ' car to bring
me to Cambridge, reading most distinctly that name upon
the signboard of a car on which (as I afterwards learned)
* North Avenue ' was painted. The illusion was so vivid
that I could hardly believe my eyes had deceived me. All
reading is more or less performed in this way.

" Practised novel- or newspaper-readers could not possibly get on so
fast if they had to see accurately every single letter of every word in
order to perceive the words. More than half of the words come out of
their mind, and hardly half from the printed page. Were this not so,
did we perceive each letter by itself, typographic errors in well-knowii
words would never be overlooked. Children, whose ideas are not yet
ready enough to perceive words at a glance, read them wrong if they
are printed wrong, that is, right according to the way of printing. In
a foreign language, although it may be printed with the same letters,
we read by so much the more slowly as we do not understand, or are
sinable promptly to perceive the words. But we notice misprints all the-
more readily. For this reason Latin and Greek and, still better,
Hebrew works are more correctly printed, because the proofs are better
corrected, than in German works. Of two friends of mine, one knew
much Hebrew, the other little ; the latter, however, gave instruction m

* Romanes, Mental Evolution in Animals, D. 324.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 97

Hebrew in a gymnasium ; and when he called the other to help correct
his pupils' exercises, it turned out that he could find out all sorts of
little errors better than his friend, because the latter's perception of the
words as totals was too swift." '

Testimony to personal identity is proverbially fallacious for
similar reasons. A man has witnessed a rapid crime or
accident, and carries away his mental image. Later he is
confronted by a prisoner whom he forthwith perceives in
the light of that image, and recognizes or 'identifies' as a
participant, although he may never have been near the
spot. Similarly at the so-called < materializing seances'
which fraudulent mediums give : in a dark room a man
sees a gauze-robed figure who in a whisper tells him she is
the spirit of his sister, mother, wife, or child, and falls upon
his neck. The darkness, the previous forms, and the ex
pectancy have so filled his mind with piemonitory images
that it is no wonder he perceives what is suggested. These
fraudulent 'seances' would furnish most precious docu
ments to the psychology of perception, if they could only
be satisfactorily inquired into. In the hypnotic trance any
suggested object is sensibly perceived. In certain subjects
this happens more or less completely after waking from
the trance. It would seem that under favorable conditions
a somewhat similar susceptibility to suggestion may exist
in certain persons who are not otherwise entranced at all.

This suggestibility is greater in the lower senses than
in the higher. A German observer writes :

" We know that a weak smell or taste may be very diversely inter
preted by us, and that the same sensation will now be named as one
thing and the next moment as another. Suppose an agreeable smell of
flowers in a room : A visitor will notice it, seek to recognize what it is,

* M. Lazarus : Das Leben d. Seele, n (1857), p. 32. In the ordinary
hearing of speech half the words we seem to hear are supplied out of our
own head. A language with which we are perfectly familiar is under
stood, even when spoken in low tones and far off. An unfamiliar language
is unintelligible under these conditions. If we do not get a very good seat
at a foreign theatre, we fail to follow the dialogue ; and what gives trouble
to most of us when abroad is not only that the natives speak so fast, but
that they speak so indistinctly and so low. The verbal objects for inter
preting the sounds by are not alert and ready made in our minds, as they
are in our familiar mother-tongue, and do not start up at so faint a cue.

98 PSYCHOLOGY.

and at last perceive more and more distinctly that it is the perfume of
roses — until after all he discovers a bouquet of violets. Then suddenly
he recognizes the violet-smell, and wonders how he could possibly have
hit upon the roses.— Just so it is with taste. Try some meat whose
visible characteristics are disguised by the mode of cooking, and you
will perhaps begin by taking it for venison, and end by being quite
certain that it is venison, until you are told that it is mutton ; where
upon you get distinctly the mutton flavor. — In this wise one may make
a person taste or smell what one will, if one only makes sure that he
shall conceive it beforehand as we wish, by saying to him : ' Doesn't
that taste just like, etc.?' or 'Doesn't it smell just like, etc.?' One
can cheat whole companies in this way ; announce, for instance, at a
meal, that the meat tastes 'high,' and almost every one who is not
animated by a spirit of opposition will discover a flavor of putrescence
which in reality is not there at all.

."In the sense of feeling this phenomenon is less prominent, because
we get so close to the object that our sensation of it is never incomplete.
Still, examples may be adduced from this sense. On superficially feel
ing of a cloth, one may confidently declare it for velvet, whilst it is
perhaps a long-haired cloth ; or a person may perhaps not be able to
decide whether he has put on woolen or cotton stockings, and, trying
to ascertain this by the feeling on the skin of the feet, he may become
aware that he gets the feeling of cotton or wool according as he thinks
of the one or the other. When the feeling in our fingers is somewhat
blunted by cold, we notice many such phenomena, being then more ex
posed to confound objects of touch with one another." *

High authorities have doubted this power of imagination
to falsify present impressions of sense, t Yet it unquestion
ably exists. Within the past fortnight I have been annoyed
by a smell, faint but unpleasant, in my library. My annoy
ance began by an escape of gas from the furnace below
stairs. This seemed to get lodged in my imagination as a
sort of standard of perception; for, several days after the
furnace had been rectified, I perceived the 'same smell'
again. It was traced this time to a new pair of India rubber
shoes which had been brought in from the shop and laid on
a table. It persisted in coming to me for several days,
however, in spite of the fact that no other member of the
family or visitor noticed anything unpleasant. My impres
sion during part of this time was one of uncertainty whether

* G. H. Meyer, Untersuchungen, etc., pp. 242-3.

f Helmholtz, P. O. 438. The question will soon come before us again
in the chapter on the Perception of Space.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 99

the smell was imaginary or real ; and at last it faded out.
Everyone must be able to give instances like this from the
smell-sense. When we have paid the faithless plumber for
pretending to mend our drains, the intellect inhibits the
nose from perceiving the same unaltered odor, until per
haps several days go by. As regards the ventilation or
heating of rooms, we are apt to feel for some time as we
think we ought to feel. If we believe the ventilator is shut,
we feel the room close. On discovering it open, the oppres
sion disappears.

An extreme instance is given in the following extract :

"A patient called at my office one day in a state of great excitement
from the effects of an offensive odor in the horse-car she had come in,
and which she declared had probably emanated from some very sick
person who must have been just carried in it. There could be no doubt
that something had affected her seriously, for she was very pale, with
nausea, difficulty in breathing, and other evidences of bodily and mental
distress. I succeeded, after some difficulty and time, in quieting her,
and she left, protesting that the smell was unlike anything she had ever
before experienced and was something dreadful. Leaving my office
soon after, it so happened that I found her at the street-corner, waiting
for a car: we thus entered the car together. She immediately called
my attention to the same sickening odor which she had experienced in
the other car, and began to be affected the same as before, when I
pointed out to her that the smell was simply that which always emanates
from the straw which has been in stables. She quickly recognized it as
the same, when the unpleasant effects which arose while she was possessed
with another perception of its character at once passed away." *

It is the same with touch. Everyone must have felt the
sensible quality change under his hand, as sudden contact
with something moist or hairy, in the dark, awoke a shock
of disgust or fear which faded into calm recognition of some
familiar object? Even so small a thing as a crumb of po
tato on the table-cloth, which we pick up, thinking it a
crumb of bread, feels horrible for a few moments to our
fancy, and different from what it is.

"Weight or muscular feeling is a sensation ; yet who has
not heard the anecdote of some one to whom Sir Humphry
Davy showed the metal sodium which he had just dis
covered? "Bless me, how heavy it is!" said the man;

* C. F Taylor, Sensation and Pain, p. 37 (N. Y., 1882).

100 PSYCHOLOGY.

showing that his idea of what metals as a class ought to be
had falsified the sensation he derived from a very light
substance.

In the sense of hearing, similar mistakes abound. I
have already mentioned the hallucinatory effect of mental
images of very faint sounds, such as distant clock-strokes
(above, p. 71). But even when stronger sensations of sound
have been present, everyone must recall some experience
in which they have altered their acoustic character as soon
as the intellect referred them to a different source. The
other day a friend was sitting in my room, when the clock,
which has a rich low chime, began to strike. " Hollo ! " said
he, "hear that hand-organ in the garden," and was sur
prised at finding the real source of the sound. I had myself
some years ago a very striking illusion of the sort. Sitting
reading late one night, I suddenly heard a most formidable
noise proceeding from the upper part of the house, which
it seemed to fill. It ceased, and in a moment renewed it
self. I went into the hall to listen, but it came no more.
Kesuming my seat in the room, however, there it was again,
low, mighty, alarming, like a rising flood or the avant-
courier of an awful gale. It came from all space. Quite
startled, I again went into the hall, but it had already
ceased once more. On returning a second time to the room,
I discovered that it was nothing but the breathing of a little
Scotch terrier which lay asleep on the floor. The note
worthy thing is that as soon as I recognized what it was, I
was compelled to think it a different sound, and could not
then hear it as I had heard it a moment before.

In the anecdotes given by Delboeuf and Eeid, this was
probably also the case, though it is not so stated. Keid

" I remember that once lying abed, and having been put into a fright,
I heard my own heart beat; but I took it to be one knocking at the
door, and arose and opened the door oftener than once, before I dis
covered that the sound was in my own breast," (Inquiry, chap. iv.
§1.)

Delboeuf s story is as follows :

" The illustrious P. J. van Beneden, senior, was walking one evening
with a friend along a woody hill near Chaudfontaine. 'Don't you

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 101

hear,' said the friend, 'the noise of a hunt on the mountain ?' M. van
Beneden listens and distinguishes in fact the giving-tongue of the dogs.
They listen some time, expecting from one moment to another to see a
deer bound by; but the voice of the dogs seems neither to recede nor
approach. At last a countryman comes by, and they ask him who it is
that can be hunting at this late hour. But he, pointing to some puddles
of water near their feet, replies: l Yonder little animals are what you
hear ' And there there were in fact a number of toads of the species
BomUnator igneus. . . . This batrachian emits at the pairing season a
silvery or rather crystalline note. ... Sad and pure, it is a voice m
nowise resembling that of hounds giving chase." !

The sense of sight, as we have seen in studying Space,
is pregnant with illusions of both the types considered.
No sense gives such fluctuating impressions of the same
object as sight does. With no sense are we so apt to treat
the sensations immediately given as mere signs ; with none
is the invocation from memory of a thing, and the conse
quent perception of the latter, so immediate. The 'thing
which we perceive always resembles, as we have seen, the
object of some absent sensation, usually another optical
figure which in our mind has come to be the standard of
reality ; and it is this incessant reduction of our optical
objects' to more « real' forms which has led some authors
into the mistake of thinking that the sensations which
first apprehend them are originaUy and natively of no

form at alLf

Of accidental and occasional illusions of sight many
amusing examples might be given. Two will suffice. One
is a reminiscence of my own. I was lying in my berth m
a steamer listening to the sailors holystone the deck out
side ; when, on turning my eyes to the window, I perceived
with perfect distinctness that the chief-engineer of the ves
sel had entered my state-room, and was standing looking
through the window at the men at work upon the guards.
Surprised at his intrusion, and also at his intentness and

* Examen Critique de la Loi Psychophysique (1883), p. 81.

f Compare A. W Volkmann's essay ' Ueber Ursprilngliches und Erwor-
benes in den Raumanschauungen,' on p. 139 of his Untersuchungen im
Oebiete der Optik ; and Chapter xm of Hering's contribution t«
mann's Handbuch der Physiologic, vol. m.

102 PSYCHOLOGY.

immobility, I remained watching him and wondering how
long he would stand thus. At last I spoke ; but getting no
reply, sat up in my berth, and then saw that what I had
taken for the engineer was my own cap and coat hanging
on a peg beside the window. The illusion was complete ;
the engineer was a peculiar-looking man ; and I saw him
unmistakably ; but after the illusion had vanished 1 found
it hard voluntarily to make the cap and coat look like him
at all.

The following story, which I owe to my friend Prof.
Hyatt, is of a probably not uncommon class :

" During the winter of 1858, while in Venice, I had tfoe somewhat
peculiar illusion which you request me to relate. I remember the cir
cumstances very accurately because I have often repeated the story,
and have made an effort to keep all the attendant circumstances clear
of exaggeration. I was travelling with my mother, and we had taken
rooms at a hotel which had been located in an old palace. The room
in which I went to bed was large and lofty. The moon was shining
brightly, and I remember standing before a draped window, thinking
of the romantic nature of the surroundings, remnants of old stories of
knights and ladies, and the possibility that even in that room itself
love-scenes and sanguinary tragedies might have taken place. The
night was so lovely that many of the people were strolling through the
narrow lanes or so-called streets, singing as they went, and I laid awake
for some time listening to these patrols of serenaders, and of course
finally fell asleep. I became aware that some one was leaning over me
closely, and that my own breathing was being interfered with; a decided
feeling of an unwelcome presence of some sort awakened me. As I
opened my eyes I saw, as distinctly as I ever saw any living person, a
draped head about a foot or eighteen inches to the right, and just above
my bed. The horror which took possession of my young fancy was
beyond anything 1 have ever experienced. The head was covered by a
long black veil which floated out into the moonlight, the face itself was
pale and beautiful, and the lower part swathed in the white band com
monly worn by the nuns of Catholic orders. My hair seemed to rise
up, and a profuse perspiration attested the genuineness of the terror
which I felt. For a time I lay in this way, and then gradually gaining
more command over my superstitious terrors, concluded to try to grap
ple with the apparition. It remained perfectly distinct until I reached
at it sharply with my hand, and then disappeared, to return again,
however, as soon as I sank back into the pillow. The second or third
grasp which I made at the head was not followed by a reappearance,
and I then saw that the ghost was not a real presence, but depended
upon the position of my head. If I moved my eyes either to the left or

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 103

right of the original position occupied by my head when I awakened, the
ghost disappeared, and by returning to about the same position, I could
make it reappear with nearly the same intensity as at first. I presently
satisfied myself by these experiments that the illusion arose from the
effect of the imagination, aided by the actual figure made by a visual
section of the moonbeams shining through the lace curtains of the win
dow. If I had given way to the first terror of the situation and cov
ered up my head, I should probably have believed in the reality of the
apparition, since I have not by the slightest word, so far as I know, ex
aggerated the vividness of my feelings."

THE PHYSIOLOGICAL PROCESS IN PERCEPTION.

Enough has now been said to prove the general law of
perception, which is this, that whilst part of what we per
ceive comes through our senses from the object before us, another
part (and it may be the larger part) always comes (in Laza
rus' s phrase) out of our own head.

At bottom this is only one case (and that the simplest
case) of the general fact that our nerve-centres are an organ
for reacting on sense-impressions, and that our hemispheres,
in particular, are given us in order that records of our private
past experience may co-operate in the reaction. Of course
such a general way of stating the fact is vague ; and all those
who follow the current theory of ideas will be prompt to
throw this vagueness at it as a reproach. Their way of de
scribing the process goes much more into detail. The sen
sation, they say, awakens ' images ' of other sensations asso
ciated with it in the past. These images ' fuse,' or are ' com
bined ' by the Ego with the present sensation into a new
product, the percept, etc., etc. Something so indistinguish
able from this in practical outcome is what really occurs,
that one may seem fastidious in objecting to such a state
ment, specially if have no rival theory of the elementary
processes to propose. And yet, if this notion of images,
rising and flocking and fusing be mythological (and we have
all along so considered it), why should we entertain it unless
confessedly as a mere figure of speech? As such, of course,
it is convenient and welcome to pass. But if we try to put
an exact meaning into it, all we find is that the brain reacts
by paths which previous experiences have worn, and makes
us usually perceive the probable thing, i.e., the thing by

104 PSYCHOLOGY.

which on previous occasions the reaction was most frequent
ly aroused.

But we can, I think, without danger of being too
speculative, be a little more exact than this, and conceive
of a physiological reason why the felt quality of an object
changes when, instead of being apprehended in a mere sen
sation, the object is perceived as a thing. All consciousness
seems to depend on a certain slowness of the process in the
cortical cells. The rapider currents are, the less feeling
they seem to awaken. If a region A, then, be so connected
with another region B that every current which enters A
immediately drains off into B, we shall not be very strongly
conscious of the sort of object that A can make us feel.
If B, on the contrary, has no such copious channel of dis
charge, the excitement will linger there longer ere it diffuses
itself elsewhere, and our consciousness of the sort of ob
ject that B makes us feel will be strong. Carrying this to
an ideal maximum, we may say that if A offer no resistance
to the transmission forward of the current, and if the cur
rent terminate in B, then, no matter what causes may initiate
the current, we shall get no consciousness of the object-
peculiar to A, but on the contrary a vivid sensation of the
object peculiar to B. And this will be true though at other
times the connection between A and B might lie less open,
and every current then entering A might give us a strong con
sciousness of A's peculiar object. In other words, just in
proportion as associations are habitual, will the qualities of
the suggested thing tend to substitute themselves in con
sciousness for those of the thing immediately there; or,
more briefly, just in proportion as an experience is probable
will it tend to be directly felt. In all such experiences the
paths lie wide open from the cells first affected to those
concerned with the suggested ideas. A circular after-image
on the receding wall or ceiling is actually seen as an ellipse,
a square after-image of a cross there is seen as slant-legged,
etc., because only in the process correlated with the vision
of the latter figures do the inward currents find a pause
(see the next chapter).

We must remember this when, in dealing with the eye,
we come to point out the erroneousness of the principle laid

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 106

down * Beid and Helmholtz that true sensations can
never be changed by the suggestions of experience.

A certain illusion of which I have not yet spoken affords
an additional illustration of this. When we ivill to execute a
movement and the movement for some reason does not occur,
unless the sensation of the part's NOT moving is a strong one, ice
are apt to fed as if the movement had actually taken place.
This seems habitually to be the case in anaesthesia of the
moving parts. Close the patient's eyes, hold his anaesthetic
arm still, and tell him to raise his hand to his head ; and
when he opens his eyes he will be astonished to find that
the movement has not taken place. All reports of anaesthetic
cases seem to mention this illusion. Sternberg who wrote on
the subject in 1885,* lays it down as a law that the intention
to move is the same thing as the feeling of the motion. We
shall later see that this is iealse (Chapter XXV) ; but it
certainly may suggest the feeling of the motion with hallu
cinatory intensity. Sternberg gives the following experi
ment, which I find succeeds with at least half of those who
try it : Eest your palm on the edge of the table with your
forefinger hanging over in a position of extreme flexion,
and then exert your will to flex it still more. The position
of the other fingers makes this impossible, and yet if we do
not look to see the finger, we think we feel it move. He
quotes from Exner a similar experiment with the jaws : Put
some hard rubber or other unindentable obstacle between

* In the Proceedings of the American Society for Psychical Research, pp.
253-4. I have tried to account for some of the variations in this conscious
ness. Out of 140 persons whom I found to feel their lost foot, some did so
dubiously. ' ' Either they only feel it occasionally, or only when it pains
them, or only when they try to move it; or they only feel it when they
' think a good deal about it ' and make an effort to conjure it up. When
they 'grow inattentive,' the feeling 'flies back' or 'jumps back,' to the
stump. Every degree of consciousness, from complete and permanent hal
lucination down to something hardly distinguishable from ordinary fancy,
seems represented in the sense of the missing extremity which these
patients say they have. Indeed I have seldom seen a more plausible lot of
evidence for the view that imagination and sensation are but differences of
vividness in an identical process than these confessions, taking them alto
gether, contain. Many patients say they can hardly tell whether they
feel or fancy the limb. "

106 PSYCHOLOGY.

your back teeth and bite hard : you think you ft v .xie jaw
move and the front teeth approach each other, though in
the nature of things no movement can occur. * — The visu
al suggestion of the path traversed by the finger-tip as the
locus of the movement-feeling in the joint, which we dis
cussed on page 41, is another example of this semi-hallu
cinatory power of the suggested thing. Amputated people,
as we have learned, still feel their lost feet, etc. This is a
necessary consequence of the law of specific energies, for if
the central region correlated with the foot give rise to any
feeling at all it must give rise to the feeling of a foot.f But
the curious thing is that many of these patients can will the
foot to move, and when they have done so, distinctly feel the
movement to occur. They can, to use their own language,
* work ' or ' wiggle ' their lost toes. J

Now in all these various cases we are dealing with data
which in normal life are inseparably joined. Of all possi
ble experiences, it is hard to imagine any pair more uni
formly and incessantly coupled than the volition to move,
on the one hand, and the feeling of the changed position of
the parts, on the other. From the earliest ancestors of ours
which had feet, down to the present day, the movement of
the feet must always have accompanied the will to move
them ; and here, if anywhere, habit's consequences ought
to be found. J The process of the willing ought, then, to pour
into the process of feeling the command effected, and ought
to awaken that feeling in a maximal degree provided no
other positively contradictory sensation come in at the same
time. In most of us, when the will fails of its effect there
is a contradictory sensation. We discern a resistance or
the unchanged position of the limb. But neither in anaes
thesia nor in amputation can there be any contradictory
sensation in the foot to correct us ; so imagination has all
the +'orce of fact.

* Pfliiger's Archiv, xxxvii. 1.
f Not all patients have this additional illusion.

} I ought to say that in almost all cases the volition is followed by
actual contraction of muscles in the *tumv.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 10?

• APPERCEPTION.'

In Germany since Herbart's time Psychology has always
had a great deal to say about a process called Apperception*
The incoming ideas or sensations are said to be ' apper-
ceived ' by * masses ' of ideas already in the mind. It is plain
that the process we have been describing as perception is,
at this rate, an apperceptive process. So are all recogni
tion, classing, and naming ; and passing beyond these sim
plest suggestions, all farther thoughts about our percepts are
apperceptive processes as well. I have myself not used the
word apperception because it has carried very different mean-
ings in the history of philosophy,f and 'psychic reaction,'
'interpretation,' 'conception,' 'assimilation/ 'elaboration,'
or simply * thought,' are perfect synonyms for its Herbartian
meaning, widely taken. It is, moreover, hardly worth while
to pretend to analyze the so-called apperceptive perform-
ances beyond the first or perceptive stage, because their varia
tions and degrees are literally innumerable. ' Apperception *
is a name for the sum-total of the effects of what we have
studied as association ; and it is obvious that the things
which a given experience will suggest to a man depend on
what Mr. Lewes calls his entire psychostatical conditions,
bis nature and stock of ideas, or, in other words, his charac
ter, habits, memory, education, previous experience, and
momentary mood. We gain no insight into what reall 7 oc
curs either in the mind or in the brain by calling all these
things the ' apperceiving mass,' though of course this may
upon occasion be convenient. On the whole I am inclined
to think Mr. Lewes' s term of ' assimilation ' the most fruit
ful one yet used4

Professor H. Steinthal has analyzed apperceptive pro
cesses with a sort of detail which is simply burdensome. §

* Cf. Herbart, Psychol als. Wissenschaft, § 125.

f Compare the historical reviews by K. Lange : Ueber Apperception
(Plauen, 1879), pp. 12-14; by Staude in Wundt's Philosophische Studicn, i.
149; and by Marty in Vierteljsch. f. wiss. Phil., x. 347 ff.

t Problems, vol. I. p. 118 ff.

§ See his Einleitung in die Psychologic u. Sprachwissenschaft (188H
p. 166 ff.

108 PSYCHOLOGY.

His introduction of the matter may, however, be quoted,
He begins with an anecdote from a comic paper.

" In the compartment of a railway-carriage six persons unknown to
each other sit in lively conversation. It becomes a matter of regret that
one of the company must alight at the next station. One of the others
says that he of all things prefers such a meeting with entirely unknown
persons, and that on such occasions he is accustomed neither to ask who
or what his companions may be nor to tell who or what he is. Another
thereupon says that he will undertake to decide this question, if they
-each and all will answer him an entirely disconnected question. They
began. He drew five leaves from his note-book, wrote a question on
*each, and gave one to each of his companions with the request that he
write the answer below. When the leaves were returned to him, he
turned, after reading them, without hesitation to the others, and said to
the first, 'You are a man of science'; to the second, 'You are a so),
dier'; to the third, ' You are a philologer'; to the fourth, ' You are a
journalist'; to the fifth, 'You are a farmer.' All admitted that he
was right, whereupon he got out arid left the five behind. Each
wished to know what question the others had received; and behold, he
had given the same question to each. It ran thus :

u * What being destroys what it has itself brought forth ?

"To this the naturalist had answered, 'vital force'; the soldier,
war'; the philologist, 'Kronos'; the publicist, 'revolution'; the
farmer, 'a boar'. This anecdote, methinks, if not true, is at least
splendidly well invented. Its narrator makes the journalist go on to
say : * Therein consists the joke. Each one answers the first thing that
occurs to him,* and that is whatever is most newly related to his pur
suit in life. Every question is a hole-drilling experiment, and the an
swer is an opening through which one sees into our interiors. ' ... So
do we all. We are all able to recognize the clergyman, the soldier, the
scholar, the business man, not only by the cut of their garments and
the attitude of their body, but by what they say and how they express
it. We guess the place in life of men by the interest which they show
and the way in which they show it, by the objects of which they speak,
by the point of view from which they regard things, judge them, conceive
them, in short by their mode of apperceiving. . . .

I' ' Every man has one group of ideas which relate to his own person
and interests, and another which is connected with society. Each has
his group of ideas about plants, religion, law, art, etc., and more
especially about the rose, epic poetry, sermons free trade, and the like.
Thus the mental content of every individual, even of the uneducated

* One of my colleagues, asking himself the question after reading the
anecdote, tells me that he replied * Harvard College,' the faculty of that body
having voted, a few days previously, to keep back the degrees of memben
of the graduating class who might be disorderly on class-day night. W. J.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 109

and of children, consists of masses or circles of knowledge of which,
each lies within some larger circle, alongside of others similarly in
cluded, and of which each includes smaller circles within itself. . . .
The perception of a thing like a horse ... is a process between the
present horse's picture before our eyes, on the one hand, and those fused
or interwoven pictures and ideas of all the horses we have ever seen, on
the other; ... a process between two factors or momenta, of which
one existed before the process and was an old possession of the mind
(the group of ideas, or concept, namely), whilst the other is but just
presented to the mind, and is the immediately supervening factor (the
sense-impression). The former apperceives the latter; the latter is
apperceived by the former. Out of their combination an apperception-
product arises: the knowledge of the perceived being as a horse. The
earlier factor is relatively to the later one active and a priori ; the super
vening factor is given, a posteriori, passive. ... We may then define
Apperception as the movement of two masses of consciousness (Vorstel-
lungsmassen) against each other so as to produce a cognition.

4k The a priori factor we called active, the a posteriori factor passive,
but this is only relatively true. . . . Although the a priori rc iment
commonly shows itself to be the more powerful, apperception- processes
can perfectly well occur in which the new observation transforms or en
riches the apperceiving group of ideas. A child who hitherto has seen
none but four-cornered tables apperceives a round one as a table; but
by this the apperceiving mass ('table') is enriched. To his previous
knowledge of tables comes this new feature that they need not be four-
cornered, but may be round. In the history of science it has happened
often enough that some discovery, at the same time that it was apper
ceived, i.e. brought into connection with the system of our knowledge,
transformed the whole system. In principle, however, we must maintain
that, although either factor is both active and passive, the a priori factor
is almost always the more active of the two." *

This account of Steinthal's brings out very clearly the
difference between our psychological conceptions and ivliat are^
called concepts in logic. In logic a concept is unalterable ; but
what are popularly called our ( conceptions of things ' alter
by being used. The aim of ' Science ' is to attain concep
tions so adequate and exact that we shall never need to
change them. There is an everlasting struggle in every
mind between the tendency to keep unchanged, and the
tendency to renovate, its ideas. Our education is a cease
less compromise between the conservative and the pro
gressive factors. Every new experience must be disposed

* Op. cit. pp. 166-171.

110 PSYCHOLOGY.

of under some old head. The great point is to find the head
which has to be least altered to take it in. Certain Polyne
sian natives, seeing horses for the first time, called them
pigs, that being the nearest head. My child of two played
for a week with the first orange that was given him, calling
it a 'ball.' He called the first whole eggs he saw 'potatoes,'
having been accustomed to see his ' eggs ' broken into a
glass, and his potatoes without the skin. A folding pocket-
corkscrew he unhesitatingly called 'bad-scissors.' Hardly
any one of us can make new heads easily when fresh expe
riences come. Most of us grow more and more enslaved to
the stock conceptions with which we have once become
familiar, and less and less capable of assimilating impres
sions in any but the old ways. Old-fogyism, in short, is the
inevitable terminus to which life sweeps us on. Objects
which violate our established habits of ' apperception ' are
simply not taken account of at all ; or, if on some occasion
we are forced by dint of argument to admit their existence,
twenty-four hours later the admission is as if it were not,
and every trace of the unassimilable truth has vanished
from our thought. Genius, in truth, means little more than
the faculty of perceiving in an unhabitual way.

On the other hand, nothing is more congenial, from
babyhood to the end of life, than to be able to assimilate
the new to the old, to meet each threatening violator or
burster of our well-known series of concepts, as it comes
in, see through its unwontedness, and ticket it off as an old
friend in disguise. This victorious assimilation of the new
is in fact the type of all intellectual pleasure. The lust for
it is curiosity. The relation of the new to the old, before
the assimilation is performed, is wonder. We feel neither
curiosity nor wonder concerning things so far beyond us
that we have no concepts to refer them to or standards by
which to measure them.* The Fuegians, in Darwin's voy-

* The great maxim in pedagogy is to knit every new piece of knowl
edge on to a pre-existing curiosity — i.e., to assimilate its matter in some
way to what is already known. Hence the advantage of " comparing all
that is far off and foreign to something that is near home, of making the
unknown plain by the example of the known, and of connecting all the
instruction with the personal experience of the pupil. ... If the teacher is

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. Ill

age. wondered at the small boats, but took the big ship as
a ' matter of course.' Only what we partly know already
inspires us with a desire to know more. The more elabo
rate textile fabrics, the vaster works in metal, to most of
us are like the air, the water, and the ground, absolute ex
istences which awaken no ideas. It is a matter of course
that an engraving or a copper-plate inscription should pos
sess that degree of beauty. But if we are shown a pen-
drawing of equal perfection, our personal sympathy with
the difficulty of the task makes us immediately wonder at
the skill. The old lady admiring the Academician's picture,
says to him : " And is it really all done by hand ?"

IS PEBCEPTION UNCONSCIOUS INPEKENCE ?

A widely-spread opinion (which has been held by such
men as Schopenhauer, Spencer, Hartmann, Wundt, Helm-
holtz, and lately interestingly pleaded for by M. Binet *)
will have it that perception should be called a sort of reasoning
operation, more or less unconsciously and automatically per
formed. The question seems at first a verbal one, depend
ing on how broadly the term reasoning is to be taken. If,
every time a present sign suggests an absent reality to our
mind, we make an inference ; and if every time we make an
inference we reason ; then perception is indubitably reason
ing. Only one sees no room in it for any unconscious part.
Both associates, the present sign and the contiguous things
which it suggests, are above-board, and no intermediary

to explain the distance of the sun from the earth, let him ask ... 'If any
one there in the sun fired off a cannon straight at you, what should you
do ?' ' Get out of the way ' would be the answer. ' No need of that,'
the toacher might reply. ' You may quietly go to sleep in your room,
and get up again, you may wait till your confirmation-day, you may learn
a trade, and grow as old as I am, — then only will the cannon-ball be get
ting near, then you may jump to one side! See, so great as that is the sun's
distance!' " (K. Lange, Ueber Apperception, 1879, p. 76— a charming
though prolix little work.)

* A. Schopenhauer, Sat/, vom Grunde, chap. iv. H. Spencer. Psychol.,
part VT. chaps, ix, x. E. v. Hartmann, Phil, of the Unconscious (B),
chaps, vii, vin. W. Wundt, Beitrage, pp. 422 If.; Vorlesuugen, iv, xiu.
H. Helmholtz, Physiol Optik, pp. 430, 447. A. Binet, Psychol. du Rai-
sonnemeut, chaps, in, v. Wundt and Helmholtz have more recently
4 recanted.' See above, vol i. p. 169 note.

PSYCHOLOGY.

ideas are required. Most of those who have upheld the
thesis in question have, however, made a more complex
supposition. What they have meant is that perception is
a mediate inference, and that the middle term is unconscious.
When the sensation which I have called * this ' (p. 83, supra)
is felt, they think that some process like the following runs
through the mind :

' This ' is M ;

but M is A ;

therefore ' this ' is A.*

Now there seem no good grounds for supposing this
additional wheelwork in the mind. The classification of
' this ' as M is itself an act of perception, and should, if all
perception were inference, require a still earlier syllogism for
its performance, and so backwards in infinitum. The only
extrication from this coil would be to represent the process
in altered guise, thus :

'This' is like those;

Those are A ;

Therefore 'this 'is A.

The major premise here involves no association by conti
guity, no naming of those as M, but only a suggestion of
unnamed similar images, a recall of analogous past sensa
tions with which the characters that make up A were habit
ually conjoined. But hers again, what grounds of fact are
there for admitting this recall ? We are quite unconscious
of any such images of the past. And the conception of all
the forms of association as resultants of the elementary fact
of habit-worn paths in the brain makes such images entirely
superfluous for explaining the phenomena in point. Since
the brain-process of ' this,' the sign of A, has repeatedly
been aroused in company with the process of the full object
A, direct paths of irradiation from the one to the other must
be already established. And although roundabout paths
may also be possible, as from 'this' to 'those,' and then

* When not all M, but only some M, is A, when, in other words, M is
' undistributed ' the conclusion is liable to error. Illusions would thus be
logical fallacies, if true perceptions were valid syllogisms. They would
draw false conclusions from undistributed middle terms.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 113

from ' those ' to * A' (paths which would lead to practically
the same conclusion as the straighter ones), yet there is no
ground whatever for assuming them to be traversed now,
especially since appearances point the other way. In
explicit reasoning, such paths are doubtless traversed , in
perception they are in all probability closed. So far, then,
from perception being a species of reasoning properly so
called, both it and reasoning are co-ordinate varieties of that
deeper sort of process known psychologically as the asso
ciation of ideas, and physiologically as the law of habit in
the brain. To call perception unconscious reasoning is thus
either a useless metaphor, or a positively misleading confusion
between two different things.

One more point and we may leave the subject of Per
ception. Sir Wm. Hamilton thought thai he had discovered a
1 great law ' which had been wholly overlooked by psycholo
gists, and which, 'simple and universal,' is this: " Knowl
edge and Feeling, — Perception and Sensation, though al
ways coexistent, are always in the inverse ratio of each
other." Hamilton wrote as if perception and sensation
were two coexistent elements entering into a single state
of consciousness. Spencer refines upon him by contending
that they are two mutually exclusive states of conscious-,
ness, not two elements of a single state. If sensation be
taken, as both Hamilton and Spencer mainly take it in this
discussion, to mean the feeling of pleasure or pain, there is
no doubt that the law, however expressed, is true ; and that
the mind which is strongly conscious of the pleasantness or
painfulness of an experience is ipso facto less fitted to
observe and analyze its outward cause. * Apart from pleas
ure and pain, however, the law seems but a corollary of the
fact that the more concentrated a state of consciousness is,
the more vivid it is. When feeling a color, or listening to
a tone per se, we get it more intensely, notice it better, than
when we are aware of it merely as one among many other
properties of a total object. The more diffused cerebral
excitement of the perceptive state is probably incompatible

* See Spencer, Psychol., n. p. 250, note, for a physiological hypothesis
to account for this fact.

114 PSYCHOLOGY.

with quite as strong an excitement of separate parts as
the sensational state comports. So we come back here to
our own earlier discrimination between the perceptive and
the sensational processes, and to the examples which we
gave on pp. 80, 81.*

HALLUCINATIONS.

Between normal perception and illusion we have seen
that there is no break, the process being identically the same
in both. The last illusions we considered might fairly be
called hallucinations. We must now consider the false
perceptions more commonly called by that name.f In or-

* Here is another good example, taken from Helmholtz's Optics, p. 435:
"The sight of a man walking is a familiar spectacle to us. We perceive
it as a connected whole, and at most notice the most striking of its pecu
liarities. Strong attention is required, and a special choice of the point of
view, in order to feel the perpendicular and lateral oscillations of such a
walking figure. We must choose fitting points or lines in the background
with which to compare the positions of its head. But if a distant walking
man be looked at through an astronomical telescope (which inverts the
object), what a singular hopping and rocking appearance he presents ! No
difficulty now in seeing the body's oscillations, and many other details of
the gait. . . . But, on the other hand, its total character, whether light or
clumsy, dignified or graceful, is harder to perceive than in the upright po
sition."

f Illusions and hallucinations must both be distinguished from delusions.
A delusion is a false opinion about a matter of fact, which need not neces
sarily involve, though it often does involve, false perceptions of sensible
things. We may, for example, have religious delusions, medical delusions,
delusions about our own importance, about other peoples' characters, etc.,
ad libitum. The delusions of the insane are apt to affect certain typical
forms, often very hard to explain. But in many cases they are certainly
theories which the patients invent to account for their abnormal bodily
sensations. In other cases they are due to hallucinations of hearing and of
sight. Dr. Clouston (Clinical Lectures on Mental Disease, lecture in ad
fin.} gives the following special delusions as having been found in about
a hundred melancholy female patients who were afflicted in this way.
There were delusions of

general persecution; being destitute;

general suspicion; being followed by the police;

being poisoned; being very wicked;

being killed; impending death;

being conspired against; impending calamity;

being defrauded; the soul being lost;

being preached against in church; having no stomach;

being pregnant; having no inside;

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 115

dinar y parlance hallucination is held to differ from illusion in
that, whilst there is an object really there in illusion, inhattu**
cination there is no objective stimulus at all. We shall presently
see that this supposed absence of objective stimulus in hal
lucination is a mistake, and that hallucinations are often
only extremes of the perception process, in which the secon
dary cerebral reaction is out of all normal proportion to the
peripheral stimulus which occasions the activity. Hallu
cinations usually appear abruptly and have the character of
being forced upon the subject. But they possess various
degrees of apparent objectivity. One mistake in limine must
be guarded against. They are often talked of as mental
images projected outwards by mistake. But where an hallu
cination is complete, it is much more than a mental image.
An hallucination is a strictly sensational form of consciousness,
as good and true a sensation as if there were a real object there.
The object happens not to be there, that is all.

The milder degrees of hallucination have been desig
nated as pseudo-hallucinations. Pseudo-hallucinations and
hallucinations have been sharply distinguished from each

having a bone in the throat; having neither stomach nor brains;

having lost much money; being covered with vermin;

being unfit to live; letters being written about her;

that she will not recover; property being stolen;

that she is to be murdered; her children being killed;

that she is to be boiled alive; having committed theft;

that she is to be starved; the legs being made of glass;

that the flesh is boiling; having horns on the head;
that the head is severed from the being chloroformed;

body; having committed murder;

that children are burning; fear of being hanged ;
that murders take place around; being called names by persons;

that it is wrong to take food; being acted on by spirits-

being in hell; being a man;

being tempted of the devil; the body being transformed;

being possessed of the devil; insects coming from the body
having committed an unpwdoo- rape being practised on her;

able sin; having a venereal disease;

unseen agencies working, being a fish;

her own identity; being dead;

being on fire; having committed 'suicide of the ami*

116 PSYCHOLOGY.

other only within a few years. Dr. Kandinsky writes of
their difference as follows :

- l In carelessly questioning a patient we may confound his pseudo-
hallucinatory perceptions with hallucinations. But to the unconfused
consciousness of the patient himself, even though he be imbecile, the
identification of the two phenomena is impossible, at least in the sphere
of vision. At the moment of having a pseudo-hallucination of sight
the patient feels himself in an entirely different relation to this subjec
tive sensible appearance, from that in which he finds himself whilst
subject to a true visual hallucination. The latter is reality itself ; the
former, on the contrary, remains always a subjective phenomenon
which the individual commonly regards either as sent to him as a sign
of God's grace, or as artificially induced by his secret persecutors . . .
If he knows by his own experience what a genuine hallucination is, it is
quite impossible for him to mistake the pseudo-hallucination for it. ...
A concrete example will make the difference clear :

"Dr. N. L. . . . heard one day suddenly amongst the voices of his
persecutors ('coming from a hollow space in the midst of the wall') a
rather loud voice impressively saying to him : ' Change your national
allegiance. ' Understanding this to mean that his only hope consisted
in ceasing to be subject to the Czar of Eussia, he reflected a moment
what allegiance would be better, and resolved to become an English sub
ject. At the same moment he saw a pseudo-hallucinatory lion of
natural size, which appeared and quickly laid its fore-paws on his
shoulders. He had a lively feeling of these paws as a tolerably painful
local pressure (complete hallucination of touch). Then the same voice
from the wall said : ' Now you have a lion — now you will rule,' where
upon the patient recollected that the lion was the national emblem of
England. The lion appeared to L. very distinct and vivid, but he never
theless remained conscious, as he afterwards expressed it, that he saw the
animal, not with his bodily but with his mental eyes. (After his re
covery he called analogous apparitions by the name of ' expressive-plastic
ideas. ') Accordingly he felt no terror, even though he felt the contact of
the claws. . . . Had the lion been a complete hallucination, the patient,
as he himself remarked after recovery, would have felt great fear, and
very likely screamed or taken to flight. Had it been a simple image of
the fancy he would not have connected it with the voices, of whose ob
jective reality he was at the time quite convinced." *

From ordinary images of memory and fancy, pseudo-
hallucinations differ in being much more vivid, minute, de-

* V. Kandinsky : Kritische u. Klinische Betrachtungen im Gebiete d.
Sinnestauschungen (1885), p. 42.

THE PERCEPTION ^V THINGS. 117

tailed, steady, abrupt, and spontaneous, in the sense that
all feeling of our own activity in producing them is lacking.
Dr. Kandinsky had a patient who, after taking opium or
liaschisch, had abundant pseudo-hallucinations and hallu
cinations. As he also had strong visualizing power and
was an educated physician, the three sorts of phenomena
could be easily compared. Although projected outwards
(usually not farther than the limit of distinctest vision, a
foot or so) the pseudo-hallucinations lacked the character of
objective reality which the hallucinations possessed, but,
unlike the pictures of imagination, it was almost impossible
to produce them at will. Most of the ' voices ' which people
hear (whether they give rise to delusions or not) are pseudo-
hallucinations. They are described as 'inner' voices, al
though their character is entirely unlike the inner speech
of the subject with himself. I know two persons who hear
such inner voices making unforeseen remarks whenever they
grow quiet and listen for them. They are a very common
incident of delusional insanity, and at last grow into vivid
hallucinations. The latter are comparatively frequent oc
currences in sporadic form ; and certain individuals are
liable to have them often. From the results of the ' Census
of Hallucinations,' which was begun by Edmund Gurney, it
would appear that, roughly speaking, one person at least
in every ten is likely to have had a vivid hallucination at
some time in his life.* The following cases from healthy
people will give an idea of what these hallucinations are :

4 ' When a girl of eighteen, I was one evening engaged in a very
painful discussion with an elderly person. My distress was so great
that I took up a thick ivory knitting-needle that was lying on the man
telpiece of the parlor and broke it into small pieces as I talked. In the
midst of the discussion T was very wishful to know the opinion of a
brother with whom I had an unusually close relationship. I turned
round and saw him sitting at the further side of a centre- table, with his
arms folded (an unusual position with him), but, to my dismay, I per-

* See Proceedings of Soc. for Psych. Research, Dec. 1889, pp. 7, 183.
The International Congress for Experimental Psychology has now charge
of the Census, and the present writer is its agent for America,

118 F.8V3HOLOG7.

ceired from the sarcastic expression of his mouth that he was not in
sympathy with me, was not 'taking my side,' as I should then have
expressed it. The surprise cooled me, and the discussion was dropped.
"Some minutes after, having occasion to speak to my brother, I
turned towards him, but he was gone. I inquired when he left the
room, and was told that he had not been in it, which I did not believe,
thinking that he had come in for a minute and had gone out without
being noticed. About an hour and a half afterwards he appeared, and
convinced me, with some trouble, that he had never been near the
house that evening. He is still alive and well."

Here is another case :

'One night in March 1873 or '74, I cannot recollect which year,
I was attending on the sick-bed of my mother. About eight o'clock in
the evening I went into the dining room to fix a cup of tea, and on turn
ing from the sideboard to the table, on the other side of the table before
the fire, which was burning brightly, as was also the gas, I saw standing
with his hand clasped to his side in true military fashion a soldier of
about thirty years of age, with dark, piercing eyes looking directly into
mine. He wore a small cap with standing feather ; his costume was
also of a soldierly style. He did not strike me as being a spirit, ghost,
or anything uncanny, only a living man ; but after gazing for fully a
minute I realized that it was nothing of earth, for he neither moved
his eyes nor his body, and in looking closely I could see the fire beyond.
I was of course startled, and yet did not run out of the room. I felt
stunned. I walked out rapidly, however, and turning to the servant
in the hall asked her if she saw anything. She said not. I went into
my mother's room and remained talking for about an hour, but never
mentioned the above subject for fear of exciting her, and finally forgot
it altogether, returning to the dining-room, still in forgetfulness of
what had occurred, but repeating, as above, the turning from sideboard
to table in act of preparing more tea. I looked casually towards the
fire, and there I saw the soldier again. This time I was entirely alarmed,
and fled from the room in haste. I called to my father, but when he
came he saw nothing."

Sometimes more than one sense is affected. The fol
lowing is a case :

" In response to your request to write out my experience of Oct. 30,
1886, I will inflict on you a letter.

" On the day above mentioned, Oct. 30, 1886, I was in ,

where I was teaching. I had performed my regular routine work for
the day, and was sitting in my room working out trigonometrical for-

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 119

mulae. I was expecting every day to hear of the confinement of my wife,
and naturally my thoughts for some time had been more or less with
her. She was, by the way, in B , some fifty miles from me.

" At the time, however, neither she nor the expected event was in my
mind ; as I said, I was working out trigonometrical formula), and I had
been working on trigonometry the entire evening. About eleven
o'clock, as I sat there buried in sines, cosines, tangents, cotangents,
secants, and cosecants, I felt very distinctly upon my left shoulder a
touch, and a slight shake, as if somebody had tried to attract my at
tention by other means and had failed. Without rising I turned my
head, and there between me and the door stood my wife, dressed exactly
as I last saw her, some five weeks before. As I turned she said : ' It
is a little Herman ; he has come.1 Something more was said, but this
is the only sentence 1 can recall. To make sure that I was not asleep
and dreaming, I rose from the chair, pinched myself and walked toward
the figure, which disappeared immediately as I rose. I can give no in
formation as to the length of time occupied by this episode, but I know
I was awake, in my usual good health. The touch was very distinct,
the figure was absolutely perfect, stood about three feet from the door,
which was closed, and had not been opened during the evening. The
sound of the voice was unmistakable, and I should have recognized it as
my wife's voice even if I had not turned and had not seen the figure
at all. The tone was conversational, just as if she would have said
the same words had she been actually standing there.

" In regard to myself, I would say, as I have already intimated, I was
in my usual good health ; I had not been sick before, nor was I after
the occurrence, not so much as a headache having afflicted me.

" Shortly after the experience above described, I retired for the night
and, as I usually do, slept quietly until morning. T did not speculate
particularly about the strange appearance of the night before, and
though I thought of it some, I did not tell anybody. The following
morning I rose, not conscious of having dreamed anything, but I was
very firmly impressed with the idea that there was something for me at
the telegraph-office. I tried to throw off the impression, for so far as I
knew there was no reason for it. Having nothing to do, I went out for
a walk ; and to help throw off the impression above noted, I walked
away from the telegraph-office. As T proceeded, however, the impres
sion became a conviction, and I actually turned about and went to the
very place I had resolved not to visit, the telegraph -office. The first
person I saw on arriving at said office was the telegraph -operator, who
being on terms of intimacy with me, remarked : ' Hello, papa, I've got
a telegram for you.' The telegram announced the birth of a boy,
weighing nine pounds, and that all were doing well. Now, then, I have
no theory at all about the events narrated above ; I never had any such
experience before nor since ; I am no believer in spiritualism, am not in
the least superstitious, know very little about * thought-transference,'

120 PSYCHOLOGY.

1 unconscious cerebration,' etc., etc., but I am absolutely certain about
what I have tried to relate.

" In regard to the remark which I heard, ' It is a little Herman,' etc.,
I would add that we had previously decided to call the child, if a boy,
Herman — my own name, by the way."*

The hallucination sometimes carries a change of the
general consciousness with it, so as to appear more like a
sudden lapse into a dream. The following case was given
me by a man of 43, who had never anything resembling it
before :

" While sitting at my desk this A. M. reading a circular of the Loyal
Legion a very curious thing happened to me, such as I have never ex
perienced. It was perfectly real, so real that it took some minutes to
recover from. It seems to me like a direct intromission into some other
world. I never had anything approaching it before save when dream
ing at night. I was wide awake, of course. But this was the feeling. I
had only just sat down and become interested in the circular, when I
seemed to lose myself for a minute and then found myself in the top
story of a high building very white and shining and clean, with a
noble window immediately at the right of where I sat. Through this
window I looked out upon a marvellous reach of landscape entirely new.
I never had before such a sense of infinity in nature, such superb
stretches of light and color and cleanness. I know that for the space
of three minutes I was entirely lost, for when I began to come to, so to
speak, — sitting in that other world, I debated for three or four minutes
more as to which was dream and which was reality. Sitting there I got
a faint sense of C ... [the town in which the writer was], away off
and dim at first. Then I remember thinking ' Why, I used to live in
C. . . . ; perhaps I am going back.' Slowly C. . . . did come back, and
I found myself at my desk again. For a few minutes the process of
determining where I was was very funny. But the whole experience
was perfectly delightful, there was such a sense of brilliancy and
clearness and lightness about it. I suppose it lasted in all about seven
minutes or ten minutes."

The hallucinations of fever-delirium are a mixture of
pseudo-hallucination, true hallucination, and illusion.
Those of opium, hasheesh, and belladonna resemble them

* This case is of the class which Mr. Myers terms ' veridical. ' In a
subsequent letter the writer informs me that his vision occurred some flv*
hours before the child was born.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 121

in this respect. The following vivid account of a fit of
hasheesh-delirium has been given me by a friend :

" I was reading a newspaper, and the indication of the approaching
delirium was an inability to keep my mind fixed on the narrative. Di
rectly I lay down upon a sofa there appeared before my eyes several
rows of human hands, which oscillated for a moment, revolved and then
changed to spoons. The same motions were repeated, the objects chang
ing to wheels, tin soldiers, lamp-posts, brooms, and countless other
absurdities. This stage lasted about ten minutes, and during that
time it is safe to say that I saw at least a thousand different objects.
These whirling images did not appear like the realities of life, but had
the character of the secondary images seen in the eye after looking at
some brightly-illuminated object. A mere suggestion from the person
who was with me in the room was sufficient to call up an image of the
thing suggested, while without suggestion there appeared all the com
mon objects of life and many unreal monstrosities, which it is abso
lutely impossible to describe, and which seemed to be creations of the
brain.

" The character of the symptoms changed rapidly. A sort of wave
seemed to pass over me, and I became aware of the fact that my pulse
was beating rapidly. I took out my watch, and by exercising consider
able will-power managed to time the heart-beats, 135 to the minute.

" I could feel each pulsation through my whole system, and a curi
ous twitching commenced, which no effort of the mind could stop.

" There were moments of apparent lucidity, when it seemed as if I
could see within myself, and watch the pumping of my heart. A
strange fear came over me, a certainty that I should never recover from
the effects of the opiate, which was as quickly followed by a feeling of
great interest in the experiment, a certainty that the experience was
the most novel and exciting that I had ever been through.

' ' My mind was in an exceedingly impressionable state. Any place
thought of or suggested appeared with all the distinctness of the reality.
I thought of the Giant's Causeway in Staffa, and instantly I stood
within the portals of Fingal's Cave. Great basaltic columns rose on all
sides*- while huge waves rolled through the chasm and broke in silence
upon the rocky shore. Suddenly there was a roar and blast of sound,
and the word 4 Ishmaral ' was echoing up the cave. At the enunciation
of this remarkable word the great columns of basalt changed into whirl
ing clothes pins and I laughed aloud at the absurdity.

" (I may here state that the word 'Ishmaral' seemed to haunt my
other hallucinations, for I remember that I heard it frequently there
after.) I next enjoyed a sort of metempsychosis. Any animal or
thing that I thought of could be made the being which held my mind.
I thought of a fox, and instantly I was transformed into that animal. I
could distinctly feel myself a fox, could see my long ears and bushy

122 PSYCHOLOGY.

tail, and by a sort of introvision felt that my complete anatomy was
that of a fox. Suddenly the point of vision changed. My eyes seemed
to be located at the back of my mouth ; I looked out between the parted
lips, saw the two rows of pointed teeth, and, closing my mouth with a
snap, saw — nothing.

" I was next transformed into a bombshell, felt my size, weight, and
thickness, and experienced the sensation of being shot up out of a giant
mortar, looking down upon the earth, bursting and falling back in a
shower of iron fragments.

** Into countless other objects was I transformed, many of them so
absurd that I am unable to conceive what suggested them. For ex
ample, I was a little china doll, deep down in a bottle of olive oil, next
moment a stick of twisted candy, then a skeleton inclosed in a whirl
ing coffin, and so on ad infinitum.

" Towards the end of the delirium the whirling images appeared
again, and I was haunted by a singular creation of the brain, which re
appeared every few moments. It was an image of a double-faced doll,
with a cylindrical body running down to a point like a peg-top.

" It was always the same, having a sort of crown on its head, and
painted in two colors, green and brown, on a background of blue. The
expression of the Janus-like profiles was always the same, as were the
adornments of the body. After recovering from the effects of the
drug I could not picture to myself exactly how this singular monstros
ity appeared, but in subsequent experiences I was always visited by
this phantom, and always recognized every detail of its composition.
It was like visiting some long-forgotten spot and seeing some sight that
had faded from the memory, but which appeared perfectly familiar as
soon as looked upon.

" The effects of the drug lasted about an hour and a half, leaving
me a trifle tipsy and dizzy ; but after a ten-hour sleep I was myself
again, save for a slight inability to keep my mind fixed on any piece of
work for any length of time, which remained with me during most of
the next day."

THE NEUBAL PBOCESS IN HALLUCINATION.

Examples of these singular perversions of perception
might be multiplied indefinitely, but I have no more space.
Let us turn to the question of what the physiological pro
cess may be to which they are due. It must, of course,
consist of an excitement from within of those centres which
are active in normal perception, identical in kind and de
gree with that which real external objects are usually
needed to induce. The particular process which cur-

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS.

rents from the sense-organs arouse would seem under
normal circumstances to be arousable in no other way. On
p. 72 ff. above, we saw that the centres aroused by incom
ing peripheral currents are probably identical with the
centres used in mere imagination ; and that the vividness
of the sensational kind of consciousness is probably cor
related with a discrete degree of intensity in the process
therein aroused. Keferring the reader back to that pas
sage and to what was more lately said on p. 103 ff., I now
proceed to complete my theory of the perceptive process
by an analysis of what may most probably be believed to
take place in hallucination strictly so called.

We have seen (p. 75) that the free discharge of cells
into each other through associative paths is a likely reason
why the maximum intensity of function is not reached
when the cells are excited by their neighbors in the cortex.
At the end of Chapter XXV we shall return to this concep
tion, and whilst making it still more precise, use it for ex
plaining certain phenomena connected with the will. The
idea is that the leakage forward along these paths is too
rapid for the inner tension in any centre to accumulate to
the maximal explosion-point, unless the exciting currents
are greater than those which the various portions of the
cortex supply to each other. Currents from the periphery
are (as it seems) the only currents whose energy can van
quish the supra-ideational resistance (so to call it) of the
cells, and cause the peculiarly intense sort of disintegra
tion with which the sensational quality is linked. If, how
ever, the leakage forward were to stop, the tension inside cer
tain cells might reach the explosion-point, even though the
influence which excited them came only from neighboring
cortical parts. Let an empty pail with a leak in its bottom,
tipped up against a support so that if it ever became full
of water it would upset, represent the resting condition of
the centre for a certain sort of feeling. Let water poured
into it stand for the currents which are its natural stimulus ;
then the hole in its bottom will, of course, represent the
'paths ' by which it transmits its excitement to other asso
ciated cells. Now let two other vessels have the function

124 PSYCHOLOGY.

of supplying it with water. One of these vessels stands
for the neighboring cortical cells, and can pour in hardly
any more water than goes out by the leak. The pail conse-
sequently never upsets in consequence of the supply from
this source. A current of water passes through it and does
work elsewhere, but in the pail itself nothing but what
stands for ideatio'.ial activity is aroused. The other vessel,
however, stands for the peripheral sense-organs, and sup
plies a stream of water so copious that the pail promptly
fills up in spite of the leak, and presently upsets ; in other
words, sensational activity is aroused. But it is obvious that
if the leak were plugged, the slower stream of supply
would also end by upsetting the pail.

To apply this to the brain and to thought, if we take a
series of processes ABODE, associated together in that
order, and suppose that the current through them is very
fluent, there will be little intensity anywhere until, perhaps,
a pause occurs at E. But the moment the current is blocked
-anywhere, say between C and D, the process in C must
grow more intense, and might even be conceived to explode
so as to produce a sensation in the mind instead of an idea.
It would seem that some hallucinations are best to be
explained in this way. We have in fact a regular series of
facts which can all be formulated under the single law that the
substantive strength of a state of consciousness bears an inverse
proportion to its suggestiveness. It is the halting-places of
our thought which are occupied with distinct imagery.
Most of the words we utter have no time to awaken images
at ^BL they simply awaken the following words. But when
th<3Btence st°Ps> an ima£e Dwells for awhile before the
TRye (see Vol. I. p. 243). Again, whenever the asso-
- e processes are reduced and impeded by the approach
^ ^consciousness, as in falling asleep, or growing faint, or
becoming narcotized, we find a concomitant increase in the
intensity of whatever partial consciousness may survive. In
some people what M. Maury has called ' hypnagogic ' hal
lucinations * are the regular concomitant of the process of

* Le Sommeil et les R6ves (1865), chaps, in, iv.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 125

falling asleep. Trains of faces, landscapes, etc., pass before
the mental eye, first as fancies, then as pseudo-hallucina
tions, finally as full-fledged hallucinations forming dreams.
If we regard association-paths as paths of drainage, then the
shutting off of one after another of them as the encroaching
cerebral paralysis advances ought to act like the plugging
GA the hole in the bottom of the pail, and make the activity
more intense in those systems of cells that retain any
activity at all. The level rises because the currents are
not drained away, until at last the full sensational explosion
may occur.

The usual explanation of hypnagogic hallucinations is
that they are ideas deprived of their ordinary reductives. In
somnolescence, sensations being extinct, the mind, it is said,
then having no stronger things to compare its ideas with,
ascribes to these the fulness of reality. At ordinary times
the objects of our imagination are reduced to the status of
subjective facts by the ever-present contrast of our sensa
tions with them. Eliminate the sensations, however, this
view supposes, and the ' images ' are forthwith ' projected '
into the outer world and appear as realities. Thus is the
illusion of dreams also explained. This, indeed, after a
fashion gives an account of the facts.* And yet it certainly
fails to explain the extraordinary vivacity and completeness
of so many of our dream-fantasms. The process of ' imagin
ing ' must (in these cases at least f) be not merely relatively,
but absolutely and in itself more intense than at other
times. The fact is, it is not a process of imagining, but a
genuine sensational process ; and the theory in quesfcp. is
therefore false as far as that point is concerned.

Dr. Hugblmgs Jackson's explanation of the tic

seizure is acknowledged to be masterly. It

ng, but i

uesjjftp i

it;

inv^Hei

This theory of incomplete rectification of the inner images by their
usual reductives is most brilliantly stated by M. Taine in his work on
Intelligence, book u. chap. i.

f Not, of course, in all cases, because the cells remaining active are them
selves on the way to be overpowered by the general (unknown) condition to
which sleep is due.

126 PSYCHOLOGY.

principles exactly like those which I am bringing forward
here. The ' loss of consciousness ' in epilepsy is due to the
most highly organized brain-processes being exhausted
and thrown out of gear. The less organized (more instinc
tive) processes, ordinarily inhibited by the others, are then
exalted, so that we get as a mere consequence of relief from
the inhibition, the meaningless or maniacal action which
so often follows the attack. *

Similarly the subsultus tendinorum or jerking of the
muscles which so often startles us when we are on the point

* For a full account of Jackson's theories, see his ' Croonian Lectures '
published in the Brit. Med. Journ. for 1884. Of. also his remarks in the
Discussion of Dr. Mercier's paper on Inhibition in ' Brain,' xi. 361.

The loss of vivacity in the images in the process of waking, as well as
the gain of it in falling asleep, are both well described by M. Taine, who
writes (on Intelligence, i. 50, 58) that often in the daytime, when fatigued
and seated in a chair, it is sufficient for him to close one eye with a hand
kerchief, when, " by degrees, the sight of the other eye becomes vague,
and it closes. All external sensations are gradually effaced, or cease, at all
events, to be remarked ; the internal images, on the other hand, feeble and
rapid during the state of complete wakefulness, become intense, distinct,
colored, steady, and lasting : there is a sort of ecstasy, accompanied by a
feeling of expansion and of comfort. Warned by frequent experience, I
know that sleep is coming on, and that I must not disturb the rising
vision ; I remain passive, and in a few minutes it is complete. Architecture,
landscapes, moving figures, pass slowly by, and sometimes remain, with
incomparable clearness of form and fulness of being ; sleep comes on, and
I know no more of the real world I am in. Many times, like M. Maury,
I have caused myself to be gently roused at different moments of this state,
and have thus been able to mark its characters. — The intense image which
seems an external object is but a more forcible continuation of the feeble
image which an instant before I recognized as internal ; some scrap of a
forest, ^jke house, some person which I vaguely imagined on closing my
eyes, hUro a minute become present to me with full bodily details, so as to
change into a complete hallucination. Then, waking up on a hand touch
ing me, I feel the figure decay, lose color, and evaporate ; what had ap
peared a substance is reduced to a shadow. . . . In such a case, I have of ten
seen, for a passing moment, the image grow pale, waste away, and evapo
rate ; sometimes, on opening the eyes, a fragment of landscape or the skirt
of a dress appears still to float over the fire-irons or on the black hearth."
This persistence of dream-objects for a few moments after the eyes are
opened seems to be no extremely rare experience. Many cases of it have
been reported to me directly. Compare Mtiller's Physiology, Baly's tr.,
p 945.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 127

of failing asleep, may be interpreted as due to the rise (in
certain lower motor centres) of the ordinary < tonic ' tension
to the explosion-point, when the inhibition commonly ex
erted by the higher centres falls too suddenly away.

One possible condition of hallucination then stands
revealed, whatever other conditions there may be. When
the normal paths of association between a centre and other centres
are thrown out of gear, any activity ivhich may exist in the
first centre tends to increase in intensity until finally the pwnt
may be reached at which the last inward resistance is overcome,
and the full sensational process explodes* Thus it will happen
that causes of an amount of activity in brain-cells which
would ordinarily result in a weak consciousness may pro
duce a very strong consciousness when the overflow of these
cells is stopped by the torpor of the rest of the brain. A
slight peripheral irritation, then, if it reaches the centres of
consciousness at all during sleep, will give rise to the dream
of a violent sensation. All the books about dreaming are
full of anecdotes which illustrate this. For example, M.
Maury's nose and lips are tickled with a feather while he
sleeps. He dreams he is being tortured by having a pitch-
plaster applied to his face, torn off, lacerating the skin of
nose and lips. Descartes, on being bitten by a flea, dreams
of being run through by a sword. A friend tells me, as I
write this, of his hair changing its position in his forehead
just as he 'dozed off' in his chair a few days since. In
stantly he dreamed that some one had struck him a blow.
Examples can be quoted ad libitum, but these are enough, f

* I say the ' normal ' paths, because hallucinations are not incompatible
with some paths of association being left- Some hypnotic patients will
not only have hallucinations of objects suggested to them, but will amplify
them and act out the situation. But the paths here seem excessively nar
row, and the reflections which ought to make the hallucination incredible
dp not occur to the subject's miud. In general, the narrower a train of
' ideas ' is, the vivider the consciousness is of each. Under ordinary cir
cumstances, the entire brain probably plays a part in draining any centre
which may be ideationally active. When the drainage is reduced in any
way it probably makes the active process more intense.

f M. A. Maury gives a number: op. cit. pp. 136-8.

PSYCHOLOGY.

We seem herewith to have an explanation for a certain
number of hallucinations. Whenever the normal fonvard
irradiation of intra-cortical excitement through association-paths
is checked, any accidental spontaneous activity or any peripheral
stimulation (hoiuever inadequate at other times) by which a brain-
centre may be visited, sets up a process of full sensational inten
sity therein.

In the hallucinations artificially produced in hypnotic
subjects, some degree of peripheral excitement seems usu
ally to be required. The brain is asleep as far as its own
spontaneous thinking goes, and the words of the ' magneti-
zer ' then awaken a cortical process which drafts off into
itself any currents of a related sort which may come in
from the periphery, resulting in a vivid objective percep
tion of the suggested thing. Thus, point to a dot on a
sheet of paper, and call it * General Grant's photograph,'
and your subject will see a photograph of the General
there instead of the dot. The dot gives objectivity to the
appearance, and the suggested notion of the General gives
it form. Then magnify the dot by a lens ; double it by a
prism or by nudging the eyeball ; reflect it in a mirror ;,
turn it upside down ; or wipe it out ; and the subject will
tell you that the ' photograph ' has been enlarged, doubled,
reflected, turned about, or made to disappear. In M. Binet's
language, * the dot is the outward point de repere which is
needed to give objectivity to your suggestion, and without
which the latter will only produce a conception in the
subject's mind.t M. Binet has shown that such a periphe-

* M. Bluet's highly important experiments, which were first published
in vol. xvii of the Revue Philosophique (1884), are also given in full in
chapter ix of his and Fere's work on ' Animal Magnetism ' in the Inter
national Scientific Series. Where there is no dot on the paper, nor any
other visible mark, the subject's judgment about the ' portrait ' would
seem to be guided by what he sees happening to the entire sheet.

f It is a difficult thing to distinguish in a hypnotic patient between a
genuine sensorial hallucination of something suggested and a conception
of it merely, coupled with belief that it is there. I have been surprised at the
vagueness with which such subjects will often trace upon blank paper the
outlines of the pictures which they say they ' see ' thereupon. On the other

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS.

ral point de repere is used in an enormous number, not only
of hypnotic hallucinations, but of hallucinations of the
insane. These latter are often unilateral ; that is, the patient
hears the voices always on one side of him, or sees the,
figure only when a certain one of his eyes is open. In
many of these cases it has been distinctly proved that a
morbid irritation in the internal ear, or an opacity in the
humors of the eye, was the starting point of the current
which the patient's diseased acoustic or optical centres
clothed with their peculiar products in the way of ideas.
Hallucinations produced in this way are 'ILLUSIONS '; and M.
Binet' s theory, that all hallucinations must start in the periphery,
may be called an attempt to reduce hallucination and illusion to
one physiological type, the type, namely, to which normal per
ception belongs, In every case, according to M. Binet,
whether of perception, of hallucination, or of illusion, we
get the sensational vividness by means of a current from
the peripheral nerves. It may be a mere trace of a cur
rent. But that trace is enough to kindle the maximal or
supra-ideational process so that the object perceived will
have the character of externality. What the nature of the
object shall be will depend wholly on the particular sys
tem of paths in which the process is kindled. Part of the
thing in all cases comes from the sense-organ, the rest is
furnished by the mind. But we cannot by introspection
distinguish between these parts ; and our only formula for
the result is that the brain has reacted on the impression in
the normal way. Just so in the dreams which we have
considered, and in the hallucinations of which M. Binet
tells, we can only say that the brain has reacted in an abnor
mal way.

M. Binetfs theory accounts indeed for a multitude of cases,
but certainly not for all. The prism does not always double

hand, you will hear them say that they find no difference between a real
flower which you show them and an imaginary flower which you tell
them is beside it. When told that one is imaginary and that they must
pick out the real one, they sometimes say the choice is Impossible, ai: 1
sometimes they point to the imaginary flower.

130 PSYCHOLOGY.

the false appearance,* nor does the latter always disappear
when the eyes are closed. Dr. Hack Tuke t gives several
examples in sane people of well-exteriorized hallucinations
which did not respond to Binet's tests ; and Mr. Edmund
Gurney J gives a number of reasons why intensity in a cor
tical process may be expected to result from local patho
logical activity just as much as its peculiar nature does.
For Binet, an abnormally or exclusively active part of the
cortex gives the nature of what shall appear, whilst a pe
ripheral sense-organ alone can give the intensity sufficient to
make it appear projected into real space. But since this
intensity is after all but a matter of degree, one does not see
why, under rare conditions, the degree in question might
not be attained by inner causes exclusively. In that case
we should have certain hallucinations centrally initiated
alongside of the peripherally initiated hallucinations, which
are the only sort that M. Binet's theory allows. It seems
probable on the whole, therefore, that centrally initiated hallu
cinations can exist. How often they do exist is another ques
tion. The existence of hallucinations which affect more
than one sense is an argument for central initiation. For
grant that the thing seen may have its starting point in the
outer world, the voice which it is heard to utter must be
due to an influence from the visual region, i.e. must be of
central origin.

Sporadic cases of hallucination, visiting people only
once in a lifetime (which seem to be by far the most fre
quent type), are on any theory hard to understand in detail.
They are often extraordinarily complete ; and the fact that
many of them are reported as veridical^ that is, as coincid
ing with real events, such as accidents, deaths, etc., of the
persons seen, is an additional complication of the phe
nomenon. The first really scientific study of hallucination

* Only the other day, in three hypnotized girls, I failed to double afi
hallucination with a prism. Of course it may not have been a fully-
developed hallucination.

t Brain, xi. 441.

iMind, x. 161, 316 ; and Phantasms of the Living (1886), I. 47(M88

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 131

in all its possible bearings, on the basis of a large mass of
empirical material, was begun by Mr. Edmund Gurney and
is continued by other members of the Society for Psy
chical Eesearch ; and the ' Census ' is now being applied
to several countries under the auspices of the International
Congress of Experimental Psychology. It is to be hoped
that out of these combined labors something solid will
eventually grow. The facts shade off into the phenomena
of motor automatism, trance, etc.; and nothing but a wide
comparative study can give really instructive results.*

The part played by the peripheral sense-organ in hallucina
tion is just as obscure as we found it in the case of imagina
tion. The things seen often seem opaque and hide the
background upon which they are projected. It does not
follow from this, however, that the retina is actually in
volved in the vision. A contrary process going on in the
visual centres would prevent the retinal impression made
by the outer realities from being felt, and this would in
mental terms be equivalent to the hiding of them by the
imaginary figure. The negative after-images of mental
pictures reported by Meyer and Fere, and the negative after
images of hypnotic hallucinations reported by Binet and
others so far constitute the only evidence there is for the
retina being involved. But until these after-images are
explained in some other way we must admit the possibility
of a centrifugal current from the optical centres downwards
into the peripheral organ of sight, paradoxical as the course
of such a current may appear.

' PEBCEPTION-TIME.'

The, time which the perceptive process occupies has been
inquired into by various experimenters. Some call it per
ception-time, some choice-time, some discrimination-time.
The results have been already given in Chapter XIII (voL
I, p. 523 ff.), to which the reader is consequently referred

* In Mr. Gurney's work, just cited, a very large number of veridical
cases are critically discussed.

PSYCHOLOGY.

Dr. Bomanes gives an interesting variation of these
time-measurements. He found *

"an astonishing difference between different individuals with respect
to the rate at which they are able to read. Of course reading implies
enormously, intricate processes of perception both of the sensuous and
of the intellectual order ; but if we choose for these observations per
sons who have been accustomed to read much, we may consider that
they are all very much on a par with respect to the amount of practice
which they have had, so that the differences in their rates of reading
may fairly be attributed to real differences in their rates of forming
complex perceptions in rapid succession, and not to any merely acci
dental differences arising from greater or less facility acquired by
special practice.

" My experiments consisted in marking a brief printed paragraph in
a book which had never been read by any of the persons to whom it
was to be presented. The paragraph, which contained simple state
ments of simple facts, was marked on the margin with pencil. The
book was then placed before the reader open, the page, however, being
covered with a sheet of paper. Having pointed out to the reader upon
this sheet of paper what part of the underlying page the marked para
graph occupied, I suddenly removed the sheet of paper with one hand,
while I started a chronograph with the other. Twenty seconds being
allowed for reading the paragraph (ten lines octavo), as soon as the
time was up I again suddenly placed the sheet of paper over the printed
page, passed the book on to the next reader, and repeated the experi
ment as before. Meanwhile, the first reader, the moment after the
book had been removed, wrote down all that he or she could remember
having read. And so on with all the other readers.

4 ' Now the results of a number of experiments conducted on this
method were to show, as I have said, astonishing differences in the
maximum rate of reading which is possible to different individuals, all
of whom have been accustomed to extensive reading. That is to say,
the difference may amount to 4 to 1 ; or, otherwise stated, in a given
time one individual may be able to read four times as much as another.
Moreover, it appeared that there was no relationship between slowness
of reading and power of assimilation ; on the contrary, when all the
efforts are directed to assimilating as much as possible in a given time,
the rapid readers (as shown by their written notes) usually give a bet
ter account of the portions of the paragraph which have been com
passed by the slow readers than the latter are able to give ; and the
most rapid reader 1 have found is also the best at assimilating. I
should further say that there is no relationship between rapidity of
perception as thus tested and intellectual activity as tested by the gen
eral results of intellectual work ; for I have tried the experiment witb

Mental Evolution in Animals, p. 136.

THE PERCEPTION OF THINGS. 133

several highly distinguished men in science and literature, most of
whom I found to be slow readers."*

* Literature. The best treatment of perception with which I am ac
quainted is that in Mr. James Sully's book on ' Illusions ' in the Interna
tional Scientific Series. On hallucinations the literature is large. Gurney,
Kandinsky (as already cited), and some articles by Kraepelin in the
Vierteljahrschrift fur Wissenschaftliche Philosophic, vol. v (1881), are
the most systematic studies recently made. All works on Insanity treat
of them. Dr. W. W. Ireland's works, ' The Blot upon the Brain ' (1886) and
' Through the Ivory Gate ' (1890) have much information on the subject.
Gurney gives pretty complete references to older literature. The most
important thing on the subject from the point of view of theory is the
article by Mr. Myers on the Demon of Socrates in the Proceedings of the
Society for Psychical Research for 1889, p. 522.

CHAPTEK XX.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.*
THE FEELING OF CRUDE EXTENSITY.

IN the sensations of hearing, touch, sight, and pain we are
accustomed to distinguish from among the other elements the
element of voluminousness. We call the reverberations of a
thunderstorm more voluminous than the squeaking of a
slate-pencil ; the entrance into a warm bath gives our skin
a more massive feeling than the prick of a pin ; a little
neuralgic pain, fine as a cobweb, in the face, seems less ex
tensive than the heavy soreness of a boil or the vast discom
fort of a colic or a lumbago ; and a solitary star looks smaller
than the noonday sky. In the sensation of dizziness or
subjective motion, which recent investigation has proved
to be connected with stimulation of the semi-circular canals
of the ear, the spatial character is very prominent. Whether
the * muscular sense ' directly yields us knowledge of space
is still a matter of litigation among psychologists. Whilst
some go so far as to ascribe our entire cognition of exten
sion to its exclusive aid, others deny to it all extensive
quality whatever. Under these circumstances we shall do
better to adjourn its consideration ; admitting, however, that
it seems at first sight as if we felt something decidedly
more voluminous when we contract our thigh-muscles than
when we twitch an eyelid or some small muscle in the face.
It seems, moreover, as if this difference lay in the feeling
of the thigh-muscles themselves.

In the sensations of smell and taste this element of
varying vastness seems less" prominent but not altogether
absent. Some tastes and smells appear less extensive than
complex flavors, like that of roast meat or plum pudding,
on the one hand, or heavy odors like musk or tuberose, on

* Reprinted, with considerable revision, from ' Mind ' for 1887.

134

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 135

the other. The epithet sharp given to the acid class would
seem to show that to the popular mind there is something
narrow and, as it were, streaky, in the impression they
make, other flavors and odors being bigger and rounder.

The sensations derived from the inward organs are also
distinctly more or less voluminous. Eepletion and empti
ness, suffocation, palpitation, headache, are examples of
this, and certainly not less spatial is the consciousness we
have of our general bodily condition in nausea, fever, heavy
drowsiness, and fatigue. Our entire cubic content seems
then sensibly manifest to us as such, and feels much larger
than any local pulsation, pressure, or discomfort. Skin
and retina are, however, the organs in which the space-
element plays the most active part. Not only does the
maximal vastness yielded by the retina surpass that yielded
by any other organ, but the intricacy with which our atten
tion can subdivide this vastness and perceive it to be com
posed of lesser portions simultaneously coexisting along
side of each other is without a parallel elsewhere.* The
ear gives a greater vastness than the skin, but is consider
ably less able to subdivide it.f

Noiv my first thesis is that this element, discernible in each
and every sensation, though more developed in some than in
others, is the original sensation of space, out of which all the
exact knowledge about space that we afterwards come to
have is woven by processes of discrimination, association,
and selection. ' Extensity,' as Mr. James Ward calls it,J

* Prof. Jastrow has found that invariably we tend to underestimate the
amount of our skin which may be stimulated by contact with an object
when we express it in terms of visual space; that is, when asked to mark
on paper the extent of skin alfected, we always draw it much too small.
This shows that the eye gets as much space-feeling from the smaller line as
the skin gets from the larger one. Of. Jastrow : Mind, xi. 546-7; Ameri
can Journal of Psychology, in. 53.

f Amongst sounds the graver ones seem the most extensive. Stumpf
gives three reasons for this : 1) association with bigger causes; 2) wider
reverberation of the hand and body when grave notes are sung; 3) audi
bility at a greater distance. He thinks that these three reasons dispense us
from supposing an immanent extensity in the 'sensation of sound as such.
See his remarks in the Tonpsychologie, i. 207-211.

\ Encyclopaedia Britannica, 9th Edition, article Psychology, pp. 46, 53.

136 PSYCHOLOGY.

on this view, becomes an element in each sensation just as
intensity is. The latter every one will admit to be a dis
tinguishable though not separable ingredient of the sensible
quality. In like manner extensity, being an entirely pecul
iar kind of feeling indescribable except in terms of itself,
and inseparable in actual experience from some sensational
quality which it must accompany, can itself receive no
other name than that of sensational element.

It must now be noted that the vastness hitherto spoken of
is as great in one direction as in another. Its dimensions are
so vague that in it there is no question as yet of surface
as opposed to depth ; ' volume ' being the best short name
for the sensation in question. Sensations of different orders
are roughly comparable, inter se, with respect to their volumes.
This shows that the spatial quality in each is identical
wherever found, for different qualitative elements, e.g.
warmth and odor, are incommensurate. Persons born
blind are reported surprised at the largeness with which
objects appear to them when their sight is restored. Franz
says of his patient cured of cataract : "He saw everything
much larger than he had supposed from the idea obtained
by his sense of touch. Moving, and especially living,
objects appeared very large." * Loud sounds have a cer
tain enormousness of feeling. It is impossible to conceive
of the explosion of a cannon as filling a small space. In
general, sounds seem to occupy all the room between us
and their source ; and in the case of certain ones, the
cricket's song, the whistling of the wind, the roaring of the
surf, or a distant railway train, to have no definite start
ing point.

In the sphere of vision we have facts of the same order.
'Glowing' bodies, as Hering says, give us a perception
"which seems roomy (raumhaft) in comparison with that
of strictly surface color. A glowing iron looks luminous
through and through, and so does a flame." t A luminous
fog, a band of sunshine, affect us in the same way. As
Hering urges :

* Philosophical Transactions (1841).

f Hermann's Handb d. Physiol., Bd. in. 1, S 575.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 137

" We must distinguish roomy from superficial, as well as distinctly
from indistinctly bounded, sensations. The dark which with closed eyes
one sees before one is, for example, a roomy sensation. We do not see
a black surface like a wall in front of us, but a space filled with dark
ness, and even when we succeed in seeing this darkness as terminated
by a black wall there still remains in front of this wall the dark space.
The same thing happens when we find ourselves with open eyes in an
absolutely dark room. This sensation of darkness is also vaguely
bounded. An example of a distinctly bounded roomy sensation is that
of a clear and colored fluid seen in a glass ; the yellow of the wine is
seen not only on the bounding surface of the glass ; the yellow sensa
tion fills the whole interior of the 'glass. By day the so-called empty
space between us and objects seen appears very different from what it
is by night. The increasing darkness settles not only upon the things
but also between us and the things, so as at last to cover them com
pletely and fill the space alone. If I look into a dark box I find it filled
with darkness, and this is seen not merely as the dark-colored sides or
walls of the box. A shady corner in an otherwise well-lighted room is
full of a darkness which is not only on the walls and floor but between
them in the space they include. Every sensation is there where I ex
perience it, and if I have it at once at every point of a certain roomy
space, it is then a voluminous sensation. A cube of transparent green
glass gives us a spatial sensation ; an opaque cube painted green, on
the contrary, only sensations of surfa.ce." *

There are certain quasi-motor sensations in the head when
we change the direction of the attention, which equally seem
to involve three dimensions. If with closed eyes we think
of the top of the house and then of the cellar, of the distance
in front of us and then of that behind us, of space far to the
right and then far to the left, we have something far stronger
than an idea, — an actual feeling, namely, as if something in
the head moved into another direction. Fechner was, I
believe, the first to publish any remarks on these feelings.
He writes as follows :

" When we transfer the attention from objects of one sense to those
of another we have an indescribable feeling (though at the same time
one perfectly determinate and reproducible at pleasure) of altered direc
tion, or differently localized tension (Spannung). We feel a strain for
ward in the eyes, one directed sideways in the ears, increasing with
the degree of our attention, and changing according as we look at an
object carefully, or listen to something attentively ; wherefore we speak
of straining the attention. The difference is most plainly felt when

* Loc. cit. S. 572.

138 PSYCHOLOGY.

the attention vibrates rapidly between eye and ear. This feeling local-
izes itself with most decided difference in regard to the various sense-
organs according as we wish to discriminate a thing delicately by touch,
taste, or smell.

* ' But now I have, when I try to vividly recall a picture of memory
or fancy, a feeling perfectly analogous to that which I experience when
I seek to grasp a thing keenly by eye or ear ; and this analogous feeling
is very differently localized. While in sharpest possible attention to
real objects (as well as to after-images) the strain is plainly forwards,
and, when the attention changes from one sense to another, only alters
its direction between the sense-organs, leaving the rest of the head free
from strain, the case is different in memory or fancy ; for here the feel
ing withdraws entirely from the external sense-organs, and seems rather
to take refuge in that part of the head which the brain fills. If I wish,
for example, to recall a place or person, it will arise before me with
vividness, not according as I strain my attention forwards, but rather
in proportion as I, so to speak, retract it backwards. " *

It appears probable that the feelings which Fechner de
scribes are in part constituted by imaginary semi-circular
canal sensations. t These undoubtedly convey the most
delicate perception of change in direction ; and when, as
here, the changes are not perceived as taking place in the
external world, they occupy a vague internal space located
within the head.J

* Elemente der Psychophysik, n. 475-6.

f See Foster's Text-book of Physiology, bk. m. c. vr. § 2.

j Fechner, who was ignorant of the but lately discovered function of
the semi-circular canals, gives a different explanation of the organic seat of
these feelings. They are probably highly composite. -With me, actual move
ments in the eyes play a considerable part in them, though I am hardly con
scious of the peculiar feelings in the scalp which Fechner goes on to de
scribe thus : ' ' The feeling of strained attention in the different sense-organs
seems to be only a muscular one produced in using these various organs
by setting in motion, by a sort of reflex action, the set of muscles which
belong to them. One can ask, then, with what particular muscular con
traction the sense of strained attention in the effort to recall something is
associated ? On this question my own feeling gives me a decided answer ;
it comes to me distinctly not as a sensation of tension in the inside of the
head, but as a feeling of strain and contraction in the scalp, with a pressure
from outwards in over the whole cranium, undoubtedly caused by a con
traction of the muscles of the scalp. This harmonizes very well with the
expressions, sich den Kopf zerbrecTien, den Kopf zusammenneJimen. In a
former illness, when I could not endure the slightest effort after continuous
thought, and had no theoretical bias on this question, the muscles of the
scalp, especially those of the back-head, assumed a fairly morbid degree of
sensibility whenever I tried to think." (Elem. der Psychophysik, 11.
490-91.)

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 139

In the skin itself there is a vague form of projection
into the third dimension to which Bering has called atten
tion.

* ' Heat is not felt only against the cutaneous surface, but when com
municated through the air may appear extending more or less out from
the surface into the third dimension of surrounding space. . . . We
can determine in the dark the place of a radiant body by moving the
hand to and fro, and attending to the fluctuation of our feeling of
warmth. The feeling itself, however, is not projected fully into the
spot at which we localize the hot body, but always remains in the
neighborhood of the hand."

The interior of one's mouth-cavity feels larger when ex
plored by the tongue than when looked at. The crater of a
newly-extracted tooth, and the movements of a loose tooth
in its socket, feel quite monstrous. A midge buzzing
against the drum of the ear will often seem as big as a but
terfly. The spatial sensibility of the tympanic membrane
has hitherto been very little studied, though the subject
will well repay much trouble. If we approach it by intro
ducing into the outer ear some small object like the tip of
a rolled-up tissue-paper lamplighter, we are surprised at
the large radiating sensation which its presence gives us,
and at the sense of clearness and openness which comes
when it is removed. It is immaterial to inquire whether
the far-reaching sensation here be due to actual irradiation
upon distant nerves or not. We are considering now, not
the objective causes of the spatial feeling, but its subjective
varieties, and the experiment shows that the same object
gives more of it to the inner than to the outer cuticle of
the ear. The pressure of the air in the tympanic cavity
upon the membrane gives an astonishingly large sensation.
We can increase the pressure by holding our nostrils and
closing our mouth and forcing air through our Eustachian
tubes by an expiratory effort ; and we can diminish it by
either inspiring or swallowing under the same conditions of
closed mouth and nose. In either case we get a large round
tridimensional sensation inside of the head, which seems
as if it must come from the affection of an organ much
larger than the tympanic membrane, whose surface hardly
exceeds that of one's little-finger-nail.

140 PSYCHOLOGY.

The tympanic membrane is furthermore able to render
sensible differences in the pressure of the external atmos
phere, too slight to be felt either as noise or in this more
violent way. If the reader will sit with closed eyes and let
a friend approximate some solid object, like a large book,
noiselessly to his face, he will immediately become aware
of the object's presence and position — likewise of its de
parture. -A friend of the writer, making the experiment
for the first time, discriminated unhesitatingly between the
three degrees of solidity of a board, a lattice-frame, and a
sieve, held close to his ear. Now as this sensation is never
used by ordinary persons as a means of perception, we may
fairly assume that its felt quality, in those whose attention
is called to it for the first time, belongs to it qua sensation,
and owes nothing to educational suggestions. But this felt
quality is most distinctly and unmistakably one of vague
spatial vastness in three dimensions — quite as much so as
is the felt quality of the retinal sensation when we lie on
our back and fill the entire field of vision with the empty
blue sky. When an object is brought near the ear we im
mediately feel shut in, contracted ; when the object is
removed, we suddenly feel as if a transparency, clearness,
openness, had been made outside of us. And the feeling
will, by any one who will take the pains to observe it, be
acknowledged to involve the third dimension in a vague,
unmeasured state.*

The reader will have noticed, in this enumeration of
facts, that voluminousness of the feeling seems to bear very little
relation to the size of the organ that yields it The ear and
eye are comparatively minute organs, yet they give us feel
ings of great volume. The same lack of exact proportion
between size of feeling and size of organ affected obtains
within the limits of particular sensory organs. An object
appears smaller on the lateral portions of the retina than it
does on the fovea, as may be easily verified by holding the

* That the sensation in question is one of tactile rather than of acoustic
sensibility would seem proved by the fact that a medical friend of the
writer, both of whose membrana tympani are quite normal, but one of
whose ears is almost totally deaf, feels the presence and withdrawal of ob
jects as well at one ear as at the other.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 141

two forefingers parallel and a couple of inches apart, and
transferring the gaze of one eye from one to the other.
Then the finger not directly looked at will appear to shrink,
and this whatever be the direction of the fingers. On the
tongue a crumb, or the calibre of a small tube, appears
larger than between the fingers. If two points kept equi
distant (blunted compass- or scissors-points, for example)
be drawn across the skin so as really to describe a pair of
parallel lines, the lines will appear farther apart in some
spots than in others. If, for example, we draw them hori
zontally across the face, so that the mouth falls between
them, the person experimented upon will feel as if they
began to diverge near the mouth and to include it in a well-
marked ellipse. In like manner, if we keep the compass-

Fio. 51 (after Weber).

points one or two centimetres apart, and draw them down
the forearm over the wrist and palm, finally drawing one
along one finger, the other along its neighbor, the appear
ance will be that of a single line, soon breaking into two,
which become more widely separated below the wrist, to
contract again in the palm, and finally diverge rapidly
again towards the finger-tips. The dotted lines in Figs.
51 and 52 represent the true path of the compass-points ;
the full lines their apparent path.

The same length of skin, moreover, will convey a more
extensive sensation according to the manner of stimulation.
If the edge of a card be pressed against the skin, the dis
tance between its extremities will seem shorter than that be
tween two compass-tips touching the same terminal points.*

* The skin seems to obey a different law from the eye here. If a given
retinal tract be excited, first by a series of points, and next by the two

142

PSYCHOLOGY.

In the eye, intensity of nerve-stimulation seems to in
crease the volume of the feeling as well
as its brilliancy. If we raise and lower
the gas alternately, the whole room and
all the objects in it seem alternately to
enlarge and contract. If we cover half
a page of small print with a gray glass, the
print seen through the glass appears
decidedly smaller than that seen outside
of it, and the darker the glass the greater
the difference. When a circumscribed
opacity in front of the retina keeps off
part of the light from the portion which
it covers, objects projected on that
portion may seem but half as large as
when their image falls outside of it.*
The inverse effect seems produced by
certain drugs and anaesthetics. Mor
phine, atropine, daturine, and cold blunt
the sensibility of the skin, so that dis
tances upon it seem less. Haschish pro
duces strange perversions of the general
sensibility. Under its influence one's
body may seem either enormously en
larged or strangely contracted. Some
times a single member will alter its
proportion to the rest ; or one's back,
for instance, will appear entirely absent,
as if one were hollow behind. Objects
comparatively near will recede to a vast
distance, a short street assume to the
eye an immeasurable perspective. Ether and chloroform

b c a>

FIG. 52 (after Weber).

extreme points, with the interval between themun excited, this interval will
seein considerably less in the second case than it seemed in the first. In
the skin the unexcited interval feels the larger. The reader may easily
verify the facts in this case by taking a visiting-card, cutting one edge of
it into a saw-tooth pattern, and from the opposite edge cutting out all but
the two corners, and then comparing the feelings aroused by the two edges
when held against the skin.

* Classen, Physiologic des Gesichtssinnes, p. 114 ; see also A. Riehl, Der
Philosophische Kriticismus, 11. p. 149.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

occasionally produce not wholly dissimilar results. Panum,
the German physiologist, relates that when, as a boy, he
was etherized for neuralgia, the objects in the room grew
extremely small and distant, before his field of vision dark
ened over and the roaring in his ears began. He also men
tions that a friend of his in church, struggling in vain to
keep awake, saw the preacher grow smaller and smaller
and more and more distant. I myself on one occasion
observed the same recession of objects during the begin
ning of chloroformization. In various cerebral diseases
we find analogous disturbances.

Can ive assign the physiological conditions which make the
elementary sensible largeness of one sensation vary so much from
that of another ? Only imperfectly. One factor in the re
sult undoubtedly is the number of nerve-terminations
simultaneously excited by the outward agent that awakens
the sensation. When many skin-nerves are warmed, or
much retinal surface illuminated, our feeling is larger than
when a lesser nervous surface is excited. The single sen
sation yielded by two compass-points, although it seems
simple, is yet felt to be much bigger and blunter than that
yielded by one. The touch of a single point may always
be recognized by its quality of sharpness. This page looks
much smaller to the reader if he closes one eye than if both
eyes are open. So does the moon, which latter fact shows I
that the phenomenon has nothing to do with parallax.}
The celebrated boy couched for the cataract by Cheselden
thought, after his first eye was operated, " all things he saw
extremely large," but being couched of his second eye,
said " that objects at first appeared large to this eye, but
not so large as they did at first to the other ; and looking
upon the same object with both eyes, he thought it looked
about twice as large as with the first couched eye only, but
not double, that we can anyways discover."

The greater extensiveness that the feeling of certain
parts of the same surface has over other parts, and that
one order of surface has over another (retina over skin, for
example), may also to a certain extent be explained by the
operation of the same factor. It is an anatomical fact that
the most spatially sensitive surfaces (retina, tongue, finger-

144 PSYCHOLOGY.

tips, etc.) are supplied by nerve-trunks of unusual thick
ness, which must supply to every unit of surface-area an
unusually large number of terminal fibres. But the varia
tions of felt extension obey probably only a very rough law
of numerical proportion to the number of fibres. A sound
is not twice as voluminous to two ears as to one ; and the
above-cited variations of feeling, when the same surface is
excited under different conditions, show that the feeling is.
a resultant of several factors of which the anatomical one
is only the principal. Many ingenious hypotheses have
been brought forward to assign the co-operating factors
where different conditions give conflicting amounts of felt
space. Later we shall analyze some of these cases in de
tail, but it must be confessed here in advance that many of
them resist analysis altogether. *

* It is worth while at this point to call attention with some emphasis to
the fact that, though the anatomical condition of the feeling resembles the
feeling itself, such resemblance cannot be taken by our understanding to
explain why the feeling should be just what it is. We hear it untiringly
reiterated by materialists and spiritualists alike that we can see no possible
inward reason why a certain brain-process should produce the feeling of
redness and another of anger : the one process is no more red than the
other is angry, and the coupling of process and feeling is, as far as our
understanding goes, a juxtaposition pure and simple. But in the matter of
spatial feeling, where the retinal patch that produces a triangle in the mind
is itself a triangle, etc., it looks at first sight as if the sensation might be a
direct cognition of its own neural condition. Were this true, however, our
sensation should be one of multitude rather than of continuous extent ; for
the condition is number of optical nerve-termini, and even this is only a
remote condition and not an immediate condition. The immediate condi
tion of the feeling is not the process in the retina, but the process in the
brain; and the process in the brain may, for aught we know, be as unlike
a triangle, — nay, it probably is so, — as it is unlike redness or rage. It is
simply a coincidence that in the case of space one of the organic conditions,
viz. , the triangle impressed on the skin or the retina, should lead to a rep
resentation in the mind of the subject observed similar to that which it
produces in the psychological observer. In no other kind of case is the
coincidence found. Even should we admit that we cognize triangles in
space because of our immediate cognition of the triangular shape of our
excited group of nerve-tips, the matter would hardly be more transparent,
for the mystery would still remain, why are we so much better cognizant
of triangles on our finger-tips than on the nerve-tips of our back, on our
eye than on our ear, and on any of these parts than in our brain ? Thos.
Brown very rightly rejects the notion of explaining the shape of the space
perceived by the shape of the 'nervous expansion affected.' "If this

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 145

THE FEBCEPTION OF SPATIAL OKDEK.

So far, all we have established or sought to establish is
the existence of the vague form or quote of spatiality as an
inseparable element bound up with the other peculiarities
of each and every one of our sensations. The numerous
examples we have adduced of the variations of this extensive
element have only been meant to make clear its strictly
sensational character. In very few of them will the reader
have been able to explain the variation by an added intel
lectual element, such as the suggestion of a recollected ex
perience. In almost all it has seemed to be the immediate
psychic effect of a peculiar sort of nerve-process excited ;
and all the nerve-processes in question agree in yielding
what space they do yield, to the mind, in the shape of a
simple total vastness, in which, primitively at least, no order
of parts or of subdivisions reigns.

Let no one be surprised at this notion of a space without
order. There may be a space without order just as there
may be an order without space.* And the primitive percep
tions of space are certainly of an unordered kind. The
order which the spaces first perceived potentially include
must, before being distinctly apprehended by the mind, be
woven into those spaces by a rather complicated set of in
tellectual acts. The primordial largenesses which the sen
sations yield must be measured and subdivided by conscious
ness, and added together, before they can form by theii
synthesis what we know as the real Space of the objective]
world. In these operations, imagination, association, at
tention, and selection play a decisive part ; and although
they nowhere add any new material to the space-data of
sense, they so shuffle and manipulate these data and hide

alone were necessary, we should have square inches and half inches, and
various other forms, rectilinear and curvilinear, of fragance and sound."
(Lectures, xxn.)

* Musical tones, e.g., have an order of quality independent either off
their space- or time-order. Music comes from the time-order of the notes
upsetting their quality- order. In general, if a b c d efg h ij k, etc., stand
for an arrangement of feelings in the order of their quality, they may as
sume any space-order or time-order, as def a hg, etc., and still the order
of quality will remain fixed and unchanged.

146 PSYCHOLOGY.

present ones behind imagined ones that it is no wonder if
some authors have gone so far as to think that the sense-
data have no spatial worth at all, and that the intellect,
since it makes the subdivisions, also gives the spatial
quality to them out of resources of its own.

As for ourselves, having found that all our sensations
(however as yet unconnected and undiscriminated) are oi{
extensive objects, our next problem is : How do we ARRANGE
these at first chaotically given spaces into the one regular and^
orderly ' world of space ' which we now know ?

To begin with, there is no reason to suppose that the
several sense-spaces of which a sentient creature may
become conscious, each filled with its own peculiar content,
should tend, simply because they are many, to enter into
any definite spatial intercourse with each other, or lie in
any particular order of positions. Even in ourselves we
can recognize this. Different feelings may coexist in us
without assuming any particular spatial order. The sound
of the brook near which I write, the odor of the cedars, the
comfort with which my breakfast has filled me, and my in
terest in this paragraph, all lie distinct in my consciousness,
but in no sense outside or alongside of each other. Their
spaces are interfused and at most fill the same vaguely ob
jective world. Even where the qualities are far less dis
parate, we may have something similar. If we take our
subjective and corporeal sensations alone, there are moments
when, as we lie or sit motionless, we find it very difficult to
feel distinctly the length of our back or the direction of our
feet from our shoulders. By a strong effort we can succeed
in dispersing our attention impartially over our whole per
son, and then we feel the real shape of our body in a sort
of unitary way. But in general a few parts are strongly
emphasized to consciousness and the rest sink out of notice ;
and it is then remarkable how vague and ambiguous our
perception of their relative order of location is. Obviously,
for the orderly arrangement of a multitude of sense-spaces
in consciousness, something more than their mere separate
existence is required. What is this further condition ?

If a number of sensible extents are to be perceived alongside

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 147

of each other and in definite order they must appear as parts in
a vaster sensible extent which can enter the mind simply and all
at once. I think it will be seen that the difficulty of esti-'
mating correctly the form of one's body by pure feeling >
arises from the fact that it is very hard to feel its totality as .,
a unit at all. The trouble is similar to that of thinking for
wards and backwards simultaneously. When conscious of
our head we tend to grow unconscious of our feet, and there
enters thus an element of time-succession into our percep
tion of ourselves which transforms the latter from an act of
intuition to one of construction. This element of con-
structiveness is present in a still higher degree, and carries
with it the same consequences, when we deal with objective
spaces too great to be grasped by a single look. The rela
tive positions of the shops in a town, separated by many
tortuous streets, have to be thus constructed from data ap
prehended in succession, and the result is a greater or less
degree of vagueness.

That a sensation be discriminated as a part from out of ail
larger enveloping space is then the conditio sine qua non of itsn
being apprehended in a definite spatial order. The problem
of ordering our feelings in space is then, in the first instance,
a problem of discrimination, but not of discrimination pure
and simple ; for then not only coexistent sights but coex
istent sounds would necessarily assume such order, which
they notoriously do not. Whatever is discriminated will
appear as a small space within a larger space, it is true, but
this is but the very rudiment of order. For the location of
it within that space to become precise, other conditions still
must supervene ; and the best way to study what they are
will be to pause for a little and analyze what the expression
'spatial order* means.

Spatial order is an abstract term. The concrete percep
tions which it covers are figures, directions, positions, mag
nitudes, and distances. To single out any one of these
things from a total vastness is partially to introduce order
into the vastness. To subdivide the vastness into a multi
tude of these things is to apprehend it in a completely
orderly way. Now what are these things severally ? To

148 PSYCHOLOGY.

begin with, no one can for an instant hesitate to say that
some of them are qualities of sensation, just as the total
vastness is in which they lie. Take figure : a square, a
circle, and a triangle appear in the first instance to the eye
simply as three different kinds of impressions, each so pecul
iar that we should recognize it if it were to return. When
Nunnely's patient had his cataracts removed, and a cube and
a sphere were presented to his notice, he could at once
perceive a difference in their shapes ; and though he could
not say which was the cube and which the sphere, he saw
they were not of the same figure. So of lines : if we can
notice lines at all in our field of vision, it is inconceivable
that a vertical one should not affect us differently from an
horizontal one, and should not be recognized as affecting us
similarly when presented again, although we might not yet
know the name * vertical,' or any of its connotations, beyond
this peculiar affection of our sensibility. So of angles : an
obtuse one affects our feeling immediately in a different way
from an acute one. Distance-apart, too, is a

tion — the sensation of a line joining the two distant points :
lengthen the line, you alter the feeling and with it the
distance felt.

Space-relations.

But with distance and direction we pass to the category
of ^pace-relations , and are immediately confronted by an
opinion which makes of all relations something toto ccdo
different from all facts of feeling or imagination whatsoever.
A relation, for the Platonizing school in psychology, is an
energy of pure thought, and, as such, is quite incommen
surable with the data of sensibility between which it may
be perceived to obtain.

We may consequently imagine a disciple of this school
to say to us at this point : " Suppose you have made a sep
arate specific sensation of each line and each angle, what
boots it? You have still the order of directions and of
distances to account for ; you have still the relative magni
tudes ot all these felt figures to state ; you h»ve their re
spective positions to define before you can be said to have
brought order into your space. And not one of these de-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 149

terminations can be effected except through an act of re
lating thought, so that your attempt to give an account of
space in terms of pure sensibility breaks down almost at
the very outset. Position, for example, can never be a sen
sation, for it has nothing intrinsic about it ; it can only
obtain between a spot, line, or other figure and extraneous
co-ordinates, and can never be an element of the sensible
datum, the line or the spot, in itself. Let us then confess
that Thought alone can unlock the riddle of space, and
that Thought is an adorable but unfathomable mystery."

Such a method of dealing with the problem has the
merit of shortness. Let us, however, be in no such hurry,
but see whether we cannot get a little deeper by patiently
considering what these space-relations are.

'Eelation' is a very slippery word. It has so many
different concrete meanings that the use of it as an abstract
universal may easily introduce bewilderment into our
thought. We must therefore be careful to avoid ambiguity
by making sure, wherever we have to employ it, what its
precise meaning is in that particular sphere of application.
At present we have to do with space-relations, and no others.
Most ' relations ' are feelings of an entirely different order
from the terms they relate. The relation of similarity, e.g.,
may equally obtain between jasmine and tuberose, or be
tween Mr. Browning's verses and Mr. Story's ; it is itself
neither odorous nor poetical, and those may well be pardoned
who have denied to it all sensational content whatever.
But just as, in the field of quantity, the relation between
two numbers is another number, so in the field of space the
relations are facts of the same order with the facts they relate.
If these latter be patches in the circle of vision, the former
are certain other patches between them. When we speak of
the relation of direction of two points toward each other,
we mean simply the sensation of the line that joins the two
points together. The line is the relation; feel it and you
feel the relation, see it and you see the relation ; nor can
you in any conceivable way think the latter except by im
agining the former (however vaguely), or describe or indi
cate the one except by pointing to the other. And the
moment you have imagined the line, the relation stands

150 PSYCHOLOGY.

before you in all its completeness, with nothing further to
be done. Just so the relation of direction between two lines
is identical with the peculiar sensation of shape of the
space enclosed between them. This is commonly called
an angular relation.

If these relations are sensations, no less so are the rela
tions of position. The relation of position between the top and
bottom points of a vertical line is that line, and nothing else.
The relations of position between a point and a horizontal
line below it are potentially numerous. There is one more
important than the rest, called its distance. This is the
sensation, ideal or actual, of a perpendicular drawn from the
point to the line.* Two lines, one from each extremity of
the horizontal to the point, give us a peculiar sensation of
triangularity. This feeling may be said to constitute the
locus of all the relations of position of the elements in ques
tion, tightness and leftness, upness and downness, are again
pure sensations differing specifically from each other, and
generically from everything else. Like all sensations, they
can only be indicated, not described. If we take a cube and
label one side top, another bottom, a third front, and a fourth
back, there remains no form of words by which we can de
scribe to another person which of the remaining sides is right
and which left. We can only point and say here is right
and there is left, just as we should say this is red and that
blue. Of two points seen beside each other at all, one isjj
always affected by one of these feelings, and the other by|
the opposite ; the same is true of the extremities of anyl
line.t

* The whole science of geometry may be said to owe its being to the
exorbitant interest which the human mind takes in lines. We cut space
up in every direction in order to manufacture them.

f Kant was, I believe, the first to call attention to this last order of facts.
After pointing out that two opposite spherical triangles, two gloves of a
pair, two spirals wound in contrary directions, have identical inward de
terminations, that is, have their parts defined with relation to each other by
the same law, and so must be conceived as identical, he showed that the im
possibility of their mutual superposition obliges us to assign to each figure
of a symmetrical pair a peculiar difference of its own which can only con
sist in an outward determination or relation of its parts, no^longer to each
other, but to the whole of an objectively outlying space with its points of the
compass given absolutely. This inconceivable difference is perceived only

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 151

Thus it appears indubitable that all space-relations ex
cept those of magnitude are nothing more or less than pure
sensational objects. But magnitude appears to outstep this

narrow sphere. We have relations of muchness and little-

. /id*

ness between times, numbers, intensities, and qualities," as

well as spaces. It is impossible, then, that such relations
should form a particular kind of simply spatial feeling.
This we must admit : the relation of quantity is generic
and occurs in many categories of consciousness, whilst the
other relations we have considered are specific and occur
in space alone. "When our attention passes from a shorter
line to a longer, from a smaller spot to a larger, from a
feebler light to a stronger, from a paler blue to a richer,
from a march tune to a galop, the transition is accompanied
in the synthetic field of consciousness by a peculiar feeling
of difference which is what we call the sensation of more, —
more length, more expanse, more light, more blue, more
motion. This transitional sensation of more must be iden
tical with itself under all these different accompaniments,
or we should not give it the same name in every case. We
get it when we pass from a short vertical line to a long
horizontal one, from a small square to a large circle, as
well as when we pass between those figures whose shapes
are congruous. But when the shapes are congruous our
consciousness Q| the relation is a good deal more distinct,
and it is most distiact of all when, in the exercise of our
analytic attention, we notice, first, a part, and then the
whole, of a single line or shape. Then the more of the whole
actually sticks out, as a separate piece of space, and is so
envisaged. The same exact sensation of it is given when
we are able to superpose one line or figure on another. This
indispensable condition of exact measurement of the more
has led some to think that the feeling itself arose in every
case from original experiences of superposition. This is

''through the relation to right and left, which is a matter of immediate
intuition." In these last words (welcfos unmittelbar auf Anschauung geht
— Prolegomena, § 12) Kant expresses all that we have meant by speaking
of up and down, right and left, as sensations. He is wrong, however, in
invoking relation to extrinsic total space as essential to the existence of
these contrasts in figures. Relation to our own body is enough.

152 PSYCHOLOGY.

probably not aii absolutely true opinion, but for our pres
ent purpose that is immaterial. So far as the subdivisions
of a sense-space are to be measured exactly against each
other, objective forms occupying one subdivision must
directly or indirectly be superposed upon the other, and
the mind must get the immediate feeling of an outstanding
plus. And even where we only feel one subdivision to be
vaguely larger or less, the mind must pass rapidly between
it and the other subdivision, and receive the immediate sen
sible shock of the more.

We seem thus to have accounted for all space-relations, and
made them clear to our understanding. They are nothing but
sensations of particular lines .particular angles, particular forms
of transition, or (in the case of a distinct more) of particular
outstanding portions of space after two figures have been super
posed. These relation-sensations may actually be produced
as such, as when a geometer draws new lines across a figure
with his pencil to demonstrate the relations of its parts,
or they may be ideal representations of lines, not really
drawn. But in either case their entrance into the mind is
equivalent to a more detailed subdivision, cognizance, and
measurement of the space considered. The bringing of sub-
divisions to consciousness constitutes, then, the entire process
by which we pass from our first vague feeling of a total
vastness to a cognition of the vastness in detail. The more
numerous the subdivisions are, the more elaborate and per
fect the cognition becomes. But inasmuch as all the sub
divisions are themselves sensations, and even the feeling
of ' more ' or ' less ' is, where not itself a figure, at least a
sensation of transition between two sensations of figure,
it follows, for aught we can as yet see to the contrary,
that all spatial knowledge is sensational at bottom, and that,
as the sensations lie together in the unity of consciousness,
no new material element whatever comes to them from a
supra-sensible source.*

* In the eyes of many it will have seemed strange to call a relation a
mere line, and a line a mere sensation. We may easily learn a great deal
about any relation, say that between two points: we may divide the line
which joins these, and distinguish it, and classify it, and find out its rela-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 153

The bringing of subdivisions to consciousness ! This, then,
is our next topic. They may be brought to consciousness
under three aspects in respect of their locality, in respect
of their size, in respect of their shape.

The Meaning of Localization.

Confining ourselves to the problem of locality for the pres
ent, let us begin with the simple case of a sensitive surface,
only two points of which receive stimulation from without.
How, first, are these two points felt as alongside of each
other with an interval of space between them ? We must
be conscious of two things for this : of the duality of the ex
cited points, and of the extensiveness of the unexcited
interval. The duality alone, although a necessary, is not a
sufficient condition of the spatial separation. We may,
for instance, discern two sounds in the same place, sweet
and sour in the same lemonade, warm and cold, round and
pointed contact in the same place on the skin, etc.* In all
discrimination the recognition of the duality of two feelings
by the mind is the easier the more strongly the feelings are

tions by drawing or representing new lines, and so on. But all this
further industry has naught to do with our acquaintance with the relation
itself, in its first intention. So cognized, the relation is the line and nothing
more. It would indeed be fair to call it something less; and in fact it is
easy to understand how most of us come to feel as if the line were a much
&^osser thing than the relation. The line is broad or narrow, blue or red,
made by this object or by that alternately, in the course of our experience;
it is therefore independent of any one of these accidents; and so, from
viewing it as no one of such sensible qualities, we may end by thinking of
it as something which cannot be defined except as the negation of all sen-
^Voie quality whatever, and which needs to be put into the sensations by a
mysterious act of 'relating thought.'

Another reason why we get to feel as if a space-relation must be some
thing other than the mere feeling of a line or angle is that between two
positions we can potentially make any number of lines and angles, or find,
to suit our purposes, endlessly numerous relations. The sense of this indefi
nite potentiality cleaves to our words when we speak in a general way of
'relations of place,' and misleads us into supposing that not even any
single one of them can be exhaustively equated by a single angle or a
single line.

* This often happens when the warm and cold points, or the round and
pointed ones, are applied to the skin within the limits of a single ' Em-
pfindungskreis.'

154 PSYCHOLOGY.

contrasted in quality. If our two excited points awaken
identical qualities of sensation, they must, perforce, appear
to the mind as one ; and, not distinguished at all, they are,
a fortiori, not localized apart. Spots four centimetres dis
tant on the back have no qualitative contrast at all, and fuse
into a single sensation. Points less than three thousandths
of a millimetre apart awaken on the retina sensations so
contrasted that we apprehend them immediately as two.
Now these unlikenesses which arise so slowly when we pass
from one point to another in the back, so much faster on
the tongue and finger-tips, but with such inconceivable
rapidity on the retina, what are they ? Can we discover
anything about their intrinsic nature ?

The most natural and immediate answer to make is that
they are unlikeness of place pure and simple. In the words
of a German physiologist,* to whom psychophysics owes
much:

" The sensations are from the outset (von vornhereiri) localized. . . .
Every sensation as such is from the very beginning affected with the
spatial quality, so that this quality is nothing like an external attribute
coming to the sensation from a higher faculty, but must be regarded as
something immanently residing in the sensation itself."

And yet the moment we reflect on this answer an insu
perable logical difficulty seems to present itself. No single
quale of sensation can, by itself, amount to a consciousness
of position. Suppose no feeling but that of a single point
ever to be awakened. Could that possibly be the feeling
of any special whereness or thereness ? Certainly not. Only
when a second point is felt to arise can the first one acquire
a determination of up, down, right or left, and these determina
tions are all relative to that second point. Each point, so far as
it is placed, is then only by virtue of what it is not, namely,
by virtue of another point. This is as much as to say that
position has nothing intrinsic about it ; and that, although a
feeling of absolute bigness may, a feeling of place cannot^
possibly form an immanent element in any single isolated sensa
tion. The very writer we have quoted has given heed to
this objection, for he continues (p. 335) by saying that the

* Vierordt, Grundriss der Physiologic, 5te Auflage (1877), pp. 326, 436.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

sensations thus originally localized " are only so in them
selves, but not in the representation of consciousness, which
is not yet present. . . . They are, in the first instance, de
void of all mutual relations with each other." But such a
localization of the sensation 'in itself ' would seem to mean
nothing more than the susceptibility or potentiality of being
distinctly localized when the time came and other conditions
became fulfilled. Can we now discover anything about such
susceptibility in itself before it has borne its ulterior fruits
in the developed consciousness ?

'Local Signs.'

To begin with, every sensation of the skin and every vis
ceral sensation seems to derive from its topographic seat
a peculiar shade of feeling, which it would not have in
another place. And this feeling per se seems quite another
thing from the perception of the place. Says Wundt * :

" If with the finger we touch first the cheek and then the palm,
exerting each time precisely the same pressure, the sensation shows not
withstanding a distinctly marked difference in the two cases. Similarly,
when we compare the palm with the back of the hand, the nape of the
neck with its anterior surface, the breast with the back ; in short, any
two distant parts of the skin with each other. And moreover, we easily
remark, by attentively observing, that spots even tolerably close
together differ in respect of the quality of their feeling. If we pass
from one point of our cutaneous surface to another, we find a perfectly
gradual and continuous alteration in our feeling, notwithstanding the
objective nature of the contact has remained the same. Even the sen
sations of corresponding points on opposite sides of the body, though
similar, are not identical. If, for instance, we touch first the back of one
hand and then of the other, we remark a qualitative unlikeness of
sensation. It must not be thought that such differences are mere mat
ters of imagination, and that we take the sensations to be different
because we represent each of them to ourselves as occupying a different
place. With sufficient sharpening of the attention, we may, confining
ourselves to the quality of the feelings alone, entirely abstract from
their locality, and yet notice the differences quite as markedly. "

*Vorlesungen iib. Menschen- u. Thierseele (Leipzig, 1863), i. 214. See
also Ladd's Physiological Psychology, pp. 396-8, and compare the account
by G. Stanley Hall (Mind, x. 571) of the sensations produced by moving
a blunt point lightly over the skin. Points of cutting pain, quivering,
thrilling, whirling, tickling, scratching, and acceleration, alternated with
each other along the surface.

156 PSYCHOLOGY.

Whether these local contrasts shade into each other
with absolutely continuous gradations, we cannot say. But
we know (continues Wuiidt) that

" they change, when we pass from one point of the skin to its neigh
bor, with very different degrees of rapidity. On delicately-feeling
parts, used principally for touching, such as the finger-tips, the dif
ference of sensation between two closely approximate points is already
strongly pronounced ; whilst in parts of lesser delicacy, as the arm, the
back, the legs, the disparities of sensation are observable only between
distant spots."

The internal organs, too, have their specific qualia of sen
sation. An inflammation of the kidney is different from
one of the liver ; pains in joints and muscular insertions
are distinguished. Pain in the dental nerves is wholly
unlike the pain of a burn. But very important and curious
similarities prevail throughout these differences. Internal
pains, whose seat we cannot see, and have no means of
knowing unless the character of the pain itself reveal it,
are felt where they belong. Diseases of the stomach,
kidney, liver, rectum, prostate, etc., of the bones, of the
brain and its membranes, are referred to their proper posi
tion. Nerve-pains describe the length of the nerve. Such
localizations as those of vertical, frontal, or occipital head
ache of intracranial origin force us to conclude that parts
which are neighbors, whether inner or outer, may possess
by mere virtue of that fact a common peculiarity of feeling,
a respect in which their sensations agree, and which serves
as a token of their proximity. These local colorings are,
moreover, so strong that we cognize them as the same,
throughout all contrasts of sensible quality in the accom
panying perception. Cold and heat are wide as the poles
asunder ; yet if both fall on the cheek, there mixes with
them something that makes them in that respect identical ;
just as, contrariwise, despite the identity of cold with itself
wherever found, when we get it first on the palm and then
on the cheek, some difference comes, which keeps the two
experiences for ever asunder.*

* Of the anatomical and physiological conditions of these facts we know
as yet but little, and that little need not here be discussed. Two principal
hypotheses have been invoked in the case of the retina. Wundt (Men-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 157

And now let us revert to the query propounded a
moment since : Can these differences of mere quality in feeling,
varying according to locality yet having each sensibly and in
trinsically and by itself nothing to do with position, constitute
the ' susceptibilities ' we mentioned, the conditions of being per
ceived in position, of the localities to ivhich they belong ? The
numbers on a row of houses, the initial letters of a set of
words, have no intrinsic kinship with points of space, and
yet they are the conditions of our knowledge of where any
house is in the row, or any word in the dictionary. Can the
modifications of feeling in question be tags or labels of this
kind which in no wise originally reveal the position of the
spot to which they are attached, but guide us to it by what
Berkeley would call a ' customary tie ' ? Many authors have
unhesitatingly replied in the affirmative ; Lotze, who in his
Medizinische Psychologic* first described the sensations in
this way, designating them, thus conceived, as local-signs.
This term has obtained wide currency in Germany, and in
speaking of the ' LOCAL-SIGN THEORY ' hereafter, I shall always
mean the theory ivhich denies that there can be in a sensation any
element of actual locality, of inherent spatial order, any tone as

schen-u. Thierseele, i. 214) called attention to the changes of color-sensibility
which the retina displays as the image of the colored object passes from the
fovea to the periphery. The color alters and becomes darker, and the
change is more rapid in certain directions than in others. This alteration
in general, however, is one of which, as such, \ve are wholly unconscious.
We see the sky as bright blue all over, the modifications of the blue sensa
tion being interpreted by us, not as differences in the objective color, but
as distinctions in its locality. Lotze (Medizinische Psychologic, 333, 355), on
the other hand, has pointed out the peculiar tendency which each particu
lar point of the retina has to call forth that movement of the eyeball which
will carry the image of the exciting object from the point in question to
the fovea. With each separate tendency to movement (as with each actual
movement) we may suppose a peculiar modification of sensibility to be
conjoined. This modification would constitute the peculiar local tingeing
of the image by each point. See also Sully 's Psychology, pp. 118-121.
Prof. B. Erdman has quite lately (Vierteljahrsschrift f. wiss. Phil., x.
324-9) denied the existence of all evidence for such immanent qualia of
feeling characterizing each locality. Acute as his remarks are, they quite
fail to convince me. On the skin the qualia are evident, 1 should say.
Where, as on the retina, they are less so (Kries and Auerbach), this may
well be a mere difficulty of discrimination not yet educated to the
analysis.

* 1852, p. 331.

158 PSYCHOLOGY.

it were which cries to us immediately and without further
ado, 'I am here,' or 'I am there.'

If, as may well be the case, we by this time find our
selves tempted to accept the Local-sign theory in a general
way, we have to clear up several farther matters. If a sign
is to lead us to the thing it means, we must have some other
source of knowledge of that thing. Either the thing has
been given in a previous experience of which the sign also
formed part — they are associated ; or it is what Reid calls a
' natural ' sign, that is, a feeling which, the first time it
enters the mind, evokes from the native powers thereof a
cognition of the thing that hitherto had lain dormant. In
both cases, however, the sign is one thing, and the thing
another. In the instance that now concerns us, the sign is
a quality of feeling and the thing is a position. Now we have
seen that the position of a point is not only revealed, but
created, by the existence of other points to which it stands
in determinate relations. If the sign can by any machinery
which it sets in motion evoke a consciousness either of the other
points, or of the relations, or of both, it would seem to fulfil its
function, and reveal to us the position we seek.

But such a machinery is already familiar to us. It is
neither more nor less than the law of habit in the nervous
system. When, any point of the sensitive surface has been
frequently excited simultaneously with, or immediately
before or after, other points, and afterwards comes to be
excited alone, there will be a tendency for its perceptive
nerve-centre to irradiate into the nerve-centres of the other
points. Subjectively considered, this is the same as if we
said that the peculiar feeling of the first point SUGGESTS the
feeling of the entire region with whose stimulation its own ex
citement has been habitually ASSOCIATED.

Take the case of the stomach. When the epigastrium
is heavily pressed, when certain muscles contract, etc., the
stomach is squeezed, and its peculiar local sign awakes in
consciousness simultaneously with the local signs of the
other squeezed parts. There is also a sensation of total
vastness aroused by the combined irritation, and someiuhere
in this the stomach-feeling seems to lie. Suppose that
later a pain arises in the stomach from some non-mechani-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 159

cal cause. It will be tinged by the gastric local sign, and.
the nerve-centre supporting this latter feeling will excite
the centre supporting the dermal and muscular feelings
habitually associated with it when the excitement was
mechanical. From the combination the same peculiar
vastness will again arise. In a word, ' something ' in the
stomach-sensation ' reminds ' us of a total space, of which
the diaphragmatic and epigastric sensations also form a
part, or, to express it more briefly still, suggests the neigh
borhood of these latter organs.*

Revert to the case of two excited points on a surface with
an unexcited space between them. The general result of
previous experience has been that when either point was
impressed by an outward object, the same object also
touched the immediately neighboring parts. Each point,
together with its local sign, is thus associated with a circle
of surrounding points, the association fading in strength as
the circle grows larger. Each will revive its own circle ;
but when both are excited together, the strongest revival
will be that due to the combined irradiation. Now the tract
joining the two excited points is the only part common to the
two circles. And the feelings of this whole tract will there
fore awaken with considerable vividness in the imagination
when its extremities are touched by an outward irritant.
The mind receives with the impression of the two distinct
points the vague idea of a line. The twoness of the points
comes from the contrast of their local signs : the line conies
from the associations into which experience has wrought
these latter. If no ideal line arises we have duality with
out sense of interval ; if the line be excited actually rather

* Maybe the localization of intracranial pain is itself due to such asso
ciation as this of local signs with each other, rather than to their qualita
tive similarity in neighboring parts (supra, p. 19); though it is conceivable
that association and similarity itself should here have one and the same
neural basis. If we suppose the sensory nerves from those parts of the
body beneath any patch of skin to terminate in the same sensorial brain-
tract as those from the skin itself, and if the excitement of any one fibre
tends to irradiate through the whole of that tract, the feelings of all fibres
going to that tract would presumably both have a similar intrinsic quality,
and at the same time tend each to arouse the other. Since the same nerve-
trunk in most cases supplies the skin and the parts beneath, the anatomical
hypothesis presents nothing improbable.

10U PSYCHOLOGY.

than ideally, we have the interval given with its ends, in
the form of a single extended object felt. E. H. Weber, in
the famous article in which he laid the foundations of all
our accurate knowledge of these subjects, laid it down as
the logical requisite for the perception of two separated points,
that the mind should, along with its consciousness of them, be
come aware of an unexcited interval as such. I have only tried
to show how the known laws of experience may cause this requi
site to be fulfilled. Of course, if the local signs of the entire
region offer but little qualitative contrast inter se, the line
suggested will be but dimly denned or discriminated in
length or direction from other possible lines in its neighbor
hood. This is what happens in the back, where conscious
ness can sunder two spots, whilst only vaguely apprehend
ing their distance and direction apart.

The relation of position of the two points is the sug
gested interval or line. Turn now to the simplest case,
that of a single excited spot. Hoiv can it suggest its position ?
Not by recalling any particular line unless experience have
constantly been in the habit of marking or tracing some one
line from it towards some one neighboring point. Now
on the back, belly, viscera, etc., no such tracing habitually
occurs. The consequence is that the only suggestion is
that of the whole neighboring circle ; i.e., the spot simply
recalls the general region in which it happens to lie. By a pro
cess of successive construction, it is quite true that we can
also get the feeling of distance between the spot and some
other particular spot. Attention, by reinforcing the local
sign of one part of the circle, can awaken a new circle
round this part, and so de proche en proche we may slide our
feeling down from our cheek, say, to our foot. But when
we first touched our cheek we had no consciousness of the
foot at all.* In the extremities, the lips, the tongue and
other mobile parts, the case is different. We there have
an instinctive tendency, when a part of lesser discriminative

* Unless, indeed, the foot happen to be spontaneously tingling or some
thing of the sort at the moment. The whole surface of the body is always
in a state of semi-conscious irritation which needs only the emphasis of
attention, or of some accidental inward irritation, to become strong at any
point.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 161

sensibility is touched, to move the member so that the
touching object glides along it to the place where sensi
bility is greatest. If a body touches our hand we move the
hand over it till the finger-tips are able to explore it. If
the sole of our foot touches anything we bring it towards
the toes, and so forth. There thus arise lines of habitual
passage from all points of a member to its sensitive tip.
These are the lines most readily recalled when any point
is touched, and their recall is identical with the conscious
ness of the distance of the touched point from the ' tip.' I
think anyone must be aware when he touches a point of
his hand or wrist that it is the relation to the finger-tips of
which he is usually most conscious. Points on the fore
arm suggest either the finger-tips 'or the elbow (the latter
being a spot of greater sensibility*). In the foot it is the
toes, and so on. A point can only be cognized in its rela
tions to the entire body at once by awakening a visual
image of the whole body. Such awakening is even more
obviously than the previously considered cases a matter of
pure association.

This leads us to the eye. On the retina the fovea and the
yellow spot about it form a focus of exquisite sensibility,
towards which every impression falling on an outlying por
tion of the field is moved by an instinctive action of the
muscles of the eyeball. Few persons, until their attention
is called to the fact, are aware how almost impossible it is
to keep a conspicuous visible object in the margin of the
field of view. The moment volition is relaxed we find that
without our knowing it our eyes have turned so as to bring
it to the centre. This is why most persons are unable to
keep the eyes steadily converged upon a point in space with
nothing in it. The objects against the walls of the room

* It is true that the inside of the fore- arm, though its discriminative
sensibility is often less than that of the outside, usually rises very promi
nently into consciousness when the latter is touched. Its esthetic sensi
bility to contact is a good deal finer. We enjoy stroking it from the ex
tensor to the flexor surface around the ulnar side more than in the reverse
direction. Pronating movements give rise to contacts in this order, and
are frequently indulged in when the back of the fore-arm feels an object
against it.

162 PSYCHOLOGY.

invincibly attract the foveae to themselves. If we contem
plate a blank wall or sheet of paper, we always observe in
a moment that we are directly looking at some speck upon it
which, unnoticed at first, ended by 'catching our eye.' Thus
ivhenever an image falling on the point P of the retina excites
attention, it more habitually moves from that point toivards the
fovea than in any one other direction. The line traced thus by
the image is not always a straight line. When the direction
of the point from the fovea is neither vertical nor horizon
tal but oblique, the line traced is often a curve, with its con
cavity directed upwards if the direction is upwards, down
wards if the direction is downwards. This may be verified
by anyone who will take the trouble to make a simple ex
periment with a luminous body like a candle-flame in a dark
enclosure, or a star. Gazing first at some point remote
from the source of light, let the eye be suddenly turned 'full
upon the latter. The luminous image will necessarily fall
in succession upon a continuous series of points, reaching
from the one first affected to the fovea. But by virtue of
the slowness with which retinal excitements die away, the
entire series of points will for an instant be visible as an
after-image, displaying the above peculiarity of form ac
cording to its situation.* These radiating lines are neither
regular nor invariable in the same person, nor, probably,
equally curved in different individuals. We are incessant
ly drawing them between the fovea and every point of the
field of view. Objects remain in their peripheral indistinct
ness only so long as they are unnoticed. The moment we
attend to them they grow distinct through one of these mo
tions — which leads to the idea prevalent among uninstructed
persons that we see distinctly all parts of the field of view
at once. The result of this incessant tracing of radii is that
whenever a local sign P is awakened by a spot of light falling
upon it, it recalls forthwith, even though the eyeball be unmoved,
the local signs of all the other points ivhich lie between P and
the fovea. It recalls them in imaginary form, just as the
normal reflex movement would recall them in vivid form ;
and with their recall is given a consciousness more or less

* These facts were first noticed by Wundt: see his Beitrage, p. 140, 202
See also Larnansky, Pfliiger's Archiv, xi. 418.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 163

faint of the whole line on which they lie. In other words,
no ray of light can fall on any retinal spot without the lo
cal sign of that spot revealing to us, by recalling the line
of its most habitual associates, its direction and distance
from the centre of the field. The fovea acts thus as the
origin of a system of polar co-ordinates, in relation to which
each and every retinal point has through an incessantly-re
peated process of association its distance and direction de
termined. Were P alone illumined and all the rest of the
field dark we should still, even with motionless eyes, know
whether P lay high or low, right or left, through the ideal
.streak, different from all other streaks, which P alone
has the power of awakening.*

* So far all has been plain sailing, but our course begins to be so tortu
ous when we descend into minuter detail that I will treat of the more pre
cise determination of locality in a long note. When P recalls an ideal line
leading to the fovea the line is felt in its entirety and but vaguely ; whilst
P, which we supposed to be a single star of actual light, stands out in strong
distinction from it. The ground of the distinction between P and the
ideal line which it terminates is manifest— P being vivid while the line is
faint ; but why should P hold the particular position it does, at the end of tlie
line, rather than anywhere else— for example, in its middle? That seems
something not at all manifest.

To clear up our thoughts about this latter mystery, let us take the case
of an actual line of light, none of whose parts is ideal. The feeling of
the line is produced, as we know, when a multitude of retinal points are
excited together, each of which when excited separately would give rise to
one of the feelings called local signs. Each of these signs is the feeling of
a small space. From their simultaneous arousal we might well suppose a
feeling of larger space to result. But why is it necessary that in this
larger spaciousness the sign a should appear always at one end of the line,
2 at the other, and m in the middle ? For though the line be a unitary
streak of light, its several constituent points can nevertheless break out
from it, and become alive, each for itself, under the selective eye of atten
tion.

The uncritical reader, giving his first careless glance at the subject, will
say that there is no mystery in this, and that ' of course ' local signs must
appear alongside of each other, each in its own place; — there is no other
way possible. But the more philosophic student, whose business it is to
discover difficulties quite as much as to get rid of them, will reflect that it
is conceivable that the partial factors might fuse into a larger space, and
yet not each be located within it any more than a voice is located in a
chorus. He will wonder how, after combining into the line, the points
can become severally alive again : the separate puffs of a ' sirene ' no longer
strike the ear after they have fused into a certain pitch of sound. He will
recall the fact that when, after looking at things with one eye closed, we

PSYCHOLOGY.

And with this we can close the first great division of
our subject. We have shown that, within the range of

double^bVopening the other eye, the number of retinal points affected,
the new retinal sensations do not as a rule appear alongside of the
old ones and additional to them, but merely make the old ones seem
laro-er and nearer. Why should the affection of new points on the same
retina have so different a result? In fact, he will see no sort of logical
connection between (1) the original separate local signs, (2) the line as a
unit (3) the line with the points discriminated in it, and (4) the various
nerve-processes which subserve all these different things. He will suspect
our local sign of being a very slippery and ambiguous sort of creature.
Positionless at first, it no sooner appears in the midst of a gang of compan
ions than it is found maintaining the strictest position of its own, and as
signing place to each of its associates. How is this possible? Must we
accept what we rejected a while ago as absurd, and admit the points each
to have position in se ? Or must we suspect that our whole construction
has been fallacious, and that we have tried to conjure up, out of association,
qualities which the associates never contained?

There is no doubt a real difficulty here; and the shortest way of dealing
with it would be to confess it insoluble and ultimate. Even if position be
not an intrinsic character of any one of those sensations we have calle
local signs we must still admit that there is something about everyone of
them that stands for the potentiality of position, and is the ground why tl
local sign when it gets placed at all, gets placed Aero rather than there.
' something ' be interpreted as a physiological something, as a mere nerve-
process it is easy to say in a blank way that when it is excited alone, it
an 'ultimate fact '(1) that a positionless spot will appear; that when il
excited together with other similar processes, but without Ithe process o
discriminative attention, it is another 'ultimate fact ' (2) that a unitary line
will come- and that the final 'ultimate fact' (3) is that, when the nerve-
process is excited in combination with that other process which subserves
the feeling of attention, what results will be the line with the local sign
inside of it determined to a particular place. Thus we should escape the
responsibility of explaining, by falling back on the everlasting inscruta
bility of the psycho-neural nexus. The moment we call the ground of 1
calization physiological, we need only point out how, in those cases i
which localization occurs, the physiological process differs from those 11
which it does not, to have done all we can possibly do in the matter,
would be unexceptionable logic, and with it we might let the matter drop,
satisfied that there was no self-contradiction in it, but only the universal
psychological puzzle of how a new mode of consciousness emerges when
ever a fundamentally new mode of nervous action occurs.

But blameless as such tactics would logically be on our part, let us see
whether we cannot push our theoretic insight a little farther. It seems t
me we can We cannot, it is true, give a reason why the line we feel when
process (2) awakens should have its own peculiar shape; nor can we explain
the essence of the process of discriminative attention. But we can s.
why if the brute facts be admitted that a line may have one of its parts
singled out by attention at all, and that that part may appear in relation to

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 165

every sense, experience takes ab initio the spatial form. We
have also shown that in the cases of the retina and skin

other parts at all, the relation must be in the line itself, — for the line and
the parts are the only things supposed to be in consciousness. And we can
furthermore suggest a reason why parts appearing thus in relation to each
other in a line should fall into an immutable order, and each within that
order keep its characteristic place.

If a lot of such local signs all have any quality which evenly augments
as we pass from one to the other, we can arrange them in an ideal serial
order, in which any one local sign must lie below those with more, above
those with less, of the quality in question. It must divide the series into
two parts, — unless indeed it have a maximum or minimum of the quality,
when it either begins or ends it.

Such an ideal series of local signs in the mind is, however, not yet iden
tical with the feeling of a line in space. Touch a dozen points on the skin
successively, and there seems no necessary reason why the notion of a defi
nite line should emerge, even though we be strongly aware of a gradation
of quality among the touches. We may of course symbolically arrange
them in a line in our thought, but we can always distinguish between a
line symbolically thought aud a line directly felt.

But note now the peculiarity of the nerve-processes of all these local
signs: though they may give no line when excited successively, when ex
cited together they do give the actual sensation of a line in space. The
sum of them is the neural process of that line; the sum of their feelings
is the feeling of that line; and if we begin to single out particular points
from the line, and notice them by their rank, it is impossible to see how
this rank can appear except as an actual fixed space-position sensibly felt
as a bit of the total line. The scale itself appearing as a line, rank in it
must appear as a definite part of the line. If the seven notes of an octave,
when heard together, appeared to the sense of hearing as an outspread
line of sound— which it is needless to say they do not— why then no one
note could be discriminated without being localized, according to its pitch,
in the line, either as one of its extremities or as some part between.

But not alone the gradation of their quality arranges the local-sign
feelings in a scale. Our movements arrange them also in a towd-scale.
Whenever a stimulus passes from point a of the skin or retina to point/,
it awakens the local -sign feelings in the perfectly definite time-order abcdef.
It cannot excite/ until cde have been successively aroused. The feeling c
sometimes is preceded by ab, sometimes followed by ba, according to the
movement's direction; the result of it all being that we never feel either a,
c, or/, without there clinging to it faint reverberations of the various time-
orders of transition in which, throughout past experience, it has been
aroused. To the local sign a there clings the tinge or tone, the penumbrn
or fringe, of the transition bed. To/ to c, there cling quite different tones.
Once admit the principle that a feeling may be tinged by the reproductive
consciousness of an habitual transition, even when the transition is not
made, and it seems entirely natural to admit that, if the transition be habit
ually in the order abcdef, and if a, c, and/ be felt separately at all, a will
be felt with an essential earliness, /with an essential lateness, and that c will

166 PSYCHOLOGY.

every sensible total may be subdivided by discriminative
attention into sensible parts, which are also spaces, and
into relations between the parts, these being sensible spaces
too. Furthermore, we have seen (in a foot-note) that differ
ent parts, once discriminated, necessarily fall into a deter
minate order, both by reason of definite gradations in their
quality, and by reason of the fixed order of time-succes
sion in which movements arouse them. But in all this
nothing has been said of the comparative measurement of
one sensible space- total against another, or of the way
in which, by summing our divers simple sensible space-
experiences together, we end by ronstructing what we re
gard as the unitary, continuous, and infinite objective Space
of the real world. To this more difficult inquiry we next

THE CONSTRUCTION OF 'HEAL' SPACE,

The problem breaks into two subordinate problems <

(1) How is the subdivision and measurement of the several
sensorial spaces completely effected ? and

(2) Now do their mutual addition and fusion and reduction
to the same scale, in a ivord, hoiv does their synthesis, occur ?

I think that, as in the investigation just finished, we
found ourselves able to get along without invoking any data
but those that pure sensibility on the one hand, and the
ordinary intellectual powers of discrimination and recollec-

fall between. Thus those psychologists who set little store by local signs
and great store by movements in explaining space-perception, would have
a perfectly definite time-order, due to motion, by which to account for
the definite order of positions that appears when sensitive spots are excited
all at once. Without, however, the preliminary admission of the * ulti
mate fact' that this collective excitement shall feel like a line and nothing
else, it can never be explained why the new order should needs be an
order of positions, and not of merely ideal serial rank. We shall hereafter
have any amount of opportunity to observe how thoroughgoing is the par
ticipation of motion in all our spatial measurements. Whether the local
signs have their respective qualities evenly graduated or not, the feelings
of transition must be set down as among the verce causa in localization.
But the gradation of the local signs is hardly to be doubted ; so we may be
lieve ourselves really to possess two sets of reasons for localizing any point
we may happen to distinguish from out the midst of any line or any larger
space.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 167

tion on the other, were able to yield ; so here we shall
emerge from our more complicated quest with the convic
tion that all the facts can be accounted for on the supposi
tion that no other mental forces have been at work save
those we find everywhere else in psychology : sensibility,
namely, for the data ; and discrimination, association,
memory, and choice for the rearrangements and combina
tions which they undergo.

1. The Subdivision of the Original Sense-spaces.

How are spatial subdivisions brought to consciousness ?
in other words, How does spatial discrimination occur?
The general subject of discrimination has been treated in
a previous chapter. Here we need only inquire what are
the conditions that make spatial discrimination so much
finer in sight than in touch, and in touch than in hearing,
smell, or taste.

The first great condition is, that different points of the
surface shall differ in the quality of their immanent sensibility r,
that is, that each shall carry its special local-sign. If the
skin felt everywhere exactly alike, a foot-bath could be dis
tinguished from a total immersion, as being smaller, but
never distinguished from a wet face. The local-signs are
indispensable ; two points which have the same local-sign
will always be felt as the same point. "We do not judge
them two unless we have discerned their sensations to be
different.* Granted none but; homogeneous irritants, that
organ would then distinguish the greatest multiplicity of
irritants — would count most stars or compass-points, or
best compare the size of two wet surfaces — whose local
sensibility was the least even. A skin whose sensibility
shaded rapidly off from a focus, like the apex of a boil,
would be better than a homogeneous integument for spatial
perception. The retina, with its exquisitely sensitive fovea,
has this peculiarity, and undoubtedly owes to it a great part

*M. Binet (Revue Philosophique, Sept. 1880, page 291) says we judge
them locally different as soon as their sensations differ enough for us to
distinguish them as qualitatively different when successively excited. This
is not strictly true. Skin-sensations, different enough to be discriminated
when successive, may still fuse locally if excited both at once.

168 PSYCHOLOGY.

* • of the minuteness with which we are able to subdivide the
total bigness of the sensation it yields. On its periphery
the local differences do not shade off very rapidly, and we
can count there fewer subdivisions.

But these local differences of feeling, so long as the surface
is unexcited from without, are almost null. I canot feel them
by a pure mental act of attention unless they belong to quite
distinct parts of the body, as the nose and the lip, the finger
tip and the ear ; their contrast needs the reinforcement of
outward excitement to be felt. In the spatial muchness of
a colic — or, to call it by the more spacious-sounding verna
cular, of a ' bellyache ' — one can with difficulty distinguish
the north-east from the south-west corner, but can do so
much more easily if, by pressing one's finger against the
former region, one is able to make the pain there more in
tense.

The local differences require then an adventitious sensa
tion, superinduced upon them, to awaken the attention. After
the attention has once been awakened in this way, it may
continue to be conscious of the unaided difference ; just as
a sail on the horizon may be too faint for us to notice until
someone's finger, placed against the spot, has pointed it out
to us, but may then remain visible after the finger has been
withdrawn. But all this is true only on condition that
separate points of the surface may be exclusively stimulated.
If the whole surface at once be excited from without, and
homogeneously, as, for example, by immersing the body in
salt water, local discrimination is not furthered. The local-
signs, it is true, all awaken at once ; but in such multitude
that no one of them, with its specific quality, stands out in
contrast with the rest. If, however, a single extremity be
immersed, the contrast between the wet and dry parts is
strong, and, at the surface of the water especially, the local-
signs attract the attention, giving the feeling of a ring sur
rounding the member. Similarly, two or three wet spots
separated by dry spots, or two or three hard points against
the skin, will help to break up our consciousness of the
latter's bigness. In cases of this sort, where points re
ceiving an identical kind of excitement are, nevertheless,
felt to be locally distinct, and the objective irritants are also

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 169

judged multiple, — e.g., compass-points on skin or stars ou
retina, — the ordinary explanation is no doubt just, and we
judge the outward causes to be multiple because we have
discerned the local feelings of their sensations to be dif
ferent.

Capacity for partial stimulation is thus the second condi
tion favoring discrimination. A sensitive surface which has to
be excited in all its parts at once can yield nothing but a
sense of undivided largeness. This appears to be the case
with the olfactory, and to all intents and purposes with the
gustatory, surfaces. Of many tastes and flavors, even sim
ultaneously presented, each affects the totality of its re
spective organ, each appears with the whole vastness given
by that organ, and appears interpenetrated by the rest*

* It may. however, be said that even iu the tongue there is a determina
tion of bitter flavors to the back and of acids to the front edge of the organ.
Spices likewise affect its sides and front, and a taste like that of alum
localizes itself, by its styptic effect on the portion of mucous membrane,
which it immediately touches, more sharply than roast pork, for example,
which stimulates all parts alike. The pork, therefore, tastes more spacious
than the alum or the pepper. In the nose, too, certain smells, of which
viuegar may be taken as the type, seem less spatially extended than heavy,
suffocating odors, like musk. The reason of this appears to be that the
former inhibit inspiration by their sharpness, whilst the latter are drawn
into the lungs, and thus excite an objectively larger surface. The asc? p-
tion of height and depth to certain notes seems due, not to any localization
of the sounds, but to the fact that a feeling of vibration in the chest and
tension in the gullet accompanies the singing of a bass note, whilst, when
we sing high, the palatine mucous membrane is drawn upon by the muscles
which move the larynx, and awakens a feeling in the roof of the mouth.

The only real objection to the law of partial stimulation laid down in
the text is one that might be drawn from the organ of hearing; for, ac
cording to modern theories, the cochlea may have its separate nerve-termini
exclusively excited by sounds of differing pitch, and yet the sounds seem
all to fill a common space, and not necessarily to be arranged alongside of
each other. At most the high note is felt as a thinner, brighter streak
against a darker background. In an article on Space, published in the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January, 1879, 1 ventured to suggest
that possibly the auditory nerve termini might be "excited all at once by
sounds of any pitch, as the whole retina would be by every luminous point
if there were no dioptric apparatus affixed." And I added : "Notwith
standing the brilliant conjectures of the last few years which assign differ
ent acoustic end-organs to different rates of air-wave, we are still greatly
in the dark about the subject ; and I, for my part, would much more con
fidently reject a theory of hearing which violated the principles advanced in

170 PSYCHOLOGY.

I should have been willing some years ago to name with
out hesitation a third condition of discrimination — saying it
would be most developed in that organ which is susceptible
of the most various qualities of feeling. The retina is un
questionably such an organ. The colors and shades it
perceives are infinitely more numerous than the diversities
of skin -sensation. And it can feel at once white and black,
whilst the ear can in nowise so feel sound and silence. But
the late researches of Donaldson, Blix, and Goldscheider, *
on specific points for heat, cold, pressure, and pain in the
skin ; the older ones of Czermak (repeated later by Klug
in Ludwig's laboratory), showing that a hot and a cold
compass-point are no more easily discriminated as two than
two of equal temperature ; and some unpublished experi
ments of my own — all disincline me to make much of this
condition now.t There is, however, one quality of sensa-

tliis article than give up those principles for the sake of any hypothesis
hitherto published about either organs of Corti or basilar membrane."
Professor Rutherford's theory of hearing, advanced at the meeting of the
British Association for 1886, already furnishes an alternative view which
would make hearing present no exception to the space-theory I defend
and which, whether destined to be proved true or false, ought, at any rate
to make us feel that the Helmholtzian theory is probably not the last wora
in the physiology of hearing. Stepano, ff. (Hermann und Schwalbe's Jahres-
bericht, xv. 404. Literature 1886) reports a case in which more than the
upper half of one cochlea was lost without any such deafness to deep notes
on that side as Helmholtz's theory would require.

* Donaldson, in Mind, x. 399, 577; Goldscheider, in Archiv f . (Anat u.)
Physiologie; Blix, in Zeitschrift fur Biologic. A good resume may be
found in Ladd's Physiol. Psychology, part n. chap. TV. §§ 21-23.

fl tried on nine or ten people, making numerous observations on each,
what difference it made in the discrimination of two points to have them
alike or unlike. The points chosen were (1) two large needle-heads, (2)
two screw-heads, and (3) a needle-head and a screw- head. The distance
of the screw-heads was measured from their centres. I found that when
the points gave diverse qualities of feeling (as in 3), this facilitated the
discrimination, but much less strongly than I expected The difference,
in fact, would often not be perceptible twenty times running When,
however, one of the points was endowed with a rotary movement, the
other remaining still, the doubleness of the points became much more evi
dent than before. To observe this I took an ordinary pair of compasses with
one point blunt, and the movable leg replaced by a metallic rod which could,
at any moment, be made to rotate in situ by a dentist's drilling-machine, to
which it was attached. The compass had then its points applied to the skin
at such a distance apart as to be felt as one impression. Suddenly rotating
the drill-apparatus then almost always made them seem as two.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 171

tion which is particularly exciting, and that is the feeling
of motion over any of our surfaces. The erection of this
into a separate elementary quality of sensibility is one of
the most recent of psychological achievements, and is
worthy of detaining us a while at this point.

The Sensation of Motion over Surfaces.
The feeling of motion has generally been assumed by
physiologists to be impossible until the positions of terminus
a quo and terminus ad quern are severally cognized, and the
successive occupancies of these positions by the moving
body are perceived to be separated by a distinct interval of
time.* As a matter of fact, however, we cognize only the
very slowest motions in this way. Seeing the hand of a
clock at XII and afterwards at VI, we judge that it has
moved through the interval. Seeing the sun now in the
east and again in the west, I infer it to have passed over
my head. But we can only infer that which we already
generically know in some more direct fashion, and it is ex
perimentally certain that we have the feeling of motion
given us as a direct and simple sensation. Czermak long ago
pointed out the difference between seeing the motion of the
second-hand of a watch, when we look directly at it, and
noticing the fact of its having altered its position when we
fix our gaze upon some other point of the dial-plate. In
the first case we have a specific quality of sensation which
is absent in the second. If the reader will find a portion
of his skin — the arm, for example — where a pair of com
pass-points an inch apart are felt as one impression, and if
he will then trace lines a tenth of an inch long on that spot
with a pencil-point, he will be distinctly aware of the point's
motion and vaguely aware of the direction of the motion.
The perception of the motion here is certainly not derived
from a pre-existing knowledge that its starting and ending
points are separate positions in space, because positions in
space ten times wider apart fail to be discriminated as such

* This is only another example of what I call ' the psychologist's fal
lacy '—thinking that the mind he is studying must necessarily be conscious
of the object after the fashion in which the psychologist himself is con
scious of it.

172 PSYCHOLOGY.

when excited by the dividers. It is the same with the
retina. One's fingers when cast upon its peripheral portions
cannot be counted — that is to say, the five retinal tracts
which they occupy are not distinctly apprehended by the
mind as five separate positions in space — and yet the slight
est movement of the fingers is most vividly perceived as
movement and nothing else. It is thus certain that our
sense of movement, being so much more delicate than our
sense of position, cannot possibly be derived from it. A
curious observation by Exner * completes the proof that move
ment is a primitive form of sensibility, by showing it to be
much more delicate than our sense of succession in time.
This very able physiologist caused two electric sparks to
appear in rapid succession, one beside the other. The
observer had to state whether the right-hand one or the
left-hand one appeared first. When the interval was re
duced to as short a time as 0.044" the discrimination of
temporal order in the sparks became impossible. But
Exner found that if the sparks were brought so close to
gether in space that their irradiation-circles overlapped, the
eye then felt their flashing as if it were the motion of a
single spark from the point occupied by the first to the
point occupied by the second, and the time-interval might
then be made as small as 0.015" before the mind began to
be in doubt as to whether the apparent motion started
from the right or from the left. On the skin similar ex
periments gave similar results.

Vierordt, at almost the same time,^ called atttention to cer
tain persistent illusions, amongst which are these : If another
person gently trace a line across our wrist or finger, the
latter being stationary, it will feel to us as if the mem
ber were moving in the opposite direction to the tracing
point. If, on the contrary, we move our limb across a fixed
point, it will be seen as if the point were moving as well.
If the reader will touch his forehead with his forefinger
kept motionless, and then rotate the head so that the skin
of the forehead passes beneath the finger's tip, he will Lave

*Sitzb. der. k. Akad. Wien, Bd. LXXII., Abth. 3 (1875).
f Zeitschrift fttr Biologie, xii. 226 (1876).

TEE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 173

an irresistible sensation of the latter being itself in motion
in the opposite direction to the head. So in abducting the
fingers from each other ; some may move and the rest be still
still, but the still ones will feel as if they were actively sep
arating from the rest. These illusions, according to Vierordt,
are survivals of a primitive form of perception, when
motion was felt as such, but ascribed to the whole content
of consciousness, and not yet distinguished as belonging ex
clusively to one of its parts. When our perception is fully
developed we go beyond the mere relative motion of thing
and ground, and can ascribe absolute motion to one of these
components of our total object, and absolute rest to another.
When, in vision for example, the whole background moves
together, we think that it is ourselves or our eyes which
are moving ; and any object in the foreground which may
move relatively to the background is judged by us to be
still. But primitively this discrimination cannot be per
fectly made. The sensation of the motion spreads over all
that we see and infects it. Any relative motion of object
and retina both makes the object seem to move, and makes
us feel ourselves in motion. Even now when our whole ob
ject moves we still get giddy ; and we still see an apparent
motion of the entire field of view, whenever we suddenly
jerk our head and eyes or shake them quickly to and fro.
Pushing our eyeballs gives the same illusion. We knoiv in
all these cases what really happens, but the conditions are
unusual, so our primitive sensation persists unchecked. So
it does when clouds float by the moon. We know the moon
is still ; but we see it move even faster than the clouds.
Even when we slowly move our eyes the primitive sensation
persists under the victorious conception. If we notice
closely the experience, we find that any object towards
which we look appears moving to meet our eye.

But the most valuable contribution to the subject is
the paper of G. H. Schneider,* who takes up the matter
zoologically, and shows by examples from every branch of
the animal kingdom that movement is the quality by which
animals most easily attract each other's attention. The in-

* Vierteljahrsch. ftir wiss. Philos., n. 377.

174 PSYCHOLOGY.

stinct of ' shamming death ' is no shamming of death at all,
but rather a paralysis through fear, which saves the insect,
crustacean, or other creature from being noticed at oil by his
enemy. It is parallelled in the human race by the breath-
Jiolding stillness of the boy playing ' I spy,' to whom the
seeker is near ; and its obverse side is shown in our invol
untary waving of arms, jumping up and down, and so forth,
when we wish to attract someone's attention at a distance.
Creatures ' stalking ' their prey and creatures hiding from
their pursuers alike show how immobility diminishes con-
spicuity. In the woods, if we are quiet, the squirrels aiid
birds will actually touch us. Flies will light on stuffed
birds and stationary frogs.* On the other hand, the tre
mendous shock of feeling the thing we are sitting on begin
to move, the exaggerated start it gives us to have an insect
unexpectedly pass over our skin, or a cat noiselessly come
and snuffle about our hand, the excessive reflex effects of
tickling, etc., show how exciting the sensation of motion is
per se. A kitten cannot help pursuing a moving ball. Im
pressions too faint to be cognized at all are immediately
felt if they move. A fly sitting is unnoticed, —we feel it the
moment it crawls. A shadow may be too faint to be per
ceived. As soon as it moves, however, we see it. Schneider
found that a shadow, with distinct outline, and directly fix
ated, could still be perceived when moving, although its
objective strength might be but half as great as that of a
stationary shadow so faint as just to disappear. With a
blurred shadow in indirect vision the difference in favor
of motion was much greater — namely, 13.3 : 40.7. If we
hold a finger between our closed eyelid and the sunshine
we shall not notice its presence. The moment we move it
to and fro, however, we discern it. Such visual perception
as this reproduces the conditions of sight among the
radiates, t

* Bxner tries to show that the structure of the faceted eye of articulates
adapts it for perceiving motions almost exclusively.

f Schneider tries to explain why a sensory surface is so much more ex
cited when its impression moves. It has long since been noticed how much
more acute is discrimination of successive than of simultaneous differences.
But in the case of a moving impression, say on the retina, we have a sum-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 175

Enough has now been said to show that in the education
of spatial discrimination the motions of impressions across sen
sory surfaces must have been the principal agent in breaking
up our consciousness of the surfaces into a consciousness
of their parts. Even to-day the main function of the pe
ripheral regions of our retina is that of sentinels, which,
when beams of light move over them, cry ' Who goes there ? '
and call the fovea to the spot. Most parts of the skin do
but perform the same office for the finger-tips. Of course
finger-tips and fovea leave some power of direct perception
to marginal retina and skin respectively. But it is worthy
of note that such perception is best developed on the skin of
the most movable parts (the labors of Vierordt and his
pupils have well shown this) ; and that in the blind, whose
skin is exceptionally discriminative, it seems to have become
so through the inveterate habit which most of them possess
of twitching and moving it under whatever object may
touch them, so as to become better acquainted with the con
formation of the same. Czermak was the first to notice this.
It may be easily verified. Of course movement of surface
und&r object is (for purposes of stimulation) equivalent to move
ment of object over surface. In exploring the shapes and

mation of both sorts of difference ; whereof the natural effect must be to
produce the most perfect discrimination of all.

Fio. 68.

In the left-hand figure let the dark spot B move, for example, from
right to left. At the outset there is the simultaneous contrast of black and
white in B and A. When the motion has occurred so that the right-hand
figure is produced, the same contrast remains, the black and the white
having changed places. But in addition to it there is a double suc
cessive contrast, first in A, which, a moment ago white, has now become
black ; and second in B, which, a moment ago black, has now become
white. If we make each single feeling of contrast = 1 (a supposition tar
too favorable to the state of rest), the sum of contrasts in the case of motion
will be 3, as against 1 in the state of rest. That is, our attention will be
called by a treble force to the difference of color, provided the color be
gin to move.— (Cf. also Fleischl, Physiologische Optische Notizen, 2te
Mittheilung, Wiener Sitzungsberichte, 1882.)

176 PSYCHOLOGY.

sizes of things by either eye or skin the movements of these
organs are incessant and unrestrainable. Every such move
ment draws the points and lines of the object across the
surface, imprints them a hundred times more sharply,
and drives them home to the attention. The immense part
thus played by movements in our perceptive activity is held
by many psychologists* to prove that the muscles are them
selves the space-perceiving organ. Not surface-sensibility,
but ' the muscular sense,' is for these writers the original
and only revealer of objective extension. But they have
all failed to notice with what peculiar intensity muscular
contractions call surface-sensibilities into play, and that the
mere discrimination of impressions (quite apart from any
question of measuring the space between them) largely
depends on the mobility of the surface upon which they
fall, t

* Brown, Bain, J. 8. Mill, and in a modified manner Wundt, Helmholtz,
Sully, etc.

fM. Ch. Dunan, in his forcibly written essay ' 1'Espace Visuel et
1'Espace Tactile ' in the Revue Philosophique for 1888, endeavors to prove
that surfaces alone give no perception of extent, by citing the way in
which the blind go to work to gain an idea of an object's shape. If surfaces
were the percipient organ, he says, " both the seeing and the blind ought
to gain an exact idea of the size (and shape) of an object by merely laying
their hand flat upon it (provided of course that it were smaller than the
hand), and this because of their direct appreciation of the amount of tactile
surface affected, and with no recourse to the muscular sense. . . . But the
fact is that a person born blind never proceeds in this way to measure ob
jective surfaces. The only means which he has of getting at the size of a
body is that of running his finger along the lines by which it is bounded.
For instance, if you put into the hands of one born blind a book whose
dimensions are unknown to him, he will begin by resting it against his
chest so as to hold it horizontal ; then, bringing his two hands together at
the middle of the edge opposite to the one against his body, he will draw
them asunder till they reach the ends of the edge in question . and then,
and not till then, will he be able to say what the length of the object is "
(vol. xxv. p. 148). I think that anyone who will try to appreciate the size
and shape of an object by simply ' laying his hand flat upon it ' will find
that the great obstacle is that he feels the contours so imperfectly. The
moment, however, the hands move, the contours are emphatically and dis
tinctly felt. All perception of shape and size is perception of contours, and
first of all these must be made sharp. Motion does this ; and the impulse
to move our organs in perception is primarily due to the craving which we
feel to get our surface-sensations sharp. When it comes to the naming and

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. Ill

2. The Measurement of the sense-spaces against each other.

What precedes is all we can say in answer to the problem
of discrimination. Turn now to that of measurement of the
several spaces against each other, that being the first step
in our constructing out of our diverse space-experiences the
one space we believe in as that of the real world.

The first thing that seems evident is that we have no
immediate power of comparing together with any accuracy
the extents revealed by different sensations. Our mouth-
cavity feels indeed to itself smaller, and to the tongue
larger, than it feels to the finger or eye, our tympanic
membrane feels larger than our finger-tip, our lips feel
larger than a surface equal to them on our thigh. So much
comparison is immediate ; but it is vague ; and for anything
exact we must resort to other help.

The great agent in comparing the extent felt by one sensory
surface with that felt by another, is superposition — superposition
of one surface upon another, and superposition of one outer
thing upon many surfaces. Thus are exact equivalencies and
common measures introduced, and the way prepared for
numerical results.

Could we not superpose one part of our skin upon an
other, or one object on both parts, we should hardly suc
ceed in coming to that knowledge of our own form which
we possess. The original differences of bigness of our dif
ferent parts would remain vaguely operative, and we should
have no certainty as to how much lip was equivalent to so
much forehead, how much finger to so much back.

But with the power of exploring one part of the surface
by another we get a direct perception of cutaneous equiva
lencies. The primitive differences of bigness are over
powered when we feel by an immediate sensation that a
certain length of thigh-surface is in contact with the entire
palm and fingers. And when a motion of the opposite finger
tips draws a line first along this same length of thigh and

measuring of objects in terms of some common standard we shall see pres
ently how movements help also , but no more in this case than the other
do they help, because the quality of extension itself is contributed by iha
'muscular sense.'

178 PSYCHOLOGY,

then along the whole of the hand in question, we get a new
manner of measurement, less direct but confirming the
equivalencies established by the first. In these ways, by
superpositions of parts and by tracing lines on different
parts by identical movements, a person deprived of sight
can soon learn to reduce all the dimensions of his body to a
homogeneous scale. By applying the same methods to
objects of his own size or smaller, he can with equal ease
make himself acquainted with their extension stated in
terms derived from his own bulk, palms, feet, cubits, spans,
paces, fathoms (armspreads), etc. In these reductions it is
to be noticed that when the resident sensations of largeness
of two opposed surfaces conflict, one of the sensations is chosen
as the trite standard and the other treated as illusory. Thus
an empty tooth-socket is believed to be really smaller than
the finger-tip which it will not admit, although it may feel
larger ; and in general it may be said that the hand, as the
almost exclusive organ of palpation, gives its own magnitude
to the other parts, instead of having its size determined by
them. In general, it is, as Fechner says, the extent felt by
the more sensitive part to which the other extents are re
duced. *

But even though exploration of one surface by another
were impossible, we could always measure our various
surfaces against each other by applying the same extended
object first to one and then to another. We should of
course have the alternative of supposing that the object
itself waxed and waned as it glided from one place to
another (cf. above, p. 141) ; but the principle of simplifying
as much as possible our world would soon drive us out of
that assumption into the easier one that objects as a rule

* Fechner describes (Psychophysik, i. 132) a ' method of equivalents'
for measuring the sensibility of the skin. Two compasses are used, one on
the part A another on the part B, of the surface The points on B must
be adjusted so that their distance apart appears equal to that between the
points on A With the place A constant, the second pair of points must be
varied a great deal for every change in the place B though for the snrne A
and B the relation of the two compasses is remarkably constant, and con
tinues unaltered for mouths provided but few experiments are made on
each day. If, however, we practise dally their difference grows less, in
accordance with the law given tn the text

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 179

keep their sizes, and that most of our sensations are
affected by errors for which a constant allowance must be
made.

In the retina there is no reason to suppose that the
bignesses of two impressions (lines or blotches) falling on
different regions are primitively felt to stand in any exact
mutual ratio. It is only when the impressions come from
the same object that we judge their sizes to be the same.
And this, too, only when the relation of the object to the
eye is believed to be on the whole unchanged. When the
object by moving changes its relations to the eye the sensa
tion excited by its image even on the same retinal region
becomes so fluctuating that we end by ascribing no absolute
import whatever to the retinal space-feeling which at any
moment we may receive. So complete does this overlook
ing of retinal magnitude become that it is next to impossi
ble to compare the visual magnitudes of objects at different
distances without making the experiment of superposition.'
We cannot say beforehand how much of a distant house or
tree our finger will cover. The various answers to the
familiar question, How large is the moon ? — answers which
vary from a cartwheel to a wafer — illustrate this most
strikingly. The hardest part of the training of a young
draughtsman is his learning to feel directly the retinal (i.e.
primitively sensible) magnitudes which the different objects
in the field of view subtend. To do this he must recover
what Buskin calls the ' innocence of the eye ' — that is, a
sort of childish perception of stains of color merely as
such, without consciousness of what they mean.

With the rest of us this innocence is lost. Out of all the ^JUi

visual magnitudes of each known object we have selected one as
the REAL one to think of, and degraded all the others to serve as
its signs. This ' real ' magnitude is determined by aesthetic
and practical interests. It is that which we get when the
object is at the distance most propitious for exact visual
discrimination of its details. This is the distance at which
we hold anything we are examining. Farther than this we
see it too small, nearer too large. And the larger and the
smaller feeling vanish in the act of suggesting this one,
their more important meaning. As I look along the dining-

180 PSYCHOLOGY.

table I overlook the fact that the farther plates and glasses
feel so much smaller than my own, for I know that they are
all equal in size ; and the feeling of them, which is a present
sensation, is eclipsed in the glare of the knowledge, which
is a merely imagined one.

If the inconsistencies of sight-spaces inter se can thus be
reduced, of course there can be no difficulty in equating
sight-spaces with spaces given to touch. In this equation
it is probably the touch-feeling which prevails as real and
the sight which serves as sign — a reduction made necessary
not only by the far greater constancy of felt over seen
magnitudes, but by the greater practical interest which the
sense of touch possesses for our lives. As a rule, things
only benefit or harm us by coming into direct contact with
our skin : sight is only a sort of anticipatory touch ; the
latter is, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, the 'mother-tongue of
thought,' and the handmaid's idiom must be translated
into the language of the mistress before it can speak clearly
to the mind.*

Later on we shall see that the feelings excited in the
joints when a limb moves are used as signs of the path
traversed by the extremity. But of this more anon. As
for the equating of sound-, smell-, and taste-volumes with
those yielded by the more discriminative senses, they are
too vague to need any remark. It may be observed of
pain, however, that its size has to be reduced to that of the
normal tactile size of the organ which is its seat. A finger
with a felon on it, and the pulses of the arteries therein, both
'feel ' larger than we believe they really 'are.'

* Prof. Jastrow gives as the result of his experiments this general
conclusion (Am. Journal of Psychology, in. 53) : "The space-perceptions
of disparate senses are themselves disparate, and whatever harmony
there is amongst them we are warranted in regarding as the result
of experience. The spacial notions of one deprived of the sense of sight
and reduced to the use of the other space-senses must indeed be different
from our own." But he continues: "The existence of the striking
disparities between our visual and our other space-perceptions without
confusing us, and, indeed, without usually being noticed, can only be
explained by the tendency to interpret all dimensions into their visual
equivalents." But this author gives no reasons for saying ' visual ' rather
than ' tactile ;' and I must continue to think that probabilities point the
other way so far as what we call real magnitudes are concerned.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 181

It will have been noticed in the account given that
when two sensorial space-impressions, believed, to come from the
same object, differ, then THE ONE MOST INTERESTING, practically
or aesthetically, is JUDGED TO BE THE TRUE ONE. This law of
interest holds throughout — though a permanent interest,
like that of touch, may resist a strong but fleeting one like
that of pain, as in the case just given of the felon.

3. The Summation of the Sense-spaces.

Now for the next step in our construction of real space :
How are the various sense-spaces added together into a
consolidated and unitary continuum ? For they are, in man
at all events, incoherent at the start.

Here again the first fact that appears is that primitively
our space-experiences form a chaos, out of which we have no
immediate faculty for extricating them. Objects of different
sense-organs, experienced together, do not in the first instance
appear either inside or alongside or far outside of each other,
neither spatially continuous nor discontinuous, in any definite
sense of these words. The same thing is almost as true of
objects felt by different parts of the same organ before
discrimination has done its finished work. The most we
«an say is that all our space-experiences together form an
objective total and that this objective total is vast.

Even now the space inside our mouth, which is so inti
mately known and accurately measured by its inhabitant
the tongue, can hardly be said to have its internal direc
tions and dimensions known in any exact relation to those
of the larger world outside. It forms almost a little world
by itself. Again, when the dentist excavates a small cavity
in one of our teeth, we feel the hard point of his instrument
scraping, in distinctly differing directions, a surface which
seems to our sensibility vaguely larger than the subsequent
use of the mirror tells us it ' really ' is. And though the
directions of the scraping differ so completely inter se, not
one of them can be identified with the particular direction
in the outer world to which it corresponds. The space of
the tooth-sensibility is thus really a little world by itself,
which can only become congruent with the outer space-

182 PSYCHOLOGY.

world by farther experiences which shall alter its bulk,
identify its directions, fuse its margins, and finally imbed it
as a definite part within a definite whole. And even though
every joint's rotations should be felt to vary inter se as so
many differences of direction in a common room ; even
though the same were true of diverse tracings on the skin,
and of diverse tracings on the retina respectively, it would
still not follow that feelings of direction, on these different
surfaces, are intuitively comparable among each other, or
with the other directions yielded by the feelings of the
semi-circular canals. It would not follow that we should
immediately judge the relations of them all to each other
in one space-world.

If with the arms in an unnatural attitude we ' feel '
things, we are perplexed about their shape, size, and
position. Let the reader lie on his back with his arms
stretched above his head, and it will astonish him to find
how ill able he is to recognize the geometrical relations of
objects placed within reach of his hands. But the geomet
rical relations here spoken of are nothing but identities
recognized between the directions and sizes perceived in
this way and those perceived in the more usual ways.
The two ways do not fit each other intuitively.

How lax the connection between the system of visual and
the system of tactile directions is in man, appears from the
facility with which microscopists learn to reverse the move
ments of their hand in manipulating things on the stage of
the instrument. To move the slide to the seen left they
must draw it to ihefelt right. But in a very few days the
habit becomes a second nature. So in tying our cravat,
shaving before a mirror, etc., the right and left sides are
inverted, and the directions of our hand movements are the
opposite of what they seem. Yet this never annoys us.
Only when by accident we try to tie the cravat of another
person do we learn that there are two ways of combining
sight and touch perceptions. Let any one try for the first
time to write or draw while looking at the image of his
hand and paper in a mirror, and he will be utterly bewil
dered. But a very short training will teach him to undo
in this respect the associations of his previous lifetime.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 183

Prisms show this in an even more striking way. If the
eyes be armed with spectacles containing slightly prismatic
glasses with their bases turned, for example, towards the
right, every object looked at will be apparently translocated
to the left ; and the hand put forth to grasp any such object
will make the mistake of passing beyond it on the left side.
But less than an hour of practice in wearing such spectacles
rectifies the judgment so that no more mistakes are made.
In fact the new-formed associations are already so strong,
that when the prisms are first laid aside again the opposite
error is committed, the habits of a lifetime violated, and
the hand now passed to the right of every object which it
seeks to touch.

The primitive chaos thus subsists to a great degree
through life so far as our immediate sensibility goes. We
feel our various objects and their bignesses, together or in
succession ; but so soon as it is a question of the order and
relations of many of them at once our intuitive apprehension
remains to the very end most vague and incomplete.
Whilst we are attending to one, or at most to two or three
objects, all the others lapse, and the most we feel of them is
that they still linger on the outskirts and can be caught
again by turning in a certain way. Nevertheless throughout
all this confusion we conceive of a world spread out in a perfectly
fixed and orderly fashion, and we believe in its existence. The
question is : How do this conception and this belief arise ? How
is the chaos smoothed and straightened out ?

Mainly by two operations : Some of the experiences are
apprehended to exist out- and alongside of each other, and
others are apprehended to interpenetrate each other, and
to occupy the same room. In this way what was incoherent
and irrelative ends by being coherent and definitely related ;
nor is it hard to trace the principles, by which the mind is
guided in this arrangement of its perceptions, in detail.

In the first place, following the great intellectual law of
economy, we simplify, unify, and identify as much as we
possibly can. Whatever sensible data can be attended to together
we locate together. Their several extents seem one extent. The
place at which each appears is held to be the same with the place

184 PSYCHOLOGY.

at which the others appear. They become, in short, so many
properties of ONE AND THE SAME EEAL THING. This is the first
and great commandment, the fundamental ' act ' by which
our world gets spatially arranged.

In this coalescence in a ' thing,' one of the coalescing
sensations is held to be the thing, the other sensations are
taken for its more or less accidental properties, or modes of
appearance.* The sensation chosen to be the thing essen
tially is the most constant and practically important of the
lot ; most often it is hardness or weight. But the hardness
or weight is never without tactile bulk ; and as we can
always see something in our hand when we feel something
there, we equate the bulk felt with the bulk seen, and thence
forward this common bulk is also apt to figure as of the
essence of the ' thing.' Frequently a shape so figures,
sometimes a temperature, a taste, etc. ; but for the most part
temperature, smell, sound, color, or whatever other phenom
ena may vividly impress us simultaneously with the bulk
felt or seen, figure among the accidents. Smell and sound
impress us, it is true, when we neither see nor touch the
thing ; but they are strongest when we see or touch, so we
locate the source of these properties within the touched or
seen space, whilst the properties themselves we regard as
overflowing in a weakened form into the spaces filled by
other things. In all this, it will be observed, the sense-data
whose spaces coalesce into one are yielded by different sense-
organs. Such data have no tendency to displace each other
from consciousness, but can be attended to together all at
once. Often indeed they vary concomitantly and reach a
maximum together. We may be sure, therefore, that the
general rule of our mind is to locate IN each other all sensa
tions which are associated in simultaneous experience, and
do not interfere with each other's perception. t

* Cf. Lipps on ' Complication, ' Grundtatsachen, etc., p. 579.

f Ventriloquism shows this very prettily. The ventriloquist talks with
out moving his lips, and at the same time draws our attention to a doll, a
box, or some other object. We forthwith locate the voice within this
object. On the stage an actor ignorant of music sometimes has to sing,
or play on the guitar or violin. He goes through the motions before our
eyes, whilst in the orchestra or elsewhere the music is performed. But
because as we listen we see the actor, it is almost impossible not to hear the
music as if coming from where he sits or stands.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 185

Different impressions on the same sense-organ do interfere
with each other's perception, and cannot well be attended
to at once. Hence we do not locate them in each other's spaces,
but arrange them in a serial order of exteriority, each alongside
of the rest, in a space larger than that which any one sensation
brings. This larger space, however, is an object of concep
tion rather than of direct intuition, and bears all the marks
of being constructed piecemeal by the mind. The blind
man forms it out of tactile, locomotor, and auditory experi
ences, the seeing man out of visual ones almost exclusively.
As the visual construction is the easiest to understand,
let us consider that first.

Every single visual sensation or ' field of view ' is
limited. To get a new field of view for our object the old
one must disappear. But the disappearance may be only
partial. Let the first field of view be A B C. If we carry
our attention to the limit C, it ceases to be the limit, and
becomes the centre of the field, and beyond it appear fresh
parts where there were none before : * ABC changes, in
short, to C D E. But although the parts A B are lost to
sight, yet their image abides in the memory ; and if we think
of our first object A B C as having existed or as still existing
at all, we must think of it as it was originally presented,
namely, as spread out from C in one direction just as C D E
is spread out in another. A B and D E can never coalesce
in one place (as they could were they objects of different
senses) because they can never be perceived at once : we
must lose one to see the other. So (the letters standing
now for ' things ') we get to conceive of the successive fields
of things after the analogy of the several things which we /\ Q
perceive in a single field. They must be out- and along
side of each other, and we conceive that their juxtaposed
spaces must make a larger space. A B C -f- C D E must,
in short, be imagined to exist in the form of A B C D E or
not imagined at all.

We can usually recover anything lost from sight by
moving our attention and our eyes back in its direction ; and

* Cf. Slmiid, in Mind, xm. 340.

186 PSYCHOLOGY.

through these constant changes every field of seen things
comes at last to be thought of as always having a fringe
of other things possible to be seen spreading in all directions
round about it. Meanwhile the movements concomitantly
with which the various fields alternate are also felt and re
membered ; and gradually (through association) this aud
that movement come in our thought to suggest this or that
extent of fresh objects introduced. Gradually, too, since
the objects vary indefinitely in kind, we abstract from
their several natures and think separately of their mere
extents, of which extents the various movements remain as
the only constant introducers and associates. More and
more, therefore, do we think of movement and seen extent
as mutually involving each other, until at last (with Bain
and J. S. Mill) we may get to regard them as synonymous,
and say, " What is the meaning of the word extent, unless it
be possible movement?"* We forget in this conclusion
that (whatever intrinsic extensiveness the movements may
appear endowed with), that seen spreadoutness which is
the pattern of the abstract extensiveness which we imagine
came to us originally from the retinal sensation.

The muscular sensations of the eyeball signify this sort
of visible spreadoutness, just as this visible spreadoutness
may come in later experience to signify the ' real ' bulks,
distances, lengths and breadths known to touch and loco
motion, t To the very end, however, in us seeing men,
the quality, the nature, the sort of thing we mean by exten
siveness, would seem to be the sort of feeling which our re
tinal stimulations bring.

In one deprived of sight the principles by which the
notion of real space is constructed are the same. Skin-
feelings take in him the place of retinal feelings in giving

* See, e.g., Bain's Senses and Intellect, pp. 366-7, 371.

f When, for example, a baby looks at Its own moving hand, it sees
one object at the same time that it feels another. Both interest its
attention, and it locates them together. But the felt object's size is the I
more constant size, just as the felt object is, on the whole, the more in
teresting and important object ; and so the retinal sensations become re- j
garded as its signs and have their 'real space- values ' interpreted in]
tangible terms.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 187

the quality of lateral spreadoutness, as our attention passes
from one extent of them to another, awakened by an object
sliding along. Usually the moving object is our hand ;
and feelings of movement in our joints invariably accom
pany the feelings in the skin. But the feeling of the skin
is what the blind man means by his skin ; so the size of the
skin-feelings stands as the absolute or real size, and the
size of the joint-feelings becomes a sign of these. Suppose,
for example, a blind baby with (to make the description
shorter) a blister on his toe, exploring his leg with his
finger-tip and feeling a pain shoot up sharply the instant
the blister is touched. The experiment gives him four
different kinds of sensation — two of them protracted, two
sudden. The first pair are the movement-feeling in the
joints of the upper limb, and the movement-feeling on
the skin of the leg and foot. These, attended to together,

have their extents identified as one objective space

the hand moves through the same space in which the
leg lies. The second pair of objects are the pain in the
blister, and the peculiar feeling the blister gives to the
finger. Their spaces also fuse ; and as each marks the end
of a peculiar movement-series (arm moved, leg stroked),
the movement-spaces are emphatically identified with each
other at that end. Were there other small blisters dis
tributed down the leg, there would be a number of these
emphatic points ; the movement-spaces would be iden
tified, not only as totals, but point for point. *

*The incoherence of the different primordial sense-spaces inter »e
is often made a pretext for denying to the primitive bodily feelings any
spatial quality at all. Nothing is commoner than to hear it said : "Babies
have originally no spatial perception ; for when a baby's toe aches he does
not place the pain in the toe. He makes no definite movements of defence,
and may be vaccinated without being held." The facts are true enough ;
but the interpretation is all wrong. What really happens is that the baby
does not place his ' toe ' in the pain ; for he knows nothing of his ' toe ' as
yet. He has not attended to it as a visual object ; he has not handled it
with his fingers ; nor have its normal organic sensations or contacts vet
become interesting enough to be discriminated from the whole massive
feeling of the foot, or even of the leg to which it belongs. In short, the
toe is neither a member of the babe's optical space, of his hand-movement
space, nor an independent member of his leg-and-foot space. It has ac
tually no mental existence yet save as this little pain-space. What wonder,

188 PSYCHOLOGY.

Just so with spaces beyond the body's limits. Continu
ing the joint-feeling beyond the toe, the baby hits another
object, which he can still think of when he brings his hand
back to its blister again. That object at the end of that
joint-feeling means a new place for him, and the more such
objects multiply in his experience the wider does the space
of his conception grow. If, wandering through the woods
to-day by a new path, I find myself suddenly in a glade
which affects my senses exactly as did another I reachedx
last week at the end of a different walk, I believe the two!
Identical affections to present the same persisting glade, \
and infer that I have attained it by two differing roads.
The spaces walked over grow congruent by their extremi
ties ; though apart from the common sensation which those
extremities give me, I should be under no necessity of con
necting one walk with another at all. The case in no whit
differs when shorter movements are concerned. If, moving
first one arm and then another, the blind child gets the
same kind of sensation upon the hand, and gets it again
as often as he repeats either process, he judges that he has
touched the same object by both motions, and concludes
that the motions terminate in a common place. From place
to place marked in this way he moves, and adding the
places moved through, one to another, he builds up his no
tion of the extent of the outer world. The seeing man's
process is identical ; only his units, which may be succes
sive bird's-eye views, are much larger than in the case of
the blind.

then, if the pain seem a little space-world all by itself? But let the pain
once associate itself with these other space -worlds, and its space will be
come part of their space. Let the baby feel the nurse stroking the
limb and awakening the pain every time her finger passes towards the
toe ; let him look on and see her finger on the toe every time the pain
shoots up ; let him handle his foot himself and get the pain whenever
the toe comes into his fingers or his mouth ; let moving the leg exacerbate
the pain, — and all is changed. The space of the pain becomes identified
with that part of each of the other spaces which gets felt when it
awakens ; and by their identity with it these parts are identified with each
other, and grow systematically connected as members of a larger extensive
whole.

TEE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 189

FEELINGS IN JOINTS AND FEELINGS IN MUSCLES.

1. Feelings of Movement in Joints.

I have been led to speak of feelings which arise in
joints. As these feelings have been too much neglected in
Psychology hitherto, in entering now somewhat minutely
into their study I shall probably at the same time freshen
the interest of the reader, which under the rather dry ab
stractions of the previous pages may presumably have
flagged.

When, by simply flexing my right forefinger on its meta-
carpal joint, I trace with its tip an inch on the palm of my
left hand, is my feeling of the size of the inch purely and
simply a feeling in the skin of the palm, or have the mus
cular contractions of the right hand and forearm anything
to do with it ? In the preceding pages I have constantly
assumed spatial sensibility to be an affair of surfaces. At
first starting, the consideration of the ' muscular sense ' as
a space-measurer was postponed to a later stage. Many
writers, of whom the foremost was Tli^m&sjirown, in his
Lectures on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, and of whom
the latest is no less a Psychologist than Prof. Delboeuf,*
hold that the consciousness of active muscular motion,!)
aware of its own amount, is the fons et origo of all spatiaM
measurement. It would seem to follow, if this theory were
true, that two skin-feelings, one of a large patch, one of a
small one, possess their difference of spatiality, not as an
immediate element, but solely by virtue of the fact that the
large one, to get its points successively excited, demands
more muscular contraction than the small one does. Fixed
associations with the several amounts of muscular contrac
tion required in this particular experience would thus ex-

*'Pourquoi les Sensations visuelles sont elles etendues?' in Revue
Philosophique, iv. 167. — As the proofs of this chapter are being corrected,
I receive the third ' Heft ' of Miinsterberg's Beitra'ge zur Experimentellen.
Psychologic, in which that vigorous young psychologist reaffirms (if I
understand him after so hasty a glance) more radically than ever the doc
trine that muscular sensation proper is our one means of measuring exten
sion. Unable to reopen the discussion here, I am in duty bound to call
the attention of the reader to Herr M.'s work.

190 PSYCHOLOGY.

plain the apparent sizes of the skin-patches, which sizes
would consequently not be primitive data but derivative re
sults.

It seems to me that no evidence of the muscular measure
ments in question exists; but that all the facts may be ex
plained by surface-sensibility, provided we take that of the
joint-surfaces also into account.

The most striking argument, and the most obvious one,
which an upholder of the muscular theory is likely to pro
duce is undoubtedly this fact : if, with closed eyes, we trace
figures in the air with the extended forefinger (the motions
may occur from the metacarpal-, the wrist-, the elbow-, or
the shoulder-joint indifferently), what we are conscious of in
each case, and indeed most acutely conscious of, is the
geometric path described by the finger-^. Its angles, its
subdivisions, are all as distinctly felt as if seen by the eye ;
and yet the surface of the finger-tip receives no impression
at all.* But with each variation of the figure, the muscular
contractions vary, and so do the feelings which these yield.
Are not these latter the sens.ible data that make us aware of
the lengths and directions we discern in the traced line ?

Should we be tempted to object to this supposition of
the advocate of perception by muscular feelings, that we
have learned the spatial significance of these feelings by
reiterated experiences of seeing what figure is drawn when
each special muscular grouping is felt, so that in the last
resort the muscular space feelings would be derived from
retinal- surf ace feelings, our opponent might immediately
hush us by pointing to the fact that in persons born blind
the phenomenon in question is even more perfect than ir
ourselves.

If we suggest that the blind may have originally traced
the figures on the cutaneous surface of cheek, thigh, or palm,
and may now remember the specific figure which each pres
ent movement formerly caused the skin- surf ace to per
ceive, he may reply that the delicacy of the motor percep-

* Even if the figure be drawn on a board instead of in the air, the vari
ations of contact on the finger's surface will be much simpler than the pe
culiarities of the traced figure itself.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 191

tion far exceeds that of most of the cutaneous surfaces ;
that, in fact, we can feel a figure traced only in its differen
tials, so to speak, — a figure which we merely start to trace by
our finger-tip, a figure which, traced in the same way on our
finger-tip by the hand of another, is almost if not wholly
unrecognizable.

The champion of the muscular sense seems likely to be
triumphant until we invoke the articular cartilages, as in
ternal surfaces whose sensibility is called in play by every
movement we make, however delicate the latter may be.

To establish the part they play in our geometrizing, it
is necessary to review a few facts. It has long been known
by medical practitioners that, in patients with cutaneous
anaesthesia of a limb, whose muscles also are insensible to
the thrill of the faradic current, a very accurate sense of the
way in which the limb may be flexed or extended by the
hand of another may be preserved.* On the other hand,
we may have this sense of movement impaired when the tac
tile sensibility is well preserved. That the pretended feeling
of outgoing innervation can play in these cases no part, is
obvious from the fact that the movements by which the
limb changes its position are passive ones, imprinted on it
by the experimenting physician. The writers who have
sought a rationale of the matter have consequently been
driven by way of exclusion to assume the articular surfaces
to be the seat of the perception in question, f

That the joint-surfaces are sensitive appears evident from
the fact that in inflammation they become the seat of excru
ciating pains, and from the perception by everyone who
lifts weights or presses against resistance, that every in
crease of the force opposing him betrays itself to his con
sciousness principally by the starting-out of new feelings
or the increase of old ones, in or about the joints. If the
structure and mode of mutual application of two articular
surfaces be taken into account, it will appear that, granting
the surfaces to be sensitive, no more favorable mechanical

* See for example Duchenne, Electrisation localised, pp. 727, 770, Ley-
den; Virchow's Archiv, Bd. XLVII. (1869).

t E.g., Eulenburg, Lehrb. d. Nervenkrankheiten (Berlin), 1878, i. 3.

192 PSYCHOLOGY.

conditions could be possible for the delicate calling of the
sensibility into play than are realized in the minutely grad
uated rotations and firmly resisted variations of pressure
involved in every act of extension or flexion. Nevertheless
it is a great pity that we have as yet no direct testimony,
no expressions from patients with healthy joints accident
ally laid open, of the impressions they experience when the
cartilage is pressed or rubbed.

The first approach to direct evidence, so far as I know,
is contained in the paper of Lewinski,* published in 1879.
This observer had a patient the inner half of whose leg
was anaesthetic. When this patient stood up, he had a
curious illusion about the position of his limb, which dis
appeared the moment he lay down again : he thought him
self knock-kneed. If, as Lewinski says, we assume the inner
half of the joint to share the insensibility of the corre
sponding part of the skin, then he ought to feel, when the
joint-surfaces pressed agamsi each other in the act of
standing, the outer half of the joint most strongly. But
this is the feeling he would also get whenever it was by any
chance sought to force his leg into a knock-kneed attitude.
Lewinski was led by this case to examine the feet of cer
tain ataxic patients with imperfect sense of position. He
found in every instance that when the toes were flexed and
draivn upon at the same time (the joint-surfaces drawn
asunder) all sense of the amount of flexion disappeared.
On the contrary, when he pressed a toe in, whilst flexing it,
the patient's appreciation of the amount of flexion was
much improved, evidently because the artificial increase of
articular pressure made up for the pathological insensibil
ity of the parts.

Since Lewinski's paper an important experimental re
search by A. Goldscheider f has appeared, which completely
establishes our point. This patient observer caused his
fingers, arms, and legs to be passively rotated upon their
various joints in a mechanical apparatus which registered
both the velocity of movement impressed and the amount

* ' Ueber den Kraftsinn/ Virchow's Archiv, Bd. LXXVII. 134.
f Archiv f. (Anat. u) Physiologic (1889), pp. 369, 540.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 193

of angular rotation. No active muscular contraction took
place. The minimal felt amounts of rotation were in all cases
surprisingly small, being much less than a single angular de
gree in all the joints except those of the fingers. Such dis
placements as these, the author says (p. 490), can hardly be
detected by the eye. The point of application of the force
which rotated the limb made no difference in the result.
Kotations round the hip- joint, for example, were as deli
cately felt when the leg was hung by the heel as when it
was hung by the thigh whilst the movements were per
formed. Anaesthesia of the skin produced by induction-cur
rents also had no disturbing effect on the perception, nor
did the various degrees of pressure of the moving force
upon the skin affect it. It became, in fact, all the more
distinct in proportion as the concomitant pressure-feelings
were eliminated by artificial anaesthesia. When the joints
themselves, however, were made artificially anaesthetic the
perception of the movement grew obtuse and the angular
rotations had to be much increased before they were per
ceptible. All these facts prove according to Herr Gold-
scheider, that the joint surfaces and these alone are the start
ing point of the impressions by ivhich the movements of our
members are immediately perceived.

Applying this result, which seems invulnerable, to the
case of the tracing finger-tip, we see that our perception of
the latter gives no countenance to the theory of the mus
cular sense. We indubitably localize the finger-tip at the suc
cessive points of its path by means of the sensations which we
receive from our joints. But if this is so, it may be asked,
why do we feel the figure to be traced, not within the joint
itself, but in such an altogether different place ? And why
do we feel it so much larger than it really is ?

I will answer these questions by asking another : Why
do we move our joints at all ? Surely to gain something
more valuable than the insipid joint-feelings themselves.
And these more interesting feelings are in the main pro
duced upon the skin of the moving part, or of some other
part over which it passes, or upon the eye. With move
ments of the fingers we explore the configuration of all real
objects with which we have to deal, our own body as well as

194 PSYCHOLOGY.

foreign things. Nothing that interests us is located in the
joint ; everything that interests us either is some part of
our skin, or is something that we see as we handle it. The
cutaneously felt and the seen extents come thus to figure
as the important things for us to concern ourselves with.
Every time the joint moves, even though we neither see,
nor feel cutaneously, the reminiscence of skin-events and
sights which formerly coincided with that extent of move
ment, ideally awaken as the movement's import, and the
mind drops the present sign to attend to the import alone.
The joint-sensation itself, as such, does not disappear in
the process. A little attention easily detects it, with all
its fine peculiarities, hidden beneath its vaster suggestions ;
so that really the mind has two space-perceptions before
it, congruent in form but different in scale and place, either
of which exclusively it may notice, or both at once, — the
joint-space which it feels and the real space which it means.
The joint-spaces serve so admirably as signs because of
their capacity for parallel variation to all the peculiarities
of external motion. There is not a direction in the real
world nor a ratio of distance which cannot be matched by
some direction or extent of joint-rotation. Joint- feelings,
like all feelings, are roomy. Specific ones are contrasted
inter se as different directions are contrasted within the
same extent. If I extend my arm straight ont at the
shoulder, the rotation of the shoulder- joint will give me one
feeling of movement ; if then I sweep the arm forward, the
same joint will give me another feeling of movement.
Both these movements are felt to happen in space, and
differ in specific quality. Why shall not the specificness
of the quality just consist in the feeling of a peculiar direc
tion ? * Why may not the several joint-feelings be so many
perceptions of movement in so many different directions ?
That we cannot explain why they should is no presumption
that they do not, for we never can explain why any sense-
organ should awaken the sensation it does.

* Direction in its ' first intention,' of course ; direction with which so
far we merely become acquainted, and about which we know nothing save
perhaps its difference from another direction a moment ago experienced in
the same way !

THE PKRCEPTTON OF SPACE. 195

But if the joint-feelings are directions and extents,
standing in relation to each other, the task of association in
interpreting their import in eye- or skin-terms is a good deal
simplified. Let the movement be, of a certain joint, derive
its absolute space-value from the cutaneous feeling it is
always capable of engendering ; then the longer movement
jbcd of the same joint will be judged to have a greater
space-value, even though it may never have wholly merged
with a skin-experience. So of differences of direction : so
much joint- difference = so much skin-difference ; therefore,
more joint-difference = more skin-difference. In fact, the
joint-feeling can excellently serve as a map on a reduced scale, of
a reality which the imagination can identify at its pleasure
with this or that sensible extension simultaneously knoivn in
some other way.

When the joint-feeling in itself acquires an emotional
interest, — which happens whenever the joint is inflamed
and painful, — the secondary suggestions fail to arise, and
the movement is felt where it is, and in its intrinsic scale oi
magnitude.*

The localization of the joint-feeling in a space simulta
neously known otherwise (i.e. to eye or skin), is what is
commonly called the extradition or eccentric projection of the
feeling. In the preceding chapter I said a good deal on this
subject ; but we must now see a little more closely just what
happens in this instance of it. The content of the joint-
fueling, to begin with, is an object, and is in itself a place.
I >r it to be placed, say in the elbow, the elbow as seen or han-
dlea must already have become another object for the mind,

* I have said hardly anything about associations with visual space in
the foregoing account, because I wished to represent a process which the
blind and the seeing man might equally share. It is to be noticed that
the space suggested to the imagination when the joint moves, and pro
jected to the distance of the finger-tip, is not represented as any specific
skin-tract. What the seeing man imagines is a visible path; what the blind
man imagines is rather a generic image, an abstraction from many skin-
spaces whose local signs have neutralized each other, and left nothing but
their common vastness behind. We shall see as we go on that this generic
abstraction of space-magnitude from the various local peculiarities of feel
ing which accompanied it when it was for the first time felt, occurs on a
considerable scale in the acquired perceptions of blind as well as of seeing
men.

196 PSYCHOLOGY.

and with its place as thus known, the place which the joint-
feeling fills must coalesce. That the latter should be felt
' in the elbow ' is therefore a ' projection ' of it into the place
of another object as much as its being felt in the finger-tip
or at the end of a cane can be. But when we say ' projec
tion ' we generally have in our mind the notion of a there as
contrasted with a here. What is the here when we say that the
joint-feeling is there ? The ' here ' seems to be the spot
which the mind has chosen for its own post of observation,
usually some place within the head, but sometimes within
the throat or breast — not a rigorously fixed spot, but a
region from any portion of which it may send forth its vari
ous acts of attention. Extradition from either of these
regions is the common law under which we perceive the
whereabouts of the north star, of our own voice, of the con
tact of our teeth with each other, of the tip of our finger,
of the point of our cane on the ground, or of a movement
in our elbow- joint.

But for the distance betiveen the ' here ' and the ' there ' to be
felt, the entire intervening space must be itself an object of per
ception. The consciousness of this intervening space is the
sine qua non of the joint-feeling's projection to the farther
end of it. When it is filled by our own bodily tissues (as
where the projection only goes as far as the elbow or fin
ger-tip) we are sensible of its extent alike by our eye, by
our exploring movements, and by the resident sensations
which fill its length. When it reaches beyond the limits
of our body, the resident sensations are lacking, but limbs
and hand and eye suffice to make it known. Let me, for
example, locate a feeling of motion coming from my elbow-
joint in the point of my cane a yard beyond my hand.
Either I see this yard as I flourish the cane, and the seen
end of it then absorbs my sensation just as my seen elbow
might absorb it, or I am blind and imagine the cane as an
object continuing my arm, either because I have explored
both arm and cane with the other hand, or because I have
pressed them both along my body and leg. If I project my
joint-feeling farther still, it is by a conception rather than a
distinct imagination of the space. I think: ' farther,' ' thrice
as far/ etc.; and thus get a symbolic image of a distant

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 197

patli at which I point. * But the * absorption ' of the joint-
feeling by the distant spot, in whatever terms the latter
may be apprehended, is never anything but that coales
cence into one 'thing' already spoken of on page 184, of
whatever different sensible objects interest our attention at
once.

2. feelings of Muscular Contraction.

Readers versed in psychological literature will have
missed, in our account thus far, the usual invocation of
'the muscular sense.' This word is used with extreme
vagueness to cover all resident sensations, whether of
motion or position, in our members, and even to designate
the supposed feeling of efferent discharge from the brain.
We shall later see good reason to deny the existence of the
latter feeling. We have accounted for the better part at least
of the resident feelings of motion in limbs by the sensibility
of the articular surfaces. The skin and ligaments also must
have feelings awakened as they are stretched or squeezed
in flexion or extension. And I am inclined to think that
the sensations of our contracting muscles themselves probably play
<is small a part in building up our exact knowledge of space as
any class of sensations which we possess. The muscles, indeed,
play an all-important part, but it is through the remote
effect of their contractions on other sensitive parts, not
through their own resident sensations being aroused. In
other words, muscular contraction is only indirectly instru
mental, in giving us space-perceptions, by its effects on surfaces.
In skin and retina it produces a motion of the stimulus
upon the surface ; in joints it produces a motion of the
surfaces upon each other — such motion being by far the

* The ideal enlargement of a system of sensations by the mind is noth
ing exceptional. Vision is full of it ; and in the manual arts, where a
workman gets a tool larger than the one he is accustomed to and has sud
denly to adapt all his movements to its scale, or where he has to execute
a familiar set of movements in an unnatural position of body; where a
piano-player meets an instrument with unusually broad or narrow keys:
where a man has to alter the size of his handwriting — we see how promptly
the mind multiplies once for all, as it were, the whole series of its opera
tions by a constant factor, and has not to trouble itself after that with fur
ther adjustment of the details.

198 PSYCHOLOGY.

most delicate manner of exciting the surfaces in question
One is tempted to doubt whether the muscular sensibility
as such plays even a subordinate part as sign of these
more immediately geometrical perceptions which are so
uniformly associated with it as effects of the contraction
objectively viewed.

For this opinion many reasons can be assigned. First,
it seems a priori improbable that such organs as muscles
should give us feelings whose variations bear any exact
proportion to the spaces traversed when they contract.
As G. E. Miiller says,* their sensory nerves must be excited
either chemically or by mechanical compression whilst the
contractions last, and in neither case can the excitement be
proportionate to the position into which the limb is thrown.
The chemical state of the muscle depends on the previous
work more than on the actually present contraction ; and
the internal pressure of it depends on the resistance offered
more than on the shortening attained. The intrinsic mus
cular sensations are likely tJierefore to be merely those of massive
strain or fatigue, and to carry no accurate discrimination with
them of lengths of path moved through.

Empirically we find this probability confirmed by many
facts. The judicious A. W. Yolkman observes t that :

" Muscular feeling gives tolerably fine evidence as to the existence
of movement, but hardly any direct information about its extent or
direction. We are not aware that the contractions of a supinator
longus have a wider range than those of a supinator brevis; and that
the fibres of a bipenniform muscle contract in opposite directions is a fact
of which the muscular feeling itself gives not the slightest intimation.
Muscle-feeling belongs to that class of general sensations which tell us
of our inner states, but not of outer relations ; it does not belong among
the space-perceiving senses."

E. H. Weber in his article Tastsinn called attention
to the fact that muscular movements as large and strong
as those of the diaphragm go on continually without our
perceiving them as motion.

G. H. Lewes makes the same remark. When we think
of our muscular sensations as movements in space, it is

* Pflilger's Archiv, XLV. 65.

f Untersuchungen im Gebiete der Optik, Leipzig (1863), p. 188

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 199-

because we have ingrained with them in our imagination a
movement on a surface simultaneously felt.

" Thus whenever we breathe there is a contraction of the muscles
of the ribs and the diaphragm. Since we see the chest expanding, we
know it as a movement and can only think of it as such. But the dia
phragm itself is not seen, and consequently by no one who is not physi
ologically enlightened on the point is this diaphragm thought of in
movement. Nay, even when told by a physiologist that the diaphragm
moves at each breathing, every one who has not seen it moving down
ward pictures it as an upward movement, because the chest moves
upward." *

A personal experience of my own seems strongly to cor
roborate this view. For years I have been familiar, during
the act of gaping, with a large, round, smooth sensation in
the region of the throat, a sensation characteristic of gap
ing and nothing else, but which, although I had often
wondered about it, never suggested to my mind the motion
of anything. The reader probably knows from his own
experience exactly what feeling I mean. It was not till one
of my students told me, that I learned its objective cause.
If we look into the mirror while gaping, we see that at the
moment we have this feeling the hanging palate rises by
the contraction of its intrinsic muscles. The contraction
of these muscles and the compression of the palatine mu
cous membrane are what occasion the feeling ; and I was
at first astonished that, coming from so small an organ,
it could appear so voluminous. Now the curious point is
this — that no sooner had I learned by the eye its objective
space -significance, than I found myself enabled mentally to
fed, it as a movement upwards of a body in the situation of
the uvula. When I now have it, my fancy injects it, so to
speak, with the image of the rising uvula ; and it absorbs
the image easily and naturally. In a word, a muscular
contraction gave me a sensation whereof I was unable dur
ing forty years to interpret a motor meaning, of which two
glances of the eye made me permanently the master. To my
mind no further proof is needed of the fact that muscular
contraction, merely as such, need not be perceived directly
as so much motion through space.

* Problems of Life and Mind, prob. vi. chap. iv. § 46.

200 PSYCHOLOGY.

Take again the contractions of the muscles which make
the eyeball rotate. The feeling of these is supposed by
many writers to play the chief part in our perceptions of
extent. The space seen between two things means, accord
ing to these authors, nothing but the amount of contraction
which is needed to carry ihefovea from the first thing to the
second. But close the eyes and note the contractions in
^ themselves (even when coupled as they still are with the
delicate surface sensations of the eyeball rolling under the
lids), and we are surprised at finding how vague their space-
import appears. Shut the eyes and roll them, and you can
with no approach to accuracy tell the outer object which
shall first be seen when you open them again.* Moreover, ii
our eye-muscle-contractions had much to do with giving us
our sense of seen extent, we ought to have a natural illusion
of which we find no trace. Since the feeling in the muscles
grows disproportionately intense as the eyeball is rolled
into an extreme eccentric position, all places on the extreme
margin of the field of view ought to appear farther from
the centre than they really are, for the fovea cannot get to
them without an amount of this feeling altogether in excess
of the amount of actual rotation, t When we turn to the

* Volkinann, op. cit. p. 189. Compare also what Hering says of the in
ability in his own case to make after-images seem to move when he rolls
his closed eyes in their sockets ; and of the insignificance of his feelings of
convergence for the sense of distance (Beitrage zur Physiologic, 1861-2,
pp. 31, 141). Helmholtz also allows to the muscles of convergence a very
feeble share in producing our sense of the third dimension (Physiologische
Optik, 649-59).

f Compare Lipps, Psychologische Studien (1885), p. 18, and the other
arguments given on pp. 12 to 27. The most plausible reasons for contrac
tions of the eyeball-muscles being admitted as original contributors to the
perception of extent, are those of Wuudt, Physiologische Psychologic, n.
96-100. They are drawn from certain constant errors in our estimate of
lines uud angles ; which, however, are susceptible, all of them, of different
interpretations (see some of them further on). — Just as my MS. goes
to the printer, Herr Miinsterberg's Beitrage zur experiraentellen Psy
chologic, Heft 2, comes into my hands with experiments on the measure
ment of space recorded in it, which, in the author's view, prove the feeling
of muscular strain to be a principal factor in our vision of extent. As
Muusterberg worked three hours a day for a year and a half at comparing
the length of lines, seen with his eyes in different positions ; and as he care
fully averaged and ' percented ' 20, 000 observations, his conclusion must be
listened to with great respect. Briefly it is this, that " our judgments of

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 201

muscles of the body at large we find the same vagueness.
Goldscheider found that the minimal perceived rotation of

size depend on a comparison of the intensity of the feelings of movement
which arise in our eyeball-muscles as we glance over the distance, and
which fuse with the sensations of light " (p. 142). The facts upon which
the conclusion is based are certain constant errors which Miinsterberg
found according as the standard or given interval was to the right or the
left of the interval to be marked off as equal to it, or as it was above or
below it, or stood in some more complicated relation still. He admits that
he cannot explain all the errors in detail, and that we "stand before results
which seem surprising and not to be unravelled, because we cannot analyze
the elements which enter into the complex sensation which we receive."
But he has no doubt whatever of the general fact "that the movements of
the eyes and the sense of their position when fixed exert so decisive an
influence on our estimate of the spaces seen, that the errors cannot possi
bly be explained by anything else than the movement-feelings and their
reproductions in the memory" (pp. 166, 167). It is presumptuous to doubt
a man's opinion when you haven't had his experience ; and yet there are a
number of points which make me feel like suspending judgment in regard
to Herr M.'s dictum. He found, for example, a constant tendency to under
estimate intervals lying to the right, and to overestimate intervals lying
to the left. He ingeniously explains this as a result of the habit of read
ing, which trains us to move our eyes easily along straight lines from left
to right, whereas in looking from right to left we move them in curved
lines across the page. As we measure intervals as straight lines, it costs
more muscular effort to measure from right to left than the other way,
and an interval lying to the left seems to us consequently longer than it
really is. Now I have been a reader for more years than Herr Munster-
berg; and yet with me there is a strongly pronounced error the other way.
It is the rightward-lying interval which to me seems longer than it really
is. Moreover, Herr M. wears concave spectacles, and looked through them
with his head fixed. May it not be that some of the errors were due to dis
tortion of the retinal image, as the eye looked no longer through the centre
but through the margin of the glass ? In short, with all the presumptions
which we have seen against muscular contraction being definitely felt as
length, I think that there may be explanations of Herr M.'s results which
have escaped even his sagacity ; and I call for a suspension of judgment
until they shall have been confirmed by other observers. I do not myself
doubt that our feeling of seen extent may be altered by concomitant mus
cular feelings. In Chapter XVII (pp. 28-80) we saw many examples of
similar alterations, interferences with, or exaltations of, the sensory effect
of one nerve -process by another. I do not see why currents from the
muscles or eyelids, coming in at the same time with a retinal impression,
might not make the latter seem bigger, in the same way that a greater in
tensity in the retinal stimulation makes it seem bigger ; or in the way that
a greater extent of surface excited makes the color of the surface seem
stronger, or if it be a skin-surface, makes its heat seem greater ; or in the
way that the coldness of the dollar on the forehead (in "Weber's old experi
ments) made the dollar seem heavier. But this is a physiological way : and

202 PSYCHOLOGY.

a limb about a joint was no less when the movement was
* active ' or produced by muscular contraction than when it
was ' passively ' impressed.* The consciousness of active
movement became so blunt when the joint (alone!) was
made anaesthetic by faradization, that it became evident
that the feeling of contraction could never be used for
fine discrimination of extents. And that it was not used
for coarse discriminations appeared clear to Goldscheider
from certain other results which are too circumstantial
for me to quote in detail. t His general conclusion is that
we feel our movements exclusively in our articular sur
faces, and that our muscular contractions in all probability
hardly occasion this sort of perception at all. %

My conclusion is that the 'muscular sense' must fall
back to the humble position from which Charles Bell raised
it, and no longer figure in Psychology as the leading organ
in space-perception which it has been so long * cracked up '
to be.

Before making a minuter study of Space as apprehended
by the eye, we must turn to see what we can discover of
space as known to the blind. But as we do so, let us cast
a glance upon the results of the last pages, and ask our
selves once more whether the building up of orderly
space-perceptions out of primitive incoherency requires
any mental powers beyond those displayed in ordinary in
tellectual operations. I think it is obvious — granting the
spacial quale to exist in the primitive sensations — that dis
crimination, association, addition, multiplication, and divi
sion, blending into generic images, substitution of similars,
selective emphasis, and abstraction from uninteresting de
tails, are quite capable of giving us all the space-percep-
.

the bigness gained is that of the retinal image after all. If I understand
Milnsterberg's meaning, it is quite different from this: the bigness be
longs to the muscular feelings, as such, and is merely associated with those
of the retina. This is what I deny.

* Archiv f. (Anat. u.) Physiol. (1889), p. 542.

f Ibid. p. 496.

j Ibid. p. 497. Goldscheider thinks that our muscles do not even give
us the feeling of resistance, that being also due to the articular surfaces :
whilst weight is due to the tendons. Ibid. p. 541.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 203

tions we have so far studied, without the aid of any mys
terious 'mental chemistry' or power of ' synthesis' to create
elements absent from the original data of feeling. It can
not be too strongly urged in the face of mystical attempts,
however learned, that there is not a landmark, not a length,
not a point of the compass in real space which is not some
OTIC of our feelings, either experienced directly as a presen
tation or ideally suggested by another feeling which has
come to serve as its sign. In degrading some sensations
to the rank of signs and exalting others to that of realities
signified, we smooth out the wrinkles of our first chaotic
impressions and make a continuous order of what was a
rather incoherent multiplicity. But the content of the order
remains identical with that of the multiplicity — sensational
both, through and through.

HOW THE BLIND PEKCBIVE SPACE.

The blind man's construction of real space differs from
that of the seeing man most obviously in the larger part
which synthesis plays in it, and the relative subordination
of analysis. The seeing baby's eyes take in the whole
room at once, and discriminative attention must arise in
him before single objects are visually discerned. The blind
child, on the contrary, must form his mental image of the
room by the addition, piece to piece, of parts which he
learns to know successively. With our eyes we may ap
prehend instantly, in an enormous bird's-eye view, a land
scape which the blind man is condemned to build up bit
by bit after weeks perhaps of exploration. We are exactly
in his predicament, however, for spaces which exceed our
visual range. We think the ocean as a whole by multiply
ing mentally the impression we get at any moment when at
sea. The distance between New York and San Francisco
is computed in days' journeys ; that from earth to sun is so
many times the earth's diameter, etc. ; and of longer dis
tances still we may be said to have no adequate mental
image whatever, but only numerical verbal symbols.

But the symbol will often give us the emotional effect
of the perception. Such expressions as the abysmal vault
of heaven, the endless expanse of ocean, etc., summarize

204 PSYCHOLOGY.

many computations to the imagination, and give the sense
of an enormous horizon. So it seems with the blind. They
multiply mentally the amount of a distinctly felt freedom
to move, and gain the immediate sense of a vaster freedom
still. Thus it is that blind men are never without the con
sciousness of their horizon. They all enjoy travelling, es
pecially with a companion who can describe to them the
objects they pass. On the prairies they feel the great open
ness ; in valleys they feel closed in ; and one has told ine
that he thought few seeing people could enjoy the view
from a mountain-top more than he. A blind person on
•entering a house or room immediately receives, from the
.reverberations of his voice and steps, an impression of its
dimensions, and to a certain extent of its arrangement.
The tympanic sense noticed on p. 140, supra, comes in to
help here, and possibly other forms of tactile sensibility not
yet understood. Mr. W. Hanks Levy, the blind author of
"* Blindness and the Blind ' (London), gives the following ac-
oount of his powers of perception :

"Whether within a house or in the open air, whether walking 01
standing still, I can tell, although quite blind, when I am opposite an
object, and can perceive whether it be tall or short, slender or bulky.
I can also detect whether it be a solitary object or a continuous fence ;
whether it be a close fence or composed of open rails ; and often whether
it be a wooden fence, a brick or stone wall, or a quick-set hedge. I
cannot usually perceive objects if much lower than my shoulder, but
sometimes very low objects can be detected. This may depend on the
nature of the objects, or on some abnormal state of the atmosphere.
The currents of air can have nothing to do with this power, as the state
of the wind does not directly affect it ; the sense of hearing has nothing
to do with it, as when snow lies thickly on the ground objects are more
distinct, although the footfall cannot be heard. I seem to perceive
objects through the skin of my face, and to have the impressions im
mediately transmitted to the brain. The only part of my body possess
ing this power is my face ; this I have ascertained by suitable experi
ments. Stopping my ears does not interfere with it, but covering my
face with a thick veil destroys it altogether. None of the five senses
have anything to do with the existence of this power, and the circum
stances above named induce me to call this unrecognized sense by the
name of ' facial perception. ' . . . When passing along a street I can
distinguish shops from private houses, and even point out the doors and
windows, etc., and this whether the doors be shut or open. When a
window consists of one entire sheet of glass, it is more difficult to dis

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 205

cover than one composed of a number of small panes. From this it
would appear that glass is a bad conductor of sensation, or at any rate
of the sensation specially connected with this sense. When objects
below the face are perceived, the sensation seems to come in an oblique
iine from the object to the upper part of the face. While walking with
a friend in Forest Lane, Stratford, I said, pointing to a fence which
separated the road from a field, ' Those rails are not quite as high as
my shoulder.' He looked at them, and said they were higher. We.
however, measured, and found them about three inches lower than my
shoulder. At the time of making this observation I was about four
feet from the rails. Certainly in this instance facial perception was
more accurate than sight. When the lower part of a fence is brick
work, and the upper part rails, the fact can be detected, and the line
where the two meet easily perceived. Irregularities in height, and pro
jections and identations in walls, can also be discovered."

According to Mr. Levy, this power of seeing with the
face is diminished by a fog, but not by ordinary dark
ness. At one time he could tell when a cloud obscured the
horizon, but he has now lost that power, which he has
known several persons to possess who are totally blind.
These effects of aqueous vapor suggest immediately that
fluctuations in the heat radiated by the objects may be the
source of the perception. One blind gentleman, Mr. Kil-
burne, an instructor in the Perkins Institution in South
Boston, who has the power spoken of in an unusual degree,
proved, however, to have no more delicate a sense of tem
perature in his face than ordinary persons. He himself
supposed that his ears had nothing to do with the faculty
until a complete stoppage of them, not only with cotton
but with putty on top of it, by abolishing the perception
entirely, proved his first impression to be erroneous. Many
blind men say immediately that their ears are concerned
in the matter.

Sojuids certainly play a far more prominent part in
the mental life of the blind than in our own. In taking a
walk through the country, the mutations of sound, far and
near, constitute their chief delight. And to a great extent
their imagination of distance and of objects moving from
one distant spot to another seems to consist in thinking
how a certain sonority would be modified by the change
of place. It is unquestionable that the semi-circular-canal
feelings play a great part in defining the points of the com-

206 PSYCHOLOGY.

pass and the direction of distant spots, in the blind as in
• us. We start towards them by feelings of this sort ; and so
many directions, so many different-feeling starts.*

The only point that offers any theoretic difficulty is the
prolongation into space of the direction, after the start. "W e
saw, ten pages back, that for extradition to occur beyond the
skin, the portion of skin in question and the space beyond
must form a common object for some other sensory surface.
The eyes are for most of us this sensory surface ; for the
blind it can only be other parts of the skin, coupled or not
with motion. But the mere gropings of the hands in every
direction must end by surrounding the whole body with a
sphere of felt space. And this sphere must become en
larged with every movement of locomotion, these move- r
ments gaining their space-values from the semi-circular-
canal feelings which accompany them, and from the farther
and farther parts of large fixed objects (such as the bed,
the wainscoting, or a fence) which they bring within the
grasp. It might be supposed that a knowledge of space
acquired by so many successive discrete acts would always
retain a somewhat jointed and so to speak, granulated char
acter. When we who are gifted with sight think of a space
too large to come into a single field of view, we are apt to
imagine it as composite, and filled with more or less jerky
stoppings and startings (think, for instance, of the space
from here to San Francisco), or else we reduce the scale
symbolically and imagine how much larger on a map the
distance would look than others with whose totality we are
familiar.

I am disposed to believe, after interrogating many blind
persons, that the use of imaginary maps on a reduced scale
is less frequent with them than with the rest of us Possi
bly the extraordinary changeableness of the visual magni
tudes of things makes this habit natural to us, while the
fixity of tactile magnitudes keeps them from falling into it.
(When the blind young man operated on by Dr, Franz was

* " Whilst the memories which we seeing folks preserve of a man all
centre round a certain exterior form composed of his image, his height,
his gait, in the blind all these memories are referred to something quite
different, namely, the sound of his voice" (Dunan, Kev. Phil., xxv. 357.)

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 207

shown a portrait in a locket, he was vastly surprised that
the face could be put into so small a compass : it would
have seemed to him, he said, as impossible as to put a bushel
into a pint.) Be this as it may, however, the space which
each blind man feels to extend beyond his body is felt by
him as one smooth continuum — all trace of those muscular
startings and stoppings and reversals which presided over
its formation having been eliminated from the memory. It
seems, in other words, a generic image of the space-element
common to all these experiences, with the unessential par
ticularities of each left out. In truth, where in this space
a start or a stop may have occurred was quite accidental.
It may never occur just there again, and so the attention
lets it drops altogether. Even as long a space as that
traversed in a several-mile walk will not necessarily appear
to a blind man's thought in the guise of a series of locomo-
tor acts. Only where there is some distinct locomotor diffi
culty, such as a step to ascend, a difficult crossing, or a
disappearance of the path, will distinct locomotor images
constitute the idea. Elsewhere the space seems continuous,
and its parts may even alLseem coexistent ; though, as a
very intelligent blind friend once remarked to me, ' To
think of such distances involves probably more mental
wear and tear and brain- waste in the blind than in the see
ing.' This seems to point to a greater element of succes
sive addition and construction in the blind man's idea.

Our own visual explorations go on by means of innum
erable stoppings and startings of the eyeballs. Yet these
are all effaced from the final space-sphere of our visual
imagination. They have neutralized each other. We can
even distribute our attention to the right and left sides
simultaneously, and think of those two quarters of space
as coexistent. Does the smoothing out of the locomotor
interruptions from the blind man's tactile space-sphere
offer any greater paradox ? Surely not. And it is curious
to note that both in him and in us there is one particular
locomotor feeling that is apt to assert itself obstinately to
the last. We and he alike spontaneously imagine space as
lying in front of us, for reasons too obvious to enumerate.
If we think of the space behind us, we, as a rule, have to

aOH PSYCHOLOGY.

turn round mentally, and in doing so the front space van
ishes. But in this, as in the other things of which we have
been talking, individuals differ widely. Some, in imagin
ing a room, can think of all its six surfaces at once. Others
mentally turn round, or, at least, imagine the room in sev
eral successive and mutually exclusive acts (cf. p. 54, above).

Sir William Hamilton, and J. S. Mill after him, have
quoted approvingly an opinion of Platner (an eighteenth-
century philosopher) regarding the space-perceptions of
the blind. Platner says :

4 ' The attentive observation of a person born blind . . . has con
vinced me that the sense of touch by itself is altogether incompetent to
afford us the representation of extension and space. ... In fact, to
those born blind, time serves instead of space. Vicinity and distance
mean in their mouths nothing more than the shorter or longer time
. . . necessary to attain from some one feeling to some other."

After my own observation of blind people, I should
hardly have considered this as anything but an eccentric
opinion, worthy to pair off with that other belief that color
is primitively seen without extent, had it not been for the
remarkable Essay on Tactile and Visual Space by M. Ch.
Dunan, which appeared in the Eevue Philosophique for
1888. This author quotes * three very competent witnesses,
all officials in institutions for the blind [it does not appear
from the text that more than one of them was blind him
self], who say that blind people only live in time. M.
Dunan himself does not share exactly this belief, but he
insists that the blind man's and the seeing man's represen
tation of space have absolutely naught in common, and that
we are deceived into believing that what they mean by
space is analogous to what we mean, by the fact that so many
of them are but semi-blind and still think in visual terms,
and from the farther fact that they all talk in visual terms
just like ourselves. But on examining M. Dunan's reasons
one finds that they all rest on the groundless logical as
sumption that the perception of a geometrical form which
we get with our eyes, and that which a blind man gets with

*Vol. xxv. pp. 357-6.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

his fingers, must either be absolutely identical or absolutely
unlike. They cannot be similar in diversity, " for they are
simple notions, and it is of the essence of such to enter the
mind or leave it all at once, so that one who has a simple no
tion at all, possesses it in all its completeness. . . . There
fore, since it is impossible that the blind should have of
the forms in question ideas completely identical with our see
ing ones, it follows that their ideas must be radically dif
ferent from and ivholly irreducible to our own" * Hereupon
M. Dunan has no difficulty in finding a blind man who still
preserves a crude sensation of diffused light, and who says
when questioned that this light has no extent. Having * no
extent ' appears, however, on farther questioning, to signify
merely not enveloping any particular tactile objects, nor
being located within their outline; so that (allowing for
latitude of expression) the result tallies perfectly with our
own view. A relatively stagnant retinal sensation of diffused
light, not varying when different objects are handled, would
naturally remain an object quite apart. If the word 'ex
tent ' were habitually used to denote tactile extent, this sen
sation, having no tactile associates whatever, would natu
rally have ' extent ' denied of it. And yet all the while it
would be analogous to the tactile sensations in having the
quality of bigness. Of course it would have no other tac
tile qualities, just as the tactile objects have no other opti
cal qualities than bigness. All sorts of analogies obtain
between the spheres of sensibility. Why are ' sweet ' and
' soft ' used so synonymously in most languages ? and why
are both these adjectives applied to objects of so many
sensible kinds. Eough sounds, heavy smells, hard lights,
cold colors, are other examples. Nor does it follow from
such analogies as these that the sensations compared need
be composite and have some of their parts identical. We
saw in Chapter XIII that likeness and difference are an ele
mentary relation, not to be resolved in every case into a
mixture of absolute identity and absolute heterogeneity of
content (cf. Vol. I, pp. 492-3).

I conclude, then, that although in its more superficial

*p.

210 PSYCHOLOGY.

determinations the blind man's space is very different from
our space, yet a deep analogy remains between the two.
' Big ' and * little,' ' far ' and ' near,' are similar contents of con-
sciousness in both of us. But the measure of the bigness and
the farness is very different in him and in ourselves. He, for
example, can have no notion of what we mean by objects
appearing smaller as they move away, because he must
always conceive of them as of their constant tactile size.
Nor, whatever analogy the two extensions involve, should
we expect that a blind man receiving sight for the first
time should recognize his new-given optical objects by their
familiar tactile names. Molyneux wrote to Locke :

" Suppose a man born blind, and now adult, and taught by his touch
to distinguish between a cube and a sphere, ... so as to tell, when he
felt one and the other, which is the cube, which the sphere. Suppose
then the cube and sphere placed on a table and the blind man to be
made to see ; query, whether by his sight, before he touched them, he
could now distinguish and tell which is the globe, which the cube ?"

This has remained in literature as ' Molyneux's query.1
Molyneux answered 'No.' And Locke says :*

" I agree with this thinking gentleman whom I am proud to call my
friend, and am of opinion that the blind man at first sight would not be
able to say which was the globe, which the cube, whilst he only saw
them ; though he could unerringly name them by his touch and
certainly distinguish them by the difference of their figures felt."

This opinion has not lacked experimental confirmation.
From Chesselden's case downwards, patients operated for
congenital cataract have been unable to name at first the
things they saw. " So, Puss, I shall know you another time,"
said Ghesselden's patient, after catching the cat, looking at
her steadfastly, and setting her down. Some of this inca
pacity is unquestionably due to general mental confusion at
the new experience, and to the excessively unfavorable con
ditions for perception which an eye with its lens just extir
pated affords. That the analogy of inner nature between
the retinal and tactile sensations goes beyond mere exten-
sity is proved by the cases where the patients were the most
intelligent, as in the young man operated on by Dr. Franz*

* Essay cone. Hum. Und., bk. IT. chap. ix. § 8.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 211

who named circular, triangular, and quadrangular figures
at first sight.*

VISUAL SPACE.

It is when we come to analyze minutely the conditions
of visual perception that difficulties arise which have made
psychologists appeal to new and gmm-mythical mental
powers. But I firmly believe that even here exact investi
gation will yield the same verdict as in the cases studied
hitherto. This subject will close our survey of the facts ;
and if it give the result I foretell, we shall be in the best of
positions for a few final pages of critically historical review.

If a common person is asked how he is enabled to see
things as they are, he will simply reply, by opening his
eyes and looking. This innocent answer has, however,
long since been impossible for science. There are various
paradoxes and irregularities about what we appear to per
ceive under seemingly identical optical conditions, which
immediately raise questions. To say nothing now of the
time-honored conundrums of why we see upright with an
inverted retinal picture, and why we do not see double ;
and to leave aside the whole field of color-contrasts and
ambiguities, as not directly relevant to the space-problem, —
it is certain that the same retinal image makes us see quite
differently-sized and differently -shaped objects at different
times, and it is equally certain that the same ocular move
ment varies in its perceptive import. It ought to be pos
sible, were the act of perception completely and simply
intelligible, to assign for every distinct judgment of size,
shape, and position a distinct optical modification of some
kind as its occasion. And the connection between the two
ought to be so constant that, given the same modification,
we should always have the same judgment. But if we

* Philosophical Transactions, 1841. In T. K. Abbot's Sight and Touch
there is a good discussion of these cases. Obviously, positive cases are of
more importance than negative. An under- witted peasant, Noe M., whose
case is described by Dr. Dufour of Lausanne (Guerison d'un Aveugle ne
1876) is much made of by MM. Naville and Dunan ; but it seems to me
only to show how little some people can deal with new experiences in which
others find themselves quickly at home. This man could not even tell
whether one of his first objects of sight moved or stood still (p. 9).

PSYCHOLOGY.

study the facts closely we soon .find no such constant con
nection between either judgment and retinal modification, or
judgment and muscular modification, to exist. The judgment
seems to result from the combination of retinal, muscular
and intellectual factors with each other ; and any one of
them may occasionally overpower the rest in a way which
seems to leave the matter subject to no simple law.

The scientific study of the subject, if we omit Descartes,
began with Berkeley, and the particular perception he
analyzed in his New Theory of Yision was that of distance
or depth. Starting with the physical assumption that a
difference in the distance of a point can make no difference
in the nature of its retinal image, since "distance being a
line directed endwise to the eye, it projects only one point
in the fund of the eye — which point remains invariably the
same, whether the distance be longer or shorter," he con
cluded that distance could not possibly be a visual sensation,
but must be an intellectual * suggestion ' from * custom *
of some non-visual experience. According to Berkeley this
experience was tactile. His whole treatment of the subject
was excessively vague, — no shame to him, as a breaker of
fresh ground, — but as it has been adopted and enthusiasti-
ally hugged in all its vagueness by nearly the whole line of
British psychologists who have succeeded him, it will be
well for us to begin our study of vision by refuting his
notion that depth cannot possibly be perceived in terms of
purely visual feeling.

The Third Dimension.

Berkeleyaus unanimously assume that no retinal sensa
tion can primitively be of volume ; if it be of extension at
all (which they are barely disposed to admit), it can be only
of two-, not of three-, dimensional extension. At the begin
ning of the present chapter we denied this, and adduced
facts to show that all objects of sensation are voluminous
in three dimensions (cf. p. 136 ff.). It is impossible to lie
on one's back on a hill, to let the empty abyss of blue fill
one's whole visual field, and to sink deeper and deeper into
the merely sensational mode of consciousness regarding it,
without feeling that an indeterminate, palpitating, circling

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 213

depth is as indefeasibly one of its attributes as its breadth.
We may artificially exaggerate this sensation of depth.
Eise and look from the hill-top at the distant view ; repre
sent to yourself as vividly as possible the distance of the
uttermost horizon ; and then with inverted head look at the
same. There will be a startling increase in the perspective,
a most sensible recession of the maximum distance ; and
as you raise the head you can actually see the horizon-
line again draw near.*

Mind, I say nothing as yet about our estimate of the
real ' amount of this depth or distance. I only want to
confirm its existence as a natural and inevitable optical
consort of the two other optical dimensions. The field of
view is always a volume-unit. Whatever be supposed to be
its absolute and ' real ' size, the relative sizes of its dimen
sions are functions of each other. Indeed, it happens per
haps most often that the breadth- and height-feeling take
their absolute measure from the depth-feeling. If we plunge
our head into a wash-basin, the felt nearness of the bottom
makes us feel the lateral expanse to be small. If, on the
contrary, we are on a mountain-top, the distance of the
horizon carries with it in our judgment a proportionate

* What may be the physiological process connected with this increased
sensation of depth is hard to discover. It seems to have nothing to do with
the parts of the retina affected, since the mere inversion of the picture (by
mirrors, reflecting prisms, etc.), without inverting the head, does not seem
to bring it about ; nothing with sympathetic axial rotation of the eyes
which might enhance the perspective through exaggerated disparity of
the two retinal images (see J. J. Mailer, 'Raddrehung u. Tiefendimen-
Bioii,' Leipzig Acad. Berichte, 1875, page 124), for one-eyed persons get
it as strongly as those with two eyes. I cannot find it to be connected
with any alteration in the pupil or with any ascertainable strain in the
muscles of the eye, sympathizing with those of the body. The exaggera
tion of distance is even greater when we throw the head over backwards
and contract our superior recti in getting the view, than when we bend
forward and contract the inferior recti. Making the eyes diverge slightly
by weak prismatic glasses has no such effect. To me, and to all whom I
have asked to repeat the observation, the result is so marked that I do not
well understand how such an observer as Helmholtz, who has carefully
cammed vision with inverted head, can have overlooked it (See hi
Phys. Optik, pp. 433, 723, 728. 772.) I cannot help thinking that anyone
who can explain the exaggeration of the depth-sensation in this case will
at the same time throw much light on its normal constitution.

214 PSYCHOLOGY.

height and length in the mountain-chains that bound it to
our view. But as aforesaid, let us not consider the ques
tion of absolute size now, — it must later be taken up in a
thorough way. Let us confine ourselves to the way in
which the three dimensions which are seen, get their values
fixed relatively to each other.

Reid, in his Inquiry into the Human Mind, has a section
* Of the Geometry of Visibles,' in which he assumes to
trace what the perceptions would be of a race of ' Idome-
nians ' reduced to the sole sense of sight. Agreeing with
Berkeley that sight alone can give no knowledge of the third
dimension, he humorously deduces various ingenious ab
surdities in their interpretations of the material appear
ances before their eyes.

Now I firmly believe, on the contrary, that one of Reid's
Idomenians would frame precisely the same conception of
the external world that we do, if he had our intellectual
powers.* Even were his very eyeballs fixed and not mov
able like ours, that would only retard, not frustrate, his
education. For the same object, by alternately covering in
its lateral movements different parts of his retina, would
determine the mutual equivalencies of the first two dimen
sions of the field of view ; and by exciting the physiological
cause of his perception of depth in various degrees, it would
establish a scale of equivalency between the first two and
the third.

First of all, one of the sensations given by the object
is chosen to represent its ' real ' size and shape, in accord
ance with the principles laid down on pp. 178 and 179.
One sensation measures the ' thing ' present, and the ' thing ' then
measures the other sensations. The peripheral parts of the
retina are equated with the central by receiving the image
of the same object. This needs no elucidation in case the

* " In Froriep's Notizen (1838, July), No. 133, is to be found a detailed
account, with a picture, of an Esthonian girl, Eva Lauk, then fourteen
years old, born with neither arms nor legs, which concludes with the
following words : 'According to the mother, her intellect developed quite
as fast as that of her brother and sisters ; in particular, she came as quickly
to a right judgment of the size and distance of visible objects, although,
of course, she had no use of hands.' " (Schopenhauer, Welt als Wille, 11
44.)

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

object does not change its distance or its front. But sup
pose, to take a more complicated case, that the object is a
stick, seen first in its whole length, and then rotated round
one of its ends ; let this fixed end be the one near the eye.
In this movement the stick's image will grow progressively
shorter ; its farther end will appear less and less sepa
rated laterally from its fixed near end ; soon it will be
screened by the latter, and then reappear on the opposite
side, and finally on that side resume its original length.
Suppose this movement to become a familiar experience ;
the mind will presumably react upon it after its usual fash
ion (which is that of unifying all data which it is in any
way possible to unify), and consider it the movement of a
constant object rather than the transformation of a fluctuat
ing one. Now, the sensation of depth which it receives dur
ing the experience is awakened more by the far than by the
near end of the object. But how much depth ? What shall
measure its amount ? Why, at the moment the far end is
ready to be eclipsed, the difference of its distance from the
near end's distance must be judged equal to the stick's
whole length ; but that length has already been judged
equal to a certain optical sensation of breadth. Thus ive
find that given amounts of the visual depth-feeling become signs
of fixed amounts of the visual breadth-feeling. The measure
ment of distance is, as Berkeley truly said, a result of sugges
tion and experience. But visual experience alone is adequate
to produce it, and this he erroneously denied.

Suppose a colonel in front of his regiment at dress-
parade, and suppose he walks at right angles towards the
midmost man of the line. As he advances, and surveys
the line in either direction, he looks more and more down
it and less and less at it, until, when abreast of the mid
most man, he feels the end men to be most distant ; then
when the line casts hardly any lateral image on his retina
at all. what distance shall he judge to be that of the end
men? Why, half the length of the regiment as it wae
originally seen, of course ; but this length was a moment
ago a retinal object spread out laterally before his sight.
He has now merely equated a retinal depth -feeling with a
retinal breadth-feeling. If the regiment moved, and the

216 PSYCHOLOGY.

colonel stood still, the result would be the same. In such
ways as these a creature endowed with eyes alone could
hardly fail of measuring out all three dimensions of the
space he inhabited. And we ourselves, I think, although
we may often l realize ' distance in locomotor terms
(as Berkeley says we must always do), yet do so no less
often in terms of our retinal map, and always in this way
the more spontaneously. Were this not so, the three visual
dimensions could not possibly feel to us as homogeneous as
they do, nor as commensurable inter se.

Let us then admit distance to be at least as genuinely optical
a content of consciousness as either height or breadth. The
question immediately returns, Can any of them be said in any
strictness to be optical sensations ? We have contended all
along for the affirmative reply to this question, but must
now cope with difficulties greater than any that have as
sailed us hitherto.

Helmholtz and Eeid on Sensations.

A sensation is, as we have seen in Chapter XVII,
the mental affection that follows most immediately upon
the stimulation of the sense-tract. Its antecedent is di
rectly physical, no psychic links, no acts of memory, infer
ence, or association intervening. Accordingly, if we sup
pose the nexus between neural process in the sense-organ,
on the one hand, and conscious affection, on the other, to
be by nature uniform, the same process ought always to give
the same sensation ; and conversely, if what seems to be a sen
sation varies whilst the process in the sense-organ remains un
changed, the reason is presumably that it is realty not a sensa
tion but a higher mental product, whereof the variations depend
on events occurring in the system of higher cerebral centres.

Now the size of the field of view varies enormously in all
three dimensions, without our being able to assign with any
definiteness the process in the visual tract on which the
variation depends. We just saw how impossible such
assignment was in the case where turning down the head
produces the enlargement. In general, the maximum feel
ing of depth or distance seems to take the lead in deter
mining the apparent magnitude of the whole field, and the

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 217

two other dimensions seem to follow. If, to use the former
instance, I look close into a wash-basin, the lateral extent
of the field shrinks proportionately to its nearness. If I
look from a mountain, the things seen are vast in height
and breadth, in proportion to the farness of the horizon.
But when we ask ivJiat changes in the eye determine how great
this maximum feeling of depth or distance (which is undoubt
edly felt as a unitary vastness) shall be, we find ourselves
unable to point to any one of them as being its absolutely regular
concomitant. Convergence, accommodation, double and
disparate images, differences in the parallactic displacement
when we move our head, faintness of tint, dimness of out
line, and smallness of the retinal image of objects named
and known, are all processes that have something to do with
the perception of ' far ' and of ' near ' ; but the effect of
each and any one of them in determining such a perception
at one moment may at another moment be reversed by the
presence of some other sensible quality in the object, that
makes us, evidently by reminding us of past experience,
judge it to be at a different distance and of another shape.
If we paint the inside of a pasteboard-mask like the out
side, and look at it with one eye, the accommodation- and
parallax-feelings are there, but fail to make us see it hollow,
as it is. Our mental knowledge of the fact that human
faces are always convex overpowers them, and we directly
perceive the nose to be nearer to us than the cheek instead
of farther of.

The other organic tokens of farness and nearness are
proved by similar experiments (of which we shall ere long
speak more in detail) to have an equally fluctuating import.
They lose all their value whenever the collateral circum
stances favor a strong intellectual conviction that the object
presented to the gaze is improbable — cannot be either what
or where they would make us perceive it to be.

Now the query immediately arises : Can the feelings of
these processes in the eye, since they are so easilj neutralized and
reversed by intellectual suggestions, ever have been direct sensa
tions of distance at all ? Ought we not rather to assume,
since the distances which we see in spite of them are con
clusions from past experience, that the distances which we

218 PSYCHOLOGY.

see by means of them are equally such conclusions ? Ought
we not, in short, to say unhesitatingly that distance must be
an intellectual and not a sensible content of consciousness ?
and that each of these eye-feelings serves as a mere signal
to awaken this content, our intellect being so framed that
sometimes it notices one signal more readily and sometimes
another ?

Reid long ago (Inquiry, c. vi. sec. 17) said :

4 ' It may be taken for a general rule that things which are produced
by custom may be undone or changed by disuse or by contrary custom.
On the other hand, it is a strong argument that an effect is not owing
to custom, but to the constitution of nature, when a contrary custom is
found neither to change nor to weaken it. "

More briefly, a way of seeing things that can be un
learned was presumably learned, and only what we cannot
unlearn is instinctive.

This seems to be Helmholtz's view, for he confirms
Reid's maxim by saying in emphatic print :

4 ' No elements in our perception can be sensational which may be
overcome or reversed by factors of demonstrably experimental origin.
Whatever can be overcome by suggestions of experience must be re
garded as itself a product of experience and custom. If we follow this
rule it will appear that only qualities are sensational, whilst almost all
spatial attributes are results of habit and experience."*

This passage of Helmholtz's has obtained, it seems to
me, an almost deplorable celebrity. The reader will please
observe its very radical import. Not only would he, and
does he, for the reasons we have just been ourselves con
sidering, deny distance to be an optical sensation ; but,
extending the same method of criticism to judgments of
size, shape, and direction, and finding no single retinal or
muscular process in the eyes to be indissolubly linked with
any one of these, he goes so far as to say that all optical
space-perceptions whatsoever must have an intellectual

* Physiol. Optik, p 438. Helmholtz's reservation of 'qualities' is in
consistent. Our judgments of light and color vary as much as our judg
ments of size, shape, and place, and ought by parity of reasoning to be
called intellectual products and not sensations. In other places he does
treat color as if it were an intellectual product.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 219

origin, and a content that no items of visual sensibility can
account for.*

As Wundt and others agree with Helmholtz here, and
as their conclusions, if true, are irreconcilable with all the
sensationalism which I have been teaching hitherto, it
clearly devolves upon me to defend my position against this
new attack. But as this chapter on Space is already so
overgrown with episodes and details, I think it best to
reserve the refutation of their general principle for the next
chapter, and simply to assume at this point its untenability.
This has of course an arrogant look ; but if the reader will
bear with me for not very many pages more, I shall hope to
appease his mind. Meanwhile I affirm confidently that
the same outer objects actually FEEL different to us according as
our brain reacts on them in one way or another by making us
perceive them as this or as that sort of thing. So true is this
that one may well, with Stumpf,t reverse Helmholtz's query,
and ask : " What would become of our sense-perceptions
in case experience were not able so to transform them ? "
Stumpf adds : " All wrong perceptions that depend on
peculiarities in the organs are more or less perfectly cor
rected by the influence of imagination following the guid
ance of experience."

If, therefore, among the facts of optical space-perception
(which we must now proceed to consider in more detail) we
find instances of an identical organic eye-process, giving us
different perceptions at different times, in consequence of
different collateral circumstances suggesting different objec
tive facts to our imagination, we must not hastily conclude,
with the school of Helmholtz and Wundt, that the organic
eye-process pure and simple, without the collateral circum
stances, is incapable of giving us any sensation of a spatial
kind at all. We must rather seek to discover by icliat means
the circumstances can so have transformed a space-sensa
tion, which, but for their presence, would probably have
been felt in its natural purity. And I may as well say

* It is needless at this point to consider what Helmholtz's views of the
nature of the intellectual space-yielding process may be. He vacillates—
we shall later see how.

\ Op. cit. p. 214.

220 PSYCHOLOGY.

now in advance that we shall find the means to be nothing
more or less than association — the suggestion to the mind of
optical objects not actually present, but more habitually asso
ciated with the * collateral circumstances ' than the sensa
tion which they now displace and being imagined now with
a quasi-hallucinatory strength. But before this conclu
sion emerges, it will be necessary to have reviewed the
most important facts of optical space-perception, in relation
to the organic conditions on which they depend. Readers
acquainted with German optics will excuse what is already
familiar to them in the following section.*

* Before embarking on this new topic it will be well to shelve, once for
all, the problem of what is the physiological process that underlies the
distance-feeling, Since one-eyed people have it, and are inferior to the
two-eyed only in measuring its gradations, it can have no exclusive connec
tion with the double and disparate images produced by binocular parallax.
Since people with closed e}res, looking at an after-image, do not usually
see it draw near or recede with varying convergence, it cannot be simply
constituted by the convergence-feeling. For the same reason it would
appear non-identical with the feeling of accommodation. The differ
ences of apparent parallactic movement between far and near objects as
we move our head cannot constitute the distance-sensation, for such dif
ferences may be easily reproduced experimentally (in the movements of
visible spots against a background) without engendering any illusion of per
spective. Finally, it is obvious that visible faintness, dirnness, and small-
ness are not per se the feeling of visible distance, however much in the
case of well-known objects they may serve as signs to suggest it.

A certain maximum distance-value, however, being given to the field of
view of the moment, whatever it be, the feelings that accompany the pro
cesses just enumerated become so many local signs of the gradation of
distances within this maximum depth. They help us to subdivide and
measure it. Itself, however, is felt as a unit, a total distance-value, deter
mining the vastness of the whole field of view, which accordingly appears
as an abyss of a certain volume. And the question still persists, what
neural process is it that underlies the sense of this distance-value ?

Hering, who has tried to explain the gradations within it by the inter
action of certain native distance-values belonging to each point of the two
retinae, seems willing to admit that the absolute scale of the space-volume
within which the natively fixed relative distances shall appear is not fixed,
but determined each time by ' experience in the widest sense of the word '
(Beitrage, p. 344). What he calls the Kernpunkt of this space-volume is
the point we are momentarily fixating. The absolute scale of the whole
volume depends on the absolute distance at which this Kernpunkt is judged
to lie from the person of the looker. " By an alteration of the localization
of the Kernpunkt, the inner relations of the seen space are nowise altered ;
this space in its totality is as a fixed unit, so to speak, displaced with re-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 221

Let us begin the long and rather tedious inquiry by the
most important case. Physiologists have long sought for

spect to the self of the looker" (p. 345). But what constitutes the localiza
tion of the Kernpunkt itself at any given time, except ' Experience,' i.e.,
higher cerebral and intellectual processes, involving memory, Hering does
not seek to define.

Stumpf, the other sensationalist writer who has best realized the difnV
culties of the problem, thinks that the primitive sensation of distance
must have an immediate physical antecedent, either in the shape of "an
organic alteration accompanying the process of accommodation, or else
given directly in the specific energy of the optic nerve." In contrast with
Hering, however, he thinks that it is the absolute distance of the spot
fixated which is thus primitively, immediately, and physiologically given,
and not the relative distances of other things about this spot. These, he
thinks, are originally seen in what, broadly speaking, may be termed one
plane with it. Whether the distance of this plane, considered as a phe
nomenon of our primitive sensibility, be an invariable datum, or suscepti
ble of fluctuation, he does not, if I understand him rightly, undertake
dogmatically to decide, but inclines to the former view. For him then,
as for Hering, higher cerebral processes of association, under the name of
' Experience,' are the authors of fully one-half part of the distance-percep
tions which we at any given time may have.

He-ring's and Stumpf 's theories are reported for the English reader by
Mr. Sully (in Mind, m. pp. 172-6). Mr. Abbott, in his Sight and Touch
(pp. 96-8), gives a theory which is to me so obscure that I only refer the
reader to its place, adding that it seems to make of distance a fixed func
tion of retinal sensation as modified by focal adjustment. Besides these
three authors I am ignorant of any, except Panum, who may have attempt
ed to define distance as in any degree an immediate sensation. And with
them the direct sensational share is reduced to a very small proportional
part, in our completed distance-judgments.

Professor Lipps, in his singularly acute Psychologische Studien (p. 69
ff.),argues, as Ferrier, in his review of Berkeley (Philosophical Remains, n.
330 ff . ), had argued before him, that it is logically impossible we should
perceive the distance of anything from the eye by sight; for &seen distance
can only be between seen termini ; and one of the termini, in the case of dis
tance from the eye, is the eye itself, which is not seen. Similarly of the
distance of two points behind each other : the near one hides the far one,
no space is seen between them. For the space between two objects to be
seen, both must appear beside each other, then the space in question will be
visible. On no other condition is its visibility possible. The conclusion is
that things can properly be seen only in what Lipps calls a surface, and
that our knowledge of the third dimension must needs be conceptual, not
sensational or visually intuitive.

But no arguments in the world can prove a feeling which actually
exists to be impossible. The feeling of depth or distance, of faruess or
awayness, does actually exist as a fact of our visual sensibility. All that
Professor Lipps's reasonings prove concerning it is that it is not linear iu

222

PSYCHOLOGY.

a simple law by which to connect the seen direction and
distance of objects with the retinal impressions they pro
duce. Two principal theories have been held of this mat
ter, the ' theory of identical points,' and the ' theory of pro
jection,' — each incompatible with the other, and each
beyond certain limits becoming inconsistent with the
facts.

The Theory of Identical Points.

This theory starts from the truth that on both retinae
an impression on the upper half makes us perceive an ob
ject as below, on the lower half as above, the horizon ; and

FIG. 54.

on the right half an object to the left, on the left half one
to the right, of the median line. Thus each quadrant of one
retina corresponds as a whole to the similar quadrant of

its character, or in its immediacy fully homogeneous and consubstantial
with the feeling of literal distance between two seen termini ; in short,
,hat there are two sorts of optical sensation, each inexplicably due to a
peculiar neural process. The neural process is easily discovered, in the
case of lateral extension or spreadoutness, to be the number of retinal
nerve-ends affected by the light ; in the case of protension or mere farness
it is more complicated and, as we have concluded, is still to seek. The
two sensible qualities unite in the primitive visual bigness. The measure
ment of their various amounts against each other obeys the general laws
of all such measurements. We discover their equivalencies by means
of objects, apply the same units to both, and translate them into each other
so habitually that at last they get to seem to us even quite similar in kind.
This final appearance of homogeneity may perhaps be facilitated by the
fact that in binocular vision two points situated on the prolongation of the
optical axis of one of the eyes, so that the near one hides the far one, are by
the other eye seen laterally apart. Each eye has in fact a foreshortened
lateral view of the other's line of sight. In The London Times for Feb. 8,
1884, is an interesting letter by J. D. Dougal, who tries to explain by this
reason why two-eyed rifle- shooting has such advantages over shootiug with
one eye closed.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 223

the other ; and within two similar quadrants, at and ar for
example, there should, if the correspondence were consist
ently carried out, be geometrically similar points which, if
impressed at the same time by light emitted from the same
object, should cause that object to appear in the same direc
tion to either eye. Experiment verifies this surmise. If
we look at the starry vault with parallel eyes, the stars all
seem single ; and the laws of perspective show that under
the circumstances the parallel light-rays coming from each
star must impinge on points within either retina which are
geometrically similar to each other. The same result may
be more artificially obtained. If we take two exactly simi
lar pictures, smaller, or at least no larger, than those on an
ordinary stereoscopic slide, and if we look at them as
stereoscopic slides are looked at, that is, at one with each
eye (a median partition confining the view of either eye to
the picture opposite it), we shall see but one flat picture,
all of whose p'arts appear sharp and single.* Identical
points being impressed, both eyes see their object in the
same direction, and the two objects consequently coalesce
into one.

The same thing may be shown in still another way.
With fixed head converge the eyes upon some conspicuous
objective point behind a pane of glass ; then close either
eye alternately and make a little ink-mark on the glass,
1 covering ' the object as seen by the eye which is momen
tarily open. On looking now with both eyes the ink-marks
will seem single, and in the same direction as the objective
point. Conversely, let the eyes converge on a single ink-

* Just so, a pair of spectacles held an inch or so from the eyes seem
like one large median glass. The faculty of seeing stereoscopic slides single
without an instrument is of the utmost utility to the student of physio
logical optics, and persons with strong eyes can easily acquire it. The
only difticulty lies in dissociating the degree of accommodation from the
degree of convergence which it usually accompanies. If the right picture
is focussed by the right eye, the left by the left eye, the optic axes must
either be parallel or converge upon an imaginary point some distance
behind the plane of the pictures, according to the size and distance apart
of the pictures. The accommodation, however, has to be made for the
plane of the pictures itself, and a near accommodation with a far-off con
vergence is something which the ordinary use of our eyes never teaches us
to effect.

224 PSYCHOLOGY.

spot on the glass, and then by alternate shutting of them
let it be noted what objects behind the glass the spot
covers to the right and left eye respectively. Now with
both eyes open, both these objects and the spot will
appear in the same place, one or other of the three becom
ing more distinct according to the fluctuations of retinal
attention.*

Now what is the direction of this common place ? The
only way of defining the direction of an object is by point
ing to it. Most people, if asked to look at an object over
the horizontal edge of a sheet of paper which conceals their
hand and arm, and then to point their finger at it (raising
the hand gradually so that at last a finger-tip will appear
above the sheet of paper), are found to place the finger not
between either eye and the object, but between the latter
and the root of the nose, and this whether both eyes or
either alone be used. Hering and Helmholtz express this
by saying that we judge of the direction of -objects as they
would appear to an imaginary cyclopean eye, situated be
tween our two real eyes, and with its optical axis bisecting
the angle of convergence of the latter. Our two retinae act,
according to Hering, as if they were superposed in the
place of this imaginary double-eye ; we see by the corre
sponding points of each, situated far asunder as they really
are, just as we should see if they were superposed and could
both be excited together.

The judgment of objective singleness and that of identi
cal direction seem to hang necessarily together. And that
of identical direction seems to carry with it the necessity of
a common origin, between the eyes or elsewhere, from which
all the directions felt may seem to be estimated. This is
why the cyclopean eye is really a fundamental part of the
formulation of the theory of identical retinal points, and
why Hering, the greatest champion of this theory, lays so
much stress upon it.

It is an immediate consequence of the law of identical pro-

* These two observations prove the law of identical direction only for
objects which excite the foveae or lie in the line of direct looking. Ob
servers skilled in indirect vision can, however, more or less easily verify the
law for outlying retinal points.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

225

jection of images on geometrically similar points that images
which fall upon geometrically DISPARATE points of the two retina
should be projected in DISPAKATE directions, and that their objects
should consequently appear in TWO places, or LOOK DOUBLE.
Take the parallel rays from a star falling upon two eyes
which converge upon a near object, O, instead of being
parallel, as in the previously instanced case. If SL and SK
in Fig. 55 be the parallel rays, each of them will fall upon
the nasal half of the retina which it strikes.

FIG. 55.

But the two nasal halves are disparate, geometrically
symmetrical, not geometrically similar. The image on the
left one will therefore appear as if lying in a direction left
ward of the cyclopean eye's line of sight ; the image of the
right one will appear far to the right of the same direction.
The star will, in short, be seen double, — ' homonymously :
double.

Conversely, if the star be looked at directly with parallel
axes, O will be seen double, because its images will affect
the outer or cheek halves of the two retinae, instead of one
outer and one nasal half. The position of the images will
here be reversed from that of the previous case. The right

226 PSYCHOLOGY:

«ye's image will now appear to the left, the left eye's to the
right — the double images will be ' heteronymous.'

The same reasoning and the same result ought to apply
where the object's place with respect to the direction of the
two optic axes is such as to make its images fall not on non-
similar retinal halves, but on non- similar parts of similar
halves. Here, of course, the directions of projection will
be less widely disparate than in the other case, and the
double images will appear to lie less widely apart.

Careful experiments made by many observers according
to the so-called haploscopic method confirm this law, and
show that corresponding points, of single visual direction, exist
upon the two retinae. For the detail of these one must con
sult the special treatises.

Note now an important consequence. If we take a
stationary object and allow the eyes to vary their direction
and convergence, a purely geometrical study will show that
there will be some positions in which its two images impress
corresponding retinal points, but more in which they im
press disparate points. The former constitute the so-called
horopter, and their discovery has been attended with great
mathematical difficulty. Objects or parts of objects which
lie in the eyes' horopter at any given time cannot appear
double. Objects lying out of the horopter ivould seem, if the
theory of identical points were strictly trite, necessarily and al
ways to appear double.

Here comes the first great conflict of the identity-theory
with experience. Were the theory true, we ought all to
have an intuitive knowledge of the horopter as the line of
distinctest vision. Objects placed elsewhere ought to seem,
if not actually double, at least blurred. And yet no living
man makes any such distinction between the parts of his
field of vision. To most of us the whole field appears single,
and it is only by rare accident or by special education that
we ever catch a glimpse of a double image. In 1838, Wheat-
stone, in his truly classical memoir on binocular vision and
the stereoscope,* showed that the disparateness of the

* This essay, published in the Philosophical Transactions, contains the
germ of almost all the methods applied since to the study of optical percep
tion. It seems a pity that England, leading off so brilliantly the modern

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 227

points on which the two images of an object fall does not
within certain limits affect its seen singleness at all, but
rather the distance at which it shall appear. Wheatstone
made an observation, moreover, which subsequently became
the bone of much hot contention, in which he strove to
show that not only might disparate images fuse, but im
ages on corresponding or identical points might be seen
double.*

I am unfortunately prevented by the weakness of my
own eyes from experimenting enough to form a decided
personal opinion on the matter. It seems to me, however,
that the balance of evidence is against the Wheatstonian
interpretation, and that disparate points may fuse, without
identical points for that reason ever giving double images.
The two questions, "Can we see single with disparate
points?" and "Can we see double with identical points?"
although at the first blush they may appear, as to Helm-
holtz they appear, to be but two modes of expressing the
same inquiry, are in reality distinct. The first may quite
well be answered affirmatively and the second negatively.

Add to this that the experiment quoted from Helmholtz
above by no means always succeeds, but that many indi
viduals place their finger between the object and one of
their eyes, oftenest the right ; t finally, observe that the

epoch of this study, should- so quickly have dropped out of the field.
Almost all subsequent progress has been made in Germany, Holland, and,
longo intervallo , America.

* This is no place to report this controversy, but a few bibliographic
references may not be inappropriate. Wheatstone's own experiment is in
section 12 of his memoir. In favor of his interpretation see Helmholtz,
Phys. Opt., pp. 737-9 ; Wundt, Physiol. Psychol., SteAurl. p. 144; Nagel,
Sehen mit zwei Augen, pp. 78-82 Against Wheatstone see Volkmann,
Arch. f. Ophth., v. 2-74. and Untersuchungen, p. 266 ; Hering, Beitragezur
Physiologic, 29-45, also in Hermann's Hdbch. d Physiol., Bd. m. 1 Th.
p. 435 ; Aubert, Physiologic d Netzhaut, p. 322 ; Schon. Archiv f. Ophthal.,
xxiv. 1. pp. 56-65 ; andloonders, ibid, xm 1. p. 15 and note.

f When we see the finger the whole time, we usually put it in the line
joining object and left eye if it be the left finger, joining object and right
eye if it be the right finger. Microscopists, marksmen, or persons one of
whose eyes is much better than the other, almost always refer directions to
H single eye, as may be seen by the position of the shadow on their face
when they point at a candle-flame.

228 L'SYCUOLOQY.

identity-theory, with its Cyclopean starting point fur ail
lines of direction, gives by itself no ground for the distance
on any line at which an object shall appear, and has to be
helped out in this respect by subsidiary hypotheses, which,
in the hands of Hering and others, have become so complex
as easily to fall a prey to critical attacks ; and it will soon
seem as if the law of identical seen directions by corresponding
points, although a simple formula for expressing concisely many
fundamental phenomena, is by no means an adequate account of
the whole matter of retinal perception. *

The Projection- Theory.

Does the theory of projection fare any better? This
theory admits that each eye sees the object in a different
direction from the other, along the line, namely, passing
from the object through the middle of the pupil to the
retina. A point directly fixated is thus seen on the optical
axes of both eyes. There is only one point, however,
which these two optical axes have in common, and that is
the point to which they converge. Everything directly
looked at is seen at this point, and is thus seen both single
and at its proper distance. It is easy to show the incom
patibility of this theory with the theory of identity. Take
an objective point (like O in Fig. 50, when the star is looked
at) casting its images R' and I/ on geometrically dissimilar
parts of the two retinae and affecting the outer half of each
eye. On the identity-theory it ought necessarily to appear
double, whilst on the projection-theory there is no reason
whatever why it should not appear single, provided only
it be located by the judgment on each line of visible direc-

* Professor Joseph Le Conte, who believes strongly in the identity-
theory, has embodied the latter in a pair of laws of the relation between
positions seen single and double, near or far, on the one hand, and con
vergences and retinal impressions, on the other, which, though compli
cated, seems to me by far the best descriptive formulation yet made of the
normal facts of vision. His account is easily accessible to the reader in his
volume ' Sight ' in the International Scientific Series, bk. n. c. 3, so I say
no more about it now, except that it does not solve any of the difficulties
we are noting in the identity-theory, nor account for the other fluctuating
perceptions of which we go on to treat.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

229

tion, neither nearer nor farther than its point of intersection
with the other line.

Every point in the field of vieiv ought, in truth, if the pro
jection-theory were uniformly valid, to appear single, entirely
irrespective of the varying positions of the eyes, for from
every point of space two lines of visible direction pass to
the two retinae ; and at the intersection of these lines, or
just where the point is, there, according to the theory, it
should appear. The objection to this theory is thus precisely
the reverse of the objection to the identity -theory. If the latter
ruled, we ought to see most things double all the time. If the
projection-theory ruled, we ought never to see anything double.
As a matter of fact we get too few double images for the iden
tity-theory, and too many for the projection-theory.

The partisans of the projection-theory, beginning with

FIG. 56.

Aguilonius, have always explained double images as the
result of an erroneous judgment of the distance of the object,
the images of the latter being projected by the imagination
along the two lines of visible direction either nearer or
farther than the point of intersection of the latter. A
diagram will make this clear.

230 PSYCHOLOGY.

Let O be the point looked at, M an object farther, and
N an object nearer, than it. Then M and N will send the
lines of visible direction MM and NN to the two retinas.
If N be judged as far as O, it must necessarily lie where
the two lines of visible direction NN intersect the plane of
the arrow, or in two places, at N' and at N". If M be
judged as near as O, it must for the same reason form two
images at M' and M".

It is, as a matter of fact, true that we often misjudge
the distance in the way alleged. If the reader will hold his
forefingers, one beyond the other, in the median line, and
fixate them alternately, he will see the one not looked at,
double ; and he will also notice that it appears nearer to the
plane of the one looked at, whichever the latter may be,
than it really is. Its changes of apparent size, as the con
vergence of the eyes alter, also prove the change of appa
rent distance. The distance at which the axes converge
seems, in fact, to exert a sort of attraction upon objects
situated elsewhere. Being the distance of which we are
most acutely sensible, it invades, so to speak, the whole
field of our perception. If two half-dollars be laid on the
table an inch or two apart, and the eyes fixate steadily the
point of a pen held in the median line at varying dis
tances between the coins and the face, there will come a
distance at which the pen stands between the left half-
dollar and the right eye, and the right half-dollar and the
left eye. The two half-dollars will then coalesce into one ;
and this one will show its apparent approach to the pen-
point by seeming suddenly much reduced in size.*

Yet, in spite of this tendency to inaccuracy, we are never
actually mistaken about the half-dollar being behind the
pen-point. It may not seem far enough off, but still it is
farther than the point. In general it may be said that
where the objects are known to us, no such illusion of dis
tance occurs in any one as the theory would require. And
in some observers, Bering for example, it seems hardly to
occur at all. If I look into infinite distance and get my
finger in double images, they do not seem infinitely far off.

* Naturally it takes a smaller object at a less distance to cover by its
image a constant amount of retinul surface.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

231

To make objects at different distances seem equidistant,
careful precautions must be taken to have them alike in
appearance, and to exclude all outward reasons for ascrib
ing to the one a different location from that ascribed to the
other. Thus Donders tries to prove the law of projection
by taking two similar electric sparks, one behind the other
on a dark ground, one seen double ; or an iron rod placed
so near to the eyes that its double images seem as broad as
that of a fixated stove-pipe, the top and bottom of the objects
being cut off by screens, so as to prevent all suggestions
of perspective, etc. The three objects in each experiment
seem in the same plane.*

Add to this the impossibility, recognized by all observ
ers, of ever seeing double with the fovece, and the fact that
authorities as able as those quoted in the note on Wheat-
stone's observation deny that they can see double then with
identical points, and we are forced to conclude that the
projection-theory, like its predecessor, breaks doivn. Neither
formulates exactly or exhaustively a law for all our perceptions.

Ambiguity of Retinal Impressions.

WJmt does each theory try to do ? To make of seen location
a fixed function of retinal impression. Other facts may be

Fio. 57.

brought forward to show how far from fixed are the perceptive
functions of retinal impressions. We alluded a while ago to
the extraordinary ambiguity of the retinal image as a re-
vealer of magnitude. Produce an after-image of the sun
and look at your finger-tip : it will be smaller than your
nail. Project it on the table, and it will be as big as a
strawberry; on the wall, as large as a plate; on yonder
mountain, bigger than a house. And yet it is an unchanged

*Archiv f. Ophthal., Bd. xvn. Abth. 2, pp. 44-6 (1871).

232

PSYCHOLOGY.

retinal impression. Prepare a sheet with the figures shown
in Fig. 57 strongly marked upon it, and get by direct fixa
tion a distinct after-image of each.

Project the after-image of the cross upon the upper left-
hand part of the wall, it will appear as in Fig. 58 ; on the
upper right-hand it will appear as in Fig. 59. The circle

FIG. 58.

Fia. 59.

similarly projected will be distorted into two different
ellipses. If the two parallel lines be projected upon the
ceiling or floor far in front, the farther ends will diverge ;
and if the three parallel lines be thrown on the same sur
faces, the upper pair will seem farther apart than the lower.
Adding certain lines to others has the same distorting
effect. In what is known as Zollner's pattern (Fig. 60), the
long parallels tip towards each other the moment we draw
the short slanting lines over them yet their retinal images

/

/ /

/

/ /

V V V X

X

/

N N

\ N

FIG. 60.

N N

A similar distortion of

are the same they always were.
parallels appears in Fig 61.

Drawing a square inside the circle (Fig. 52) gives to the
outline of the latter an indented appearance where the
square's corners touch it. Drawing the radii inside of one

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

233

FIG. 61.

FIG. 62.

Fio. 63.

234 PSYCHOLOGY.

of the right angles in the same figure makes it see™ larger
than the other. In Fig. 63, the retinal image of the space
between the extreme dots is in all three lines the same, yet
it seems much larger the moment it is filled up with other
dots.

In the stereoscope certain pairs of lines which look
single under ordinary circumstances immediately seem
double when we add certain other lines to them.*

Ambiguous Import of Eye-movements.

These facts show the indeterminateness of the space-
import of various retinal impressions. Take now the eye's
movements, and we find a similar vacillation. When >ve
follow a moving object with our gaze, the motion is ' volun
tary ' ; when our eyes oscillate to and fro after we have
made ourselves dizzy by spinning around, it is ' reflex ' ;
and when the eyeball is pushed with the finger, it is ' pas
sive.' Now, in all three of these cases we get a feeling
from the movement as it effects itself. But the objective
perceptions to which the feeling assists us are by no means
the same. In the first case we may see a stationary field
of view with one moving object in it ; in the second, the
total field swimming more or less steadily in one direction ;
in the third, a sudden jump or twist of the same total
field.

The feelings of convergence of the eyeballs permit of the
same ambiguous interpretation. When objects are near we
converge strongly upon them in order to see them ; when
far, we set our optic axes parallel. But the exact degree of
convergence fails to be felt ; or rather, being felt, fails to
tell us the absolute distance of the object we are regarding.
Wheatstone arranged his stereoscope in such a way that the
size of the retinal images might change without the con
vergence altering ; or conversely, the convergence might
change without the retinal image altering. Under these
circumstances, he says,t the object seemed to approach or
recede in the first case, without altering its size , in the
second, to change its size without altering its distance — just

* A. W. Volkmaun, Uiitersuckungen, p. 253.
f Philosophical Transactions, 1852, p. 4.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 235

the reverse of what might have been expected. Wheatstone
adds, however, that ' fixing the attention ' converted each of
these perceptions into its opposite. The same perplexity
occurs in looking through prismatic glasses, which alter the
eyes' convergence. We cannot decide whether the object
has come nearer, or grown larger, or both, or neither ; and
our judgment vacillates in the most surprising way. We
may even make our eyes diverge, and the object will none
the less appear at a finite distance. When we look through
the stereoscope, the picture seems at no determinate dis
tance. These and other facts have led Helmholtz to deny
that the feeling of convergence has any very exact value as
a distance-measurer.*

With the feelings of accommodation it is very much the
same. Donders has shown t that the apparent magnifying
power of spectacles of moderate convexity hardly depends at
all upon their enlargement of the retinal image, but rather
oil the relaxation they permit of the muscle of accommoda
tion. This suggests an object farther off, and consequently
a much larger one, since its retinal size rather increases
than diminishes. But in this case the same vacillation of
judgment as in the previously mentioned case of converg
ence takes place. The recession made the object seem
larger, but the apparent growth in size of the object now
makes it look as if it came nearer instead of receding. The
effect thus contradicts its own cause. Everyone is conscious,
on first putting on a pair of spectacles, of a doubt whether
the field of view draws near or retreats.:);

There is still another deception, occurring in persons ivho
have had one eye-muscle suddenly paralyzed. This deception

* Physiol. Optik, 649-664. Later this author is led to value converg
ence more highly. Arch. f. (Anat. u.) Physiol. (1878), p. 322.

f Anomalies of Accommodation and Refraction (New Sydenham Soc.
Transl., London, 1864), p. 155.

| These strange contradictions have been called by Aubert ' secondary '
deceptions of judgment. See Grundziige d. Physiologischeu Optik (Leip
zig, 1876), pp. 601, 615, 627. One of the best examples of them is the small
size of the moon as first seen through a telescope. It is larger and brighter,
so we see its details more distinctly and judge it nearer. But because we
judge it so much nearer we think it must have grown smaller. Cf. Char-
pentier in Jahresbericht, x. 430.

236 PSYCHOLOGY.

has led Wundt to affirm that the eyeball-feeling proper, the
incoming sensation of effected rotation, tells us only of the
direction of our eye-movements, but not of their whole ex
tent.* For this reason, and because not only Wundt, but
many other authors, think the phenomena in these partial
paralyses demonstrate the existence of a feeling of innerva
tion, a feeling of the outgoing nervous current, opposed to
every afferent sensation whatever, it seems proper to note
the facts with a certain degree of detail.

Suppose a man wakes up some morning with the exter
nal rectus muscle of his right eye half paralyzed, what will
be the result ? He will be enabled only with great effort
to rotate the eye so as to look at objects lying far off to the
right. Something in the effort he makes will make him feel
as if the object lay much farther to the right than it really
is. If the left and sound eye be closed, and he be asked
to touch rapidly with his finger an object situated towards
his right, he will point the finger to the right of it. T4ie
current explanation of the ' something ' in the effort which
causes this deception is that it is the sensation of the out
going discharge from the nervous centres, the ' feeling of
innervation,' to use Wundt's expression, requisite for bring
ing the open eye with its weakened muscle to bear upon
the object to be touched. If that object be situated 20
degrees to the right, the patient has now to innervate as
powerfully to turn the eye those 20 degrees as formerly
he did to turn the eye 30 degrees. He consequently
believes as before that he has turned it 30 degrees ; until,
by a newly-acquired custom, he learns the altered spatial
import of all the discharges his brain makes into his right
abducens nerve. The ' feeling of innervation,' maintained
to exist by this and other observations, plays an immense
part in the space-theories of certain philosophers, especial
ly Wundt. I shall elsewhere try to show that the observa
tions by no means warrant the conclusions drawn from
them, and that the feeling in question is probably a wholly
fictitious entity. t Meanwhile it suffices to point out that
even those who set most store by it are compelled, by the

* Revue Philosophique, in. 9, p. 220.
f See Chapter XXIV.

TEE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 237

readiness with which the translocation of the field of view
becomes corrected and further errors avoided, to admit
that the precise space-import of the supposed sensation of
outgoing energy is as ambiguous and indeterminate as that of
any other of the eye-feelings we have considered hitherto.

I have now given what no one will call an understate
ment of the facts and arguments by which it is sought to
banish the credit of directly revealing space from each and
every kind of eye-sensation taken by itself. The reader
will confess that they make a very plausible show, and
most likely wonder whether my own theory of the matter
can rally from their damaging evidence. But the case is
far from being hopeless ; and the introduction of a discrimi
nation hitherto unmade will, if I mistake not, easily vindi
cate the view adopted in these pages, whilst at the same
time it makes ungrudging allowance for all the ambiguity
and illusion on which so much stress is laid by the advo
cates of the intellectualist-theory.

The Choice of the Visual Reality.

We have native and fixed optical space-sensations ; but
experience leads us to select certain ones from among them to be
the exclusive bearers of reality : the rest become mere signs and
suggesters of these. The factor of selection, on which we have
already laid so much stress, here as elsewhere is the solving
word of the enigma. If Helmholtz, Wundt, and the rest,
with an ambiguous retinal sensation before them, meaning
now one size and distance, and now another, had not con
tented themselves with merely saying : — The size and dis
tance are not this sensation, they are something beyond it
which it merely calls up, and whose own birthplace is afar
—in ' synthesis ' (Wundt) or in ' experience ' (Helmholtz) as
the case may be ; if they had gone on definitely to ask and
definitely to answer the question, What are the size and
distance in their proper selves ? they would not only have
escaped the present deplorable vagueness of their space-
theories, but they woul'd have seen that the objective
spatial attributes ' signified ' are simply and solely certain

238 PS TCEOL OOT.

otJier optical sensations noiu absent, but which the present
sensations suggest.

What, for example, is the slant-legged cross which we
think we see on the wall when we project the rectangular
after-image high up towards our right or left (Figs. 58 and
59) ? Is it not in very sooth a retinal sensation itself ? An
imagined sensation, not a felt one, it is true, but none the
less essentially and originally sensational or retinal for that,

the sensation, namely, which we should receive if a ' real '

slant-legged cross stood on the wall in front of us and threw
its image on our eye. That image is not the one our retina
now holds. Our retina now holds the image which a cross
of square shape throws when in front, but which a cross of
the slant-legged pattern ivould throw, provided it were
actually on the wall in the distant place at which we look.
Call this actual retinal image the ' square ' image. The
square image is then one of the innumerable images the
slant-legged cross can throw. Why should another one,
and that an absent one, of those innumerable images be
picked out to represent exclusively the slant-legged cross's
' true ' shape ? Why should that absent and imagined
slant-legged image displace the present and felt square
image from our mind? Why, when the objective cross
gives us so many shapes, as it varies its position, should we
think we feel the true shape only when the cross is directly
in front ? And when that question is answered, how can
the absent and represented feeling of a slant-legged figure
so successfully intrude itself into the place of a presented
square one?

Before answering either question, let us be doubly sure
about our facts, and see how true it is that in our dealings
with objects ive always do pick out one of the visual images they
yield, to constitute the real form or size.

The matter of size has been already touched upon, so
that no more need be said of it here. As regards shape,
almost all the retinal shapes that objects throw are perspec
tive ' distortions.' Square table-tops constantly present two
acute and two obtuse angles ; circles drawn on our wall
papers, our carpets, or on sheets of paper, usually show like
ellipses ; parallels approach as they recede ; human bodies

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 239

are foreshortened ; and the transitions from one to another
of these altering forms are infinite and continual. Out of
the flux, however, one phase always stands prominent. It
is the form the object has when we see it easiest and best :
and that is when our eyes and the object both are in what
may be called the normal position. In this position our
head is upright and our optic axes either parallel or sym
metrically convergent ; the plane of the object is perpen
dicular to the visual plane ; and if the object is one containing
many lines it is turned so as to make them, as far as possible,
either parallel or perpendicular to the visual plane. In this
situation it is that we compare all shapes with each other ;
here every exact measurement and decision is made.*

It is very easy to see why the normal situation should have
this extraordinary pre-eminence. First, it is the position in
which we easiest hold anything we are examining in our
hands ; second, it -is a turning-point between all right- and
all left-hand perspective views of a given object ; third, it
is the only position in which symmetrical figures seem sym
metrical and equal angles seem equal ; fourth, it is often
that starting-point of movements from which the eye is
least troubled by axial rotations, by which superposition f of
the retinal images of different lines and different parts of
the same line is easiest produced, and consequently by
which the eye can make the best comparative measure
ments in its sweeps. All these merits single the normal
position out to be chosen. No other point of view offers
so many aesthetic and practical advantages. Here we be
lieve we see the object as it is ; elsewhere, only as it seems.
Experience and custom soon teach us, however, that the
seeming appearance passes into the real one by continuous
gradations. They teach us, moreover, that seeming and
being may be strangely interchanged. Now a real circle
may slide into a seeming ellipse ; now an ellipse may, by
sliding in the same direction, become a seeming circle ; now

* The only exception seems to be when we expressly wish to abstract from
particulars, and to judge of the general 'effect.' Witness ladies trying on
new dresses with their heads inclined and their eyes askance ; or painters in
the same attitude judging of the ' values ' in their pictures.

\ The importance of Superposition will appear later on.

240 PSYCHOLOGY.

a rectangular cross grows slant-legged ; now a slant-legged
one grows rectangular.

Almost any form in oblique vision may be thus a deriva
tive of almost any other in ' primary ' vision ; and we must
learn, when we get one of the former appearances, to trans
late it into the appropriate one of the ] attei °la AS ; we must
learn of what optical 'reality ' ;s optical signs.

Having learned this, we do but, obey cuai xu,w of economy
or simplification which dominates our whole psychic life,
when we attend exclusively to the ' reality ' and ignore as
much as our consciousness will let us the ' sign ' by which
we came to apprehend it. The signs of each probable real
thing being multiple and the thing itself one and fixed,
we gain the same mental relief by abandoning the former
for the latter that we do when we abandon mental images,
with all their fluctuating characters, for the definite and
unchangeable names which they suggest. The selection of
the several ' normal ' appearances from out of the jungle
of our optical experiences, to serve as the real sights of
which we shall think, is psychologically a parallel phenom
enon to the habit of thinking in words, and has a like use.
Both are substitutions of terms few and fixed for terms
manifold and vague.

Sensations which we Ignore.

This service of sensations as mere signs, to be ignored
when they have evoked the other sensations which are their
significates, was noticed first by Berkeley and remarked in
many passages, as the following :

' ' Signs, being little considered in themselves, or for their own sake,
but only in their relative capacity and for the sake of those things
whereof they are signs, it comes to pass that the mind overlooks them,
so as to carry its attention immediately on to the things signified . . .
which in truth and strictness are not seen, but only suggested and ap
prehended by means of the proper objects of sight which alone are
seen." (Divine Visual Language, § 12.)

Berkeley of course erred in supposing that the thing
suggested was not even originally an object of sight, as the
sign now is which calls it up. Reid expressed Berkeley's
principle in yet clearer language :

" The visible appearances of objects are intended by nature only as
signs or indications, and the mind passes instantly to the things sig-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 241

nified, without making the least reflection upon the sign, or even per
ceiving that there is any such thmg. . . . The mind has acquired aeon-
firmed and inveterate habit of inattention to them (the signs). For
they no sooner appear than, quick as lightning, the thing signified suc
ceeds and engrosses all our regard. They have no name in language ;
and although we are conscious of them when they pass through the
mind, yet their passage is so quick and so familiar that it is absolutely
unheeded ; nor do they leave any footsteps of themselves, either in the
memory or imagination." (Inquiry, chap. v. §§ 2, 3.)

If we review the facts we shall find every grade of non-
attention between the extreme form of overlooking men
tioned by Keid (or forms even more extreme still) and com
plete conscious perception of the sensation present. Some
times it is literally impossible to become aware of the latter.
Sometimes a little artifice or effort easily leads us to discern
it together, or in alternation, with the 'object' it reveals.
Sometimes the present sensation is held to be the object or
to reproduce its features in undistorted shape, and then, of
course, it receives the mind's full glare.

The deepest inattention is to subjective optical sensa
tions, strictly so called, or those which are not signs of
outer objects at all. Helmholtz's treatment of these phe
nomena, muscce volitantes, negative after-images, double
images, etc., is very satisfactory. He says :

" We only attend with any ease and exactness to our sensations in so
far forth as they can be utilized for the knowledge of outward things ;
and we are accustomed to neglect all those portions of them which have
no significance as regards the external world. So much is this the case
that for the most part special artifices and practice are required for
the observation of these latter more subjective feelings. Although it
might seem that nothing should be easier than to be conscious of one's
own sensations, experience nevertheless shows that often enough either a
special talent like that showed in eminent degree by Purkinje, or acci
dent or theoretic speculation, are necessary conditions for the discovery
of subjective phenomena. Thus, for example, the blind spot on the
retina was discovered by Mariotte by the theoretic way ; similarly by
me the existence of ' summation '-tones in acoustics. In the majority
of cases accident is what first led observers whose attention was espe
cially exercised on subjective phenomena to discover this one or that ;
only where the subjective appearances are so intense that they inter
fere with the perception of objects are they noticed by all men alike.
But if they have once been discovered it is for the most part easy for
subsequent observers who place themselves in proper conditions and
bend their attention in the right direction to perceive them. But in

242 PSYCHOLOGY.

many cases — for example, in the phenomena of the blind spot, in the
discrimination of over-tones and combination-tones from the ground-
tone of musical sounds, etc. — such a strain of the attention is required,
even with appropriate instrumental aids, that most persons fail. The
very after-images of bright objects are by most men perceived only
under exceptionally favorable conditions, and it takes steady practice
to see the fainter images of this kind. It is a commonly recurring ex
perience that persons smitten with some eye-disease which impairs
vision suddenly remark for the first time the muscce volitantes which
all through life their vitreous humor has contained, but which they now
firmly believe to have arisen since their malady ; the truth being that
the latter has only made them more observant of all their visual sensa
tions. There are also cases where one eye has gradually grown blind,
and the patient lived for an indefinite time without knowing it, until,
through the accidental closure of the healthy eye alone, the blindness
of the other was brought to attention.

"Most people, when first made aware of binocular double images,
are uncommonly astonished that they should never have noticed them
before, although all through their life they had been in the habit of see
ing singly only those few objects which were about equally distant with
the point of fixation, and the rest, those nearer and farther, which con
stitute the great majority, had always been double.

"We must then learn to turn our attention to our particular sensa
tions, and we learn this commonly only for such sensations as are means
of cognition of the outer world. Only so far as they serve this end have
our sensations any importance for us in ordinary life. Subjective
feelings are mostly interesting only to scientific investigators ; were
they remarked in the ordinary use of the senses, they could only cause
disturbance. Whilst, therefore, we reach an extraordinary degree of
firmness and security in objective observation, we not only do not reach
this where subjective phenomena are concerned, but we actually attain
in a high degree the faculty of overlooking these altogether, and keep
ing ourselves independent of their influence in judging of objects, even
in cases where their strength might lead them easily to attract our at
tention." (Physiol. Optik, pp. 431-2.)

Even where the sensation is not merely subjective, as in
the cases of which Helmholtz speaks, but is a sign of some
thing outward, we are also liable, as Reid says, to overlook
its intrinsic quality and attend exclusively to the image of
the * thing ' it suggests. But here everyone caw easily notice
the sensation itself if he will. Usually we see a sheet of
paper as uniformly white, although a part of it may be in
shadow. But we can in an instant, if we please, notice the
shadow as local color. A man walking towards us does
not usually seem to alter his size ; but we can, by setting

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 243

our attention in a peculiar way make him appear to do so.
The whole education of the artist consists in his learning
to see the presented signs as well as the represented things.
No matter what the field of view means, he sees it also as
it feels — that is, as a collection of patches of color bounded
by lines — the whole forming an optical diagram of whose
intrinsic proportions one who is not an artist has hardly a
conscious inkling. The ordinary man's attention passes
over them to their import ; the artist's turns back and
dwells upon them for their own sake. 'Don't draw the
thing as it is, but as it looks / ' is the endless advice of every
teacher to his pupil ; forgetting that what it ' is ' is what it
would also ' look,' provided it were placed in what we have
called the ' normal ' situation for vision. In this situation
the sensation as ' sign ' and the sensation as ' object ' co
alesce into one, and there is no contrast between them.

Sensations which seem Suppressed.

But a great difficulty has been made of certain peculiar
cases which we must now turn to consider. They are cases
in which a present sensation, whose existence is supposed to be
proved by its outward conditions being there, seems absolutely
suppressed or changed by the image of the ' thing ' it suggests.

This matter carries us back to what was said on p. 218.
The passage there quoted from Helmholtz refers to these
cases. He thinks they conclusively disprove the original
and intrinsic spatiality of any of our retinal sensations ;
for if such a one, actually present, had an immanent and
essential space-determination of its own, that might well
be added to and overlaid or even momentarily eclipsed by
suggestions of its signification, but how could it possibly
be altered or completely suppressed thereby ? Of actually
present sensations, he says, being suppressed by suggestions
of experience—

" We have not a single well-attested example. In all those illusions
which are provoked by sensations in the absence of their usually excit
ing objects, the mistake never vanishes by the better understanding of
the object really present, and by insight into the cause of deception.
Phosphenes provoked by pressure on the eyeball, by traction on the en
trance of the optic nerve, after-images, etc., remain projected into their
apparent place in the field of vision, just as the image projected from

244 PSYCHOLOGY.

a mirror's surface continues to be seen behind the mirror, although we
know that to all these appearances no outward reality corresponds.
True enough, we can remove our attention, and keep it removed, from
sensations that have no reference to the outer world, those, e.g., of the
weaker after-images, and of entoptic objects, etc. . . . But what would
become of our perceptions at all if we had the power not only of ignor
ing, but of transforming into their opposites, any part of them that
differed from that outward experience, the image of which, as that of
a present reality, accompanies them in the mind ? " *

And again :

u On the analogy of all other experience, we should expect that the
conquered feelings would persist to our perception, even if only in the
shape of recognized illusions. But this is not the case. One does not
see how the assumption of originally spatial sensations can explain our
optical cognitions, when in the last resort those who believe in these
very sensations find themselves obliged to assume that they are over
come by our better judgment, based on experience. "

These words, coming from such a quarter, necessarily
carry great weight. But the authority even of a Helmholtz
ought not to shake one's critical composure. And the mo
ment one abandons abstract generalities and comes to close
quarters with the particulars, I think one easily sees that
no such conclusions as those we have quoted follow from
the latter. But profitably to conduct the discussion ive
must divide the alleged instances into groups.

(a) With Helmholtz, color-perception is equally with space-
perception an intellectual affair. The so-called simulta
neous color-contrast, by which one color modifies another
alongside of which it is said, is explained by him as an
unconscious inference. In Chapter XYII we discussed the
color-contrast problem ; the principles which applied to its
solution will prove also applicable to part of the present
problem. In my opinion, Hering has definitively proved
that, when one color is laid beside another, it modifies the
sensation of the latter, not by virtue of any mere mental
suggestion, as Helmholtz would have it, but by actually
exciting a new nerve -process, to which the modified feeling
of color immediately corresponds. The explanation is
physiological, not psychological. The transformation of

*Physiol. Optik, p. 817.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

245

the original color by the inducing color is due to the dis
appearance of the physiological conditions under which the
first color was produced, and to the induction, under the
new conditions, of a genuine new sensation, with which the
' suggestions of experience ' have naught to do.

FIG. 64.

That processes in the visual apparatus propagate them
selves laterally, if one may so express it, is also shown by
the phenomena of contrast which occur after looking upon
motions of various kinds. Here are a few examples. If,
over the rail of a moving vessel, we look at the water rush
ing along the side, and then transfer our gaze to the deck, a
band of planks will appear to us, moving in the opposite

246 PSYCHOLOGY.

direction to that in which, a moment previously, we had
been seeing the water move, whilst on either side of this
band another band of planks will move as the water did.
Looking at a waterfall, or at the road from out of a car-
window in a moving train, produces the same illusion, which
may be easily verified in the laboratory by a simple piece
of apparatus. A board with a window five or six inches
wide and of any convenient length is supported upright on
two feet. On the back side of the board, above and below
the window, are two rollers, one of which is provided with
a crank. An endless band of any figured stuff is passed
over these rollers (one of which can be so adjusted on its
bearings as to keep the stuff always taut and not liable to
slip), and the surface of the front board is also covered with
stuff or paper of a nature to catch the eye. Turning the
crank now sets the central band in continuous motion,
whilst the margins of the field remain really at rest, but
after a while appear moving in the contrary way. Stopping
the crank results in an illusory appearance of motion in
reverse directions all over the field.

A disk with an Archimedean spiral drawn upon it,
whirled round on an ordinary rotating machine, produces
still more startling effects.

FIG. 65.

"If the revolution is in the direction in which the spiral line
Approaches the centre of the disk the entire surface of the latter seems
to expand during revolution and to contract after it has ceased ; *nd

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 247

vice versd if the movement of revolution is in the opposite direction. If
in the former case the eyes of the observers are turned from the rotat
ing disk towards any familiar object — e.g. the face of a friend — the latter
seems to contract or recede in a somewhat striking manner, and to
expand or approach after the opposite motion of the spiral. " *

An elementary form of these motor illusions seems to be
the one described by Helmholtz on pp. 568-571 of his
Optik, The motion of anything in the field of vision along
an acute angle towards a straight line sensibly distorts

1>

I

^--""~ 0 H

FIG. 66.

that line. Thus in Fig. 66 : Let AB be a line drawn on
paper, CDE the tracing made over this line by the point
of a compass steadily followed by the eye, as it moves. As
the compass-point passes from C to D, the line appears to
move downwards ; as it passes from D to E, the line appears
to move upwards ; at the same time the whole line seems
to incline itself in the direction FG during the first half
of the compass's movement ; and in the direction HI dur
ing its last half ; the change from one inclination to an
other being quite distinct as the compass-point passes
over D.

Any line across which we draw a pencil-point appears
to be animated by a rapid movement of its own towards
the pencil-point. This apparent movement of both of two
things in relative motion to each other, even when one of
them is absolutely still, reminds us of the instances quoted

* Bowditch and Hall, in Journal of Physiology, vol. in. p. 299. Helm
holtz tries to explain this phenomenon by unconscious rotations of the eye
ball. But movements of the eyeball can only explain such appearances
of movements as are the same over the whole field. In the windowed
board one part of the field seems to move in one way, another part in an
other. The same is true when we turn from the spiral to look at the wall
— the centre of the field alone swells out or contracts, the margin does the
reverse or remains at rest. Mach and Dvorak have beautifully proved the
impossibility of eye-rotations in this case (Sitzungsber. d. Wiener Akad.,
Bd. LXI.). See also Bowditch and Hall's paper as above, p. 300.

248 PSYCHOLOGY.

from Vierordt on page 188, and seems to take us back to a
primitive stage of perception, in which the discriminations
we now make when we feel a movement have not yet been
made. If we draw the point of a pencil through ' Zollner's
pattern' (Fig. 60, p. 232), and follow it with the eye, the
whole figure becomes the scene of the most singular
apparent unrest, of which Helmholtz has very carefully
noted the conditions. The illusion of Zollner's figure van
ishes entirely, or almost so, with most people, if they
steadily look at one point of it with an unmoving eye ; and
the same is the case with many other illusions.

Now all these facts taken together seem to show — vaguely
it is true, but certainly — that present excitements and after
effects of former excitements may alter the result of processes
occurring simultaneously at a distance from them in the retina
or other portions of the apparatus for optical sensation. In
the cases last considered, the moving eye, as it sweeps the
fovea over certain parts of the figure, seems thereby to
determine a modification in the feeling which the other parts
confer, which modification is the figure's 'distortion.' It is
true that this statement explains nothing. It only keeps
the cases to which it applies from being explained spuri
ously. The spurious account of these illusions is that they are
intellectual, not sensational, that they are secondary, not primary,
mental facts. The distorted figure is said to be one which
the mind is led to imagine, by falsely drawing an uncon
scious inference from certain premises of which it is not
distinctly aware. And the imagined figure is supposed to
be strong enough to suppress the perception of whatever
real sensations there may be. But Helmholtz, Wundt,
Delbceuf, Zollner, and all the advocates of unconscious in
ference are at variance with each other when it comes to
the question what these unconscious premises and infer
ences may be.

That small angles look proportionally larger than larger
ones is, in brief, the fundamental illusion to which almost all
authors would reduce the peculiarity of Fig. 67, as of Figs.
60, 61, 62 (pp. 232, 233). This peculiarity of small angles
is by Wundt treated as the case of a filled space seeming
larger than an empty one, as in Fig. 68 ; and this, according

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

249

to both Delboauf and Wundt, is owing to the fact that more
muscular innervation is needed for the eye to traverse a
filled space than an empty one, because the points and lines

FIG. 67.

in the filled space inevitably arrest and constrain the eye,
and this makes us feel as if it were doing more work, i.e.
traversing a longer distance.* When, however, we recol-

FIG. 68.

lect that muscular movements are positively proved to have
no share in the waterfall and revolving-spiral illusions, and
that it is hard to see how Wundt's and Delboeuf's particular
form of muscle-explanation can possibly apply to the com
pass-point illusion considered a moment ago, we must con
clude that these writers have probably exaggerated, to say
the least, the reach of their muscle-explanation in the case

* Bulletins de 1'Acad. de Belgique, xxi. 2; Revue Philosophique, vi.
pp. 223-5 ; Physiologische Psychologic, 2te Aufl. p. 103. Compare Mttn-
aterberg's views, Beitrage, Heft 2, p. 174.

250 PSYCHOLOGY.

of the subdivided angles and lines. Never do we get such
strong muscular feelings as when, against the course of na
ture, we oblige our eyes to be still ; but fixing the eyes on
one point of the figure, so far from making that part of the
latter seem larger, dispels, in most persons, the illusion of
these diagrams altogether.

As for Helmholtz, he invokes, to explain the enlarge
ment of small angles,* what he calls a « law of contrast '
between directions and distances of lines, analogous to that
between colors and intensities of light. Lines cutting
another line make the latter seem more inclined away from
them than it really is. Moreover, clearly recognizable mag
nitudes appear greater than equal magnitudes which we
but vaguely apprehend. But this is surely a sensational-
istic law, a native function of our seeing-apparatus. Quite
as little as the negative after-image of the revolving spiral
could such contrast be deduced from any association of
ideas or recall of past objects. The principle of contrast
is criticised by Wundt, f who says that by it small spaces
ought to appear to us smaller, and not larger, than they
really are. Helmholtz might have retorted (had not the
retort been as fatal to the uniformity of his own principle
as to Wundt's) that if the muscle-explanation were true, it
ought not to give rise to just the opposite illusions in the
skin. We saw on p. 141 that subdivided spaces appear!
shorter than empty ones upon the skin. To the instances!
there given add this : Divide a line on paper into equal
halves, puncture the extremities, and make punctures all
along one of the halves ; then, with the finger-tip on the
opposite side of the paper, follow the line of punctures ;
the empty half will seem much longer than the punctured
half. This seems to bring things back to unanalyzable|
laws, by reason of which our feeling of size is determined!
differently in the skin and in the retina, even when the!
objective conditions are the same. Bering's explanation
of Zollner's figure is to be found in Hermann's Handb. d.
Physiologie, m. 1. p. 579. Lipps t gives another reason

* Physiol. Optik, pp. 562-71.
f Physiol. Psych., pp. 107-8.
Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 526-30.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

why lines cutting another line make the latter seem to
bend away from them more than is really the case. If,
he says, wo draw (Fig. 69) the line pm upon the line ab,
and follow the latter with our eye, we shall, on reaching
the point m, tend for a moment to slip off ab and to follow
mp, without distinctly realizing that we are not still on the
main line. This makes us feel as if the remainder nib of
the main line were bent a little away from its original direc
tion. The illusion is apparent in the shape of a seeming

FIG. 69.

approach of the ends 5, 6, of the two main lines. This to
my mind would be a more satisfactory explanation of this
class of illusions than any of those given by previous au
thors, were it not again for what happens in the skin.

Considering all the circumstances, I fed justified in dis
carding his entire batch of illusions as irrelevant to our pres
ent inquiry. Whatever they may prove, they do not prove
that our visual percepts of form and movement may not be
sensations strictly so called. They much more probably
fall into line with the phenomena of irradiation and of
color-contrast, and with Vierordt's primitive illusions of
movement. They show us, if anything, a realm of sen
sations in which our habitual experience has not yet made
traces, and which persist in spite of our better knowledge,
imsuggestive of those other space-sensations which we all
the time know from extrinsic evidence to constitute the real
space-determinations of the diagram. Yery likely, if these
sensations were as frequent and as practically important as
they now are insignificant and rare, we should end by sub
stituting their significates — the real space-values of the
diagrams — for them. These latter we should then seem to

252

PSYCHOLOGY.

see directly, and the illusions would disappear like that of
the size of a tooth-socket when the tooth has been out a
week.

(b) Another batch of cases which we may discard is that of
double images. A thoroughgoing anti-sensationalist ought
to deny all native tendency to see double images when
disparate retinal points are stimulated, because, he should
say, most people never get them, but see all things single
which experience has led them to believe to be single.
" Can a doubleness, so easily neutralized by our knowledge,
ever be a datum of sensation at all? " such an anti-sensa
tionalist might ask.

To which the answer is that it is a datum of sensation,
but a datum which, like many other data, must first be
discriminated. As a rule, no sensible qualities are dis
criminated without a motive.* And those that later we
learn to discriminate were originally felt confused. As
well pretend that a voice, or an odor, which we have
learned to pick out, is no sensation now. One may easily
acquire skill in discriminating double images, though, as
Hering somewhere says, it is an art of which one cannot
become master in one year or in two. For masters like
Hering himself, or Le Conte, the ordinary stereoscopic dia
grams are of little use. Instead of combining into one solid
appearance, they simply cross each other with their doubled

Fro. 70.

lines. Volkmann has shown a great variety of ways in
which the addition of secondary lines, differing in the two

* Of. supra, p. 515 if.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 253

fields, helps us to see the primary lines double. The effect
is analogous to that shown in the cases which we despatched
a moment ago, where given lines have their space-value
changed by the addition of new lines, without our being
able to say why, except that a certain mutual adhesion of
the lines and modification of the resultant feeling takes
place by psychophysiological laws. Thus, if in Fig. 70, I
and r be crossed by an horizontal line at the same level,
and viewed stereoscopically, they appear as a single pair of
lines, 5, in space. But if the horizontal be at different
levels, as in I', r', three lines appear, as in s'.*

Let us then say no more about double images. All that
the facts prove is what Yolkmann says,t that, although
there may be sets of retinal fibres so organized as to give
an impression of two separate spots, yet the excitement of
other retinal fibres may inhibit the effect of the first ex
citement, and prevent us from actually making the dis
crimination. Still farther retinal processes may, however,
bring the doubleness to the eye of attention; and, once
there, it is as genuine a sensation as any that our life
affords.J

(c) These groups of illusions being eliminated, either as cases
of defective discrimination, or as changes of one space-
sensation into another when the total retinal process
changes, there remain but tivo other groups to puzzle us. The
first is that of the after-images distorted by projection on to
oblique planes ; the second relates to the instability of
our judgments of relative distance and size by the eye,
and includes especially what are known as pseudoscopic
illusions.

* See Archiv f . Ophthalm. , v. 2, 1 (1859), where many more examples
are given.

f Untersuchungen, p. 250 ; see also p. 242.

j 1 pass over certain difficulties about double images, drawn from the
perceptions of a few squinters (e.g. by Schweigger, Klin. Untersuch liber
das Schielen, Berlin, 1881 ; by Javal, Annales d'Oculistique, LXXXV.
p. 217), because the facts are exceptional at best and very difficult of inter
pretation. In favor of the sensationalistic or nativistic view of one such
case, see the important paper by Von Kries, Archiv f. Ophthalm., xxiv.
4, p. 117.

254

PSYCHOLOGY.

The phenomena of the first group were described on
page 232. A. W. Yolkmann has studied them with his
accustomed clearness and care. * Even an imaginarily
inclined wall, in a picture, will, if an after-image be thrown
upon it, distort the shape thereof, and make us see a form
of which our after-image would be the natural projection
on the retina, were that form laid upon the wall. Thus a
signboard is painted in perspective on a screen, and the
eye, after steadily looking at a rectangular cross, is turned
to the painted signboard. The after-image appears as an
oblique-legged cross upon the signboard. It is the converse
phenomenon of a perspective drawing like Fig. 71, in which

FIG. 71.

really oblique-legged figures are seen as rectangular crosses.
The unstable judgments of relative distance and size
were also mentioned on pp. 231-2. Whatever the size may
be of the retinal image which an object makes, the object is
seen as of its own normal size. A man moving towards us
is not sensibly perceived to grow, for example ; and my
finger, of which a single joint may more than conceal him
from my view, is nevertheless seen as a much smaller object
than the man. As for distances, it is often possible to make
the farther part of an object seem near and the nearer part
far. A human profile in intaglio, looked at steadily with
one eye, or even both, soon appears irresistibly as a bas-
relief. The inside of a common pasteboard mask, painted
like the outside, and viewed with one eye in a direct light,
also looks convex instead of hollow. So strong is the illu-

* Physiologische Untersuclmngen im Gebiete der Optik, v.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

255

sion, after long fixation, that a friend who painted such a
mask for me told me it soon became difficult to see how to
apply the brush. Bend a visiting-card across the middle,
so that its halves form an angle of 90° more or less ; set it
upright on the table, as in Fig. 72, and view it with one eye.

FIG. 72.

You can make it appear either as if it opened towards you
or away from you. In the former case, the angle ab lies

upon the table, b being nearer to you than a ; in the latter

case ab seems vertical to the table — as indeed it really is

with a nearer to you than b* Again, look,with either one or
* Cf. E. Mach, Beitrage zur Analyse der Einptindungen, p. 87.

256

PSYCHOLOGY.

two eyes, at the opening of a wine-glass or tumbler (Fig.
73), held either above or below the eye's level. The retinal
image of the opening is an oval, but we can see the oval in
either of two ways, — as if it were the perspective view of a>
circle whose edge b were farther from us than its edge a
(in which case we should seem to be looking down on the
circle), or as if its edge a were the more distant edge (in
which case we should be looking up at it through the b side
of the glass). As the manner of seeing the edge changes,
the glass itself alters its form in space and looks straight
or seems bent towards or from the eye,* according as the
latter is placed beneath or above it.

Plane diagrams also can be conceived as solids, and that
in more than one way. Figs. 74, 75, 76, for example, are am-

FTG. 74.

FIG. 75.

FIG.

biguous perspective projections, and may each of them re
mind us of two different natural objects. Whichever of these

* Cf. V. Egger, Revue Pbilos., xx. 488.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 257

objects we conceive clearly at the moment of looking at the
figure, we seem to see in all its solidity before us. A little prac
tice will enable us to flap the figures, so to speak, backwards
and forwards from one object to the other at will. We need
only attend to one of the angles represented, and imagine it
either solid or hollow — pulled towards us out of the plane
of the paper, or pushed back behind the same — and the
whole figure obeys the cue and is instantaneously trans
formed beneath our gaze.*

The peculiarity of all these cases is the ambiguity of
the perception to which the fixed retinal impression gives
rise. With our retina excited in exactly the same way,
whether by after-image, mask or diagram, we see now this
object and now that, as if the retinal image per se had no
essential space-import. Surely if form and length were
originally retinal sensations, retinal rectangles ought not to
become acute or obtuse, and lines ought not to alter their
relative lengths as they do. If relief were an optical
feeling, it ought not to flap to and fro, with every optical con
dition unchanged. Here, if anywhere, the deniers of space-
sensation ought to be able to make their final stand, t

It must be confessed that their plea is plausible at first
sight. But it is one thing to throw out retinal sensibility
altogether as a space-yielding function the moment we find
an ambiguity in its deliverances, and another thing to
examine candidly the conditions which may have brought
the ambiguity about. The former way is cheap, wholesale,
shallow; the latter difficult and complicated, but full of
instruction in the end. Let us try it for ourselves.

In the case of the diagrams 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, the real
object, lines meeting or crossing each other on a plane, is

* Loeb (Pfliiger's Archiv, XL. 274) has proved that muscular changes
of adaptation in the eye for near and far distance are what determine the
form of the relief.

f The strongest passage in Helmholtz's argument against sensations of
space is relative to these fluctuations of seen relief: "Ought one not to
conclude that if sensations of relief exist at all, they must be so faint and
vague as to have no influence compared with that of past experience?
Ought we not to believe that the perception of the third dimension may
have arisen without them, since we now see it taking place as well againtt
them as with them?" (Physiol. Optik, p. 817.)

258 PSYCHOLOGY.

replaced by an imagined solid which we describe as seen,
fieally it is not seen but only so vividly conceived as to
approach a vision of reality. We feel all the while, however,
that the solid suggested is not solidly there. The reason
why one solid may seem more easily suggested than
another, and why it is easier in general to perceive the
diagram solid than flat, seems due to probability '* Those
lines have countless times in our past experience been
drawn on our retina by solids for once that we have seen
them flat on paper. And hundreds of times we have
looked down upon the upper surface of parallelepipeds,
stairs and glasses, for once that we have looked upwards
at their bottom — hence we see the solids easiest as if from
above.

Habit or probability seems also to govern the illusion of
the intaglio profile, and of the hollow mask. We have never
seen a human face except in relief — hence the case with
which the present sensation is overpowered. Hence, too,
the obstinacy with which human faces and forms, and
other extremely familiar convex objects, refuse to appear
hollow when viewed through Wheatstone's pseudoscope.
Our perception seems wedded to certain total ways of
seeing certain objects. The moment the object is suggested
at all, it takes possession of the mind in the fulness of its
stereotyped habitual form. This explains the suddenness
of the transformations when the perceptions change. The
object shoots back and forth completely from this to that
familiar thing, and doubtful, indeterminate, and composite
things are excluded, apparently because we are unused to
their existence.

W^hen we turn from the diagrams to the actual folded
visiting-card and to the real glass, the imagined form seems
fully as real as the correct one. The card flaps over ; the
glass rim tilts this way or that, as if some inward spring
suddenly became released in our eye. In these changes the
actual retinal image receives different complements from the
mind. But the remarkable thing is that the complement

* Cf. E. Mach, Beitrage, etc., p. 90, and the preceding chapter of the
present work, p. 86 ff.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 259

and the image combine so completely that the twain are
one flesh, as it were, and cannot be discriminated in the
result. If the complement be, as we have called it (on pp.
237-8), a set of imaginary absent eye-sensations, they seem
no whit less vividly there than the sensation which the eye
now receives from without.

The case of the after-images distorted by projection upon
an oblique plane is even more strange, for the imagined
perspective figure, lying in the plane, seems less to combine
with the one a moment previously seen by the eye than to
suppress it and take its place.* The point needing explana
tion, then, in all this, is how it comes to pass that, when
imagined sensations are usually so inferior in vivacity to real
ones, they should in these few experiences prove to be
almost or quite their match.

The mystery is solved when we note the class to which
all these experiences belong. They are * perceptions ' of
definite 'things,' definitely situated in tridimensional space.
The mind uniformly uses its sensations to identify things by.
The sensation is invariably apperceived by the idea, name,
or ' normal ' aspect (p. 238) of the thing. The peculiarity of
the optical signs of things is their extraordinary mutability.
A * thing ' which we follow with the eye, never doubting of
its physical identity, will change its retinal image inces
santly. A cross, a ring, waved about in the air, will pass
through every conceivable angular and elliptical form. All
the while, however, as we look at them, we hold fast to the
perception of their ' real ' shape, by mentally combining
the pictures momentarily received with the notion of peculiar
positions in space. It is not the cross and ring pure and
simple which we perceive, but the cross so held, the ring so
hdd. From the day of our birth we have sought every hour
of our lives to correct the apparent form of things, and trans-

* I ought to say that I seem always able to see the cross rectangular at
will. But this appears to come from an imperfect absorption of the
rectangular after-image by the inclined plane at which the eyes look. The
cross, with me, is apt to detach itself from this and then look square. I get the
illusion better from the circle, whose after-image becomes in various ways
elliptical on being projected upon the different surfaces of the room, and
cannot then be easily made to look circular again.

260 PSYCHOLOGY.

late it into the real form by keeping note of the way they
are placed or held. In no other class of sensations does
this incessant correction occur. What wonder, then, that
the notion ' so placed ' should invincibly exert its habitual
corrective effect, even when the object with which it com
bines is only an after-image, and make us perceive the latter
under a changed but more ' real ' form ? The * real ' form
is also a sensation conjured up by memory ; but it is one so
probable, so habitually conjured up when we have just this
combination of optical experiences, that it partakes of the
invincible freshness of reality, and seems to break through
that law which elsewhere condemns reproductive processes
to being so much fainter than sensations.

Once more, these cases form an extreme. Somewhere, in
the list of our imaginations of absent feelings, there must be found
the vividest of all. These optical reproductions of real form are
the vividest of all. It is foolish to reason from cases lower
in the scale, to prove that the scale can contain no such ex
treme cases as these ; and particularly foolish since we can
definitely see why these imaginations ought to be more
vivid than any others, whenever they recall the forms of
habitual and probable things. These latter, by incessantly
repeated presence and reproduction, will plough deep
grooves in the nervous system. There will be developed,
to correspond to them, paths of least resistance, of unstable
equilibrium, liable to become active in their totality when
any point is touched off. Even when the objective stimulus
is imperfect, we shall still see the full convexity of a human
face, the correct inclination of an angle or sweep of a curve,
or the distance of two lines. Our mind will be like a poly
hedron, whose facets are the attitudes of perception in which
it can most easily rest. These are worn upon it by habitual
objects, and from one of these it can pass only by tumbling
over into another.*

Bering has well accounted for the sensationally vivid
character of these habitually reproduced forms. He says,

* In Chapter XVIII, p. 74, I gave a reason why imaginations ought not
to be as vivid as sensations. It should be borne in mind that that reason
does not apply to these complemental imaginings of the real shape of
things actually before our eyes.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 261

after reminding us that every visual sensation is correlated
to a physical process in the nervous apparatus :

** If this psychophysical process is aroused, as usually happens, by
light-rays impinging on the retina, its form depends not only on the na
ture of these rays, but on the constitution of the entire nervous appa
ratus which is connected with the organ of vision, and on the state in
which it finds itself. The same stimulus may excite widely different
sensations according to this state.

u The constitution of the nervous apparatus depends naturally in
part upon innate predisposition ; but the ensemble of effects wrought by
stimuli upon it in the course of life, whether these come through the eyes
or from elsewhere, is a co-factor of its development. To express it
otherwise, involuntary and voluntary experience and exercise assist in
determining the material structure of the nervous organ of vision, and
hence the ways in which it may react on a retinal image as an outward
stimulus. That experience and exercise should be possible at all in
vision is a consequence of the reproductive power, or memory, of its
nerve-substance. Every particular activity of the organ makes it more
suited to a repetition of the same ; ever slighter touches are required to
make the repetition occur. The organ habituates itself to the repeated
activity. . . .

u Suppose now that, in the first experience of a complex sensation
produced by a particular retinal image, certain portions were made the
special objects of attention. In a repetition of the sensible experience
it will happen that notwithstanding the identity of the outward stimulus
these portions will be more easily and strongly reproduced ; and when
this happens a hundred times the inequality with which the various
constituents of the complex sensation appeal to consciousness grows
ever greater.

"Now in the present state of our knowledge we cannot assert that
in both the first and the last occurrence of the retinal image in question
the same pure sensation is provoked, but that the mind interprets it
differently the last time in consequence of experience ; for the only
given things we know are on the one hand the retinal image which is
both times the same, and on the other the mental percept which is both
times different ; of a third thing, such as a pure sensation, interpolated
between image and percept, we know nothing. We ought, therefore,
if we wish to avoid hypotheses, simply to say that the nervous apparatus
reacts the last time differently from the first, and gives us in conse
quence a different group of sensations.

" But not only by repetition of the same retinal image, but by that
of similar ones, will the law obtain. Portions of the image common to
the successive experiences will awaken, as it were, a stronger echo in
the nervous apparatus than other portions. Hence it results that repro
duction is usually elective : the more strongly reverberating parts of the
picture yield stronger feelings than the rest. This may result in the

262 PSYCHOLOGY.

latter being quite overlooked and, as it were, eliminated from perception.
It may even come to pass that instead of these parts eliminated by elec
tion a feeling of entirely different elements comes to consciousness — •
elements not objectively contained in the stimulus. A group of sensa
tions, namely, for which a strong tendency to reproduction has become,
by frequent repetition, ingrained in the nervous system will easily revive
as a whole when, not its whole retinal image, but only an essential part
thereof, returns. In this case we get some sensations to which no ade
quate stimulus exists in the retinal image, and which owe their being
solely to the reproductive power of the nervous apparatus. This is
complementary (erganzende) reproduction.

"Thus a few points and disconnected strokes are sufficient to make
us see a human face, and without specially directed attention we fail to
note that we see much that really is not drawn on the paper. Attention
will show that the outlines were deficient in spots where we thought
them complete. . . . The portions of the percept supplied by comple
mentary reproduction depend, however, just as much as its other por
tions, on the reaction of the nervous apparatus upon the retinal image,
indirect though this reaction may, in the case of the supplied portions,
be. And so long as they are present, we have a perfect right to call
them sensations, for they differ in no wise from such sensations as cor
respond to an actual stimulus in the retina. Often, however, they are
not persistent ; many of them may be expelled by more close observa
tion, but this is not proved to be the case with all. ... In vision with
one eye . . . the distribution of parts within the third dimension is
essentially the work of this complementary reproduction, i.e. of former
experience. . . . When a certain way of localizing a particular group
of sensations has become with us a second nature, our better knowl
edge, our judgment, our logic, are of no avail. . . . Things actually
diverse may give similar or almost identical retinal images; e.g., an
object extended in three dimensions, and its flat perspective picture.
In such cases it often depends on small accidents, and especially on our
will, whether the one or the other group of sensations shall be excited.
... We can see a relief hollow, as a mould, or vice versa; for a relief
illuminated from the left can look just like its mould illuminated from
the right. Reflecting upon this, one may infer from ttie direction of
the shadows that one has a relief before one, and the idea of the relief
will guide the nerve-processes into the right path, so that the feeling of
the relief is suddenly aroused. . . . Whenever the retinal image is of
such a nature that two diverse modes of reaction on the part of the
nervous apparatus are, so to speak, equally, or nearly equally, immi
nent, it must depend on small accidents whether the one or the other
reaction is realized. In these cases our previous knowledge often has a
decisive effect, and helps the correct perception to victory. The bare
idea of the right object is itself a feeble reproduction which with the
help of the proper retinal picture develops into clear and lively sensa
tion. But if there be not already in the nervous apparatus a disposi-

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

263

tion to the production of that percept which our judgment tells us is
right, our knowledge strives in vain to conjure up the feeling of it ;
we then know that we see something to which no reality corresponds,
but we see it all the same." *

Note that no object not probable, no object which we are not
incessantly practised in reproducing, can acquire this vividness
in imagination. Objective corners are ever changing their
angles to the eyes, spaces their apparent size, lines their
distance. But by no transmutation of position in space
does an objective straight line appear bent, and only in one
position out of an infinity does a broken line look straight.
Accordingly, it is impossible by projecting the after-image

A B

FIG. 77.

«>/ a straight line upon two surfaces which make a solid
angle with each other to give the line itself a sensible
'kink.' Look with it at the corner of your room: the
after-image, which may overlap all three surfaces of the
corner, still continues straight. Volkmann constructed a
complicated surface of projection like that drawn in Fig.
77, but he found it impossible so to throw a straight after
image upon it as to alter its visible form.

* Hermann's Handb. der Physiologie. in. 1, p. 565-71.

264

PSYCHOLOGY.

One of the situations in which we oftenest see things is
spread out on the ground before us. We are incessantly
drilled in making allowance for this perspective, and reduc
ing things to their real form in spite of optical foreshorten
ing. Hence if the preceding explanations are true, we
ought to find this habit inveterate. The lower half of the
retina, which habitually sees the fartfor half of things
spread out on the ground, ought to have acquired a habit
of enlarging its pictures by imagination, so as to make
them more than equal to those which fall on the upper
retinal surface ; and this habit ought to be hard to escape
from, even when both halves of the object are equidistant
from the eye, as in a vertical line on paper. Delboauf has
found, accordingly, that if we try to bisect such a line we
place the point of division about -fa of its length too high.*

Similarly, a square cross, or a square, drawn on paper,
should look higher than it is broad. And that this is actu
ally the case, the reader may verify by a glance at Fig. 78.

FIG. 78.

For analogous reasons the upper and lower halves of the
letter S, or of the figure 8, hardly seem to differ. But when
turned upside down, as g, g> the upper half looks much the
larger, f

* Bulletin de 1' Academic de Belgique, 2me Serie, xix. 2.

f Wundt seeks to explain all these illusions by the relatively stronger
' feeling of innervation ' needed to move the eyeballs upwards,— a careful
study of the muscles concerned is taken to prove this,— and a consequently
greater estimate of the distance traversed. It suffices to remark, however,
with Lipps, that were the innervation all, a column of S's placed on top
of each other should look each larger than the one below it, and a weather
cock on a steeple gigantic, neither of which is the case. Only the halves
of the same object look different in size, because the customary correction

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 265

Hering has tried to explain our exaggeration of small
angles in the same way. We have more to do with right
angles than with any others : right angles, in fact, have an
altogether unique sort of interest for the human mind.
Nature almost never begets them, but we think space by
means of them and put them everywhere. Consequently
obtuse and acute ones, liable always to be the images of
right ones foreshortened, particularly easily revive right
ones in memory. It is hard to look at such figures as
a, b, c, in Fig. 79, without seeing them in perspective, as

a i

FIG. 79.

approximations, at least, to foreshortened rectangular
forms. *

At the same time the genuine sensational form of the
lines before us can, in all the cases of distortion by sug
gested perspective, be felt correctly by a mind able to ab
stract from the notion of perspective altogether. Individ
uals differ in this abstracting power. Artistic training im
proves it, so that after a little while errors in vertical bi
section, in estimating height relatively to breadth, etc., be
come impossible. In other words, we learn to take the
optical sensation before us pure, f

for foreshortening bears only on the relations of the parts of special things
spread out before us. Cf. Wundt, Physiol. Psych., 2te Aufl. 11. 96-8;
Th. Lipps, Grundtatsachen, etc., p. 535.

* Hering would partly solve in this way the mystery of Figs. 60, 61, and
67. No doubt the explanation partly applies ; but the strange cessation of
the illusion when we fix the gaze fails to be accounted for thereby.

f Helmholtz has sought (Physiol. Optik, p. 715) to explain the diverg
ence of the apparent vertical meridians of the two retinae, by the manner
in which an identical line drawn on the ground before us in the median
plane will throw its images on the two eyes respectively. The matter is
too technical for description here ; the unlearned reader may be referred
for it to J. Le Conte's Sight in the Internat. Scient. Series, p. 198 ff. But, for
the benefit of those to whom verbum sat, I cannot help saying that it seems
to me that the exactness of the relation of the two meridians— whether diver-

266 PSYCHOLOGY.

We may then sum up our study of illusions by saying that
they in no wise undermine our view that every spatial determi
nation of things is originally given in the shape of a sensation
of the eyes. They only show how very potent certain
imagined sensations of the eyes may become.

These sensations, so far as they bring definite forms to
the mind, appear to be retinal exclusively. The move
ments of the eyeballs play a great part in educating our
perception, it is true ; but they have nothing to do with
constituting any one feeling of form. Their function is
limited to exciting the various feelings of form, by tracing
retinal streaks ; and to comparing them, and measuring them
off against each other, by applying different parts of the
retinal surface to the same objective thing. Helmholtz's
analysis of the facts of our * measurement of the field of vieiv*
is, bating a lapse or two, masterly, and seems to prove that
the movements of the eye have had some part in bringing
our sense of retinal equivalencies about — equivalencies, mind,
of different retinal forms and sizes, not forms and sizes
themselves. Superposition is the way in which the eve-
movements accomplish this result. An object traces the
line AB on a peripheral tract of the retina. Quickly we
move the eye so that the same object traces the line ah on
a central tract. Forthwith, to our mind, AB and ab are
judged equivalent. But, as Helmholtz admits, the equiv
alence-judgment is independent of the way in which we
may feel the form and length of the several retinal pic
tures themselves :

"The retina is like a pair of compasses, whose points we apply in
succession to the ends of several lines to see whether they agree or not in
length. All we need know meanwhile about the compasses is that the
distance of their points remains unchanged. What that distance is, and
what is the shape of the compasses, is a matter of no account."*

gent or not, for their divergence differs in individuals and often in one in
dividual at diverse times— precludes its being due to the mere habitual
falling-oil of the image of one objective line on both. Le Conte, e.g.,
measures their positiou down to a sixth of a degree, others to tenths. This
indicates an organic identity in the sensations of the two retinae, which the
experience of median perspective horizontals may roughly have agreed
with, but hardly can have engendered. Wundt explains the divergence as
usual, by the Innervatiomgefuhl (op. cit. n. 99 if.).
* Physiol. Optik, p. 547.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 2(',T

Measurement implies a stuff to measure. Retinal sensa
tions give the stuff; objective things form the yard-stick ; mo
tion does the measuring operation; which can, of course, be
well performed only where it is possible to make the same
object fall on many retinal tracts. This is practically im
possible where the tracts make a wide angle with each
other. But there are certain directions in the field of view,
certain retinal lines, along which it is particularly easy to
make the image of an object slide. The object then be
comes a 'ruler' for these lines, as Helmholtz puts it,*
making them seem straight throughout if the object looked
straight to us in that part of them at which it was most
distinctly seen.

But all this need of superposition shows how devoid of
exact space-import the feelings of movement are per se. As
we compare the space-value of two retinal tracts by super
posing them successively upon the same objective line, so
we also have to compare the space-value of objective angles
and lines by superposing them on the same retinal tract.
Neither procedure would be required if our eye-movements
were apprehended immediately, by pure muscular feeling
or innervation, for example, as distinct lengths and direc
tions in space. To compare retinal tracts, it would then
suffice simply to notice how it feels to move any image over
them. And two objective lines could be compared as
well by moving different retinal tracts along them as by
laying them along the same. It would be as easy to com-

* "We can with a short ruler draw a line as long as we please on a
plane surface by first drawing one as long as the ruler permits, and then
sliding the ruler somewhat along the drawn line and drawing again, etc.
If the ruler is exactly straight, we get in this way a straight line. If it is
somewhat curved we get a circle. Now, instead of the sliding ruler we
use in the field of sight the central spot of distinctest vision impressed with
a rinear sensation of sight, which at times may be intensified till it becomes
an after-image. We follow, in looking, the direction of this line, and in
so doing we slide the line along itself and get a prolongation of its length.
On a plane surface we can carry on this procedure on any sort of a straight
or curved ruler, but in the field of vision there is for each direction and
movement of the eye only one sort of line which it is possible for us to-
slide along in its own direction continually." These are what Helmholtz
calls the 'circles of direction' of the visual field— lines which he has
studied with his usual care. Cf. Physiol. Optih, p. 548 ff.

268 PSYCHOLOGY.

pare non-parallel figures as it now is to judge of those
which are parallel.* Those which it took the same amount
of movement to traverse would be equal, in whatever direc
tion the movement occurred.

GENERAL SUMMARY.

With this we may end our long and, I fear to many
readers, tediously minute survey. The facts of vision form
a jungle of intricacy ; and those who penetrate deeply into
physiological optics will be more struck by our omissions
than by our abundance- of detail. But for students who
may have lost sight of the forest for the trees, I will re
capitulate briefly the points of our whole argument from
the beginning, and then proceed to a short historical survey,
which will set them in relief.

All our sensations are positively and inexplicably exten
sive wholes.

The sensations contributing to space-perception seem
exclusively to be the surface of skin, retina, and joints.
1 Muscular ' feelings play no appreciable part in the genera
tion of our feelings of form, direction, etc.

The total bigness of a cutaneous or retinal feeling soon
becomes subdivided by discriminative attention.

Movements assist this discrimination by reason of the
peculiarly exciting quality of the sensations which stimuli
moving over surfaces arouse.

Subdivisions, once discriminated, acquire definite rela
tions of position towards each other within the total space.
These 'relations' are themselves feelings of the subdivis
ions that intervene. When these subdivisions are not the
seat of stimuli, the relations are only reproduced in imagi
nary form.

The various sense-spaces are, in the first instance, inco
herent with each other ; and primitively both they and
their subdivisions are but vaguely comparable in point of
bulk and form. *

The education of our space-perception consists largely
of two processes — reducing the various sense-feelings to a

* Cf. Heriug in Hermann's Handb. der Pnysiol., m. 1, pp. 553-4.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 269

common measure, and adding them together into the single
all-including space of the real world.

Both the measuring and the adding are performed bj
the aid of things.

The imagined aggregate of positions occupied by all the
actual or possible, moving or stationary, things which we
know, is our notion of 'real' space — a very incomplete
and vague conception in all minds.

The measuring of our space-feelings against each other
mainly comes about through the successive arousal of dif
ferent ones by the same thing, by our selection of certain
ones as feelings of its real size and shape, and by the deg
radation of others to the status of being merely signs of
these.

For the successive application of the same thing to dif
ferent space-giving surfaces motion is indispensable, and
hence plays a great part in our space-education, especially
in that of the eye. Abstractly considered, the motion of
the object over the sensitive surface would educate us quite
as well as that of the surface over the object. But the self-
mobility of the organ 'carrying the surface accelerates im
mensely the result.

In completely educated space-perception, the present
sensation is usually just what Helmholtz (Physiol. Optik,
p. 797) calls it, ' a sign, the interpretation of whose mean
ing is left to the understanding.' But the understanding is
exclusively reproductive and never productive in the pro
cess ; and its function is limited to the recall of previous
space-sensations with which the present one has been as
sociated and which may be judged more real than it.

Finally, this reproduction may in the case of certain
visual forms be as vivid, or almost so, as actual sensation is.

The third dimension forms an original element of all
our space-sensations. In the eye it is subdivided by various
discriminations. The more distant subdivisions are often
shut out altogether, and, in being suppressed, have the
effect of diminishing the absolute space-value of the total
field of view.*

* This shrinkage and expansion of the absolute space-value of the total
optical sensation remains to my mind the most obscure part of the whole

270 PSYCHOLOGY.

HISTORICAL.

Let 118 now close with a brief historical survey. The
first achievement of note in the study of space-perception
was Berkeley's theory of vision. This undertook to establish
two points, first that distance was not a visual but a tactile
form of consciousness, suggested by visual signs ; secondly,
that there is no one quality or * idea ' common to the sensa
tions of touch and sight, such that prior to experience one
might possibly anticipate from the look of an object any
thing about its felt size, shape, or position, or from the
touch of it anything about its look.

In other words, that primitively chaotic or semi-chaotic
-condition of our various sense-spaces which we have
demonstrated, was established for good by Berkeley; and
he bequeathed to psychology the problem of describing the
manner in which the deliverances are harmonized so as all
to refer to one and the same extended world.

His disciples in Great Britain have solved this problem
after Berkeley's own fashion, and to a great extent as we
have done ourselves, by the ideas of the various senses sug
gesting each other in consequence of Association. But, either
because they were intoxicated with the principle of associa
tion, or because in the number of details they lost their
general bearings, they have forgotten, as a rule, to state under
what sensible form the primitive spatial experiences are found
which later became associated with so many other sensible
signs. Heedless of their master Locke's precept, that the
mind can frame unto itself no one new simple idea, they
seem for the most part to be trying to explain the extensive
quality itself, account for it, and evolve it, by the mere asso
ciation together of feelings which originally possessed it not.
They first evaporate the nature of extension by making it
tantamount to mere * coexistence,' and then they explain
coexistence as being the same thing as succession, provided it

subject. It is a real optical sensation, seeming introspectively to have
nothing to do with locomotor or other suggestions. It is easy to say that
'the Intellect produces it,' but what does that mean? The investigator
who will throw light on this one point will probably clear up other diffi
culties as well.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 271

be aii extremely rapid or a reversible succession, Space-
perception thus emerges without being anywhere postulated.
The only things postulated are unextended feelings and 1 ime.
Says Thomas Brown (lecture xxm.) : " I am inclined to re
verse exactly the process commonly supposed ; and instead
of deriving the measure of time from extension, to derive
the knowledge and original measure of extension from time."
Brown and both the Mills think that retinal sensations,
colors, in their primitive condition, are felt with no extension
and that the latter merely becomes inseparably associated
with them. John Mill says : " Whatever may be the retinal
impression conveyed by a line which bounds two colors, I
see no ground for thinking that by the eye alone we could
acquire the conception of what we now mean when we say
that one of the colors is outside [beside] the other." *

Whence does the extension come which gets so insepa
rably associated with these non-extended colored sensations ?
From the ' sweep and movements ' of the eye — from mus
cular feelings. But, as Prof. Bain says, if movement-feel
ings give us any property of things, " it would seem to be
not space, but time." t And John Mill says that " the idea
of space is, at bottom, one of time." | Space, then, is not to
be found in any elementary sensation, but, in Bain's words,
" as a quality, it has no other origin and no other meaning
than the association of these different [non-spatial] motor
and sensitive effects." §

This phrase is mystical-sounding enough to one who
understands association as producing nothing, but only as
knitting together things already produced in separate ways.
The truth is that the English Associationist school, in trying
to show how much their principle can accomplish, have
altogether overshot the mark and espoused a kind of theory
in respect to space-perception which the general tenor of
their philosophy should lead them to abhor. Keally there
are but three possible kinds of theory concerning space.
Either (1) there is no spatial quality of sensation at all, and

* Examination of Hamilton, 3d ed. p. 283.
f Senses and Intellect, 3d ed. p. 183.
j Exam, of Hamilton, 3d ed. p. 283.
§ Senses and Intellect, p. 372.

272 PSYCHOLOGY.

space is a mere symbol of succession ; or (2) there is an ex
tensive quality given immediately in certain particular sen
sations ; or, finally, (3) there is a quality produced out of the
inward resources of the mind, to envelop sensations which,
as given originally, are not spatial, but which, on being
cast into the spatial form, become united and orderly. This
last is the Kantian view. Stumpf admirably designates it
as the * psychic stimulus ' theory, the crude sensations being
considered as goads to the mind to put forth its slumbering
power.

Brown, the Mills, and Bain, amid these possibilities,
seem to have gone astray like lost sheep. With the * men
tal chemistry ' of which the Mills speak — precisely the
same thing as the * psychical synthesis ' of Wundt, which,
as we shall soon see, is a principle expressly intended to do
what Association can never perform — they hold the third
view, but again in other places imply the first. And, be
tween the impossibility of getting from mere association
anything not contained in the sensations associated and the
dislike to allow spontaneous mental productivity, they
flounder in a dismal dilemma. Mr. Sully joins them there
in what I must call a vague and vacillating way. Mr.
Spencer of course is bound to pretend to ' evolve ' all
mental qualities out of antecedents different from them
selves, so that we need perhaps not wonder at his refusal
to accord the spatial quality to any of the several elemen
tary sensations out of which our space-perception grows.
Thus (Psychology, n. 168, 172, 218) :

" No idea of extension can arise from a simultaneous excitation " of
a multitude of nerve-terminations like those of the skin or the retina,
since this would imply a " knowledge of their relative positions v — that
is, "a pre-existent idea of a special extension, which is absurd.11 " No
relation between successive states of consciousness gives in itself any
idea of extension." " The muscular sensations accompanying motion
are quite distinct from the notions of space and time associated with
them. ''

Mr. Spencer none the less inveighs vociferously against
the Kantian position that space is produced by the mind's
own resources. And yet he nowhere denies space to be a
specific affection of consciousness different from time !

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 273

Such incoherency is pitiful. The fact is that, at bottom,
all these authors are really ' psychical stimulists,' or Kant-
ists. The space they speak of is a super- sensational mental
product. This position appears to me thoroughly mytho
logical. But let us see how it is held by those who know
more definitely what they mean. Schopenhauer expresses
the Kantian view with more vigor and clearness than any
one else. He says :

' ' A man must be forsaken by all the gods to dream that the world we
see outside of us, filling space in its three dimensions, moving down the
inexorable stream of time, governed at each step by Causality's invariable
law? — but in all this only following rules which we may prescribe for it
in advance of all experience, — to dream, I say, that such a world should
stand there outside of us, quite objectively real with no complicity of
ours, and thereupon by a subsequent act, through the instrumentality
of mere sensation, that it should enter our head and reconstruct a dupli
cate of itself as it was outside. For what a poverty-stricken thing is this
mere sensation ! Even in the noblest organs of sense it is nothing more
than a local and specific feeling, susceptible within its kind of a few
variations, but always strictly subjective and containing in itself noth
ing objective, nothing resembling a perception. For sensation of every
sort is and remains a process in the organism itself. As such it is limited
to the territory inside the skin and can never, accordingly, per se con
tain anything that lies outside the skin or outside ourselves. . . . Only
when the Understanding ... is roused to activity and brings its
sole and only form, the law of Causality, into play, only then does the
mighty transformation take place which makes out of subjective sensa
tion objective intuition. The Understanding, namely, grasps by means
of its innate, a priori, ante-experiential form, the given sensation of the
body as an effect which as such must necessarily have a cause. At the
same time the Understanding summons to its aid the form of the outer
sense which similarly lies already preformed in the intellect (or brain),
and which is Space, in order to locate that cause outside of the organ
ism. ... In this process the Understanding, as I shall soon show, takes
note of the most minute peculiarities of the given sensation in order to
construct in the outer space a cause which shall completely account for
them. This operation of the Understanding is, however, not one that
takes place discursively, reflectively, in abstracto, by means of words
and concepts ; but is intuitive and immediate. . . . Thus the Under
standing must first create the objective world ; never can the latter,
already complete in se, simply promenade into our heads through the
senses and organic apertures. For the senses yield us nothing further
than the raw material which must be first elaborated into the objective
conception of an orderly physical world-system by means of the afore
said simple forms of Space, Time, and Causality. . . . Let me show thee

274 PSYCHOLOGY.

great chasm between sensation and perception by showing how raw the
material is out of which the fair structure is upreared. Only two senses
serve objective perception : touch and sight. They alone furnish the
data on the basis whereof the Understanding, by the process indicated,
erects the objective world. . . . These data in themselves are still no
perception ; that is the Understanding's work. If I press with my hand
against the table, the sensation I receive has no analogy with the idea
of the firm cohesion of the parts of this mass : only when my Under
standing passes from the sensation to its cause does it create for itself
a body with the properties of solidity, impenetrability, and hardness.
When in the dark I lay my hand on a surface, or grasp a ball of three
inches diameter, in either case the same parts of the hand receive the
impression : but out of the different contraction of the hand in the two
cases my Understanding constructs the form of the body whose contact
caused the feeling, and confirms its construction by leading me to move
my hand over the body. If one born blind handles a cubical body, the
sensations of his hand are quite uniform on all sides and in all direc
tions.— only the corners press upon a smaller part of his skin. In these
sensations, as such, there is nothing whatever analogous to a cube. But
from the felt resistance his Understanding infers immediately and
intuitively a cause thereof, which now presents itself as a solid body;
and from the movements of exploration which the arms made whilst
the feelings of the hands remained constant he constructs, in thesp'ace
known to him a priori, the body's cubical shape. Did he not bring
with him ready-made the idea of a cause and of a space, with the laws
thereof, there never could arise, out of those successive feelings in his
hand, the image of a cube. If we let a string run through our closed
hand, we immediately construct as the cause of the friction and its dura
tion in such an attitude of the hand, a long cylindrical body moving
uniformly in one direction. But never out of the pure sensation in the
hand could the idea of movement, that is, of change of position in space
by means of time, arise : such a content can never lie in sensation, nor
come out of it. Our Intellect, antecedently to all experience, must bear
in itself the intuitions of Space and Time, and therewithal of the possi
bility of motion, and no less the idea of Causality, to pass from the
empirically given feeling to its cause, and to construct the latter as a
so moving body of the designated shape. For how great is the abyss
between the mere sensation in the hand and the ideas of causality,
materiality, and movement through Space, occurring in Time! The
feeling in the hand, even with different contacts and positions, is some
thing far too uniform and poor in content for it to be possible to con
struct out of it the idea of Space with its three dimensions, of the
action of bodies on each other, with the properties of extension, impen
etrability, cohesion, shape, hardness, softness, rest, and motion — in
short, the foundations of the objective world. This is only possible
through Space, Time, and Causality . . . being preformed in the
Intellect itself, . . - from whence it again follows that the perception

THh! PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 275

of the external world is essentially an intellectual process, a work of the
Understanding, to which sensation furnishes merely the occasion, and
the data to be interpreted in each particular case." *

I call this view mythological, because I am conscious of
no such Kantian machine-shop in my mind, and feel no
call to disparage the powers of poor sensation in this merci
less way. I have no introspective experience of mentally
producing or creating space. My space-intuitions occur
not in two times but in one. There is not one moment of
passive inextensive sensation, succeeded by another of ac
tive extensive perception, but the form I see is as immedi
ately felt as the color which fills it out. That the higher
parts of the mind come in, who can deny ? They add and
subtract, they compare and measure, they reproduce and
abstract. They inweave the space-sensations with intel
lectual relations ; but these relations are the same when they
obtain between the elements of the space-system as when
they obtain between any of the other elements of which the
world is made.

The essence of the Kantian contention is that there are
not spaces, but Space — one infinite continuous Unit — and
that our knowledge of this cannot be a piecemeal sensa
tional affair, produced by summation and abstraction. To
which the obvious reply is that, if any known thing bears
on its front the appearance of piecemeal construction and
abstraction, it is this very notion of the infinite unitary
space of the world. It is a notion, if ever there was one ;
and no intuition. Most of us apprehend it in the barest
symbolic abridgment : and if perchance we ever do try to
make it more adequate, we just add one image of sensible
extension to another until we are tired. Most of us are
obliged to turn round and drop the thought of the space in
front of us when we think of that behind. And the space
represented as near to us seems more minutely subdivisible
than that we think of as lying far away.

The other prominent German writers on space are also
* psychical stimulists.' Herbart, whose influence has been
widest, says ' the resting eye sees no space,'t and ascribes

* Vierfache Wurzel desSatzes vom zureicheudeii Gruiide, pp.
f Pay chol. als Wissenschaft, 8 111.

276 PSYCHOLOGY.

visual extension to the influence of movements combining
with, the non-spatial retinal feelings so as to form gradated
series of the latter. A given sensation of such a series
reproduces the idea of its associates in regular order, and
its idea is similarly reproduced by any one of them with
the order reversed. Out of the fusion of these two con
trasted reproductions comes the form of space* — Heaven
knows how.

The obvious objection is that mere serial order is a genus,
and space-order a very peculiar species of that genus ; and
that, if the terms of reversible series became by that fact
coexistent terms in space, the musical scale, the degrees of
warmth and cold, and all other ideally graded series ought
to appear to us in the shape of extended corporeal aggre
gates, — which they notoriously do not, though we may of
course symbolize their order by a spatial scheme. W.
Volkmann von Yolkmar, the Herbartian, takes the bull here
by the horns, and says the musical scale is spatially ex
tended, though he admits that its space does not belong to
the real world. t I am unacquainted with any other Her
bartian so bold.

To Lotze we owe the much-used term 'local sign.' He
insisted that space could not emigrate directly into the
mind from without, but must be reconstructed by the soul ;
and he seemed to think that the first reconstructions of it
by the soul must be super-sensational. But why sensa
tions themselves might not be the soul's original spatial re
constructive acts Lotze fails to explain.
«

Wundt has all his life devoted himself to the elaboration
of a space-theory, of which the neatest and most final ex
pression is to be found in his Logik (n. 457-60). He says :

"In the eye, space-perception has certain constant peculiarities
which prove that no single optical sensation by itself possesses the ex
tensive form, but that every where in our perception of space heterogene-

* Psychol. als Wissenschaft, § 113.

f Lehrbuch d. Psychol., 2te Auflage, Bd. n. p. 66. Volkmann's fifth,
chapter contains a really precious collection of historical notices concern
ing space-perception theories.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 277

ous feelings combine. If we simply suppose that luminous sensations
per se feel extensive, our supposition is shattered by that influence of
movement in vision which is so clearly to be traced in many normal
errors in the measurement of the field of view. If we assume, on the
other hand, that the movements and their feelings are alone possessed
of the extensive quality, we make an unjustified hypothesis, for the
phenomena compel us, it is true, to accord an influence to movement,
but give us no right to call the retinal sensations indifferent, for there
are no visual ideas without retinal sensations. If then we wish rigor
ously to express the given facts, we can ascribe a spatial constitution
only to combinations of retinal sensations with those of movement. "

Thus Wundt, dividing theories into * nativistic ' and

* genetic,' calls his own a genetic theory. To distinguish it
from other theories of the same class, he names it a * theory
of complex local signs.'

" It supposes two systems of local signs, whose relations— taking the
eye as an example — we may think as ... the measuring of the mani
fold local-sign system of the retina by the simple local-sign system of
the movements. In its psychological nature this is a process of associa
tive synthesis : it consists in the fusion of both groups of sensations
into a product, whose elementary components are no longer separable
from each other in idea. In melting wholly away into the product
which they create they become consciously undistinguishable, and the
mind apprehends only their resultant, the intuition of space. Thus
there obtains a certain analogy between this psychic synthesis and that
chemical synthesis which out of simple bodies generates a compound
that appears to our immediate perception as a homogeneous whole with
•new properties."

Now let no modest reader think that if this sounds ob
scure to him it is because he does not know the full con
text ; and that if a wise professor like Wundt can talk so
fluently and plausibly about ' combination ' and ' psychic
synthesis,' it must surely be because those words convey a
so much greater fulness of positive meaning to the scholar
ly than to the unlearned mind. Really it is quite the re
verse ; all the virtue of the phrase lies in its mere sound
and skin. Learning does but make one the more sensible of
its inward unintelligibility. Wundt's ' theory ' is the flim
siest thing in the world. It starts by an untrue assump
tion, and then corrects it by an unmeaning phrase. Retinal
sensations are spatial ; and were they not, no amount of

* synthesis ' with equally spaceless motor sensations could

PSYCHOLOGY.

intelligibly make them so. Wundt's theory is, in short,
but an avowal of impotence, and an appeal to the inscru
table powers of the soul.* It confesses that we cannot
analyze the constitution or give the genesis of the spatial
quality in consciousness. But at the same time it says the
antecedents thereof are psychical and not cerebral facts.
In calling the quality in question a sensational quality, ourj
own account equally disclaimed ability to analyze it, but!
said its antecedents were cerebral, not psychical — in othetf
words, that it was & first psychical thing. This is merely
a question of probable fact, which the reader may decide]

And now what shall be said of Helmholtz? Can I find
fault with a book which, on the whole, I imagine to be one
of the four or five greatest monuments of human genius in
the scientific line? If truth impels I must fain try, and
take the risks. It seems to me that Helmholtz's genius-
moves most securely when it keeps close to particular facts.
At any rate, it .shows least strong in purely speculative
passages, which in the Optics, in spite of many beauties,
seem to me fundamentally vacillating and obscure. The
'empiristic' view which Helmholtz defends is that the
space-determinations we perceive are in every case pro
ducts of a process of unconscious inference, f The infer-
.ence is similar to one from induction or analogy. J We al
ways see that form before us which habitually would have
caused the sensation we now have. § But the latter sensa
tion can never be intrinsically spatial, or its intrinsic space-
determinations would never be overcome as they are so
often by the 'illusory' space-determinations it so often
suggests.) Since the illusory determination can be traced
to a suggestion of Experience, the ' real ' one must also be
such a suggestion : so that all space intuitions are due sole-

* Why talk of 'genetic theories '? when we have in the next breath to
write as Wundt does: ' ' If then we must regard the intuition of space as a
product that simply emerges from the conditions of our mental and physi
cal organization, nothing need stand in the way of our designating it asone
of the a priori functions with which consciousness is endowed " (Loirik
ii. 460.)

t P. 430. % Pp. 430, 449. § P. 428. | P. 442.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE.

ly to Experience.* The only psychic activity required for
this is the association of ideas, f

But how, it may be asked, can association produce a
space- quality not in the things associated ? How can we
by induction or analogy infer what we do not already
generically know ? Can ' suggestions of experience ' repro
duce elements which no particular experience originally
contained ? This is the point by which Helmholtz 's ' em-
piristic ' theory, as a tfoory, must be judged. No theory is
worthy of the name which leaves such a point obscure.

Well, Helmholtz does so leave it. At one time he seems
to fall back on inscrutable powers of the soul, and to range
himself with the ' psychical stimulists.' He speaks of Kant
as having made the essential step in the matter in dis
tinguishing the content of experience from that form

space, course— which is given it by the peculiar faculties
of the mind. ;f But elsewhere, again, § speaking of sensa
tion alistic theories which would connect spatially determi
nate feelings directly with certain neural events, he says it
is better to assume only such simple psychic activities as
we know to exist, and gives the association of ideas as an
instance of what he means. Later, || he reinforces this re
mark by confessing that he does not see how any neural
process can give rise without antecedent experience to a
ready-made (fertige) perception of space. And, finally, in
a single momentous sentence, he speaks of sensations of
touch as if they might be the original material of our space-
percepts — which thus, from the optical point of view, ' may
be assumed as given.'^

Of course the eye-man has a right to fall back on the
skin-man for help at a pinch. But doesn't this mean that
he is a mere eye-man and not a complete psychologist ? In
other words, Helmholtz's Optics and the ' empiristic theory '
therein professed must not be understood as attempts at
answering the general question of how space-consciousness
enters the mind. They simply deny that it enters with the

* Pp. 442, 818. f P. 798. Of. also Popular Scientific Lectures, pp. 301-3
J P. 456; see also 428, 441. § P. 797. || P. 812.

•|f Bottom of page 797.

280 PSYCHOLOGY.

first optical sensations.* Our own account lias affirmed
stoutly that it enters then ; but no more than Helmholtz
have we pretended to show why. Who calls a thing a first
sensation admits he has no theory of its production. Helm
holtz, though all the while without an articulate theory,
makes the world think he has one. He beautifully traces
the immense part which reproductive processes play in our
vision of space, and never — except in that one pitiful little
sentence about touch — does he tell us just what it is they
reproduce. He limits himself to denying that they repro
duce originals of a visual sort. And so difficult is the
subject, and so magically do catch-words work on the
popular-scientist ear, that most likely, had he written
' physiological ' instead of ' nativistic,' and ' spiritualistic '
instead of ' empiristic ' (which synonyms Hering suggests),
numbers of his present empirical evolutionary followers
would fail to find in his teaching anything worthy of praise.
But since he wrote otherwise, they hurrah for him as a sort
of second Locke, dealing another death-blow at the old
bugaboo of ' innate ideas.' His ' nativistic ' adversary
Hering they probably imagine — Heaven save the mark !-
to be a scholastic in modern disguise.

After Wundt and Helmholtz, the most important anti-
sensationalist space-philosopher in Germany is Professor
Lipps, whose deduction of space from an order of non-
spatial differences, continuous yet separate, is a wonderful
piece of subtlety and logic. And yet he has to confess that
continuous differences form in the first instance only a logi
cal series, which need not appear spatial, and that wher
ever it does so appear, this must be accounted a ' fact,' due
merely 'to the nature of the soul.' t

Lipps, and almost all the anti-sensationalist theorists
except Helmholtz, seem guilty of that confusion which Mr.

*In fact, to borrow a simile from Prof. G. E. Miiller (Theorie der sinnl.
Aufmerksamkeit, p. 38), the various senses bear in the Helinholtzian phi
losophy of perception the same relation to the ' object ' perceived by their
means that a troop of jolly drinkers bear to the landlord's bill, when no
one has any money, but each hopes that one of the rest will pay.

fGrundtatsachen des Seelenlebens (1883), pp. 480, 591-2. Psycholo-
gische Studien (1885), p. 14.

THE PERCEPTION OF SPACE. 281

Shadworth Hodgson lias done so much to clear away, viz.,
the confounding the analysis of an idea with the means of
its production. Lipps, for example, finds that every space
we think of can be broken up into positions, and concludes
that in some undefined way the several positions must have
pre-existed in thought before the aggregate space could
have appeared to perception. Similarly Mr. Spencer, de
fining extension as an ' aggregate of relations of coexistent
position,' says " every cognition of magnitude is a cogni
tion of relations of position,"* and " no idea of extension
can arise from the simultaneous excitation " of many nerves
"unless there is a knowledge of their relative positions. "f
Just so Prof. Bain insists that the very meaning of space is
scope for movement, J and that therefore distance and mag
nitude can be no original attributes of the eye's sensibility.
Similarly because movement is analyzable into positions
occupied at successive moments by the mover, philoso
phers (e.g. Schopenhauer, as quoted above) have repeatedly
denied the possibility of its being an immediate sensation.
We have, however, seen that it is the most immediate of all
our space-sensations. Because it can only occur in a defi
nite direction the impossibility of perceiving it without
perceiving its direction has been decreed — a decree which
the simplest experiment overthrows. § It is a case of what
I have called the ' psychologist's fallacy ' : mere acquaint
ance with space is treated as tantamount to every sort of
knowledge about it, the conditions of the latter are de
manded of the former state of mind, and all sorts of mytho
logical processes are brought in to help. || As well might
one say that because the world consists of all its parts, there-

* Psychology, ir. p. 174.

\Ibid. p. 168.

i Senses and Intellect, 3d ed. pp. 366-75.

§ Of. Hall and Donaldson in Mind, x. 559.

I As other examples of the confusion, take Mr. Sully : " The fallacious
assumption that there can be an idea of distance in general, apart from
particular distances" (Mind, in. p. 177); and Wundt : "An indefinite
localization, which waits for experience to give it its reference to real
space, stands in contradiction with the very idea of localization, which
means the reference to a determinate point of space " (Physiol. Psych.,
Ite Aufl. p. 480).

282 PSYCHOLOGY.

fore we can only apprehend it at all by having unconsciously
summed these up in our head. It is the old idea of our
actual knowledge being drawn out from a pre-existent
potentiality, an idea which, whatever worth it may meta
physically possess, does no good in psychology.

My own sensationalistic account has derived most aid
and comfort from the writings of Hering, A. W. Volkmann,
Stumpf, Leconte, and Schon. All these authors allow
ample scope to that Experience which Berkeley's genius
saw to be a present factor in all our visual acts. But they
give Experience some grist to grind, which the soi-distant
' empiristic ' school forgets to do. Stumpf seems to me the
most philosophical and profound of all these writers ; and
I owe him much. I should doubtless have owed almost as
much to Mr. James Ward, had his article on Psychology in
the Encyclopaedia Britannica appeared before my own
thoughts were written down. The literature of the question
is in all languages very voluminous. I content myself with
referring to the bibliography in Helmholtz's and Aubert's
works on Physiological Optics for the visual part of the
subject, and with naming in a note the ablest works in the
English tongue which have treated of the subject in a gen
eral way.*

* G. Berkeley : Essay towards a new Theory of Vision ; Samuel Bailey :
A Review of Berkeley's Theory of Vision (1842) ; J. S. Mill's Review of
Bailey, in his Dissertations and Disquisitions, vol. n ; Jas. Ferrier : Re
view of Bailey, in 'Philosophical Remains,' vol. n ; A. Bain : Senses and
Intellect, 'Intellect,' chap. I ; H. Spencer : Principles of Psychology, pt.
vi. chaps, xiv, xvi ; J. S. Mill : Examination of Hamilton, chap, xui
(the best statement of the so-called English empiricist position) ; T. K.
Abbott : Sight and Touch, 1861 (the first English book to go at all mi
nutely into facts; Mr. Abbott maintaining retinal sensations to be originally
of space in three dimensions) ; A. C. Fraser : Review of Abbott, in North
British Review for Aug. 1864 ; another review in Macmillan's Magazine,
Aug. 1866 ; J. Sully : Outlines of Psychology, chap, vi ; J. Ward : En-
cyclop. Britannica, 9th Ed., article ' Psychology,' pp. 53-5 ; J. E. Walter:
The Perception of Space and Matter (1879).— I may also refer to a ' discus
sion ' between Prof. G, Croorn Robertson, Mr. J. Ward, and the present
writer, in Mind, vol. xm.— The present chapter is only the filling out with
detail of an article entitled 'The Spatial Quale,' which appeared in the
Journal of Speculative Philosophy for January 1879 (xin. 64).

CHAPTEE XXL*

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY.
BELIEF.

EVERYONE knows the difference between imagining a
thing and believing in its existence, between supposing a
proposition and acquiescing in its truth. In the case of
acquiescence or belief, the object is not only apprehended
by the mind, but is held to have reality. Belief is thus th&
mental state or function of cognizing reality. As used in
the following pages, ' Belief ' will mean every degree of as*
surance, including the highest possible certainty and con
viction.

There are, as we know, two ways of studying every
psychic state. First, the way of analysis: What does it
consist in? What is its inner nature? Of what sort of
mind-stuff is it composed ? Second, the way of history :
What are its conditions of production, and its connection
with other facts ?

Into the first way we cannot go very far. In its inner
nature, belief, or the sense of reality, is a sort of feeling more
allied to the emotions than to anything else. Mr. Bagehot dis
tinctly calls it the ' emotion ' of conviction. I just now
spoke of it as acquiescence. It resembles more than any
thing what in the psychology of volition we know as con
sent. Consent is recognized by all to be a manifestation
of our active nature. It would naturally be described by
such terms as * willingness ' or the * turning of our dispo
sition.' What characterizes both consent and belief is the
cessation of theoretic agitation, through the advent of an
idea which is inwardly stable, and fills the mind solidly to
the exclusion of contradictory ideas. When this is the
case, motor effects are apt to follow. Hence the states of

* Reprinted, with additions, from ' Mind' for July 1889.

284 PSYCHOLOGY.

consent and belief, characterized by repose on the purely
intellectual side, are both intimately connected with subse
quent practical activity. This inward stability of the mind's
content is as characteristic of disbelief as of belief. But we
shall presently see that we never disbelieve anything ex
cept for the reason that we believe something else which
contradicts the first thing.* Disbelief is thus an incidental
complication to belief, and need not be considered by itself.

The true opposites of belief, psychologically considered,
are doubt and inquiry, not disbelief. In both these states the
content of our mind is in unrest, and the emotion engen
dered thereby is, like the emotion of belief itself, perfectly
distinct, but perfectly indescribable in words. Both sorts
of emotion may be pathologically exalted. One of the
charms of drunkenness unquestionably lies in the deepen
ing of the sense of reality and truth which is gained therein.
In whatever light things may then appear to us, they seem
more utterly what they are, more ' utterly utter ' than when
we are sober. This goes to a fully unutterable extreme
in the nitrous oxide intoxication, in which a man's very soul
will sweat with conviction, and he be all the while unable
to tell what he is convinced of at all.t The pathological
state opposed to this solidity and deepening has been called
the questioning mania ( Grubelsucht by the Germans). It is
sometimes found as a substantive affection, paroxysmal or
chronic, and consists in the inability to rest in any concep
tion, and the need of having it confirmed and explained.
* Why do I stand here where I stand ? ' ' Why is a glass a
glass, a chair a chair ? ' ' How is it that men are only of
the size they are ? Why not as big as houses,' etc., etc.J

* Compare this psychological fact with the corresponding logical truth
that all negation rests on covert assertion of something else than the thing
denied. (See Bradley 's Principles of Logic, bk. i. ch. 3.)

f See that very remarkable little work, ' The Anaesthetic Revelation and
the Gist of Philosophy,' by Benj. P. Blood (Amsterdam, N. Y., 1874).
Compare also Mind, vn. 206.

J "To one whose mind is healthy thoughts come and go unnoticed;
with me they have to be faced, thought about in a peculiar fashion, and
then disposed of as finished, and this often when I am utterly wearied and
would be at peace ; but the call is imperative. This goes on to the hiu-

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 285

There is, it is true, another pathological state which is as
far removed from doubt as from belief, and which some
may prefer to consider the proper contrary of the latter
state of mind. I refer to the feeling that everything is
hollow, unreal, dead. I shall speak of this state again
upon a later page. The point I wish to notice here is sim
ply that belief and disbelief are but two aspects of one
psychic state.

John Mill, reviewing various opinions about belief,
comes to the conclusion that no account of it can be given :

" What," he says, "is the difference to our minds between thinking
of a reality and representing to ourselves an imaginary picture ? I con
fess I can see no escape from the opinion that the distinction is ultimate
and primordial. There is no more difficulty in holding it to be so than
in holding the difference between a sensation and an idea to be primor
dial. It seems almost another aspect of the same difference. ... I
cannot help thinking, therefore, that there is in the remembrance of a
real fact, as distinguished from that of a thought, an element which
does not consist ... in a difference between the mere ideas which are
present to the mind in the two cases. This element, howsoever we de
fine it, constitutes belief, and is the difference between Memory and
Imagination. From whatever direction we approach, this difference
seems to close our path. When we arrive at it, we seem to have reached,
as it were, the central point of our intellectual nature, presupposed and
built upon in every attempt we make to explain the more recondite
phenomena of our mental being."*

drance of all natural action. If I were told that the staircase was on tire
and I had only a minute to escape, and the thought arose — ' Have they
sent for fire-engines? Is it probable that the man who has the key is on
hand ? Is the man a careful sort of person ? Will the key be hanging on
a peg? Am I thinking rightly? Perhaps they don't lock the depot '-
my foot would be lifted to go down ; I should be conscious to excitement
that I was losing my chance ; but I thould be unable to stir until all these
absurdities were entertained and disposed of. In the most critical moments
of my life, when I ought to have been so engrossed as to leave no room for
any secondary thoughts, I have been oppressed by the inability to be at
peace. And in the most ordinary circumstances it is all the same. Let me
instance the other morning I went to walk. The day was biting cold, but
I was unable to proceed except by jerks. Once I got arrested, my feet in
a muddy pool. One foot was lifted to go, knowing that it was not good to
be standing in water, but there I was fast, the cause of detention being the
discussing with myself the reasons why I should not stand in that pool."
(T. S. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases, 1883, p. 43. See
niao Berger, in Archiv f. Psychiatric, vi. 217.)
* Note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, i. 412-423.

286 PSYCHOLOGY.

If the words of Mill be taken to apply to the mere sub
jective analysis of belief — to the question, What does it
feel like when we have it ? — they must be held, on the whole,
to be correct. Belief, the sense of reality, feels like itself —
that is about as much as we can say.

Prof. Brentano, in an admirable chapter of his Psycho
logic, expresses this by saying that conception and belief
(which he names judgment) are two different fundamental
psychic phenomena. What I myself have called (Yol. I, p.
275) the ' object ' of thought may be comparatively simple,
like "Ha! what a pain," or "It-thunders"; or it may be
complex, like "Columbus-discovered-America-in-1492," or
" There- exists-an-all-wise-Creator-of- the- world." In either
case, however, the mere thought of the object may exist as
something quite distinct from the belief in its reality. The
belief, as Brentano says, presupposes the mere thought :

"Every object comes into consciousness in a twofold way, as simply
thought of \yorgestellt} and as admitted [anerkannt] or denied. The
relation is analogous to that which is assumed by most philosophers
(by Kant no less than by Aristotle) to obtain between mere thought and
desire. Nothing is ever desired without being thought of; but the
desiring is nevertheless a second quite new and peculiar form of rela
tion to the object, a second quite new way of receiving it into
consciousness. No more is anything judged [i. e., believed or disbelieved]
which is not thought of too. But we must insist that, so soon as the
object of a thought becomes the object of an assenting or rejecting
judgment, our consciousness steps into an entirely new relation to
wards it. It is then twice present in consciousness, as thought of, and
as held for real or denied ; just as when desire awakens for it, it is both
thought and simultaneously desired." (P. 266.)

The commonplace doctrine of * judgment ' is that it
consists in the combination of * ideas ' by a * copula ' into
a ' proposition/ which may be of various sorts, as affir
mative, negative, hypothetical, etc. But who does not see
that in a disbelieved or doubted or interrogative or condi
tional proposition, the ideas are combined in the same
identical way in which they are in a proposition which is
solidly believed ? The way in which the ideas are combined is
a part of the inner constitution of the thought's object or content.
That object is sometimes an articulated whole with relations
between its parts, amongst which relations, that of predicate

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 287

to subject may be one. But when we have got our object
with its inner constitution thus defined in a proposition,
then the question comes up regarding the object as a whole :
' Is it a real object ? is this proposition a true proposition
or not ? ' And in the answer Yes to this question lies that
new psychic act which Brentano calls 'judgment,' but which
1 prefer to call ' belief.'

In every proposition, then, so far as it is believed, ques
tioned, or disbelieved, four elements are to be distinguished,
the subject, the predicate, and their relation (of whatever
sort it be) — these form the object of belief — and finally the
psychic attitude in which our mind stands towards the
proposition taken as a whole — and this is the belief itself.*

Admitting, then, that this attitude is a state of conscious
ness sui generis, about which nothing more can be said in
the way of internal analysis, let us proceed to the second
way of studying the subject of belief : Under what circum
stances do we, think things real ? We shall soon see how much
matter this gives us to discuss.

THE VABIOTTS OBDEBS OF BEALITY.

Suppose a new-born mind, entirely blank and waiting
for experience to begin. Suppose that it begins in the
form of a visual impression (whether faint or vivid is im
material) of a lighted candle against a dark background,
and nothing else, so that whilst this image lasts it consti
tutes the entire universe known to the mind in question.
Suppose, moreover (to simplify the hypothesis), that the
candle is only imaginary, and that no 'original' of it is
recognized by us psychologists outside. Will this hallu
cinatory candle be believed in, will it have a real existence
for the mind ?

What possible sense (for that mind) would a suspicion
have that the candle was not real ? What would doubt or
disbelief of it imply ? When we, the onlooking psycholo
gists, say the candle is unreal, we mean something quite
definite, viz., that there is a world known to us which is

* For an excellent account of the history of opinion on this subject
tee A. Marty, in Vierteljahrsch. f. wiss. Phil., vin. 101 if. (1884).

288 PSYCHOLOGY.

real, and to which we perceive that the candle does not
belong ; it belongs exclusively to that individual mind, has
no status anywhere else, etc. It exists, to be sure, in a
fashion, for it forms the content of that mind's hallucina
tion ; but the hallucination itself, though unquestionably
it is a sort of existing fact, has no knowledge of other facts ;
and since those other facts are the realities par excellence for
us, and the only things we believe in, the candle is simply
outside of our reality and belief altogether.

By the hypothesis, however, the mind ivhich sees the candle
can spin no such considerations as these about it, for of
other facts, actual or possible, it has no inkling whatever.
That candle is its all, its absolute. Its entire faculty of
attention is absorbed by it. It is, it is that ; it is there ; no
other possible candle, or quality of this candle, no other
possible place, or possible object in the place, no alterna
tive, in short, suggests itself as even conceivable ; so how
can the mind help believing the candle real ? The suppo
sition that it might possibly not do so is, under the sup
posed conditions, unintelligible.*

This is what Spinoza long ago announced :

"Let us conceive a boy," he said, u imagining to himself a horse,
and taking note of nothing else. As this imagination involves the ex
istence of the horse, and the boy has no perception which annuls its
existence, he will necessarily contemplate the horse as present, nor will
he be able to doubt of its existence, however little certain of it he may
be. I deny that a man in so far as he imagines [percipif] affirms noth
ing. For what is it to imagine a winged horse but to affirm that the
horse [that horse, namely] has wings ? For if the mind had nothing
before it but the winged horse it would contemplate the same as pres
ent, would have no cause to doubt of its existence, nor any power of
dissenting from its existence, unless the imagination of the winged
horse were joined to an idea which contradicted [tollit] its existence."
(Ethics, ii. 49, Scholium.)

The sense that anything we think of is unreal can only
come, then, when that thing is contradicted by some other

* We saw near the end of Chapter XIX that a candle-image taking ex
clusive possession of the mind in this way would probably acquire the
sensational vividness. But this physiological accident is logically im
material to the argument in the text, which ought to apply as well to the
dimmest sort of mental image as to the brightest sensation.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 289

thing of which we think. Any object which remains uncon-
tradicted is ipso facto believed and posited as absolute reality.

Now, how comes it that one thing though4; of can be con
tradicted by another ? It cannot unless it begins the quar
rel by saying something inadmissible about that other.
Take the mind with the candle, or the boy with the horse.
If either of them say, ' That candle or that horse, even when
I don't see it, exists in the outer tvorld,' he pushes into * the
outer world ' an object which may be incompatible with
everything which he otherwise knows of that world. If so,
he must take his choice of which to hold by, the present
perceptions or the other knowledge of the world. If he
holds to the other knowledge, the present perceptions are
contradicted, so far as their relation to that world goes. Can
dle and horse, whatever they may be, are not existents in
outward space. They are existents, of course ; they are
mental objects ; mental objects have existence as mental
objects. But they are situated in their own spaces, the
space in which they severally appear, and neither of those
spaces is the space in which the realities called ' the outer
world' exist.

Take again the horse with wings. If I merely dream of
a horse with wings, my horse interferes with nothing else
and has not to be contradicted. That horse, its wings, and
its place, are all equally real. That horse exists no other
wise than as winged, and is moreover really there, for that
place exists no otherwise than as the place of that horse,
and claims as yet no connection with the other places of
the world. But if with this horse I make an inroad into
the world otherwise knoivn, and say, for example, ' That is
my old mare Maggie, having grown a pair of wings where
she stands in her stall,' the whole case is altered ; for now
the horse and place are identified with a horse and place
otherwise known, and what is known of the latter objects is
incompatible with what is perceived with the former.
' Maggie in her stall with wings ! Never ! ' The wings are
unreal, then, visionary. I have dreamed a lie about Mag
gie in her stall.

The reader will recognize in these two cases the two
sorts of judgment called in the logic-books existential and

290 PSYCHOLOGY.

attributive respectively. * The candle exists as an outer
reality ' is an existential, ' My Maggie has got a pair of
wings ' is an attributive, proposition ;* and it follows from
what was first said that all propositions, whether attributive
or existential, are believed through the very fact of being con
ceived, unless they clash with other propositions believed, at the
same time, by affirming that their terms are the same with the,
terms of these other propositions. A dream-candle has exist
ence, true enough ; but not the same existence (existence
for itself, namely, or extra mentem meam) which the candles
of waking perception have. A dream-horse has wings ; but
then neither horse nor wings are the same with any horses
or wings known to memory. That we can at any moment
think of the same thing which at any former moment we
thought of is the ultimate law of our intellectual constitu
tion. But when we now think of it incompatibly with our
other ways of thinking it, then we must choose which way
to stand by, for we cannot continue to think in two contra
dictory ways at once. The whole distinction of real and un
real, the whole psychology of belief, disbelief, and doubt, is thus
grounded on two mental facts— first, that we are liable to think
differently of the same ; and second, that ivhen we have done so,
we can choose which way of thinking to adhere to and ivhich to
disregard.

The subjects adhered to become real subjects, the at
tributes adhered to real attributes, the existence adhered
to real existence ; whilst the subjects disregarded become
imaginary subjects, the attributes disregarded erroneous

* In both existential and attributive judgments a synthesis is repre
sented. The syllable ex in the word Existence, da in the word Dasein, ex
press it. ' The candle exists ' is equivalent to ' The candle is over there"
And the ' over there ' means real space, space related to other reals. The
proposition amounts to saying : ' The candle is in the same space with
other reals.' It affirms of the candle a very concrete predicate — namely,
this relation to other particular concrete things. Their real existence, as
we shall later see, resolves itself into their peculiar relation to ourselves.
Existence is thus no substantive quality when we predicate it of any ob
ject ; it is a relation, ultimately terminating in ourselves, and at the mo
ment when it terminates, becoming a practical relation. But of this more
anon., I only wish now to indicate the superficial nature of the distinction
between the existential and the attributive proposition.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 291

attributes, and the existence disregarded an existence in
no man's land, in the limbo ' where footless fancies dwell.'
The real things are, in M. Taine's terminology, the reduc-
tives of the things judged unreal.

THE MATOTT WORLDS.

Habitually and practically we do not count these disre
garded things as existents at all. For them Fee victis is the
law in the popular philosophy ; they are not even treated as
appearances ; they are treated as if they were mere waste,
equivalent to nothing at all. To the genuinely philosophic
mind, however, they still have existence, though not the
same existence, as the real things. As objects of fancy, as
errors, as occupants of dreamland, etc., they are in their
way as indefeasible parts of life, as undeniable features of
the Universe, as the realities are in their way. The total
world of which the philosophers must take account is thus
composed of the realities plus the fancies and illusions.

Two sub-universes, at least, connected by relations
which philosophy tries to ascertain ! Eeally there are more
than two sub-universes of which we take account, some of
us of this one, and others of that. For there are various
categories both of illusion and of reality, and alongside of
the world of absolute error (i.e., error confined to single
individuals) but still within the world of absolute reality
(i.e., reality believed by the complete philosopher) there is
the world of collective error, there are the worlds of abstract
reality, of relative or practical reality, of ideal relations,
and there is the supernatural world. The popular mind
conceives of all these sub-worlds more or less discon
nectedly ; and when dealing with one of them, forgets for
the time being its relations to the rest. The complete phi
losopher is he who seeks not only to assign to every given
object of his thought its right place in one or other of these
sub-worlds, but he also seeks to determine the relation of
each sub-world to the others in the total world which is.

The most important sub-universes commonly discrimi
nated from each other and recognized by most of us as
existing, each with its own special and separate style of
existence, are the following :

PS TCHOL OOT.

(1) The world of sense, or of physical ' things ' as we
instinctively apprehend them, with such qualities as heat,
color, and sound, and such ' forces ' as life, chemical affinity,
gravity, electricity, all existing as such within or on the
surface of the things.

(2) The world of science, or of physical things as the
learned conceive them, with secondary qualities and ' forces '
(in the popular sense) excluded, and nothing real but solids
and fluids and their 'laws' (i.e., customs) of motion.*

(3) The world of ideal relations, or abstract truths be
lieved or believable by all, and expressed in logical, mathe
matical, metaphysical, ethical, or aesthetic propositions.

(4) The world of ' idols of the tribe,' illusions or preju
dices common to the race. All educated people recognize
these as forming one sub-universe. The motion of the sky
round the earth, for example, belongs to this world. That
motion is not a recognized item of any of the other worlds ;
but as an ' idol of the tribe ' it really exists. For certain
philosophers * matter * exists only as an idol of the tribe.
For science, the ' secondary qualities ' of matter are but
* idols of the tribe.'

(5) The various supernatural worlds, the Christian
heaven and hell, the world of the Hindoo mythology, the
world of Swedenborg's visa et audita, etc. Each of these is
a consistent system, with definite relations among its own
parts. Neptune's trident, e.g., has no status of reality what
ever in the Christian heaven ; but within the classic Olym
pus certain definite things are true of it, whether one believe
in the reality of the classic mythology as a whole or not.
The various worlds of deliberate fable may be ranked with
these worlds of faith — the world of the Iliad, that of King
Lear, of the Pickwick Papers, etc.f

* I define the scientific universe here in the radical mechanical way.
Practically, it is oftener thought of in a mongrel way and resembles in
more points the popular physical world.

f It thus comes about that we can say such things as that Ivanhoe
did not really marry Rebecca, as Thackeray falsely makes him do. The
real Ivanhoe-world is the one which Scott wrote down for us. In that
world Ivanhoe does not marry Rebecca. The objects within that world
are knit together by perfectly definite relations, which can be affirmed
or denied. "Whilst absorbed in the novel, we turn our backs on all other

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 293

(6) The various worlds of individual opinion, as numer
ous as men are.

(7) The worlds of sheer madness and vagary, also in
definitely numerous.

Every object we think of gets at last referred to one world or
another of this or of some similar list. It settles into our be
lief as a common-sense object, a scientific object, an abstract
object, a mythological object, an object of some one's mis
taken conception, or a madman's object ; and it reaches
this state sometimes immediately, but often only after be
ing hustled and bandied about amongst other objects until
it finds some which will tolerate its presence and stand in
relations to it which nothing contradicts. The molecules
and ether-waves of the scientific world, for example, simply
kick the object's warmth and color out, they refuse to
Lave any relations with them. But the world of < idols of
the tribe ' stands ready to take them in. Just so the world
of classic myth takes up the winged horse ; the world of
individual hallucination, the vision of the candle ; the
world of abstract truth, the proposition that justice is
kingly, though no actual king be just. The various worlds
themselves, however, appear (as aforesaid) to most men's
minds in no very definitely conceived relation to each
other, and our attention, when it turns to one, is apt to
drop the others for the time being out of its account. Pro
positions concerning the different worlds are made from
1 different points of view'; and in this more or less chaotic
state the consciousness of most thinkers remains to the
end. Each world whilst it is attended to is real after its own
fashion ; only the reality lapses with the attention.

THE 'WORLD OP 'PRACTICAL REALITIES.'

Each thinker, however, has dominant habits of atten
tion ; and these practically elect from among the various
worlds some one to be for him the world of ultimate realities.
From this world's objects he does not appeal. Whatever

worlds, and, for the time, the Ivanhoe-world remains our absolute reality.
When we wake from the spell, however, we find a still more real world,
which reduces Ivanhoe, and all things connected with him, to the fictive
atatus, and relegates them to one of the sub-universes grouped under No. 5.

PSYCHOLOGY.

positively contradicts them must get into another world or
die. The horse, e.g., may have wings to its heart's content,
so long as it does not pretend to be the real world's horse —
that horse is absolutely wingless. For most men, as we shall
immediately see, the ' things of sense ' hold this prerogative
position, and are the absolutely real world's nucleus. Other
things, to be sure, may be real for this man or for that —
things of science, abstract moral relations, things of the
Christian theology, or what not. But even for the special
man, these things are usually real with a less real reality
than that of the things of sense. They are taken less
seriously ; and the very utmost that can be said for any
one's belief in them is that it is as strong as his * belief in
his own senses.' *

In all this the everlasting partiality of our nature shows
itself, our inveterate propensity to choice. For, in the
strict and ultimate sense of the word existence, everything
which can be thought of at all exists as some sort of object,
whether mythical object, individual thinker's object, or ob
ject in outer space and for intelligence at large. Errors,
fictions, tribal beliefs, are parts of the whole great Universe
which God has made, and He must have meant all these
things to be in it, each in its respective place. But for us
finite creatures, " 'tis to consider too curiously to consider

* The world of dreams is our real world whilst we are sleeping, because
our attention then lapses from the sensible world. Conversely, when we
wake the attention usually lapses from the dream-world and that becomes
unreal. But if a dream haunts us and compels our attention during the
day it is very apt to remain figuring in our consciousness as a sort of sub-
universe alongside of the waking world. Most people have probably had
dreams which it is hard to imagine not to have been glimpses into an
actually existing region of being, perhaps a corner of the ' spiritual world.'
And dreams have accordingly in all ages been regarded as revelations, and
have played a large part in furnishing forth mythologies and creating
themes for faith to lay hold upon. The 'larger universe,' here, which
helps us to believe both in the dream and in the waking reality which is
its immediate reductive, is the total universe, of Nature plus the Super
natural. The dream holds true, namely, in one half of that universe ; the
waking perceptions in the other half. Even to-day dream-objects figure
among the realities in which some ' psychic- researchers ' are seeking to rouse
our belief . All our theories, not only those about the supernatural, but
our philosophic and scientific theories as well, are like our dreams in rous
ing such different degrees of belief in different minds.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 295

so." The mere fact of appearing as an object at all is not
enough to constitute reality. That may be metaphysical
reality, reality for God ; but what we need is practical
reality, reality for ourselves ; and, to have that, an object
must not only appear, but it must appear both interesting
and important. The worlds whose objects are neither in
teresting nor important we treat simply negatively, we
brand them as unreal.

In the relative sense, then, the sense in which ^e contrast
reality with simple unreality, and in which one thing is
said to have more reality than another, and to be more be
lieved, reality means simply relation to our emotional and
active life. This is the only sense which the word ever has
in the mouths of practical men. In this sense, whatever ex
cites and stimulates our interest is real ; whenever an object
so appeals to us that we turn to it, accept it, fill our mind
with it, or practically take account of it, so far it is real for
us, and we believe it. Whenever, on the contrary, we
ignore it, fail to consider it or act upon it, despise it, reject
it, forget it, so far it is unreal for us and disbelieved.
Hume's account of the matter was then essentially correct,
when he said that belief in anything was simply the having
the idea of it in a lively and active manner :

" I say, then, that belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible,
firm, steady conception of an object than the imagination alone is ever
able to attain. ... It consists not in the peculiar nature or order of
the ideas, but in the manner of their conception and in their feeling to
the mind. I confess that it is impossible perfectly to explain this feel
ing or manner of conception. ... Its true and proper name ... is
belief, which is a term that everyone sufficiently understands in common
life. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief ia
something felt by themind, which distinguishes the idea of the judg
ment from the fictions of the imagination.* It gives them more weight
and influence ; makes them appear of greater importance ; enforces
them in the mind ; gives them a superior influence on the passions, and
renders them the governing principle in our actions. " t

* Distinguishes realities from unrealities, the essential from the rubbishy
and neglectable.

f Inquiry concerning Hum. Understanding, sec. v. pt. 2 (slightly trans
posed in my quotation).

296 PSYCHOLOGY.

Or as Prof. Bain puts it : "In its essential character,
belief is a phase of our active nature — otherwise called the
Will." *

The object of belief, then, reality or real existence, is
something quite different from all the other predicates which
a subject may possess. Those are properties intellectually
or sensibly intuited. When we add any one of them to the
subject, we increase the intrinsic content of the latter, we
enrich its picture in our mind. But adding reality does
not enrich the picture in any such inward way ; it leaves it
inwardly as it finds it, and only fixes it and stamps it in to
us.

" The real," as Kant says, "contains no more than the possible. A
hundred real dollars do not contain a penny more than a hundred pos
sible dollars. ... By whatever, and by however many, predicates I
may think a thing, nothing is added to it if I add that the thing exists.
Whatever, therefore, our concept of an object may contain, we
must always step outside of it in order to attribute to it existence." t

The ' stepping outside ' of it is the establishment either
of immediate practical relations between it and ourselves,
or of relations between it and other objects with which we
have immediate practical relations. Relations of this sort,
which are as yet not transcended or superseded by others,
are ipso facto real relations, and confer reality upon their
objective term. Thefons et origo of oil reality, whether from

* Note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, i. 394.

f Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Muller, u. 515-17. Hume also :
"When, after the simple conception of anything, we would conceive it as
existent, we in reality make no addition to, or alteration of, our first idea.
Thus, when we affirm that God is existent, we simply form the idea of
such a being as He is represented to us ; nor is the existence which we at
tribute to Him conceived by a particular idea, which we join to His other
qualities, and can again separate and distinguish from them. . . . The be
lief of the existence joins no new idea to those which compose the ideas of
the object. When I think of God, when I think of Him as existent, and
when I believe Him to be existent, my idea of Him neither increases nor
diminishes. But as 'tis certain there is a great difference betwixt the sim
ple conception of the existence of an object and the belief of it, and as this
difference lies not in the facts or compositions of the idea which we con
ceive, it follows that it must lie in the manner in which we conceive it."
(Treatise of Human Nature, pt. in. sec. 7.)

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 297

the absolute or the practical point of view, is thus subjective, is
ourselves. As bare logical thinkers, without emotional re
action, we give reality to whatever objects we think of, for
they are really phenomena, or objects of our passing
thought, if nothing more. But, as thinkers ivith emotional
reaction, we give what seems to us a still higher degree of
reality to whatever things we select and emphasize and turn
to WITH A WILL. These are our living realities; and not
only these, but all the other things which are intimately
connected with these. Keality, starting from our Ego,
thus sheds itself from point to point — first, upon all objects
which have an immediate sting of interest for our Ego in
them, and next, upon the objects most continuously related
with these. It only fails when the connecting thread is
lost. A whole system may be real, if it only hang to our
Ego by one immediately stinging term. But what contra
dicts any such stinging term, even though it be another
stinging term itself, is either not believed, or only believed
after settlement of the dispute.

We reach thus the important conclusion that our own
reality, that sense of our own life which ive at every moment pos
sess, is the ultimate of ultimates for our belief. ' As sure as I
exist ! ' — this is our uttermost warrant for the being of all
other things. As Descartes made the indubitable reality
of the cogito go bail for the reality of all that the cogito in
volved, so we all of us, feeling our own present reality with
absolutely coercive force, ascribe an all but equal degree
of reality, first to whatever things we lay hold on with a
sense of personal need, and second, to whatever farther
things continuously belong with these. " Mein Jetzt und
Hier," as Prof. Lipps says, " ist der letzte Angelpunkt fur
alle Wirklichkeit, also alle Erkenntniss."

The world of living realities as contrasted with unreali
ties is thus anchored in the Ego, considered as an active
and emotional term.* That is the hook from which the
rest dangles, the absolute support. And as from a painted

* I use the notion of the Ego here, as common-sense uses it. Nothing
is prejudged as to the results (or absence of results) of ulterior attempts to
analyze the notion.

298 PSYCHOLOGY.

hook it has been said that one can only hang a painted
chain, so conversely, from a real hook only a real chain
can properly be hung. Whatever tilings have intimate and
continuous connection with my life are things of whose reality
I cannot doubt. Whatever things fail to establish this con
nection are things which are practically no better for me
than if they existed not at all.

In certain forms of melancholic perversion of the sensi
bilities and reactive powers, nothing touches us intimately,
rouses us, or wakens natural feeling. The consequence is
the complaint so often heard from melancholic patients,
that nothing is believed in by them as it used to be, and
that all sense of reality is fled from life. They are sheathed
in india-rubber ; nothing penetrates to the quick or draws
blood, as it were. According to Griesinger, " I see, I hear !"
such patients say, ' but the objects do not reach me, it is as
if there were a wall between me and the outer world !"

4k In such patients there often is an alteration of the cutaneous sen
sibility, such that things feel indistinct or sometimes rough and woolly.
But even were this change always present, it would not completely ex
plain the psychic phenomenon . . . which reminds us more of the altera
tion in our psychic relations to the outer world which advancing age on
the one hand, and on the other emotions and passions, may bring about.
In childhood we feel ourselves to be closer to the world of sensible
phenomena, we live immediately with them and in them; an intimately
vital tie binds us and them together. But with the ripening of reflec
tion this tie is loosened, the warmth of our interest cools, things look
differently to us, and we act more as foreigners to the outer world, even
though we know it a great deal better. Joy and expansive emotions in
general draw it nearer to us again. Everything makes a more lively
impression, and with the quick immediate return of this warm recep
tivity for sense impressions, joy makes us feel young again. In depress
ing emotions it is the other way. Outer things, whether living or in
organic, suddenly grow cold and foreign to us, and even our favorite
objects of interest feel as if. they belonged to us no more. Under these
circumstances, receiving no longer from anything a lively impression,
we cease to turn towards outer things, and the sense of inward loneliness
grows upon us. . . . Where there is no strong intelligence to control this
blase condition, this psychic coldness and lack of interest, the issue of
these states in which all seems so cold and hollow, the heart dried up,
the world grown dead and empty, is often suicide or the deeper forms
of insanity.*

* Griesinger, Mental Diseases, $§ 50, 98. The neologism we so often.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 299

THE PARAMOUNT REALITY OF SENSATIONS.

But DOW we are met by questions of detail. What does
this stirring, this exciting power, this interest, consist in,
which some objects have ? which are those * intimate rela
tions ' with our life which give reality ? And what things
stand in these relations immediately, and what others are
so closely connected with the former that (in Hume's lan
guage) we ' carry our disposition ' also on to them ?

In a simple and direct way these questions cannot be
answered at all. The whole history of human thought is
but an unfinished attempt to answer them. For what have
men been trying to find out, since men were men, but just
those things : " Where do our true interests lie — which re
lations shall we call the intimate and real ones — which
things shall we call living realities and which not ?" A few
psychological points can, however, be made clear.

Any relation to our mind at all, in the absence of a stronger
relation, suffices to make an object real. The barest appeal
to our attention is enough for that. Eevert to the begin
ning of the chapter, and take the candle entering ifche vacant
mind. The mind was waiting for just some such object to
make its spring upon. It makes its spring and the candle
is believed. But when the candle appears at the same time
with other objects, it must run the gauntlet of their rivalry,
and then it becomes a question which of the various candi
dates for attention shall compel belief. As a rule we be
lieve as much as we can. We would believe everything if
we only could. When objects are represented by us quite
unsystematically they conflict but little with each other,
and the number of them which in this chaotic manner we
can believe is limitless. The primitive savage's mind is a
jungle in which hallucinations, dreams, superstitions, con
ceptions, and sensible objects all flourish alongside of each
other, unregulated except by the attention turning in this
way or in that. The child's mind is the same. It is only
as objects become permanent and their relations fixed that

hear, that an experience * gives us a realizing sense ' of the truth of some
proposition or other, illustrates the dependence of the sense of reality upon
excitement. Only what stirs us is ' realized.'

300 PSYCHOLOGY.

discrepancies and contradictions are felt and must be set
tled in some stable way. As a rule, the success with which
a contradicted object maintains itself in our belief is pro
portional to several qualities which it must possess. Of
these the one which would be put first by most people,
because it characterizes objects of sensation, is its —

(1) Coerciveness over attention, or the mere power to

consciousness : then follow —

(2) Liveliness, or sensible pungency, especially in the
way of exciting pleasure or pain ;

(3) Stimulating effect upon the will, i.e., capacity to
arouse active impulses, the more instinctive the better ;

(4) Emotional interest, as object of love, dread, admira
tion, desire, etc. ;

(5) Congruity with certain favorite forms of contempla
tion — unity, simplicity, permanence, and the like ;

(6) Independence of other causes, and its own causal
importance.

These characters run into each other. Coerciveness is
the result of liveliness or emotional interest. What is lively
and interesting stimulates eo ipso the will ; congruity holds
of active impulses as well as of contemplative forms ; causal
independence and importance suit a certain contemplative
demand, etc. I will therefore abandon all attempt at a
formal treatment, and simply proceed to make remarks in
the most convenient order of exposition.

As a whole, sensations are more lively and are judged
more real than conceptions ; things met with every hour
more real than things seen once ; attributes perceived when
awake, more real than attributes perceived in a dream.
But, owing to the diverse relations contracted by .the various
objects with each other, the simple rule that the lively and
permanent is the real is often enough disguised. A con
ceived thing may be deemed more real than a certain sen
sible thing, if it only be intimately related to other sensible
things more vivid, permanent, or interesting than the first
one. Conceived molecular vibrations, e.g., are by the
physicist judged more real than felt warmth, because so
intimately related to all those other facts of motion in the

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 301

world which he has made his special study. Similarly, a
rare thing may be deemed more real than a permanent
thing if it be more widely related to other permanent
things. All the occasional crucial observations of science
are examples of this. A rare experience, too, is likely to
be judged more real than a permanent one, if it be more in
teresting and exciting. Such is the sight of Saturn through
a telescope ; such are the occasional insights and illumi
nations which upset our habitual ways of thought.

But no mere floating conception, no mere disconnected
rarity, ever displaces vivid things or permanent things from
our belief. A conception, to prevail, must terminate in the
world of orderly sensible experience. A rare phenomenon,
to displace frequent ones, must belong with others more
frequent still. The history of science is strewn with wrecks
and ruins of theory — essences and principles, fluids and
forces — once fondly clung to, but found to hang together
with no facts of sense. And exceptional phenomena solicit
our belief in vain until such time as we chance to conceive
them as of kinds already admitted to exist. What science
means by * verification ' is no more than this, that no object
of conception shall be believed which sooner or later has
not some permanent and vivid object of sensation for its
term. Compare what was said on pages 3-7, above.

Sensible objects are thus either our realities or the tests of our
realities. Conceived objects must show sensible effects or else be
disbelieved. And the effects, even though reduced to relative
unreality when their causes come to view (as heat, which
molecular vibrations make unreal), are yet the things on
which our knowledge of the causes rests. Strange mutual
dependence this, in which the appearance needs the reality
in order to exist, but the reality needs the appearance in
order to be known !

Sensible vividness or pungency is then the vital factor in
reality when once the conflict between objects, and the connecting
of them together in the mind, has begun. No object which
neither possesses this vividness in its own right nor is able
to borrow it from anything else has a chance of making
headway against vivid rivals, or of rousing in us that re
action in which belief consists. On the vivid objects we

302 PS YCHOLOG T.

pin, as the saying is, our faitli in all the rest ; and our
belief returns instinctively even to those of them from
which reflection has led it away. Witness the obduracy
with which the popular world of colors, sounds, and smjlls
holds its own against that of molecules and vibrations.
Let the physicist himself but nod, like Homer, and the
world of sense becomes his absolute reality again.*

That things originally devoid of this stimulating power
should be enabled, by association with other things which
have it, to compel our belief as if they had it themselves, is a
remarkable psychological fact, which since Hume's time it
has been impossible to overlook.

"The vividness of the first conception," he writes, "diffuses itself
along the relations and is conveyed, as by so many pipes or channels, to
every idea that has any communication with the primary one. . . .
Superstitious people are fond of the relics of saints and holy men, for the
same reason that they seek after types and images, in order to enliven
their devotion and give them a more intimate and strong conception of
those exemplary lives. . . . Now, 'tis evident one of the best relics a
devotee could procure would be the handiwork of a saint, and if his
clothes and furniture are ever to be considered in this light, 'tis because
they were once at his disposal, and were moved and affected by him; in
which respect they are ... connected with him by a shorter train of
consequences than any of those from which we learn the reality of his

* The way in which sensations are pitted against systematized concep
tions, and in which the one or the other then prevails according as the
sensations are felt by ourselves or merely known by report, is interestingly
illustrated at the present day by the state of public belief about ' spiritual
istic ' phenomena. There exist numerous narratives of movement without
contact on the part of articles of furniture and other material objects, in
the presence of certain privileged individuals called mediums. Such move
ment violates our memories, and the whole system of accepted physical
'science.' Consequently those who have not seen it either brand the
narratives immediately as lies or call the phenomena ' illusions ' of sense,
produced by fraud or due to hallucination. But one who has actually seen
such a phenomenon, under what seems to him sufficiently ' test-conditions,'
will hold to his sensible experience through thick and thin, even though
the whole fabric of ' science ' should be rent in twain. That man would
'be a weak-spirited creature indeed who should allow any fly blown gener
alities about ' the liability of the senses to be deceived ' to bully him out of
his adhesion to what for him was an indubitable experience of sight. A
man may err in this obstinacy, sure enough, in any particular case. But
the spirit that animates him is that on which ultimately the very life and
health of Science rest.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 303

•existence. This phenomenon clearly proves that a present impression,
with a relation of causation, may enliven any idea, and consequently
produce belief or assent, according to the precedent definition of it. ...
It has been remarked among the Mahometans as well as Christians
that those pilgrims who have seen Mecca or the Holy Land are ever
after more faithful and zealous believers than those who have not had
that advantage. A man whose memory presents him with a lively
image of the Red Sea and the Desert and Jerusalem and Galilee can
never doubt of any miraculous events which are related either by Moses
or the Evangelists. The lively idea of the places passes by an easy
transition to the facts which are supposed to have been related to them
by contiguity, and increases the belief by increasing the vivacity of the
conception. The remembrance of those fields and rivers has the same
influence as a new argument. . . . The ceremonies of the Catholic
religion may be considered as instances of the same nature. The
devotees of that strange superstition usually plead in excuse for the
mummeries with which they are upbraided that they feel the good effect
of external motions and postures and actions in enlivening their
devotion and quickening their fervor, which otherwise would decay,
if directed entirely to distant and immaterial objects. We shadow out
the objects of our faith, say they, in sensible types and images, and
render them more present to us by the immediate presence of these
types than it is possible for us to do merely by an intellectual view and
contemplation." *

Hume's cases are rather trivial ; and the things which
associated sensible objects make us believe in are supposed
by him to be unreal. But all the more manifest for that is
the fact of their psychological influence. Who does not
* realize' more the fact of a dead or distant friend's
existence, at the moment when a portrait, letter, garment
or other material reminder of him is found ? The whole
notion of him then grows pungent and speaks to us and
shakes us, in a manner unknown at other times. In chil
dren's minds, fancies and realities live side by side. But
however lively their fancies may be, they still gain help
from association with reality. The imaginative child
identifies its dramatis personal with some doll or other
material object, and this evidently solidifies belief, little as
it may resemble what it is held to stand for. A thing not
too interesting by its own real qualities generally does the
best service here. The most useful doll I ever saw was a
large cucumber in the hands of a little Amazonian-Indian

* Treatise of Human Nature, bk. i. pt. in. sec. 7.

304 PSYCHOLOGY.

girl ; she nursed it and washed it and rocked it to sleep in
a hammock, and talked to it all day long — there was no
part in life which the cucumber did not play. Says Mr.
Tylor :

"An imaginative child will make a dog do duty for a horse, or a sol
dier for a shepherd, till at last the objective resemblance almost disap
pears, and a bit of wood may be dragged about, resembling a ship on the
sea or a coach on the road. Here the likeness of the bit of wood to a
ship or coach is very slight indeed; but it is a thing, and can be moved
about, . . . and is an evident assistance to the child in enabling it to
arrange and develop its ideas. ... Of how much use . . . may be
seen by taking it away, and leaving the child nothing to play with. . . .
In later years and among highly educated people the mental process
which goes on in a child's playing with wooden soldiers and horses,
though it never disappears, must be sought for in more complex phe
nomena. Perhaps nothing in after-life more closely resembles the effect
of a doll upon a child than the effect of the illustrations of a tale upon
a grown reader. Here the objective resemblance is very indefinite . . .
yet what reality is given to the scene by a good picture. . . . Mr. Back
house one day noticed in Van Diemen's Land a woman arranging
several stones that were flat, oval, and about two inches wide, and
marked in various directions with black and red lines. These, he
learned, represented absent friends, and one larger than the rest stood
for a fat native woman on Flinder's Island, known by the name of
Mother Brown. Similar practices are found among far higher races
than the ill-fated Tasmanians. Among some North American tribes a
mother who has lost a child keeps its memory ever present to her by
filling its cradle with black feathers and quills, and carrying it about
with her for a year or more. When she stops anywhere, she sets up the
cradle and talks to it as she goes about her work, just as she would
have done if the dead body had been still alive within it. Here we have
an image; but in Africa we find a rude doll representing the child, kept
as a memorial. . . . Bastian saw Indian women in Peru who had lost
an infant carrying about on their backs a wooden doll to represent it."*

To many persons among us, photographs of lost ones
seem to be fetishes. They, it is true, resemble ; but the
fact that the mere materiality of the reminder is almost as
important as its resemblance is shown by the popularity a
hundred years ago of the black taffeta ' silhouettes ' which
are still found among family relics, and of one of which
Fichte could write to his affianced : ' Die Farbe fehlt, das
Auge fehlt, es fehlt der himmlische Ausdruck deiner lieblichen

* Early Hist, of Mankind, p. 108-

TUB PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 305

Zilge ' — and yet go on worshipping it all the same. The
opinion so stoutly professed by many, that language is es
sential to thought, seems to have this much of truth in it,
that all our inward images tend invincibly to attach them
selves to something sensible, so as to gain in corporeity and
life. Words serve this purpose, gestures serve it, stones,
straws, chalk-marks, anything will do. As soon as anyone
of these things stands for the idea, the latter seems to be
more real. Some persons, the present writer among the
number, can hardly lecture without a black-board : the ab
stract conceptions must be symbolized by letters, squares
or circles, and the relations between them by lines. All
this symbolism, linguistic, graphic, and dramatic, has other
uses too, for it abridges thought and fixes terms. But one
of its uses is surely to rouse the believing reaction and give
to the ideas a more living reality. As, when we are told a
story, and shown the very knife that did the murder, the
very ring whose hiding-place the clairvoyant revealed, the
whole thing passes from fairy -land to mother-earth, so here
we believe all the more, if only we see that ' the bricks are
alive to tell the tale.'

So much for the prerogative position of sensations in
regard to our belief. But among the sensations themselves
all are not deemed equally real. The more practically
important ones, the more permanent ones, and the more
aesthetically apprehensible ones are selected from the mass,
to be believed in most of all ; the others are degraded to
the position of mere signs and suggestions of these. This
fact has already been adverted to in former chapters.*
The real color of a thing is that one color-sensation which
it gives us when most favorably lighted for vision. So
of its real size, its real shape, etc. — these are but optical
sensations selected out of thousands of others, because
they have aesthetic characteristics which appeal to our
convenience or delight. But I will not repeat what I have
already written about this matter, but pass on to our
treatment of tactile and muscular sensations, as ' primary

* See Vol. I. pp. 285-6; Vol. II. pp. 237 ff.

306 PSYCHOLOGY.

qualities,' more real than those ' secondary ' qualities which
eye and ear and nose reveal. "Why do we thus so markedly
select the tangible to be the real ? Our motives are not far
to seek. The tangible qualities are the least fluctuating.
"When we get them at all we get them the same. The other
qualities fluctuate enormously as our relative position to
the object changes. Then, more decisive still, the tactile
properties are those most intimately connected with our
weal or woe. A dagger hurts us only when in contact with
our skin, a poison only when we take it into our mouths,
and we can only use an object for our advantage when we
have it in our muscular control. It is as tangibles, then,
that things concern us most ; and the other senses, so far
as their practical use goes, do but warn us of what tangi
ble things to expect. They are but organs of anticipa
tory touch, as Berkeley has with perfect clearness ex
plained.*

Among all sensations, the most belief-compelling are
those productive of pleasure or of pain. Locke expressly
makes the pleasure- or pain-giving quality to be the ultimate
human criterion of anything's reality. Discussing (with a
supposed Berkeleyan before Berkeley) the notion that all
our perceptions may be but a dream, he says :

" He may please to dream that I make him this answer . . . that I
believe he will allow a very manifest difference between dreaming of
being in the fire and being actually in it. But yet if he be resolved to
appear so sceptical as to maintain that what I call being actually in the
fire is nothing but a dream, and that we cannot thereby certainly know
that any such thing as fire actually exists without us, I answer that we,
certainly finding that pleasure or pain [or emotion of any sort] follows
upon the application of certain objects to us, whose existence we per
ceive, or dream that we perceive by our senses, this certainly is as great
as our happiness or misery, beyond which we have no concernment to
know or to be." f

* See Theory of Vision, § 59.

f Essay, bk. iv. chap. 2, § 14. In another place: "He that sees a
candle burning and hath experimented the force of its flame by putting
his finger into it, will little doubt that this is something existing without
him, which does 'hirn harm and puts him to great pain. . . . And if our
dreamer pleases to try whether the glowing heat of a glass furnace be
barely a wandering imagination in a drowsy man's fancy by putting his
hand into it, he may, perhaps, be awakened into a certainty greater than

THE PERCEPTION OF EEALITT. 307

THE INFLUENCE OF EMOTION AND ACTIVE IMPULSE ON

BELIEF.

The quality of arousing emotion, of shaking, moving us
or inciting us to action, has as much to do with our belief in
an object's reality as the quality of giving pleasure or pain.
In Chapter XXIV I shall seek to show that our emotions
probably owe their pungent quality to the bodily sensations
which they involve. Our tendency to believe in emotionally
exciting objects (objects of fear, desire, etc.) is thus ex
plained without resorting to any fundamentally new prin
ciple of choice. Speaking generally, the more a conceived
object excites us, the more reality it has. The same object
excites us differently at different times. Moral and religious
truths come ' home ' to us far more on some occasions than
on others. As Emerson says, " There is a difference between
one and another hour of life in their authority and subse
quent effect. Our faith comes in moments, . . . yet there
is a depth in those brief moments which constrains us to
ascribe more reality to them than to all other experiences."
The ' depth ' is partly, no doubt, the insight into wider sys
tems of unified relation, but far more often than that it is
the emotional thrill. Thus, to descend to more trivial ex
amples, a man who has no belief in ghosts by daylight will
temporarily believe in them when, alone at midnight, he
feels his blood curdle at a mysterious sound or vision, his
heart thumping, and his legs impelled to flee. The thought
of falling when we walk along a curbstone awakens no emo
tion of dread ; so no sense of reality attaches to it, and we
are sure we shall not fall. On a precipice's edge, however,
the sickening emotion which the notion of a possible fall
engenders makes us believe in the latter's imminent reality,
and quite unfits us to proceed.

he could wish, that it is something more than bare imagination. So that
the evidence is as great as we can desire, being as certain to us as our pleas
ure or pain, i.e. happiness or misery; beyond which we have no concern
ment, either of knowledge or being. Such an assurance of the existence
of things without us is sufficient to direct us in the attaining the good and
avoiding the evil which is caused by them, which is the important con
cernment we have of being made acquainted with them. " (Ibid, bk. iv.
chap. 11, § 8.)

308 PSYCHOLOGY.

The greatest proof that a man is sui compos is his ability
to suspend belief in presence of an emotionally exciting
idea. To give this power is the highest result of education.
In untutored minds the power does not exist. Every excit
ing thought in the natural man carries credence with it. To
conceive with passion is eo ipso to affirm. As Bagehot says :

"The Caliph Omar burnt the Alexandrian Library, saying: 'All
books which contain what is not in the Koran are dangerous. All which
contain what is in it are useless ! ' Probably no one ever had an intenser
belief in anything than Omar had in this. Yet it is impossible to
imagine it preceded by an argument. His belief in Mahomet, in the
Koran, and in the sufficiency of the Koran, probably came to him in
spontaneous rushes of emotion ; there may have been little vestiges of
argument floating here and there, but they did not justify the strength
of the emotion, still less did they create it, and they hardly even excused
it. ... Probably, when the subject is thoroughly examined, conviction
will be found to be one of the intensest of human emotions, and one
most closely connected with the bodily state, . . . accompanied or pre
ceded by the sensation that Scott makes his seer describe as the prelude
of a prophecy :

' At length the fatal answer came,
In characters of living flame —
Not spoke in words, nor blazed in scroll,
But borne and branded on my soul.'

A hot flash seems to burn across the brain. Men in these intense states
of mind have altered all history, changed for better or worse the creed
of myriads, and desolated or redeemed provinces or ages. Nor is this
intensity a sign of truth, for it is precisely strongest in those points in
which men differ most from each other. John Knox felt it in his anti-
Catholicism ; Ignatius Loyola in his anti-Protestantism; and both, I
suppose, felt it as much as it is possible to feel it." *

The reason of the belief is undoubtedly the bodily com
motion which the exciting idea sets up. * Nothing which
I can feel like that can be false.' All our religious and
supernatural beliefs are of this order. The surest warrant
for immortality is the yearning of our bowels for our dear
ones ; for God, the sinking sense it gives us to imagine no
such Providence or help. So of our political or pecuniary
hopes and fears, and things and persons dreaded and

* W. Bagehot, 'The Emotion of Conviction,' Literary Studies, L
412-17.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 309

desired. " A grocer has a full creed as to foreign policy,
a young lady a complete theory of the sacraments, as to
which neither has any doubt. ... A girl in a country par
sonage will be sure that Paris never can be taken, or that
Bismarck is a wretch " — all because they have either con
ceived these things at some moment with passion, or asso
ciated them with other things which they have conceived
with passion.

M. Kenouvier calls this belief of a thing for no other
reason than that we conceive it with passion, by the name
of mental vertigo.* Other objects whisper doubt or dis
belief ; but the object of passion makes us deaf to all but
itself, and we affirm it unhesitatingly. Such objects are the
delusions of insanity, which the insane person can at odd
moments steady himself against, but which again return to
sweep him off his feet. Such are the revelations of mysti
cism. Such, particularly, are the sudden beliefs which ani
mate mobs of men when frenzied impulse to action is
involved. Whatever be the action in point — whether the
stoning of a prophet, the hailing of a conqueror, the burn
ing of a witch, the baiting of a heretic or Jew, the starting
of a forlorn hope, or the flying from a foe — the fact that to
believe a certain object will cause that action to explode is a
sufficient reason for that belief to come. The motor im
pulse sweeps it unresisting in its train.

The whole history of witchcraft and early medicine is
a commentary on the facility with which anything which
chances to be conceived is believed the moment the belief
chimes in with an emotional mood. 'The cause of sickness?'
When a savage asks the cause of anything he means to ask
exclusively * What is to blame ? ' The theoretic curiosity
starts from the practical life's demands. Let some one then
accuse a necromancer, suggest a charm or spell which has
been cast, and no more ' evidence ' is asked for. What evi
dence is required beyond this intimate sense of the culprit's
responsibility, to which our very viscera and limbs reply ? f

* Psychologic Rationnelle, cb. 12.
f Two examples out of a thousand :

Reid, Inquiry, ch. n. § 9: "I remember, many years ago, a white ox
was brought into the country, of so enormous size that people came many

810 PSYCHOLOGY.

Human credulity in the way of therapeutics has similar
psychological roots. If there is anything intolerable (espe
cially to the heart of a woman), it is to do nothing when a

miles to see him. There happened, some months after, an uncommon
fatality among women in child-bearing. Two such uncommon events, fol
lowing one another, gave a suspicion of their connection, and occasioned
a common opinion among the country people that the white ox was the
cause of this fatality."

H. M. Stanley, Through the Dark Continent, 11. 888 : " On the third
day of our stay at Mowa, feeling quite comfortable amongst the people, on
account of their friendly bearing, I began to write in my note-book the
terms for articles, in order to improve my already copious vocabulary of
native words. I had proceeded only a few minutes when I observed i
strange commotion amongst the people who had been flocking about me,
and presently they ran away. In a short time we heard war-cries ringing
loudly and shrilly over the table-land. Two hours afterwards a long line
of warriors were seen descending the table-land and advancing towards
our camp. There may have been between five and six hundred of them.
We, on the other hand, had made but few preparations except such as.
would justify us replying to them in the event of the actual commence
ment of hostilities. But I had made many firm friends among them, and
I firmly believed that I should be able to avert an open rupture. When
they had assembled at about a hundred yards in front of our camp, Safeui
and I walked up towards them and sat down midway. Some half-dozen
of the Mowa people came near, and the shauri began.

"'What is the matter, my friends?' I asked. ' Why do you come
with guns in your hands, in such numbers, as though you were corning
to fight ? Fight ? fight us, your friends ! Tut ! this is some great mis
take, surely.'

"Mundele," replied one of them, . . . 'our people saw you yesterday
make marks on some tara-tara [paper]. This is very bad. Our country
will waste, our goats will die, our bananas will rot, and our women will
dry up. What have we done to you that you should wish to kill us ?
We have sold you food and we have brought you wine each day. Your
people are allowed to wander where they please without trouble. Why is
the Mundele so wicked ? We have gathered together to fight you if you
do not burn that tara-tara now before our eyes. If you burn it we go
away, and shall be your friends as heretofore.'

"I told them to rest there, and left Safeni in their hands as a pledge
that I should return. My tent was not fifty yards from the spot, but
while going towards it my brain was busy in devising some plan to foil
this superstitious madness. M.J note-book contained a vast number of val
uable notes. ... I could not sacrifice it to the childish caprice of savages.
As I was rummaging my book-box, I came across a volume of Shakespeare
[Chandos edition] much worn, and well thumbed, and which was of the
same size as my field-book ; its cover was similar also, and it might be
passed for the field-book, provided that no one remembered its appearance

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 311

loved one is sick or in pain. To do anything is a relief.
Accordingly, whatever remedy may be suggested is a spark
on inflammable soil. The mind makes its spring towards
action on that cue, sends for that remedy, and for a day at
least believes the danger past. Blame, dread, and hope are
thus the great belief-inspiring passions, and cover among
them the future, the present, and the past.

These remarks illustrate the earlier heads of the list on
page 292. Whichever represented objects give us sensa
tions, especially interesting ones, or incite our motor im
pulses, or arouse our hate, desire, or fear, are real enough
for us. Our requirements in the way of reality terminate in
our own acts and emotions, our own pleasures and pains.
These are the ultimate fixities from which, as we formerly
observed, the whole chain of our beliefs depends, object
hanging to object, as the bees, in swarming, hang to each
other until, de proche en proche, the supporting branch, the
Self, is reached and held.

BELIEF IN OBJECTS OF THEORY.

Now the merely conceived or imagined objects which
our mind represents as hanging to the sensations (causing
them, etc.), filling the gaps between them, and weaving their
interrupted chaos into order are innumerable. Whole sys
tems of them conflict with other systems, and our choice of

too well. I took it to them. ' Is this the tara-tara, friends, that you wish
burned? '

" 'Yes, yes, that is it.'

" ' Well, take it, and burn it, or keep it.'

' ' M— m. No, no, no. We will not touch it. It is fetish. You must
burn it. '

''I! Well, let it be so. I will do anything to please my good friends
of Mowa.'

" We walked to the nearest fire. I breathed a regretful farewell to my
genial companion, which, during my many weary hours of night, had
assisted to relieve my mind when oppressed by almost intolerable woes,
and then gravely consigned the innocent Shakespeare to the flames, heap
ing the brush fuel over it with ceremonious care.

"' A h-h,' breathed the poor deluded natives sighing their relief. . . .
' There is no trouble now.' . . . And something approaching to a cheer
was shouted among them, which terminated the episode of the burning of

312 PSYCHOLOGY.

which system shall carry our belief is governed by princi
ples which are simple enough, however subtle and difficult
may be their application to details. The conceived system, to
pass for true, must at least include the reality of the sensible
objects in it, by explaining them as effects on us, if nothing more.
The system which includes the most of them, and definitely ex-
plains or pretends to explain the most of them, will, ceteris
paribus, prevail It is needless to say how far mankind still
is from having excogitated such a system. But the various
materialisms, idealisms, and hylozoisms show with what in
dustry the attempt is forever made. It is conceivable that
several rival theories should equally well include the actual
order of our sensations in their scheme, much as the one-
fluid and two-fluid theories of electricity formulated all the
common electrical phenomena equally well. The sciences
are full of these alternatives. Which theory is then to be
believed ? That theory will be most generally believed which,
besides offering us objects abk to account satisfactorily for our
sensible experience, also offers those which are most interesting,
those tvhich appeal most 'urgently to our cesthetic, emotional, and
active needs. So here, in the higher intellectual life, the
same selection among general conceptions goes on which
went on among the sensations themselves. ^ First, a word
of their relation to our emotional and active needs— and
here I can do no better than quote from an article pub
lished some years ago :*

" A philosophy may be unimpeachable in other respects, but either
of two defects will be fatal to its universal acceptance. First, its ulti
mate principle must not be one that essentially baffles and disappoints
our dearest desires and most cherished powers. A pessimistic principle
like Schopenhauer's incurably vicious Will-substance, or Hartmann's
wicked jack-at-all-trades, the Unconscious, will perpetually call forth
essays at other philosophies. Incompatibility of the future with their
desires and active tendencies is, in fact, to most men a source of more
fixed disquietude than uncertainty itself. Witness the attempts to
overcome the 'problem of evil,' the ' mystery of pain.' There is no
problem of 'good.'

" But a second and worse defect in a philosophy than that ot <
tradicting our active propensities is to give them no Object whatever

»• Rationality, Activity,, and Faith' (Princeton Review, July 1882,
pp. 64-9).

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 313

to press against. A philosophy whose principle is so incommensurate
with our most intimate powers as to deny them all relevancy in univer
sal affairs, as to annihilate their motives at one blow, will be even more
unpopular than pessimism. Better face the enemy than the eternal
Void ! This is why materialism will always fail of universal adoption,
however well it may fuse things into an atomistic unity, however
clearly it may prophesy the future eternity. For materialism denies
reality to the objects of almost all the impulses which we most cherish.
The real meaning of the impulses, it says, is something which has no
emotional interest for us whatever. But what is called extradition is
quite as characteristic of our emotions as of our sense. Both point to an
Object as the cause of the present feeling. What an intensely objective
reference lies in fear ! In like manner an enraptured man, a dreary-
feeling man, are not simply aware of their subjective states ; if they
were, the force of their feelings would evaporate. Both believe there
is outward cause why they should feel as they do : either 'It is a glad
world ! how good is life ! ' or ' What a loathsome tedium is existence ! '
Any philosophy which annihilates the validity of the reference by ex
plaining away its objects or translating them into terms of no emo
tional pertinency leaves the mind with little to care or act for. This
is the opposite condition from that of nightmare, but when acutely
brought home to consciousness it produces a kindred horror. In night
mare we have motives to act, but no power ; here we have powers, but
no motives. A nameless Uriheimliclikeit comes over us at the thought
of there being nothing eternal in our final purposes, in the objects of
those loves and aspirations which are our deepest energies. The mon
strously lopsided equation of the universe and its knower, which we
postulate as the ideal of cognition, is perfectly paralleled by the no less
lopsided equation of the universe and the doer. We demand in it a
character for which our emotions and active propensities shall be a
match. Small as we are, minute as is the point by which the Cosmos
impinges upon each one of us, each one desires to feel that his reaction
at that point is congruous with the demands of the vast whole, that he
balances the latter, so to speak, and is able to do what it expects of
him. But as his abilities to ' do ' lie wholly in the line of his natural
propensities ; as he enjoys reaction with such emotions as fortitude,
hope, rapture, admiration, earnestness, and the like ; and as he very
unwillingly reacts with fear, disgust, despair, or doubt, —a philosophy
which should legitimate only emotions of the latter sort would be sure
to leave the mind a prey to discontent and craving.

" It is far too little recognized how entirely the intellect is built up
of practical interests. The theory of Evolution is beginning to do very
good service by its reduction of all mentality to the type of reflex action.
Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a cross-section at a
certain point of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon. In the
lower forms of life no one will pretend that cognition is anything more
than a guide to appropriate action. The germinal question concerning

314 PSYCHOLOGY.

things brought for the first time before consciousness is not the theo
retic ' What is that ?' but the practical ' Who goes there ? ' or rather, as
Horwicz has admirably put it, 'What is to be done?' — ' Was fang* ich
an ? ' iu all our discussions about the intelligence of lower animals the
only tebC we use is that of their acting as if for a purpose. Cognition,
in short, is incomplete until discharged in act. And although it is true
that the iater mental development, which attains its maximum through
the hypertrophied cerebrum of man, gives birth to a vast amount of
theoretic activity over and above that which is immediately ministerial
to practice, yet the earlier claim is only postponed, not effaced, and the
active nature asserts its rights to the end.

' ' If there be any truth at all in this view, it follows that however
vaguely a philosopher may define the ultimate universal datum, he can
not be said to leave it unknown to us so long as he in the slightest
degree pretends that our emotional or active attitude towards it should
be of one sort rather than another. He who says, ' Life is real, life is
earnest,' however much he may speak of the fundamental mysterious-
ness of things, gives a distinct definition to that mysteriousness by
ascribing to it the right to claim from us the particular mood called
seriousness, which means the willingness to live with energy, though
energy bring pain. The same is true of him who says that all is vanity.
Indefinable as the predicate vanity may be in se, it is clearly enough
something which permits anaesthesia, mere escape from suffering, to be
our rule of life. There is no more ludicrous incongruity than for
agnostics to proclaim with one breath that the substance of things is
unknowable, and with the next that the thought of it should inspire us
with admiration of its glory, reverence, and a willingness to add our co
operative push in the direction towards which its manifestations seem
to be drifting. The unknowable may be unfathomed, but if it make
such distinct demands upon our activity, we surely are not ignorant of
its essential quality.

" If we survey the field of history and ask what feature all great
periods of revival, of expansion of the human mind, display in common,
we shall find, I think, simply this : that each and all of them have said
to the human being, ' The inmost nature of the reality is congenial to
powers which you possess.' In what did the emancipating message of
primitive Christianity consist, but in the announcement that God rec
ognizes those weak and tender impulses which paganism had so rudely
overlooked ? Take repentance : the man who can do nothing rightly can
at least repent of his failures. But for paganism this faculty of re
pentance was a pure supernumerary, a straggler too late for the fair.
Christianity took it and made it the one power within us which appealed
straight to the heart of God. And after the night of the Middle Ages
had so long branded with obloquy even the generous impulses of the flesh,
and defined the Reality to be such that only slavish natures could com
mune with it, in what did the Sursum corda ! of the Renaissance lie
but in the proclamation that the archetype of verity in things laid claim

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 315

on the widest activity of our whole aesthetic being? What were
Luther's mission and Wesley's but appeals to powers which even the
meanest of men might carry with them, faith and self-despair, but
which were personal, requiring no priestly intermediation, and which
brought their owner face to face with God ? What caused the wild-fire
influence of Rousseau but the assurance he gave that man's nature
was in harmony with the nature of things, if only the paralyzing cor
ruptions of custom would stand from between ? How did Kant and
Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, inspire their time with cheer, except by
saying, « Use all your powers ; that is the only obedience which the uni
verse exacts'? And Carlyle with his gospel of Work, of Fact, of Ve
racity, how does he move us except by saying that the universe 'imposes
no tasks upon us but such as the most humble can perform ? Emerson's
creed that everything that ever was or will be is here in the enveloping
Now ; that man has but to obey himself—' He who will rest in what he
is, is a part of Destiny '—is in like manner nothing but an exorcism of
all scepticism as to the pertinency of one's natural faculties.

" In a word, l Son of Man, stand upon thy feet and I will speak
unto thee ! ' is the only revelation of truth to which the solving epochs
have helped the disciple. But that has been enough to satisfy the
greater part of his rational need. In se and per se the universal essence
has hardly been more defined by any of these formula than by the
agnostic x; but the mere assurance that my powers, such as they are
are not irrelevant to it, but pertinent, that it speaks to them and will
in some way recognize their reply, that I can be a match for it if I will,
and not a footless waif, suffices to make it rational to my feeling m the
sense given above. Nothing could be more absurd than to hope for the
definitive triumph of any philosophy which should refuse to legitimate,
and to legitimate in an emphatic manner, the more powerful of our
emotional and practical tendencies. Fatalism, whose solving word in
all crises of behavior is * All striving is vain,' will never reign supreme,
for the impulse to take life strivingly is indestructible in the race!
Moral creeds which speak to that impulse will be widely successful m
spite of inconsistency, vagueness, and shadowy determination of expec
tancy. Man needs a rule for his will, and will invent one if one be not
given him."

After the emotional and active needs come the intellec
tual and aesthetic ones. The two great aesthetic principles,
of richness and of ease, dominate our intellectual as well
as our sensuous life. And, ceteris paribus, no system which
should not be rich, simple, and harmonious would have a
chance of being chosen for belief, if rich, simple, and har
monious systems were also there. Into the latter we should
unhesitatingly settle, with that welcoming attitude of the will

316 PSYCHOLOGY.

in which belief consists. To quote from a remarkable
book :

" This law that our consciousness constantly tends to the minimum
of complexity and to the maximum of definiteness, is of great impor
tance for all our knowledge. . . . Our own activity of attention will time
determine what we are to know and what we are to believe. If things
have more than a certain complexity, not only will our limited powers
of attention forbid us to unravel this complexity, but we shall strongly
desire to believe the things much simpler than they are. For oui
thoughts about them will have a constant tendency to become as simple
and definite as possible. Put a man into a perfect chaos of phenomena
-sounds, sights, feelings— and if the man continued to exist, and 1
be rational at all, his attention would doubtless soon find for him away
to make up some kind of rhythmic regularity, which he would impute
to the things about him, so as to imagine that he had discovered some
laws of sequence in this mad new world. And thus, in every case
where we fancy ourselves sure of a simple law of Nature, we must re
member that a great deal of the fancied simplicity may be due, in the
given case, nqt to Nature, but to the ineradicable prejudice of our own
minds in favor of regularity and simplicity. All our thoughts are de
termined, in great measure, by this law of least effort, as it is found
exemplified in our activity of attention. ... The aim of the whole
process seems to be to reach as complete and united a conception of
reality as possible, a conception wherein the greatest fulness of data
shall be combined with the greatest simplicity of conception. The effort
of consciousness seems to be to combine the greatest richness of content
with the greatest definiteness of organization."*

The richness is got by including all the facts of sense
in the scheme ; the simplicity, by deducing them out of the
smallest possible number of permanent and independent
primordial entities : the definite organization, by assimi
lating these latter to ideal objects between which relations
of an inwardly rational sort obtain. What these ideal ob
jects and rational relations are will require a separate
chapter to show.f Meanwhile, enough has surely been said
to justify the assertion made above that no general offhand
answer can be given as to which objects mankind shall
choose as its realities. The fight is still under way. Our
minds are yet chaotic ; and at best we make a mixture and

* J. Royce, The Religious Aspect of Philosophy (Boston, 1885), pp
317-57.

\ Chapter XXVII.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 317

a compromise, as we yield to the claim of this interest or
that, and follow first one and then another principle in
turn. It is undeniably true that materialistic, or so-called
' scientific,' conceptions of the universe have so far gratified
the purely intellectual interests more than the mere senti
mental conceptions have. But, on the other hand, as
already remarked, they leave the emotional and active
interests cold. The perfect object of belief would be a God or
1 Soul of the World? represented both optimistically and moral-
istically (if such a combination could be), and withal so defi
nitely conceived as to shoiv us lohy our phenomenal experiences
should be sent to us by Him in just the very tuay in which they
come. All Science and all History would thus be accounted
for in the deepest and simplest fashion. The very room in
which I sit, its sensible walls and floor, and the feeling the
air and fire within it give me, no less than the ' scientific '
conceptions w^hich I am urged to frame concerning the
mode of existence of all these phenomena when my back is
turned, would then all be corroborated, not de-realized, by
the ultimate principle of my belief. The AVorld-soul sends
me just those phenomena in order that I may react upon
them ; and among the reactions is the intellectual one of
spinning these conceptions. What is beyond the crude
experiences is not an alternative to them, but something
that means them for me here and now. It is safe to say
that, if ever such a system is satisfactorily excogitated,
mankind will drop all other systems and cling to that one
alone as real. Meanwhile the other systems coexist with
the attempts at that one, and, all being alike fragmentary,
each has its little audience and day.

I have now, I trust, shown sufficiently what the psycho
logic sources of the sense of reality are. Certain postulates
are given in our nature ; and whatever satisfies those pos
tulates is treated as if real.* I might therefore finish the

* Prof. Royce puts this well in discussing idealism and the reality of an
' external ' world. " If the history of popular speculation on these topics
could be written, how much of cowardice and shuffling would be found in
the behavior of the natural mind before the question, ' How dost thou
know of an external reality ?' Instead of simply and plainly answering:
' I mean by the external world in the first place something that I accept

318 PSYCHOLOGY.

chapter here, were it not that a few additional words will
set the truth in a still clearer light.

DOUBT.

There is hardly a common man who (if consulted)
would not say that things come to us in the first instance
as ideas; and that if we take them for realities, it is because
we add something to them, namely, the predicate of having
also ' real existence outside of our thought.' This notion that
a higher faculty than the mere having of a conscious con
tent is needed to make us know anything real by its means
has pervaded psychology from the earliest times, and is the
tradition of Scholasticism, Kantism, and Common-sense.
Just as sensations must come as inward affections and then
be 'extradited ;' as objects of memory must appear at first
as presently unrealities, and subsequently be 'projected'
backwards as past realities ; so conceptions must be entia
rationis till a higher faculty uses them as windows to look
beyond the ego, into the real extra-mental world ; — so runs
the orthodox and popular account.

And there is no question that this is a true account of
the way in which many of our later beliefs come to pass.
The logical distinction between the bare thought of an object
and belief in the object's reality is often a chronological
distinction as well. The having and the crediting of an

or demand, that I posit, postulate, actively construct on the basis of sense-
data,' the natural man gives us all kinds of vague compromise answers.
Where shall these endless turnings and twistings have an end? ...... All

these lesser motives are appealed to, and the one ultimate motive is
neglected. The ultimate motive with the man of every-day life is the will
to have an external world. Whatever consciousness contains, reason will
persist in spontaneously adding the thought: ' But there shall be something
beyond this.' . . . The popular assurance of an external world is ikefsced
determination to make one, now and henceforth." (Religious Aspect of
Philosophy, p. 304 — the italics are my own.) This immixture of the will
appears most flagrantly in the fact that although external matter is
doiibted commonly enough, minds external to our own are never doubted.
We need them too much, are too essentially social to dispense with them.
Semblances of matter may suffice to react upon, but not semblances of
communing souls. A psychic solipsism is too hideous a mockery of our
wants, and, so far as I know, has never been seriously entertained.--
Chapters ix and x of Prof. Royce's work are on the whole the clearest
account of the psychology ef belief with which lam acquainted.

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 319

idea do not always coalesce ; for often we first suppose and
then believe ; first play with the notion, frame the hypoth
esis, and then affirm the existence, of an object of thought.
And we are quite conscious of the succession of the two
mental acts. But these cases are none of them primitive
cases. They only occur in minds long schooled to doubt
by the contradictions of experience. The primitive impulse
is to affirm immediately the reality of all that is conceived.*
When we do doubt, however, in what does the subsequent
resolution of the doubt consist? It either consists in a
purely verbal performance, the coupling of the adjectives
' real ' or * outwardly existing ' (as predicates) to the thing
originally conceived (as subject) ; or it consists in the per
ception in the given case of that for which these adjectives, ab
stracted from other similar concrete cases, stand. But what
these adjectives stand for, we now know well. They stand
for certain relations (immediate, or through intermediaries)
to ourselves. Whatever concrete objects have hitherto stood
in those relations have been for us ' real,' ' outwardly exist
ing.' So that when we now abstractly admit a thing to be
' real' (without perhaps going through any definite percep-

* " The leading fact in Belief, according to my view of it, is our Primi
tive Credulity. We begin by believing everything ; whatever is, is true.
. . . The animal born in the morning of a summer day proceeds upon the
fact of daylight ; assumes the perpetuity of that fact. Whatever it is
disposed to do, it does without misgivings. If in the morning it began a
round of operations continuing for hours, under the full benefit of day
light, it would unhesitatingly begin the same round in the evening. Its
state of mind is practically one of unbounded confidence ; but, as yet, it
does not understand what confidence means.

' ' The pristine assurance is soon met by checks ; a disagreeable experience
leading to new insight. To be thwarted and opposed is one of our earliest
and most frequent pains. It develops the sense of a distinction between
free and obstructed impulses ; the unconsciousness of an open way is ex
changed for consciousness ; we are now said properly to believe in what
has never been contradicted, as we disbelieve in what has been contradicted.
We believe that, after the dawn of day, there is before us a continuance
of light ; we do not believe that this light is to continue forever.

" Thus, the vital circumstance in belief is never to be contradicted — never
to lose prestige. The number of repetitions counts for little in the process:
we are as much convinced after ten as after fifty ; we are more convinced
by ten unbroken than by fifty for and one against," (Bain ; The Emotions
and the Will, pp. 511, 512.)

320 PSYCHOLOGY.

tion of its relations), it is as if we said " it belongs in the
same world with those other objects." Naturally enough,
we have hourly opportunities for this summary process of
belief. All remote objects in space or time are believed in
this way. When I believe that some prehistoric savage
chipped this flint, for example, the reality of the savage and
of his act makes no direct appeal either to my sensation,
emotion, or volition. What I mean by my belief in it is
simply my dim sense of a continuity between the long dead
savage and his doings and the present world of which the
flint forms part. It is pre-eminently a case for applying
our doctrine of the ' fringe ' (see Vol I. p. 258). When I think
the savage with one fringe of relationship, I believe in him ;
when I think him without that fringe, or with another one
(as, e.g., if I should class him with * scientific vagaries ' in
general), I disbelieve him. The word ' real ' itself is, in
short, a fringe.

RELATIONS OF BELIEF AND -WILL.

We shall see in Chapter XXV that will consists in
nothing but a manner of attending to certain objects, or
consenting to their stable presence before the mind. The
objects, in the case of will, are those whose existence
depends on our thought, movements of our own body for
example, or facts which such movements executed in future
may make real. Objects of belief, on the contrary, are those
which do not change according as we think regarding them.
I will to get up early to-morrow morning ; I believe that I
got up late yesterday morning; I will that my foreign
bookseller in Boston shall procure me a German book and
write to him to that effect. I believe that he will make me
pay three dollars for it when it comes, etc. Now the im
portant thing to notice is that this difference between the
objects of will and belief is entirely immaterial, as far as
the relation of the mind to them goes. All that the mind
does is in both cases the same ; it looks at the object and
consents to its existence, espouses it, says 'it shall be my
reality.' It turns to it, in short, in the interested active
emotional way. The rest is done by nature, which in some
cases makes the objects real which we think of in this-

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 321

manner, and in other cases does not. Nature cannot change
the past to suit our thinking. She cannot change the stars
or the winds ; but she does change our bodies to suit our
thinking, and through their instrumentality changes much
besides ; so the great practical distinction between objects
which we may will or unwill, and objects which we can merely
believe or disbelieve, grows up, and is of course one of the
most important distinctions in the world. Its roots, how
ever, do not lie in psychology, but in physiology ; as the
chapter on Volition will abundantly make plain. Will and
Belief, in short, meaning a certain relation bettveen objects and
the Self, are tivo names for one and the same PSYCHOLOGICAL
phenomenon. All the questions which arise concerning one
are questions which arise concerning the other. The causes
and conditions of the peculiar relation must be the same
in both. The free-will question arises as regards belief.
If our wills are indeterminate, so must our beliefs be, etc.
The first act of free-will, in short, would naturally be to
believe in free-will, etc. In Chapter XXYI, I shall mention
this again.

A practical observation may end this chapter. If belief
consists in an emotional reaction of the entire man on an
object, how can we believe at will ? We cannot control our
emotions. Truly enough, a man cannot believe at will
abruptly. Nature sometimes, and indeed not very infre
quently, produces instantaneous conversions for us. She
suddenly puts us in an active connection with objects of
which she had till then left us cold. " I realize for the first
time," we then say, " what that means !" This happens often
with moral propositions. We have often heard them ; but
now they shoot into our lives ; they move us ; we feel their
living force. Such instantaneous beliefs are truly enough not
to be achieved by will. But gradually our will can lead us to
the same results by a very simple method : we need only
in cold blood ACT as if the thing in question were real, and keep
acting as if it were real, and it will infallibly end by growing
into such a connection with our life that it will become real.
It will become so knit with habit and emotion that our
interests in it will be those which characterize belief.

822 PSYCHOLOGY.

Those to whom ' God ' and ' Duty ' are now mere names
can make them much more than that, if they make a little
sacrifice to them every day. But all this is so well known
in moral and religious education that I need say no more.*

* Literature. D. Hume : Treatise on Human Nature, part in. §§ vii-
x. A. Bain : Emotions and Will, chapter on Belief (also pp. 20 ff).
J. Sully: Sensation and Intuition, essay iv. J. Mill: Analysis of Human
Mind, chapter xi. Ch. Renouvier : Psychologic Rationnelle, vol. n.
pt. ii ; and Esquisse d'une Classification systematique des Doctrines
Philosophiques, part vi. J. H. Newman: The Grammar of Assent. J.
Venn: Some Characteristics of Belief. V. Brochard : De 1'Erreur, part
n. chap, vi, ix ; and Revue Philosophique, xxvm. 1. E. Rabier : Psy
chologic, chap xxi, Appendix. OlleLaprune: La Certitude Morale (1881).
G. F. Stout: On Genesis of Cognition of Physical Reality, in ' Mind,' Jan.
1890. J. Pikler: The Psychology of the Belief in Objective Existence
(London, 1890). — Mill says that we believe present sensations ; and makes
our belief in all other things a matter of association with these. So far so
good; but as he makes no mention of emotional or volitional reaction, Bain
rightly charges him with treating belief as a purely intellectual state. For
Bain belief is rather an incident of our active life. When a thing is such
as to make us act on it, then we believe it, according to Bain. " But how
about past things, or remote things, upon which no reaction of ours is pos
sible? And how about belief in things which check action?" says Sully;
who considers that we believe a thing only when "the idea of it has an in
herent tendency to approximate in character and intensity to a sensation."
It is obvious that each of these authors emphasizes a true aspect of the
question. My own account has sought to be more complete, sensation,
association, and active reaction all being acknowledged to be concerned.
The most compendious possible formula perhaps would be that our belief
and attention are the same fact. For the moment, what we attend to is
reality ; Attention is a motor reaction; and we are so made that sensations
force attention from us. On Belief and Conduct see an article by Leslie
Stephen, Fortnightly Review, July 1888.

A set of facts have been recently brought to my attention which I
hardly know how to treat, so I say a word about them in this footnote. I
refer to a type of experience which has frequently found a place amongst
the ' Yes' answers to the ' Census of Hallucinations,' and which is gener
ally described by those who report it as an ' impression of the presence ' of
someone near them, although no sensation either of sight, hearing, or touch
is involved. From the way in which this experience is spoken of by those
who have had it, it would appear to be an extremely definite and positive
state of mind, coupled with a belief in the reality of its object quite as
strong as any direct sensation ever gives. And yet no sensation seems to
be connected with it at all. Sometimes the person whose nearness is thus
impressed is a known person, dead or living, sometimes an unknown one.
His attitude and situation are often very definitely impressed, and so, some
times (though not by way of hearing), are words which he wishes to say.

The phenomenon, would seem to be due to a pure conception becoming

THE PERCEPTION OF REALITY. 32U

saturated with the sort of stinging urgency which ordinarily only sensa
tions bring. But I cannot yet persuade myself that the urgency in ques
tion consists in concomitant emotional and motor impulses. The ' impres
sion ' may come quite suddenly and depart quickly; it may cany no
emotional suggestions, and wake no motor consequences beyond those
involved in attending to it. Altogether, the matter is somewhat paradoxical,
and no conclusion can be come to until more definite data are obtained.

Perhaps the most curious case of the sort which I have received is the
following. The subject of the observation, Mr. P., is an exceptionally
intelligent witness, though the words of the narrative are his wife's.

4 ' Mr. P. has all his life been the occasional subject of rather singular
delusions or impressions of various kinds. If I had belief in the existence
of latent or embryo faculties, other than the five senses, I should explain
them on that ground. Being totally blind, his other perceptions are
abnormally keen and developed, and given the existence of a rudimentary
sixth sense, it would be only natural that this also should be more acute in
him than in others. One of the most interesting of his experiences in this
line was the frequent apparition of a corpse some years ago, which may be
worth the attention of your Committee on that subject. At the time Mr.
P. had a music-room in Boston on Beacon Street, where he used to do
severe and protracted practice with little interruption. Now, all one season
it was a very familiar occurrence with him while in the midst of work to
feel a o^ld draft of air suddenly upon his face, with a prickling sensation
at the loots of his hair, when he would turn from the piano, and a figure
which he knew to be dead would come sliding under the crack of the door
from without, flattening itself to squeeze through and rounding out again
to the human form. It was of a middle-aged man, and drew itself along
the carpet on hands and knees, but with head thrown back till it reached
the sofa, upon which it stretched itself. It remained some moments, but
vanished always if Mr. P. spoke or made a decided movement. The most
singular point in the occurrence was its frequent repetition. He might
expect it on any day between two and four o'clock, and it came always
heralded by the same sudden cold shiver, and was invariably the same fig
ure which went through the same movements. He afterwards traced the
whole experience to strong tea. He was in the habit of taking cold tea,
which always stimulates him, for lunch, and on giving up this practice he
never saw this or any other apparition again. However, even allowing, as
is doubtless true, that the event was a delusion of nerves first fatigued by
overwork and then excited by this stimulant, there is one point which is
still wholly inexplicable and highly interesting to me. Mr. P. has no
memory whatever of sight, nor conception of it. It is impossible for him
to form any idea of what we mean by light or color, consequently he has
no cognizance of any object which does not reach his sense of hearing or
of touch, though these are so acute as to give a contrary impression some
times to other people. When he becomes aware of the presence of a person
or an object, by means which seem mysterious to outsiders, he can always
trace it naturally and legitimately to slight echoes, perceptible only to his
keen ears, or to differences in atmospheric pressure, perceptible only to his
acute nerves of touch; but with the apparition described, for the only time
in his xperience, he was aware of presence, size, and appearance, without

324 PSYCHOLOGY.

the use of either of these mediums. The figure never produced the least
sound nor came within a number of feet of his person, yet he knew that it
was a man, that it moved, and in what direction, even that it wore a full
beard, which, like the thick curly hair, was partially gray; also that it was
dressed in the style of suit known as 'pepper and salt.' These points were
jill perfectly distinct and invariable each time. If asked how he perceived
them, he will answer he cannot tell, he simply knew it, and so strongly and
so distinctly that it is impossible to shake his opinion as to the exact details
of the man's appearance. It would seem that in this delusion of the senses-
he really saw, as he has never done in the actual experiences of life, except
in the first two years of childhood."

On cross-examining Mr. P., I could not make out that there was any
thing like visual imagination involved, although he was quite unable to
describe in just what terms the false perception was carried on. It seemed
to be more like an intensely definite conception than anything else, a con-
ception to which the feeling of present reality was attached, but in no such
shape as easily to fall under the heads laid down in my text.

CHAPTER XXII *

REASONING.

WE talk of man being the rational animal ; and the tra
ditional intellectualist philosophy has always made a great
point of treating the brutes as wholly irrational creatures.
Nevertheless, it is by no means easy to decide just what is
meant by reason, or how the peculiar thinking process
called reasoning differs from other thought-sequences which
may lead to similar results.

Much of our thinking consists of trains of images sug
gested one by another, of a sort of spontaneous revery of
which it seems likely enough that the higher brutes should
be capable. This sort of thinking leads nevertheless to
rational conclusions, both practical and theoretical. The
links between the terms are either ' contiguity ' or ' similar
ity,' and with a mixture of both these things we can hard
ly be very incoherent. As a rule, in this sort of irrespon
sible thinking, the terms which fall to be coupled together
are empirical concretes, not abstractions. A sunset may
call up the vessel's deck from which I saw one last summer,
the companions of my voyage, my arrival into port, etc.; or
it may make me think of solar myths, of Hercules' and
Hector's funeral pyres, of Homer and whether he could
write, of the Greek alphabet, etc. If habitual contiguities
predominate, we have a prosaic mind ; if rare contiguities,
or similarities, have free play, we call the person fanciful,
poetic, or witty. But the thought as a rule is of matters
taken in their entirety. Having been thinking of one, we
find later that we are thinking of another, to which we haye
been lifted along, we hardly know how. If an abstract

* The substance of this chapter, and a good many pages of the text,
originally appeared in an article entitled ' Brute and Human Intellect,' in
the Journal of Speculative Philosophy for July 1878 (vol. xn. p. 236).

325

326 PSYCHOLOGY.

quality figures in the procession, it arrests our attention
but for a moment, and fades into something else ; and is
never very abstract. Thus, in thinking of the sun-myths, we
may have a gleam of admiration at the gracefulness of the
primitive human mind, or a moment of disgust at the nar
rowness of modern interpreters. But, in the main, we
think less of qualities than of whole things, real or possi
ble, just as we may experience them.

The upshot of it may be that we are reminded of some
practical duty : we write a letter to a friend abroad, or we
take down the lexicon and study our Greek lesson. Our
thought is rational, and leads to a rational act, but it can
hardly be called reasoning in a strict sense of the term.

There are other shorter flights of thought, single coup
lings of terms which suggest one another by association,
which approach more to what would commonly be classed
as acts of reasoning proper. Those are where a present sign
suggests an unseen, distant, or future reality. Where the
sign and what it suggests are both concretes which have
been coupled together on previous occasions, the inference
is common to both brutes and men, being really nothing
more than association by contiguity. A and B, dinner-bell
and dinner, have been experienced in immediate succes
sion. Hence A no sooner falls upon the sense than B is
anticipated, and steps are taken to meet it. The whole
education of our domestic beasts, all the cunning added by
age and experience to wild ones, and the greater part of
our human knowingness consists in the ability to make a
mass of inferences of this simplest sort. Our ' perceptions/
or recognitions of what objects are before us, are inferences
of this kind. We feel a patch of color, and we say ' a dis
tant house,' a whiff of odor crosses us, and we say ' a
skunk,' a faint sound is heard, and we call it ' a railroad
train.' Examples are needless ; for such inferences of sen
sations not presented form the staple and tissue of our
perceptive life, and our Chapter XIX was full of them,
illusory or veracious. They have been called unconscious
inferences. Certainly we are commonly unconscious that
we are inferring at all. The sign and the signified melt
into what seems to us the object of a single pulse of

REASONING. 327

thought. Immediate inferences would be a good name for
these simple acts of reasoning requiring but two terms,*
were it not that formal logic has already appropriated the
expression for a more technical use.

'RECEPTS.'

In these first and simplest inferences the conclusion
may follow so continuously upon the ' sign ' that the latter
is not discriminated or attended to as a separate object by the
mind. Even now we can seldom define the optical signs
which lead us to infer the shapes and distances of the ob
jects which by their aid we so unhesitatingly perceive.
The objects, too, when thus inferred, are general objects.
The dog crossing a scent thinks of a deer in general, or of
another dog in general, not of a particular deer or dog. To
these most primitive abstract objects Dr. G. J. Bomanes
gives the name of recepts or generic ideas, to distinguish
them from concepts and general ideas properly so called. f
They are not analyzed or defined, but only imagined.

u It requires but a slight analysis of our ordinary mental processes
to prove that all our simpler ideas are group-arrangements which have
been formed spontaneously or without any of that intentionally com
paring, sifting, and combining process which is required in the higher
departments of ideational activity. The comparing, sifting, and com
bining is here done, as it were, for the conscous agent, not by him.
Recepts are received ; it is only concepts that require to be conceived.
... If I am crossing a street and hear behind me a sudden shout, I
do not require to wait in order to predicate to myself that there is prob
ably a hansom-cab just about to run me down : a cry of this kind, and
in those circumstances, is so intimately associated in my mind with its

* I see no need of assuming more than two terms in this sort of reason
ing — first, the sign, and second, the thing inferred from it. Either may
be complex, but essentially it is but A calling up B, and no middle term is
involved. M. Binet, in his most intelligent little book, La Psychologic du
Raisouuement, maintains that there are three terms. The present sensa
tion or sign must, according to him, first evoke from the past an image
which resembles it and fuses with it, and the things suggested or inferred
are always the contiguous associates of this intermediate image, and not of
the immediate sensation. The reader of Chapter XIX will see why I do
not believe in the ' image ' in question as a distinct psychic fact.

f Mental Evolution in Man (1889), chapters in and iv. See especially
pp. 68-80, and later 353, 396.

328 PSYCHOLOGY.

purpose, that the idea which it arouses need not rise above the level ot
a recept ; and the adaptive movements on my part which that idea im
mediately prompts are performed without any intelligent reflection.
Yet, on the other hand, they are neither reflex actions nor instinctive
actions ; they are what may be termed receptual actions, or actions de
pending on recepts." *

" How far can this kind of unnamed or non-conceptional
ideation extend ?" Dr. Romanes asks ; and answers by a
variety of examples taken from the life of brutes, for which
I must refer to his book. One or two of them, however, I
will quote :

" Houzeau writes that while crossing a wide and arid plain in Texas,
his two dogs suffered greatly from thirst, and that between thirty and
forty times they rushed down the hollows to search for water. The hol
lows were not valleys, and there were no trees in them, or any other
difference in the vegetation ; and as they were absolutely dry, there
could have been no smell of damp earth. The dogs behaved as if they
knew that a dip in the ground offered them the best chance of finding
water, and Houzeau has often witnessed the same behavior in other ani
mals. . . .

" Mr. Darwin writes : ' When I say to my terrier in an eager voice
(and I have made the trial many times), " Hi ! hi ! where is it ? " she at
once takes it as a sign that something is to be hunted, and generally
first looks quickly all round, and then rushes into the nearest thicket,
to scout for any game, but finding nothing she looks up into any neigh-
boring tree for a squirrel. Now do not these actions clearly show that
she had in her mind a general idea, or concept, that some animal is to
be discovered and hunted ? '" f

They certainly show this. But the idea in question is
of an object about which nothing farther may be articulately
known. The thought of it prompts to activity, but to no
theoretic consequence. Similarly in the following ex
ample :

"Water-fowl adopt a somewhat different mode of alighting upon
land, or even upon ice, from that which they adopt when alighting
upon water; and those kinds which dive from a height (such as terns
and gannets) never do so upon land or upon ice. These facts prove
that the animals have one recept answering to a solid surface, and an
other answering to a fluid. Similarly a man will not dive from a height
over hard ground or over ice, nor will he jump into water in the same
way as he jumps upon dry land. In other words, like the water-fowl

* Loc. cit. p. 50. t P- 52.

REASONING. 329

he has two distinct recepts, one of which answers to solid ground, and
the other to an unresisting fluid. But unlike the water-fowl he is able
to bestow upon each of these recepts a name, and thus to raise them
both to the level of concepts. So far as the practical purposes of loco
motion are concerned, it is of course immaterial whether or not he thus
raises his recepts into concepts ; but ... for many other purposes it is
of the highest importance that he is able to do this. " *

IN REASONING, WE PICK OUT ESSENTIAL QUALITIES,

The chief of these purposes is predication, a theoretic
function which, though it always leads eventually to some
kind of action, yet tends as often as not to inhibit the imme
diate motor response to which the simple inferences of
which we have been speaking give rise. In reasoning, A
may suggest B ; but B, instead of being an idea which is
simply obeyed by us, is an idea which suggests the distinct
additional idea C. And where the train of suggestion is one
of reasoning distinctively so called as contrasted with mere
revery or * associative ' sequence, the ideas bear certain
inward relations to each other which we must proceed to
examine with some care.

The result C yielded by a true act of reasoning is apt
to be a thing voluntarily sought, such as the means to a
proposed end, the ground for an observed effect, or the
effect of an assumed cause. All these results may be
thought of as concrete things, but they are not suggested im
mediately by other concrete things, as in the trains of simply as
sociative thought. They are linked to the concretes which
precede them by intermediate steps, and these steps are
formed by general characters articulately denoted and ex
pressly analyzed out. A thing inferred by reasoning need
neither have been an habitual associate of the datum from
which we infer it, nor need it be similar to it. It may be
a thing entirely unknown to our previous experience, some
thing which no simple association of concretes could ever
have evoked. The great difference, in fact, between that
simpler kind of rational thinking which consists in the con
crete objects of past experience merely suggesting each
other, and reasoning distinctively so called, is this, that

* Loc. cit. p. 74.

330 PSYCHOLOGY.

whilst the empirical thinking is only reproductive, reason
ing is productive. An empirical, or l rule-of-thumb,' thinker
can deduce nothing from data with whose behavior and
associates in the concrete he is unfamiliar. But put a
reasoner amongst a set of concrete objects which he has
neither seen nor heard of before, and with a little time, if
he is a good reasoner, he will make such inferences from
them as will quite atone for his ignorance. Reasoning
helps us out of unprecedented situations — situations for
which all our common associative wisdom, all the ' educa
tion ' which we share in common with the beasts, leaves us
without resource.

Let us make this ability to deal with NOVEL data the tech
nical differentia of reasoning. This will sufficiently mark
it out from common associative thinking, and will immedi
ately enable us to say just what peculiarity it contains.

It contains analysis and abstraction. Whereas the merely
empirical thinker stares at a fact in its entirety, and remains
helpless, or gets * stuck,' if it suggests no concomitant or
similar, the reasoner breaks it up and notices some one of
its separate attributes. This attribute he takes to be the
essential part of the whole fact before him. This attribute
has properties or consequences which the fact until then
was not known to have, but which, now that it is noticed
to contain the attribute, it must have.

Call the fact or concrete datum S ;
the essential attribute M ;
the attribute's property P.

Then the reasoned inference of P from S cannot be
made without M's intermediation. The * essence ' M is
thus that third or middle term in the reasoning which a
moment ago was pronounced essential, for his original
concrete S the reasoner substitutes its abstract property, M.
What is true of M, what is coupled with M, then holds
true of S, is coupled with S. As M is properly one of the
parts of the entire S, reasoning may then be very well defined
as the substitution of parts and their implications or consequences
for wholes. And the art of the reasoner will consist of two
stages :

REASONING. 331

First, sagacity* or the ability to discover what part, M,
lies embedded in the whole S which is before him ;

Second, learning, or the ability to recall promptly M's
consequences, concomitants, or implications. t

If we glance at the ordinary syllogism —

MisP;
S isM;

. • . S is P

* J. Locke, Essay cone. Hum. Understanding, bk. iv. chap. n. § 3.

f To be sagacious is to be a good observer. J. S. Mill has a passage
which is so much in the spirit of the text that I cannot forbear to quote it.
"The observer is not he who merely sees the thing which is before his
eyes, but he who sees what parts that thing is composed of. To do this
well is a rare talent. One person, from inattention, or attending only in
the wrong place, overlooks half of what he sees ; another sets down much
more than he sees, confounding it with what he imagines, or with what
he infers ; another takes note of the kind of all the circumstances, but
being inexpert in estimating their degree, leaves the quantity of each
vague and uncertain ; another sees indeed the whole, but makes such
an awkward division of it into parts, throwing things into one mass
which require to be separated, and separating others which might more
conveniently be considered as one, that the result is much the same,
sometimes even worse, than if no analysis had been attempted at all. It
would be possible to point out what qualities of mind, and modes of
mental culture, fit a person for being a good observer : that, however, is
a question not of Logic, but of the Theory of Education, in the most en
larged sense of the term. There is not properly an Art of Observing.
There may be rules for observing. But these, like rules for inventing, are
properly instructions for the preparation of one's own mind ; for putting
it into the state in which it will be most fitted to observe, or most likely to
invent, They are, therefore, essentially rules of self-education, which is
a different thing from Logic. They do not teach how to do the thing,
but how to make ourselves capable of doing it. They are an art of
strengthening the limbs, not an art of using them. The extent and minute
ness of observation which may be requisite, and the degree of decomposi
tion to which it may be necessary to cany the mental analysis, depend on
the particular purpose in view. To ascertain the state of the whole uni
verse at any particular moment is impossible, but would also be useless.
In making chemical experiments, we do not think it necessary to note the
position of the planets ; because experience has shown, as a very superficial
experience is sufficient to show, that in such cases that circumstance is not
material to the result : and accordingly, in the ages when man believed in
the occult influences of the heavenly bodies, it might have been unphilo-
sophical to omit ascertaining the precise condition of those bodies at the
moment of the experiment." (Logic, bk. m. chap. vn. § 1. Cf. also bk.
iv. chap. TI.)

332 PSYCHOLOGY.

—we see that the second or minor premise, the 'subsump-
tion ' as it is sometimes called, is the one requiring the sa
gacity ; the first or major the one requiring the fertility, or
fulness of learning. Usually the learning is more apt to be
ready than the sagacity, the ability to seize fresh aspects
in concrete things, being rarer than the ability to learn old
rules ; so that, in most actual cases of reasoning, the minor
premise, or the way of conceiving the subject, is the one
that makes the novel step in thought. This is, to be sure,
not always the case ; for the fact that M carries P with it
may also be unfamiliar and now formulated for the first
time.

The perception that S is M is a mode of conceiving S.
The statement that M is P is an abstract or general proposi
tion. A word about both is necessary.

WHAT IS MEANT BY A MODE OP CONCEIVING.

When we conceive of S merely as M (of vermilion
merely as a mercury-compound, for example), we neglect
all the other attributes which it may have, and attend
exclusively to this one. We mutilate the fulness of
S's reality. Every reality has an infinity of aspects or
properties. Even so simple a fact as a line which you trace
in the air may be considered in respect to its form, its
length, its direction, and its location. When we reach
more complex facts, the number of ways in which we may
regard them is literally endless. Vermilion is not only a
mercury-compound, it is vividly red, heavy, and expensive,
it comes from China, and so on, in infinitum. All objects are
well-springs of properties, which are only little by little
developed to our knowledge, and it is truly said that to
know one thing thoroughly would be to know the whole
universe. Mediately or immediately, that one thing is re
lated to everything else ; and to know all about it, all its
relations need be known. But each relation forms one of
its attributes, one angle by which some one may conceive it,
and while so conceiving it may ignore the rest of it. A man
is such a complex fact. But out of the complexity all that
an army commissary picks out as important for his purposes
is his property of eating so many pounds a day ; the general,

REASONING. 333

of marching so many miles; the chair-maker, of having
such a shape ; the orator, of responding to such and such
feelings ; the theatre-manager, of being willing to pay just
such a price, and no more, for an evening's amusement.
Each of these persons singles out the particular side of the
entire man which has a bearing on Us concerns, and not till
this side is distinctly and separately conceived can the
proper practical conclusions for that reasoner be drawn ; and
when they are drawn the man's other attributes may be ig
nored.

All ways of conceiving a concrete fact, if they are true
ways at all, are equally true ways. There is no property
ABSOLUTELY essential to any one thing. The same property
which figures as the essence of a thing on one occasion be
comes a very inessential feature upon another. Now that
I am writing, it is essential that I conceive my paper as a
surface for inscription. If I failed to do that, I should have
to stop my work. But if I wished to light a fire, and no
other materials were by, the essential way of conceiving
the paper would be as combustible material ; and I need
then have no thought of any of its other destinations. It is
•eally all that it is : a combustible, a writing surface, a thin
thing, a hydrocarbonaceous thing, a thing eight inches one
way and ten another, a thing just one furlong east of a certain
stone in my neighbor's field, an American thing, etc etc
ad infinitum. Whichever one of these aspects of its being I
temporarily class it under, makes me unjust to the other
aspects But as I always am classing it under one aspect
or another, I am always -unjust, always partial, always ex
clusive. My excuse is necessity— the necessity which my
finite and practical nature lays upon me. My thinking is
first and last and always for the sake of my doing, and I
can only do one thing at a time. A God, who is supposed
to drive the whole universe abreast, may also be supposed,
without detriment to his activity, to see all parts of it at
once and without emphasis. But were our human attention
so to disperse itself we should simply stare vacantly at
things at large and forfeit our opportunity of doing any
particular act. Mr. Warner, in his Adirondack story, shot a
bear by aiming, not at his eye or heart, but 'at him gen-

334 PSYCHOLOGY.

erally.' But we cannot aim ' generally ' at the universe ;
or if we do, we miss our game. Our scope is narrow, and
we must attack things piecemeal, ignoring the solid fulness
in which the elements of Nature exist, and stringing one
after another of them together in a serial way, to suit our
little interests as they change from hour to hour. In this,
the partiality of one moment is partly atoned for by the
different sort of partiality of the next. To me now, writing
these words, emphasis and selection seem to be the essence
of the human mind. In other chapters other qualities have
seemed, and will again seem, more important parts of psy
chology.

Men are so ingrainedly partial that, for common-sense
and scholasticism (which is only common-sense grown artic
ulate), the notion that there is no one quality genuinely,
-absolutely, and exclusively essential to anything is almost
unthinkable. " A thing's essence makes it what it is. With
out an exclusive essence it would be nothing in particular,
would be quite nameless, we could not say it was this
rather than that. What you write on, for example,— why
talk of its being combustible, rectangular, and the like,
when you know that these are mere accidents, and that
what it really is, and was made to be, is just paper and
nothing else?" The reader is pretty sure to make some
such comment as this. But he is himself merely insisting
on an aspect of the thing which suits his own petty purpose,
that of naming the thing ; or else on an aspect which suits
the manufacturer's purpose, that of producing an article
for which there is a vulgar demand. Meanwhile the reality
overflows these purposes at every pore. Our usual purpose
with it, our commonest title for it, and the properties which
this title suggests, have in reality nothing sacramental.
They characterize us more than they characterize the thing.
But we are so stuck in our prejudices, so petrified intellec
tually, that to our vulgarest names, with their suggestions,
we ascribe an eternal and exclusive worth. The thing must
be, essentially, what the vulgarest name connotes; what
less usual names connote, it can be only in an < accidental '
and relatively unreal sense.*

* Readers brought up on Popul^Science may think UMrtthemoieciilaii

REASONING. 335

Locke undermined the fallacy. But none of his succes
sors, so far as I know, have radically escaped it, or seen
that the only meaning of essence is teleological, and that classi
fication and conception are purely teleological weapons of the
mind. The essence of a thing is that one of its properties
which is so important for my interests that in comparison
with it I may neglect the rest. Amongst those other things
which have this important property I class it, after this
property I name it, as a thing endowed with this property
I conceive it ; and whilst so classing, naming, and conceiv
ing it, all other truths about it become to me as naught.*
The properties which are important vary from man to man
and from hour to hour.f Hence divers appellations and

structure of things is their real essence in an absolute sense, and that water
is H-O-H more deeply and truly than it is a solvent of sugar or a
slaker of thirst. Not a whit ! It is all of these things with equal reality,
and the only reason why /or the chemist it is H-O-H primarily, and only
secondarily the other things, is that for his purpose of deduction and com
pendious definition the H-O-H aspect of it is the more useful one to bear
in mind

* " We find that we take for granted irresistibly that each kind [of thing]
has some character which distinguishes it from other classes. . . . What
is the foundation of this postulate ? What is the ground of this assumption
that there must exist a definition which we have never seen, and which
perhaps no one has seen in a satisfactory form ?....! reply that our con
viction that there must needs be characteristic marks by which things can
be defined in words is founded upon the assumption of the necessary possi
bility of reasoning." (W. Whewell : Hist, of Scientific Ideas, bk. vin. chap
i, §9.)

f I may quote a passage from an article entitled ' The Sentiment of
Rationality,' published in vol. iv of Mind, 1879 : "What is a conception*
It is a teleological instrument. It is a partial aspect of a thing which
for our purpose we regard as its essential aspect, as the representative
of the entire thing. In comparison with this aspect, whatever other
properties and qualities the thing may have are unimportant accidents
which we may without blame ignore. But the essence, the ground
of conception, varies with the end we have in view. A substance like
oil has as many different essences as it has uses to different individuals.
One man conceives it as a combustible, another as a lubricator, another as
a food ; the chemist thinks of it as a hydrocarbon ; the furniture maker
as a darkener of wood ; the speculator as a commodity whose market-price
to-day is this and to-morrow that. The soap-boiler, the physicist, the
•clothes- scourer severally ascribe to it other essences in relation to their
needs. Ueberweg's doctrine that the essential quality of a thing is the

336 PSYCHOLOGY.

conceptions for the same thing. But many objects of daily
use — as paper, ink, butter, horse-car — have properties of
such constant unwavering importance, and have such stereo
typed names, that we end by believing that to conceive
them in those ways is to conceive them in the only true
way. Those are no truer ways of conceiving them than any
others ; they are only more important ways, more fre
quently serviceable ways.*

quality of most worth is strictly true ; but Ueberweg has failed to note
that the worth is wholly relative to the temporary interests of the conceiver.
And, even, when his interest is distinctly denned in his own mind, the
discrimination of the quality in the object which has the closest connection
with it is a thing which no rules can teach. The only a priori advice that
can be given to a man embarking on life with a certain purpose is the
somewhat barren counsel : Be sure that in the circumstances that meet
you, you attend to the right ones for your purpose. To pick out the right
ones is the measure of the man. ' Millions/ says Hartmann, ' stare at the
phenomenon before a genialer Kopf pounces on the concept.' The genius
is simply he to whom, when he opens his eyes upon the world, the ' right '
characters are the prominent ones. The fool is he who, with the same
purposes as the genius, infallibly gets his attention tangled amid the
accidents."

* Only if one of our purposes were itself truer than another, could one
of our conceptions become the truer conception. To be a truer purpose,
however, our purpose must conform more to some absolute standard of
purpose in things to which our purposes ought to conform. This shows
that the whole doctrine of essential characters is intimately bound up
with a teleological view of the world. Materialism becomes self-contra
dictory when it denies teleology, and yet in the same breath calls atoms, etc.,
the essential facts. The world contains consciousness as well as atoms— and
the one must be written down as just as essential as the other, in the ab
sence of any declared purpose regarding them on the creator's part, or in
the absence of any creator. As far as we ourselves go, the atoms are worth
more for purposes of deduction, the consciousness for purposes of inspira
tion. We may fairly write the Universe in either way, thus : ATOMS-
producing-consciousness ; or CoNSCiousNESS-produced- by-atoms. Atoms
alone, or consciousness alone, are precisely equal mutilations of the truth.
If, without believing in a God, I still continue to talk of what the world
' essentially is,' I am just as much entitled to define it as a place in which
my nose itches, or as a place where at a certain corner I can get a mess
of oysters for twenty cents, as to call it an evolving nebula differentiating
and integrating itself. It is hard to say which of the three abstractions is
the more rotten or miserable substitute for the world's concrete fulness
To conceive it merely as 'God's work' would be a similar mutilation of
it, so long as we said not what God, or what kind of work. The only real
truth about the world, apart from particular purposes, is the total truth.

REASONING. 33?

So much for what is implied, when the reasoner con
ceives of the fact S before him as a case of which the essence
is to be M. One word now as to what is involved in M's
having properties, consequences, or implications, and we
can go back to the study of the reasoning process again.

WHAT IS INVOLVED IN GENERAL PROPOSITIONS.

M is not a concrete, or ' self-sufficient,' as Mr. Clay
would say. It is an abstract character which may exist,
embedded with other characters, in many concretes. Whe
ther it be the character of being a writing surface, of being
made in America or China, of being eight inches square, or
of being in a certain part of space, this is always true of it.
Now we might conceive of this being a world in which all
such general characters were independent of each other, so
that if any one of them were found in a subject S, we never
could be sure what others would be found alongside of it.
On one occasion there might be P with M, on another Q,
and so on. In such a world there would be no general
sequences or coexistences, and no universal laws. Each
grouping would be sui generis ; from the experience of the
past no future could be predicted ; and reasoning, as we
shall presently see, would be an impossibility.

But the world we live in is not one of this sort. Though
many general characters seem indifferent to each other,
there remain a number of them which affect constant habits
of mutual concomitance or repugance. They involve or
imply each other. One of them is a sign to us that the
other will be found. They hunt in couples, as it were ; and
such a proposition as that M is P, or includes P, or precedes
or accompanies P, if it prove to be true in one instance,
may very likely be true in every other instance which we
meet. This is, in fact, a world in which general laws obtain,
in which universal propositions are true, and in which rea
soning is therefore possible. Fortunately for us : for since
we cannot handle things as wholes, but only by conceiving
them through some general character which for the time
we call their essence, it would be a great pity if the matter
ended there, and if the general character, once picked out
au/i in our possession, helped us to no farther advance. In

338 PSYCHOLOGY.

Chapter XXVIII we shall have again to consider this har
mony between our reasoning faculty and the world in which
its lot is cast*

To revert now to our symbolic representation of the
reasoning process :

MisP
SisM

SisP

M is discerned and picked out for the time being to be
the essence of the concrete fact, phenomenon, or reality, 8.
But M in this world of ours is inevitably conjoined with P ;
so that P is the next thing that we may expect to find con
joined with the fact S. We may conclude or infer P,
through the intermediation of the M which our sagacity
began by discerning, when S came before it, to be the
essence of the case.

Now note that if P have any value or importance for us,
M was a very good character for our sagacity to pounce upon
and abstract. If, on the contrary, P were of no importance,
some other character than M would have been a better
essence for us to conceive of 8 by. Psychologically, as a
rule, P overshadows the process from the start. We are
seeking P, or something like P. But the bare totality of 8
does not yield it to our gaze ; and casting about for some
point in 8 to take hold of, which will lead us to P, we hit,
if we are sagacious, upon M, because M happens to be just
the character which is knit up with P. Had we wished Q
instead of P, and were N a property of 8 conjoined with Q,
we ought to have ignored M, noticed N, and conceived of 8
as a sort of N exclusively.

^Reasoning is always for a subjective interest, to attain
some particular conclusion, or to gratify some special
curiosity. It not only breaks up the datum placed before
it and conceives it abstractly ; it must conceive it rightly
too ; and conceiving it rightly means conceiving it by that
one particular abstract character which leads to the one

* Compare Lotze, Metaphysik, §§ 58, 67, for some instructive remarks
on ways in which the world's constitution might differ from what it actu
ally is. Compare also Chapter XXVIII.

REASONING. 339

sort of conclusion which it is the reasoner's temporary in
terest to attain.*

The results of reasoning may be hit upon by accident
The stereoscope was actually a result of reasoning; it is
conceivable, however, that a man playing with pictures and
mirrors might accidentally have hit upon it. Cats have been
known to open doors by pulling latches, etc. But no cat,
if the latch got out of order, could open the door again,
unless some new accident of random fumbling taught her
to associate some new total movement with the total phe
nomenon of the closed door. A reasoning man, however,
would open the door by first analyzing the hindrance. He
would ascertain what particular feature of the door was
wrong. The lever, e.g., does not raise the latch sufficiently
from its slot — case of insufficient elevation — r^ loor
bodily on hinges ! Or door sticks at top by friction * •• J;
lintel — press it bodily down! Now it is obvious t..
child or an idiot might without this reasoning learn the '/
for opening that particular door. I remember a clock whic
the maid-servant had discovered would not go unless it
were supported so as to tilt slightly forwards. She had
stumbled on this method after many weeks of groping. The
reason of the stoppage was the friction of the pendulum-
bob against the back of the clock-case, a reason which an
educated man would have analyzed out in five minutes. I

* Sometimes, it must be confessed, the conceiver's purpose falls short of
reasoning and the only conclusion he cares to reach is the bare naming of
the datum. " What is that?" is our first question relative to any unknown
thing. And the ease with which our curiosity is quenched as soon as we
are supplied with any sort of a name to call the object by, is ridiculous
enough. To quote from an unpublished essay by a former student of
mine, Mr. R. W. Black : " The simplest end which a thing's predicate can
serve is the satisfaction of the desire for unity itself, the mere desire that
the thing shall be the same with something else. Why, the other day,
when I mistook a portrait of Shakespeare for one of Hawthorne, was I not,
on psychological principles, as right as if I had correctly named it ? — the
two pictures had a common essence, bald forehead, mustache, flowing
hair. Simply because the only end that could possibly be served by naming
it Hawthorne was my desire to have it so. With reference to any other end
that classification of it would not serve. And every unity, every identity,
ever)1 classification is rightly called fanciful unless it serves some other end
than the mere satisfaction, emotion , or inspiration caught by momentarily
believing in it."

340 PSYCHOLOGY.

have a student's lamp of which the flame vibrates most un
pleasantly unless the collar which bears the chimney be
raised about a sixteenth of an inch. I learned the remedy
after much torment by accident, and now always keep the
collar up with a small wedge. But my procedure is a mere
association of two totals, diseased object and remedy. One
learned in pneumatics could have named the cause of the
disease, and thence inferred the remedy immediately. By
many measurements of triangles one might find their area
always equal to their height multiplied by half their base,
and one might formulate an empirical law to that effect.
But a reasoner saves himself all this trouble by seeing that
it is the essence (pro hoc vice) of a triangle to be the half of
a parallelogram whose area is the height into the entire
base. To see this he must invent additional lines ; and the
geometer must often draw such to get at the essential prop
erty he may require in a figure. The essence consists in
some relation of the figure to the new lines, a relation not ob
vious at all until they are put in. The geometer's sagacity
lies in the invention of the new lines.

THUS, THERE ABE TWO GREAT POINTS IN REASONING:

First, an extracted character is taken as equivalent to the
entire datum from which it comes ; and,

Second, the character thus taken suggests a certain conse
quence more obviously than it was suggested by the total datum
as it originally came. Take them again, successively.

1. Suppose I say, when offered a piece of cloth, " I won't
buy that; it looks as if it would fade," meaning merely
that something about it suggests the idea of fading to my
mind, — my judgment, though possibly correct, is not rea
soned, but purely empirical ; but, if I can say that into the
color there enters a certain dye which I know to be chemi
cally unstable, and that therefore the color will fade, my judg
ment is reasoned. The notion of the dye which is one of the
parts of the cloth, is the connecting link between the latter
and the notion of fading. So, again, an uneducated man
will expect from past experience to see a piece of ice melt
if placed near the fire, and the tip of his finger look coarse

REASONING. 341

if he views it through a convex glass. In neither of these
cases could the result be anticipated without full previous
acquaintance with the entire phenomenon. It is not a
result of reasoning.

But a man who should conceive heat as a mode of
motion, and liquefaction as identical with increased motion
of molecules ; who should know that curved surfaces bend
light-rays in special ways, and that the apparent size of
anything is connected with the amount of the ' bend ' of its
light-rays as they enter the eye,— such a man would make
the right inferences for all these objects, even though he
had never in his life had any concrete experience of them ;
and he would do this because the ideas which we have
above supposed him to possess would mediate in his mind
between the phenomena he starts with and the conclusions
he draws. But these ideas or reasons for his conclusions
are all mere extracted portions or circumstances singled
out from the mass of characters which make up the entire
phenomena. The motions which form heat, the bending
of the light-waves, are, it is true, excessively recondite
ingredients ; the hidden pendulum I spoke of above is less
so ; and the sticking of a door on its sill in the earlier ex
ample would hardly be so at all. But each and all agree
in this, that they bear a more evident relation to the con
clusion than did the immediate data in their full totality.

The difficulty is, in each case, to extract from the im
mediate data that particular ingredient which shall have
this very evident relation to the conclusion. Every phe
nomenon or so-called ' fact ' has an infinity of aspects or
properties, as we have seen, amongst which the fool, or
man with little sagacity, will inevitably go astray. But no
matter for this point now. The first thing is to have seen
that every possible case of reasoning involves the extrac
tion of a particular partial aspect of the phenomena thought
about, and that whilst Empirical Thought simply associates
phenomena in their entirety, Seasoned Thought couples
them by the conscious use of this extract.

2. And, now, to prove the second point : Why are the
couplings, consequences, and implications of extracts more

342 PSYCHOLOGY.

evident and obvious than those of entire phenomena ? For
two reasons.

First, the extracted characters are more general than
the concretes, and the connections they may have are,
therefore, more familiar to us, having been more often
met in our experience. Think of heat as motion, and what
ever is true of motion will be true of heat ; but we have had
a hundred experiences of motion for every one of heat.
Think of the rays passing through this lens as bending
towards the perpendicular, and you substitute for the com
paratively unfamiliar lens the very familiar notion of a par
ticular change in direction of a line, of which notion every
day brings us countless examples.

The other reason why the relations of the extracted
characters are so evident is that their properties are so
few, compared with the properties of the whole, from which
we derived them. In every concrete total the characters
and their consequences are so inexhaustibly numerous
that we may lose our way among them before noticing
the particular consequence it behooves us to draw. But,
if we are lucky enough to single out the proper character,
we take in, as it were, by a single glance all its possible
consequences. Thus the character of scraping the sill
has very few suggestions, prominent among which is the
suggestion that the scraping will cease if we raise the door ;
whilst the entire refractory door suggests an enormous num
ber of notions to the mind.

Take another example. I am sitting in a railroad-car,
waiting for the train to start. It is winter, and the stove
fills the car with pungent smoke. The brakeman enters,
and my neighbor asks him to " stop that stove smoking/*
He replies that it will stop entirely as soon as the car begins
to move. "Why so?" asks the passenger. "It always
does," replies the brakeman. It is evident from this
* always ' that the connection between car moving and
smoke stopping was a purely empirical one in the brake-
man's mind, bred of habit. But, if the passenger had been
an acute reasoner, he, with no experience of what that stove
always did, might have anticipated the brakeman's reply,
and spared his own question. Had he singled out of all the

REASONING. 343

numerous points involved in a stove's not smoking the one
special point of smoke pouring freely out of the stove-pipe's
mouth, he would, probably, owing to the few associations
of that idea, have been immediately reminded of the law
that a fluid passes more rapidly out of a pipe's mouth if
another fluid be at the same time streaming over that
mouth ; and then the rapid draught of air over the stove
pipe's mouth, which is one of the points involved in the
car's motion, would immediately have occurred to him.

Thus a couple of extracted characters, with a couple of
their few and obvious connections, would have formed the
reasoned link in the passenger's mind between the phenom
ena, smoke stopping and car moving, which were only linked
as wholes in the brakeman's mind. Such examples may seem
trivial, but they contain the essence of the most refined and
transcendental theorizing. The reason why physics grows
more deductive the more the fundamental properties it as
sumes are of a mathematical sort, such as molecular mass
or wave-length, is that the immediate consequences of these
notions are so few that we can survey them all at once, and
promptly pick out those which concern us.

Sagacity ; or the Perception of the Essence.

To reason, then, we must be able to extract characters, —
not any characters, but the right characters for our conclu
sion. If we extract the wrong character, it will not lead to
that conclusion. Here, then, is the difficulty: How are
Characters extracted, and why does it require the advent of a
genius in many cases before the fitting character is brought to
light ? Why cannot anybody reason as well as anybody
else ? Why does it need a Newton to notice the law of the
squares, a Darwin to notice the survival of the fittest '? To
answer these questions we must begin a new research, and
gee how our insight into facts naturally grows.

All our knowledge at first is vague. WThen we say that
a thing is vague, we mean that it has no subdivisions ab in-
tra, nor precise limitations ab extra ; but still all the forms
of thought may apply to it. It may have unity, reality, ex
ternality, extent, and what not — thinghood, in a word, but

344 PSYCHOLOGY.

tliinghood only as a whole.* In tins vague way, probably,
does the room appear to the babe who first begins to be
conscious of it as something other than his moving nurse.
It has no subdivisions in his mind, unless, perhaps, the
window is able to attract his separate notice. In this vague
way, certainly, does every entirely new experience appear
to the adult. A library, a museum, a machine-shop, are
mere confused wholes to the uninstructed, but the machin
ist, the antiquary, and the bookworm perhaps hardly no
tice the whole at all, so eager are they to pounce upon the
details. Familiarity has in them bred discrimination.
Such vague terms as ' grass,' ' mould,' and ' meat ' do not
exist for the botanist or the anatomist. They know too
much about grasses, moulds, and muscles. A certain per
son said to Charles Kingsley, who was showing him the dis
section of a caterpillar, with its exquisite viscera, " Why, I
thought it was nothing but skin and squash !" A layman
present at a shipwreck, a battle, or a fire is helpless. Dis
crimination has been so little awakened in him by expe
rience that his consciousness leaves no single point of the
complex situation accented aud standing out for him to be
gin to act upon. But the sailor, the fireman, and the gen
eral know directly at what corner to take up the business.
They ' see into the situation ' — that is, they analyze it — with
their first glance. It is full of delicately differenced ingre
dients which their education has little by little brought to
their consciousness, but of which the novice gains no clear
idea.

How this power of analysis was brought about we saw
in our chapters on Discrimination and Attention. We dis
sociate the elements of originally vague totals by attending
to them or noticing them alternately, of course. But what
determines which element we shall attend to first ? There
are two immediate and obvious answers : first, our practical
or instinctive interests ; and, second, our aesthetic interests.
The dog singles out of any situation its smells, and the horse
its sounds, bcause they may reveal facts of practical mo
ment, and are instinctively exciting to these several crea-

* See above, p. 8.

REASONING. 345

tures. The infant notices the candle-flame or the window,
and ignores the rest of the room, because those objects give
him a vivid pleasure. So, the country boy dissociates the
blackberry, the chestnut, and the wintergreen, from the
vague mass of other shrubs and trees, for their practical
uses, and the savage is delighted with the beads, the bits of
looking-glass, brought by an exploring vessel, and gives no
heed to the features of the vessel itself, which is too much
beyond his sphere. These aesthetic and practical interests,
then, are the weightiest factors in making particular ingre
dients stand out in high relief. What they lay their accent
on, that we notice ; but what they are in themselves, we can
not say. We must content ourselves here with simply ac
cepting them as irreducible ultimate factors in determining
the way our knowledge grows.

Now, a creature which has few instinctive impulses, or
interests, practical or aesthetic, will dissociate few charac
ters, and will, at best, have limited reasoning powers ;
whilst one whose interests are very varied will reason much
better. Man, by his immensely varied instincts, practical
wants, and aesthetic feelings, to which every sense contrib
utes, would, by dint of these alone, be sure to dissociate
vastly more characters than any other animal ; and accord
ingly we find that the lowest savages reason incomparably
better than the highest brutes. The diverse interests lead,
too, to a diversification of experiences, whose accumulation
becomes a condition for the play of that law of dissociation
by varying concomitants of which I treated in a former chap
ter (see Vol I. p. 506).

The Help given by Association by Similarity.

It is probable, also, that man's superior association by
similarity has much to do with those discriminations of
character on which his higher flights of reasoning are based.
As this latter is an important matter, and as little or noth
ing was said of it in the chapter on Discrimination, it be
hooves me to dwell a little upon it here.

What does the reader do when he wishes to see in what
the precise likeness or difference of two objects lies ? He

346 PSYCHOLOGY.

transfers his attention as rapidly as possible, backwards
and forwards, from one to the other. The rapid alteration
in consciousness shakes out, as it were, the points of dif
ference or agreement, which would have slumbered forever
unnoticed if the consciousness of the objects compared had
occurred at widely distant periods of time. What does
the scientific man do who searches for the reason or law
embedded in a phenomenon '? He deliberately accumu
lates all the instances he can find which have any analogy
to that phenomenon ; and, by simultaneously filling his
mind with them all, he frequently succeeds in detaching
from the collection the peculiarity which he was unable
to formulate in one alone ; even though that one had been
preceded in his former experience by all of those with
which he now at once confronts it. These examples show
that the mere general fact of having occurred at some time
in one's experience, with varying concomitants, is not by
itself a sufficient reason for a character to be dissociated
now. We need something more ; we need that the varying
concomitants should in all their variety be brought into
consciousness at once. Not till then will the character in
question escape from its adhesion to each and all of them
and stand alone. This will immediately be recognized by
those who have read Mill's Logic as the ground of Utility
in his famous ' four methods of experimental inquiry,' the
methods of agreement, of difference, of residues, and of
concomitant variations. Each of these gives a list of
analogous instances out of the midst of which a sought-for
character may roll and strike the mind.

Now it is obvious that any mind in which association by
similarity is highly developed is a mind which will spon
taneously form lists of instances like this. Take a present
case A, with a character ra in it. The mind may fail at first
to notice this character m at all. But if A calls up C, D,
E, and F, — these being phenomena which resemble A in
possessing m, but which may not have entered for months
into the experience of the animal who now experiences A,
why, plainly, such association performs the part of the
reader's deliberately rapid comparison referred to above,
and of the systematic consideration of like cases by the

REASONING. 347

scientific investigator, and may lead to the noticing of m
in an abstract way. Certainly this is obvious ; and no
conclusion is left to us but to assert that, after the few
most powerful practical and aesthetic interests, our chief
help towards noticing those special characters of phenom
ena, which, when once possessed and named, are used as
reasons, class names, essences, or middle terms, is this
association by similarity. Without it, indeed, the deliberate
procedure of the scientific man would be impossible : he
could never collect his analogous instances. But it oper
ates of itself in highly-gifted minds without any delibera
tion, spontaneously collecting analogous instances, uniting
in a moment what in nature the whole breadth of space and
time keeps separate, and so permitting a perception of
identical points in the midst of different circumstances,
which minds governed wholly by the law of contiguity
could never begin to attain.

FIG. 80

Figure 80 shows this. If m, in the present representa
tion A, calls up B, C, D, and E, which are similar to A in
possessing it, and calls them up in rapid succession, then
m, being associated almost simultaneously with such vary
ing concomitants, will * roll out ' and attract our separate
notice.

348 PSYCHOLOGY.

If so much is clear to the reader, he will be willing to
iidmit that the mind in which this mode of association most
prevails will, from its better opportunity of extricating
characters, be the one most prone to reasoned thinking ;
whilst, on the other hand, a mind in which we do not
detect reasoned thinking will probably be one in which
association by contiguity holds almost exclusive sway.

Geniuses are, by common consent, considered to diffei
from ordinary minds by an unusual development of associa
iion by similarity. One of Professor Bain's best strokes ol
work is the exhibition of this truth.* It applies to geniuses
in the line of reasoning as well as in other lines. And as the
genius is to the vulgarian, so the vulgar human mind is to
the intelligence of a brute. Compared with men, it is
probable that brutes neither attend to abstract characters,
nor have associations by similarity. Their thoughts prob
ably pass from one concrete object to its habitual concrete
successor far more uniformly than is the case with us. In
other words, their associations of ideas are almost exclu
sively by contiguity. It will clear up still farther oui
understanding of the reasoning process, if we devote a few
pages to

THE INTELLECTUAL CONTRAST BETWEEN BRUTE AND MAN

I will first try to show, by taking the best stories I cai
find of animal sagacity, that the mental process involved
may as a rule be perfectly accounted for by mere contigu
ous association, based on experience. Mr. Darwin, in his
1 Descent of Man,' instances the Arctic dogs, described by
Dr. Hayes, who scatter, when drawing a sledge, as soon a&
the ice begins to crack. This might be called by some aik
exercise of reason. The test would be, Would the most
intelligent Eskimo dogs that ever lived act so when placed
upon ice for the first time together ? A band of men from
the tropics might do so easily. Recognizing cracking to
be a sign of breaking, and seizing immediately the partial
character that the point of rupture is the point of greatest

*See his Study of Character, chap, xv ; also Senses and Intellect,
'Intellect/ chap, n, the latter half.

REASONING. 349

Btrain, and that the massing of weight at a given point con
centrates there the strain, a Hindoo might quickly infer that
scattering would stop the cracking, and, by crying out to
his comrades to disperse, save the party from immersion.
But in the dog's case we need only suppose that they
have individually experienced wet skins after cracking, that
they have often noticed cracking to begin when they were
huddled, together, and that they have observed it to cease
when they scattered. Naturally, therefore, the sound would
redintegrate all these former experiences, including that of
scattering, which latter they would promptly renew. It
would be a case of immediate suggestion or of that ' Logic
of Recepts ' as Mr. Eomanes calls it, of which we spoke
above on p. 327.

A friend of the writer gave as a proof of the almost
human intelligence of his dog that he took him one day
down to his boat on the shore, but found the boat full of
dirt and water. He remembered that the sponge was up at
the house, a third of a mile distant ; but, disliking to go back
himself, he made various gestures of wiping out the boat
and so forth, saying to his terrier, " Sponge, sponge ; go
fetch the sponge." But he had little expectation of a result,
since the dog had never received the slightest training with
the boat or the sponge. Nevertheless, off he trotted to the
house, and, to his owner's great surprise and admiration,
brought the sponge in his jaws. Sagacious as this was, it
required nothing but ordinary contiguous association of
ideas. The terrier was only exceptional in the minuteness
of his spontaneous observation. Most terriers would have
taken no interest in the boat-cleaning operation, nor no
ticed what the sponge was for. This terrier, in having
picked those details out of the crude mass of his boat-expe
rience distinctly enough to be reminded of them, was truly
enough ahead of his peers on the line which leads to human
reason. But his act was not yet an act of reasoning proper.
It might fairly have been called so if, unable to find the
sponge at the house, he had brought back a dipper or a
mop instead. Such a substitution would have shown that,
embedded in the very different appearances of these articles,
he had been able to discriminate the identical partial attri-

350 PSYCHOLOGY.

bute of capacity to take up water, and had reflected, "For
the present purpose they are identical." This, which the
dog did not do, any man but the very stupidest could not
fail to do.

If the reader will take the trouble to analyze the best
dog and elephant storier \e knows, he will find that, m most
cases, this simple contiguous calling up of one whole by
another is quite sufficient to explain the phenomena.
Sometimes, it is true, we have to suppose the recognition of
a property or character as such, but it is then always a char
acter which the peculiar practical interests of the animal
may have singled out. A dog, noticing his master's hat on its
peg, may possibly infer that he has not gone out. Intelligent
dogs recognize by the tone of the master's voice whether
the latter is angry or not. A dog will perceive whether
you have kicked him by accident or by design, and behave
accordingly. The character inferred by him, the particular
mental state in you, however it be represented in his
mind — it is represented probably by a ' recept ' (p. 327) or
set of practical tendencies, rather than by a definite con
cept or idea — is still a partial character extracted from the
totality of your phenomenal being, and is his reason for
crouching and skulking, or playing with you. Dogs, more
over, seem to have the feeling of the value of their master's
personal property, or at least a particular interest in objects
which their master uses. A dog left with his master's coat
will defend it, though never taught to do so. I know of a
dog accustomed to swim after sticks in the water, but who
always refused to dive for stones. Nevertheless, when a fish-
basket, which he had never been trained to carry, but mere
ly knew as his master's, fell over, he immediately dived after
it and brought it up. Dogs thus discern, at any rate so far
as to be able to act, this partial character of being valuable^
which lies hidden in certain things.* Stories are told of

* Whether the dog has the notion of your being angry or of your prop
erty being valuable in any such abstract way as we have these notions is
more than doubtful. The conduct is more likely an impulsive result of a
conspiracy of outward stimuli ; the beast feels like acting so when these
stimuli are present, though conscious of no definite reason why. The
distinction of recept and concept is useful here. Some breeds of dogs,

REASONING. 351

(togs carrying coppers to pastry-cooks to get buns, and it ia
said that a certain dog, if lie gave two coppers, would never

e.g. collies, seem instinctively to defend their master's property. The case
is similar to that of a dog's barking at people after dark, at whom he would
not bark in daylight. I have heard this quoted as evidence of the dog'a
reasoning power. It is only, as Chapter III has shown us, the impulsive
result of a summation of stimuli, and has no connection with reasoning.

In certain stages of the hypnotic trance the subject seems to lapse into
the non-analytic state. If a sheet of ruled foolscap paper, or a paper with
a fine monotonous ornamental pattern printed on it, be shown to the sub
ject, and one of the ruled lines or elements of the pattern be pointed to for
an instant, and the paper immediately removed, he will then almost always,
when after a short interval the paper is presented to him again, pick out the
indicated line or element with infallible correctness. The operator, mean-
while, has either to keep his eye fixed upon it, or to make sure of its posi
tion by counting, in order not to lose its place. Just so we may remember
a friend's house in a street by the single character of its number rather
than by its general look. The trance-subject would seem, in these instan
ces, to surrender himself to the general look. He disperses his attention
impartially over the sheet. The place of the particular lino touched is part
of a ' total effect ' which he gets in its entirety, and which would be distort
ed if another line were touched instead. This total effect is lost upon the
normal looker-on, bent as he is on concentration, analysis, and emphasis.
What wonder, then, that, under these experimental conditions, the trance-
subject excels him in touching the right line again ? If he has time given
him to count the line, he will excel the trance-subject ; but if the time be too
short to count, he will best succeed by following the trance-metho 1, ab
staining from analysis, and being guided by the ' general look ' of the line's
place on the sheet. One is surprised at one's success in this the moment one
gives up one's habitually analytic state of mind.

Is it too much to say that we have in this dispersion of the attention
and subjection to the ' general effect ' something like a relapse into the
state of mind of brutes? The trance-subject never gives any other reason
for his optical discriminations, save that ' it looks so.' So a man, on a road
once traversed inattentively before, takes a certain turn for no reason ex
cept that he feels as if it must be right. He is guided by a sum of impres
sions, not one of which is emphatic or distinguished from the rest, not one
of which is essential, not one of which is conceived, but all of which
together drive him to a conclusion to which nothing but that sum- total
leads. Are not some of the wonderful discriminations of animals expli
cable in the same way ? The cow finds her own stanchions in the long
stable, the horse stops at the house he has once stopped at in the monoto
nous street, because no other stanchions, no other house, yield impartially all
the impressions of the previous experience. The man, however, by seek
ing to make some one impression characteristic and essential, prevents the
rest from having their effect. So that, if the (for him) essential feature be
forgotten or changed, he is too apt to be thrown off altogether, and then
the brute or the trance-subject may seem to outstrip him in sagacity.

Dr. Romanes's already quoted distinction between ' receptual ' and

552 PSYCHOLOGY.

leave without two buns. This was probably mere con
tiguous association, but it is possible that the animal noticed
the character of duality, and identified it as the same
in the coin and the cake. If so, it is the maximum of
canine abstract thinking. Another story told to the writer
is this : a dog was sent to a lumber-camp to fetch a wedge,
with which he was known to be acquainted. After half an
hour, not returning, he was sought and found biting and
tugging at the handle of an axe which was driven deeply
into a stump. The wedge could not be found. The teller
of the story thought that the dog must have had a clear
perception of the common character of serving to split
which was involved in both the instruments, and, from their
identity in this respect, inferred their identity for the pur
poses required.

It cannot be denied that this interpretation is a possible
one, but it seems to me far to transcend the limits of ordi
nary canine abstraction. The property in question was not
one which had direct personal interest for the dog, such
as that of belonging to his master is in the case of the
coat or the basket. If the dog in the sponge story had re
turned to the boat with a dipper it would have been no
more remarkable. It seems more probable, therefore, that
this wood-cutter's dog had also been accustomed to carry
the axe, and now, excited by the vain hunt for the wedge,
had discharged his carrying powers upon the former instru
ment in a sort of confusion — just as a man may pick up a
sieve to carry water in, in the excitement of putting out a
fire.*

' conceptual ' thought (published since the body of my text and my note
were written) connotes conveniently the difference which I seek to point
out. See also his Mental Evolution in Man, p. 197 ff., for proofs of the
fact that in a receptual way brutes cognize the mental states of other brutes
and men.

* This matter of confusion is important and interesting. Since confu
sion is mistaking the wrong part of the phenomenon for the whole, whilst
reasoning is, according to our definition, based on the substitution of the
right part for the whole, it might be said that confusion and reasoning
are generically the same process. I believe that they are so, and that the
only difference between a muddle-head and a genius is that between ex
tracting wrong characters and right ones. In other words, a muddle-head-

REASONING. 353

Thus, then, the characters extracted by animals are
rery few, and always related to their immediate interests
or emotions. That dissociation by varying concomitants,
which in man is based so largely on association by similarity,
hardly seems to take place at all in the mind of brutes.
One total thought suggests to them another total thought,
and they find themselves acting with propriety, they know
not why. The great, the fundamental, defect of their minds
seems to be the inability of their groups of ideas to break
across in unaccustomed places. They are enslaved to
routine, to cut-and-dried thinking ; and if the most prosaic
of human beings could be transported into his dog's mind,
he would be appalled at the utter absence of fancy which
reigns there.* Thoughts will not be found to call up their
similars, but only their habitual successors. Sunsets will
not suggest heroes' deaths, but supper-time. This is why
man is the only metaphysical animal. To wonder why the
universe should be as it is presupposes the notion of its being
different, and a brute, which never reduces the actual to
fluidity by breaking up its literal sequences in his imagina
tion, can never form such a notion. He takes the world
simply for granted, and never wonders at it at all.

Professor Striimpell quotes a dog-story which is prob
ably a type of many others. The feat performed looks like
abstract reasoning; but an acquaintance with all the cir
cumstances shows it to have been a random trick learned
by habit. The story is as follows :

44 1 have two dogs, a small, long-legged pet dog and a rather large
watch-dog. Immediately beyond the house-court is the garden, into
which one enters through a low lattice-gate which is closed by a latch

ed person is a genius spoiled in the making. I think it will be admitted
that all eminently muddle-headed persons have the temperament of genius.
They are constantly breaking away from the usual consecutions of con
cretes. A common associator by contiguity is too closely tied to routine to
get muddle-headed.

- The horse is a densely stupid animal, as far as everything goes except
contiguous association. We reckon him intelligent, partly because he
looks so handsome, partly because he has such a wonderful faculty of
contiguous association and can be so quickly moulded into a mass of set
habits. Had he anything of reasoning intelligence, he would be a less
faithful slave than he is.

354 PSYCHOLOGY.

^n the yard-side. This latch is opened by lifting it. Besides this,
moreover, the gate is fastened on the garden-side by a string nailed to
the gate-post Here, as often as one wished, could the following sight
be observed. If the little dog was shut in the garden and he wished to
get out, he placed himself before the gate and barked. Immediately
the large dog in the court would hasten to him and raise the latch with
his nose while the little dog on the garden-side leaped up and, catching
the string in his teeth, bit it through ; whereupon the big one wedged
his snout between the gate and the post, pushed the gate open, and the
little dog slipped through. Certainly reasoning seems here to prevail.
In face of it, however, and although the dogs arrived of themselves, and
without human aid, at their solution of the gate question, I am able to
point out that the complete action was pieced together out of accidental
experiences which 'the dogs followed, I might say, unconsciously. While
the large dog was young, he was allowed, like the little one, to go into
the garden, and therefore the gate was usually not latched, but simply
closed. Now if he saw anyone go in, he would follow by thrusting his
snout between gate and post, and so pushing the gate open. When he
was grown I forbade his being taken in, and had the gate kept latched.
But he naturally still tried to follow when anyone entered and tried m
the old fashion to open it, which he could no longer do. Now it fell
out that once, while making the attempt, he raised his nose higher than
usual and hit the latch from below so as to lift it off its hook, and the
gate unclosed. From thenceforth he made the same movement of the
head when trying to open it, and, of course, with the same result. He
now knew how to open the gate when it was latched.

' ' The little dog had been the large one's teacher in many things,
especially in the chasing of cats and the catching of mice and moles; so
when the little one was heard barking eagerly, the other always has
tened to him. If the barking came from the garden, he opened the gate
to get inside. But meanwhile the little dog, who wanted to get out the
moment the gate opened, slipped out between the big one's legs, and so
the appearance of his having come with the intention of letting him out
arose. And that it was simply an appearance transpired from the fact
that when the little dog did not succeed at once in getting out, the large
one ran in and nosed about the garden, plainly showing that he had ex
pected to find something there. In order to stop this opening of the
gate I fastened a string on the garden-side which, tightly drawn, held
the gate firm against the post, so that if the yard dog raised the latch
and let go, it would every time fall back on to the hook. And this
device was successful for quite a time, until it happened one day that
on my return from a walk upon which the little dog had accompanied
me I crossed the garden, and in passing through the gate the dog re
mained behind, and refused to come to my whistle. As it was begin
ning to rain, and I knew how he disliked to get wet, I closed the gate
in order to punish him in this manner. But I had hardly reached the
house ere he was before the gate, whining and crying most piteously,

REASONING. 355

for the rain was falling faster and faster. The big dog, to whom the
rain was a matter of perfect indifference, was instantly on hand and
tried his utmost to open the gate, but naturally without success. Al
most in despair the little dog bit at the gate, at the same time springing
into the air in the attempt to jump over it, when he chanced to catch
the string in his teeth ; it broke, and the gate flew open. Now he
knew the secret and thenceforth bit the string whenever he wished to
get out, so that I was obliged to change it.

" That the big dog in raising the latch did not in the least know that
the latch closed the gate, that the raising of the same opened it, but that
he merely repeated the automatic blow with his snout which had once
had such happy consequences, transpires from the following : the gate
leading to the barn is fastened with a latch precisely like the one on
the garden-gate, only placed a little higher, still easily within the dog's
reach. Here, too, occasionally the little dog is confined, and when he
barks the big one makes every possible effort to open the gate, but it
has never occurred to him to push the latch up. The brute cannot
draw conclusions, that is, he cannot think. " *

Other classical differentia of man besides that of being
the only reasoning animal, also seem consequences of his
unrivalled powers of similar association. He has, e.g., been
called « the laughing animal.' But humor has often been
defined as the recognition of identities in things different.
When the man in Coriolanus says of that hero that " there
is no more mercy in him than there is milk in a male tiger,'*
both the invention of the phrase and its enjoyment by the
hearer depend on a peculiarly perplexing power to associ
ate ideas by similarity.

Man is known again as 'the talking animal' ; and lan-

* Th Schumann : Journal Daheim, No. 19, 1878. Quoted by Strum-
pel] ;: Die Geisteskrafte der Menschen verglichen mit denen der Thiere
(Leipzig, 1878), p. 39. Cats are notorious for the skill with which they will
open latches, locks, etc. Their feats are usually ascribed to their reason-
ing powers. But Dr. Romanes well remarks (Mental Evolution, etc., p.
351, note) that we ought first to be sure that the actions are not due to mere
nssociation. A cat is constantly playing with things with her paws ; a trick
accidentally hit upon may be retained. Romanes notes the fact that the
animals most skilled in this way need not be the most generally intelligent,
but those which have the best corporeal members for handling things
cat's paws, horse's lips, elephant's trunk, cow's horns. The monkey has
3th the corporeal and the intellectual superiority. And my deprecatory
remarks on animal reasoning in the text apply far less to the quadrumana
than to quadrupeds. -On the possible fallacies in interpreting animals'
minds, compare C. L. Morgan in Mind, xi. 174 (1886)

356 PSYCHOLOGY.

guage is assuredly a capital distinction between man and
brute. But it may readily be shown how this distinction
merely flows from those we have pointed out, easy disso
ciation of a representation into its ingredients, and associa
tion by similarity.

Language is a system of signs, different from the things
signified, but able to suggest them.

No doubt brutes have a number of such signs. When
a dog yelps in front of a door, and his master, understand
ing his desire, opens it, the dog may, after a certain number
of repetitions, get to repeat in cold blood a yelp which was
at first the involuntary interjectional expression of strong
emotion. The same dog may be taught to ' beg ' for food,
and afterwards come to do so deliberately when hungry.
The dog also learns to understand the signs of men, and
the word ' rat ' uttered to a terrier suggests exciting
thoughts of the rat-hunt. If the dog had the varied im
pulse to vocal utterance which some other animals have,
he would probably repeat the word ' rat ' whenever he
spontaneously happened to think of a rat-hunt — he no
doubt does have it as an auditory image, just as a parrot
calls out different words spontaneously from its repertory,
and having learned the name of a given dog will utter it on
the sight of a different dog. In each of these separate cases
the particular sign may be consciously noticed by the ani
mal, as distinct from the particular thing signified, and will
thus, so far as it goes, be a true manifestation of language.
But when we come to man we find a great difference. He
has a deliberate intention to apply a sign to everything. The
linguistic impulse is with him generalized and systematic.
For things hitherto unnoticed or unfelt, he desires a sign
before he has one. Even though the dog should possess
his ' yelp ' for this thing, his ' beg ' for that, and his audi
tory image 'rat' for a third thing, the matter with him rests
there. If a fourth thing interests him for which no sign
happens already to have been learned, he remains tran
quilly without it and goes no further. But the man postu
lates it, its absence irritates him, and he ends by inventing
it This GENERAL PUHPOSE constitutes, I take it, the peculiarity
of human speech, and explains its prodigious development.

REASONING. 357

How, then, does the general purpose arise ? It arises
as soon as the notion of a sign as such, apart from any par
ticular import, is born ; and this notion is born by dis
sociation from the outstanding portions of a number of
concrete cases of signification. The ' yelp,' the ' beg,' the
* rat,' differ as to their several imports and natures. They
agree only in so far as they have the same use — to be signs,
to stand for something more important than themselves.
The dog whom this similarity could strike would have
grasped the sign per se as such, and would probably
thereupon become a general sign-maker, or speaker in
the human sense. But how can the similarity strike
him? Not without the juxtaposition of the similars (in
virtue of the law we have laid down (p. 506), that in order
to be segregated an experience must be repeated with
varying concomitants) — not unless the 'yelp' of the dog
at the moment it occurs recalls to him his ' beg,' by the
delicate bond of their subtle similarity of use — not till
then can this thought flash through his mind : " Why, yelp
and beg, in spite of all their unlikeness, are yet alike in
this : that they are actions, signs, which lead to important
boons. Other boons, any boons, may then be got by other
signs !" This reflection made, the gulf is passed. Animals
probably never make it, because the bond of similarity is
not delicate enough. Each sign is drowned in its import,
and never awakens other signs and other imports in jux
taposition. The rat-hunt idea is too absorbingly interest
ing in itself to be interrupted by anything so uncontiguoua
to it as the idea of the ' beg for food,' or of ' the door-open
yelp,' nor in their turn do these awaken the rat-hunt idea.

In the human child, however, these ruptures of contigu
ous association are very soon made ; far off cases of sign-
using arise when we make a sign now ; and soon language
is launched. The child in each case makes the discovery
for himself. No one can help him except by furnishing
him with the conditions. But as he is constituted, the con
ditions will sooner or later shoot together .into the result*

* There are two other conditions of language in the human being, addi
tional to association by similarity, that assist its action, or rather pave the
way for it. These are: first, the great natural loquacity; and, second, the

358 PSYCHOLOGY.

The exceedingly interesting account which Dr. Howe
gives of the education of his various blind-deaf mutes illus
trates this point admirably. He began to teach Laura
Bridgman by gumming raised letters on various familiar
articles. The child was taught by mere contiguity to pick
out a certain number of particular articles when made to
feel the letters. But this was merely a collection of par
ticular signs, out of the mass of which the general purpose
of signification had not yet been extracted by the child's
mind. Dr. Howe compares his situation at this moment to
that of one lowering a line to the bottom of the deep sea in
which Laura's soul lay, and waiting until she should spon
taneously take hold of it and be raised into the light. The
moment came, ' accompanied by a radiant flash of intelli
gence and glow of joy '; she seemed suddenly to become
aware of the general purpose imbedded in the different de
tails of all these signs, and from that moment her education
went on with extreme rapidity.

Another of the great capacities in which man has been
said to differ fundamentally from the animal is that of pos-

great imitativeness of man. The first produces the original reflex inter-
jectioual sign; the second (as Bleek has well shown) fixes it, stamps it, and
ends by multiplying the number of determinate specific signs which are a
requisite preliminary to the general conscious purpose of sign-making,
which I have called the characteristic human element in language. The
way in which imitativeness fixes the meaning of signs is this: When a pri
meval man has a given emotion, he utters his natural interjection; or when
(to avoid supposing that the reflex sounds are exceedingly determinate by
nature) a group of such men experience a common emotion, and one takes
the lead in the cry, the others cry like him from sympathy or imitative-
ness. Now, let one of the group hear another, who is in presence of the
experience, utter the cry; he, even without the experience, will repeat the
cry from pure imitativeness. But, as he repeats the sign, he will be re
minded by it of his own former experience. Thus, first, he has the sign
with the emotion; then, without it; then, with it again. It is " dissociated
by change of concomitants "; he feels it as a separate entity and yet as hav
ing a connection with the emotion. Immediately it becomes possible for
him to couple it deliberately with the emotion, in cases where the latter
would either have provoked no interjectional cry or not the same one. In
a word, his mental procedure tends to fix this cry on that emotion; and
when this occurs, in many instances, he is provided with a stock of signs,
like the yelp, beg, rat of the dog, each of -which suggests a determinate
image. On this stock, then, similarity works in the way above explained.

REASONING. 359

sessing self-consciousness or reflective knowledge of him
self as a thinker. But this capacity also flows from our
criterion, for (without going into the matter very deeply)
we may say that the brute never reflects on himself as a
thinker, because he has never clearly dissociated, in the
full concrete act of thought, the element of the thing
thought of and the operation by which he thinks it. They
remain always fused, conglomerated — just as the interjec-
tional vocal sign of the brute almost invariably merges in
his mind with the thing signified, and is not independently
attended to in se*

Now, the dissociation of these two elements probably
occurs first in thb child's mind on the occasion of some
error or false expectation which would make him experience
the shock of difference between merely imagining a thing
and getting it. The thought experienced once with the
concomitant reality, and then without it or with opposite
concomitants, reminds the child of other cases in which the
same provoking phenomenon occurred. Thus the general
ingredient of error may be dissociated and noticed per se,
and from the notion of his error or wrong thought to that of
his thought in general the transition is easy. The brute, no
doubt, has plenty of instances of error and disappointment
in his life, but the similar shock is in him most likely al
ways swallowed up in the accidents of the actual case. An
expectation disappointed may breed dubiety as to the reali
zation of that particular thing when the dog next expects
it. But that disappointment, that dubiety, while they are
present in the mind, will not call up other cases, in which
the material details were different, but this feature of pos-

* See the ' Evolution of Self-consciousness ' in ' Philosophical Discus
sions,' by Chauncey Wright (New York: Henry Holt & Co. , 1877). Dr. Ro,
manes, in the book from which I have already quoted, seeks to show that
the ' consciousness of truth as truth ' and the deliberate intention to predi
cate (which are the characteristics of higher human reasoning) presuppose
a consciousness of ideas as such, as things distinct from their objects ; and
that this consciousness depends on our having made signs for them by
language. My text seems to me to include Dr. Romanes's facts, and formu
lates them in what to me is a more elementary way, though the reader who
wishes to understand the matter better should go to his clear and patient
exposition also.

360 PSYCHOLOGY.

sible error was the same. The brute will, therefore, stop
short of dissociating the general notion of error per se, and
a fortiori will never attain the conception of Thought itself
as such.

We may then, we think, consider it proven that the most
elementary single difference between the human mind and that of
brutes lies in this deficiency on the brute's part to associate ideas
by similarity — characters, the abstraction of which depends
on this sort of association, must in the brute always remain
drowned, swamped in the total phenomenon which they
help constitute, and never used to reason from. If a char
acter stands out alone, it is always some obvious sensible
quality like a sound or a smell which is instinctively excit
ing and lies in the line of the animal's propensities ; or it
is some obvious sign which experience has habitually
coupled with a consequence, such as, for the dog, the sight
of his master's hat on and the master's going out.

DIFFERENT ORDERS OF HUMAN GENIUS.

But, now, since nature never makes a jump, it is evident
that we should find the lowest men occupying in this respect
an intermediate position between the brutes and the highest
men. And so we do. Beyond the analogies which their own
minds suggest by breaking up the literal sequence of their
experience, there is a whole world of analogies which they
can appreciate when imparted to them by their betters, but
which they could never excogitate alone. This answers
the question why Darwin and Newton had to be waited for
so long. The flash of similarity between an apple and the
moon, between the rivalry for food in nature and the rivalry
for man's selection, was too recondite to have occurred to any
but exceptional minds. Genius, then, as has been already
said, is identical with the possession of similar association
to an extreme degree. Professor Bain says : " This I count
the leading fact of genius. I consider it quite impossible
to afford any explanation of intellectual originality except
on the supposition of unusual energy on this point." Alike
in the arts, in literature, in practical affairs, and in science,
association by similarity is the prime condition of success.

REASONING. 361

But as, according to our view, there are two stages in
reasoned thought, one where similarity merely operates to
call up cognate thoughts, and another farther stage, where
the^ bond of identity between the cognate thoughts is
noticed; so minds of genius may be divided into tivo main
sorts, those ivho notice the bond and those who merely obey it.
The first are the abstract reasoners, properly so called,
the men of science, and philosophers— the analysts, in
a word ; the latter are the poets, the critics— the artists,
in a ^ word, the men of intuitions. These judge rightly,
classify cases, characterize them by the most striking ana
logic epithets, but go no further. At first sight it might
seem that the analytic mind represented simply a higher
intellectual stage, and that the intuitive mind represented
an arrested stage of intellectual development ; but the dif
ference is not so simple as this. Professor Bain has said
that a man's advance to the scientific stage (the stage of
noticing and abstracting the bond of similarity) may often
be due to an absence of certain emotional sensibilities. The
sense of color, he says, may no less determine a mind away
from science than it determines it toward painting. There
must be a penury in one's interest in the details of particu
lar forms in order to permit the forces of the intellect to
be concentrated on what is common to many forms.* In
other words, supposing a mind fertile in the suggestion of
analogies, but, at the same time, keenly interested in the
particulars of each suggested image, that mind would be
far less apt to single out the particular character which
called up the analogy than one whose interests were less
generally lively. A certain richness of the sesthetic nature
may, therefore, easily keep one in the intuitive stage. All
the poets are examples of this. Take Homer :

" Ulysses, too, spied round the house to see if any man were still

alive and hiding, trying to get away from gloomy death. He found

hem all fallen in the blood and dirt, and in such number as the fish

the fishermen to the low shore, out of the foaming sea drag

with their meshy nets. These all, sick for the ocean water, are strewn

around the sands, while the blazing sun takes their life from them So

the suitors lay strewn round on one another." Or again :

* Study of Character, p. 317.

362 PSYCHOLOGY.

"And as when a Mseonian or a Carian woman stains ivory with
purple to be a cheek-piece for horses, and it is kept in the chamber, and
many horsemen have prayed to bear it off ; but it is kept a treasure for
a king, both a trapping for his horse and a glory to the driver — in such
wise were thy stout thighs, Menelaos, and legs and fair ankles stained
with blood."*

A man in whom all the accidents of an analogy rise up
as vividly as this, may be excused for not attending to the
ground of the analogy. But he need not on that account
be deemed intellectually the inferior of a man of drier mind,
in whom the ground is not as liable to be eclipsed by the
general splendor. Karely are both sorts of intellect, the
splendid and the analytic, found in conjunction, Plato
among philosophers, and M. Taine, who cannot quote a
child's saying without describing the ' voix chantante,
etonnee, heureuse' in which it is uttered, are only excep
tions whose strangeness proves the rule.

An often-quoted writer has said that Shakespeare pos
sessed more intellectual power than any one else that ever
lived. If by this he meant the power to pass from given
premises to right or congruous conclusions, it is no doubt
true. The abrupt transitions in Shakespeare's thought
astonish the reader by their unexpectedness no less than
they delight him by their fitness. Why, for instance, does
the death of Othello so stir the spectator's blood and leave
him with a sense of reconcilement? Shakespeare himself
could very likely not say why ; for his invention, though
rational, was not ratiocinative. Wishing the curtain to fall
upon a reinstated Othello, that speech about the turbaned
Turk suddenly simply flashed across him as the right end of
all that went before. The dry critic who comes after can,
however, point out the subtle bonds of identity that guided
Shakespeare's pen through that speech to the death of the
Moor. Othello is sunk in ignominy, lapsed from his
height at the beginning of the play. What better way
to rescue him at last from this abasement than to make
him for an instant identify himself in memory with the old
Othello of better days, and then execute justice on his pres
ent disowned body, as he used then to smite all enemies of

* Translated by my colleague, Professor G. H. Palmer.

REASONING. 363

the State ? But Shakespeare, whose mind supplied these
means, could probably not have told why they were so
effective.

But though this is true, and though it would be absurd
in an absolute way to say that a given analytic mind was
superior to any intuitional one, yet it is none the less true
that the former represents the higher stage. Men, taken
historically, reason by analogy long before they have learned
to reason by abstract characters. Association by similarity
and true reasoning may have identical results. If a philos
opher wishes to prove to you why you should do a certain
thing, he may do so by using abstract considerations exclu
sively ; a savage will prove the same by reminding you of a
similar case in which you notoriously do as he now pro
poses, and this with no ability to state the point in which
the cases are similar. In all primitive literature, in all
savage oratory, we find persuasion carried on exclusively
by parables and similes, and travellers in savage countries
readily adopt the native custom. Take, for example, Dr.
Livingstone's argument with the negro conjuror. The mis
sionary was trying to dissuade the savage from his fetichistic
ways of invoking rain. "You see," said he, "that, after all
your operations, sometimes it rains and sometimes it does
not, exactly as when you have not operated at all." " But,"
replied the sorcerer, "it is just the same with you doctors;
you give your remedies, and sometimes the patient gets well
and sometimes he dies, just as when you do nothing at all."
To that the pious missionary replied : " The doctor does his
duty, after which God performs the cure if it pleases Him."
" Well," rejoined the savage, " it is just so with me. I do
what is necessary to procure rain, after which God sends it
or withholds it according to His pleasure." *

This is the stage in which proverbial philosophy reigns
supreme. " An empty sack can't stand straight" will stand
for the reason why a man with debts may lose his honesty ;
and " a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush" will serve
to back up one's exhortations to prudence. Or we answer
the question : " Why is snow white ?" by saying, " For the

* Quoted by Renouvier, Critique Philosophique, October 19, 1879.

364 PSYCHOLOGY.

same reason that soap-suds or whipped eggs are white"-
in other words, instead of giving the reason for a fact, we
give another example of the same fact. This offering a simi
lar instance, instead of a reason, has often been criticised
as one of the forms of logical depravity in men. But mani
festly it is not a perverse act of thought, but only an in
complete one. Furnishing parallel cases is the necessary
first step towards abstracting the reason imbedded in
them all.

As it is with reasons, so it is with words. The first
words are probably always names of entire things and en
tire actions, of extensive coherent groups. A new experi
ence in the primitive man can only be talked about by
him in terms of the old experiences which have received
names. It reminds him of certain ones from among them,
but the points in which it agrees with them are neither
named nor dissociated. Pure similarity must work before
the abstraction can work which is based upon it. The first
adjectives will therefore probably be total nouns embody
ing the striking character. The primeval man will say,,
not ' the bread is hard,' but ' the bread is stone' ; not
' the face is round,' but * the face is moon' ; not ' the
fruit is sweet,' but 'the fruit is sugar-cane.' The first
words are thus neither particular nor general, but vaguely
concrete ; just as we speak of an ' oval ' face, a ' velvet '
skin, or an 'iron' will, without meaning to connote any
other attributes of the adjective-noun than those in which
it does resemble the noun it is used to qualify. After
a while certain of these adjectively-used nouns come only
to signify the particular quality for whose sake they are
oftenest used ; the entire thing which they originally meant
receives another name, and they become true abstract
and general terms. Oval, for example, with us suggests
only shape. The first abstract qualities thus formed are,
no doubt, qualities of one and the same sense found in
different objects — as big, sweet ; next analogies between
different senses, as ' sharp ' of taste, ' high ' of sound, etc. ;
then analogies of motor combinations, or form ot relation,
as simple, confused, difficult, reciprocal, relative, spontane
ous, etc. The extreme degree of subtlety in analogy is

REASONING. 365

reached in such cases as when we say certain English art
critics' writing reminds us of a close room in which pastilles
have been burning, or that the mind of certain Frenchmen
is like old Roquefort cheese. Here language utterly fails
to hit upon the basis of resemblance.

Over immense departments of our thought we are still,
all of us, in the savage state. Similarity operates in us, but
abstraction has not taken place. We know what the pres
ent case is like, we know what it reminds us of, we have an
intuition of the right course to take, if it be a practical mat
ter. But analytic thought has made no tracks, and we can
not justify ourselves to others. In ethical, psychological,
and aesthetic matters, to give a clear reason for one's judg
ment is universally recognized as a mark of rare genius.
The helplessness of uneducated people to account for their
likes and dislikes is often ludicrous. Ask the first Irish
girl why she likes this country better or worse than her
home, and see how much she can tell you. But if you ask
your most educated friend why he prefers Titian to Paul
Veronese, you will hardly get more of a reply ; and you will
probably get absolutely none if you inquire why Beethoven
reminds him of Michael Angelo, or how it comes that a
bare figure with unduly flexed joints, by the latter, can so
suggest the moral tragedy of life. His thought obeys a
nexus, but cannot name it. And so it is with all those judg
ments of experts, which even though unmotived are so valu
able. Saturated with experience of a particular class of
materials, an expert intuitively feels whether a newly-re
ported fact is probable or not, whether a proposed hypoth
esis is worthless or the reverse. He instinctively knows
that, in. a novel case, this and not that will be the promising
course of action. The well-known story of the old judge
advising the new one never to give reasons for his decisions,
" the decisions will probably be right, the reasons will surely
be wrong," illustrates this. The doctor will feel that the
patient is doomed, the dentist will have a premonition that
the tooth will break, though neither can articulate a reason
for his foreboding. The reason lies imbedded, but not yet
laid bare, in all the countless previous cases dimly sug
gested by the actual one, all calling up the same conclusion,

366 PSYCHOLOGY.

which the adept thus finds himself swept on to, he knows
not how or why.

A physiological conclusion remains to be drawn. If the
principles laid down in Chapter XIV are true, then it fol
lows that the great cerebral difference between habitual and
reasoned thinking must be this : that in the former an entire
system of cells vibrating at any one moment discharges in
its totality into another entire system, and that the order
of the discharges tends to be a constant one in time ; whilst
in the latter a part of the prior system still keeps vibrating
in the midst of the subsequent system, and the order—
which part this shall be, and what shall be its concomitants
in the. subsequent system — has little tendency to fixedness
in time. This physical selection, so to call it, of one part
to vibrate persistently whilst the others rise and subside,
we found, in the chapter in question, to be the basis of
similar association. (See especially pp. 578-81.) It would
seem to be but a minor degree of that still more urgent
and importunate localized vibration which we can easiest
conceive to underlie the mental fact of interest, attention,
or dissociation. In terms of the brain-process, then, all
these mental facts resolve themselves into a single peculi
arity: that of indeterminateness of connection between
the different tracts, and tendency of action to focalize
itself, so to speak, in small localities which vary infinitely
at different times, and from which irradiation may pro
ceed in countless shifting ways. (Compare figure 80, p.
347.) To discover, or (what more befits the present stage
of nerve-physiology) to adumbrate by some possible guess,
on what chemical or molecular-mechanical fact this instable
equilibrium of the human brain may depend, should be the
next task of the physiologist who ponders over the passage
from brute to man. Whatever the physical peculiarity in
question may be, it is the cause why a man, whose brain
has it, reasons so much, whilst his horse, whose brain lacks
it, reasons so little. We can but bequeath the problem to
abler hands than our own.

But, meanwhile, this mode of stating the matter suggests
a couple of other inferences. The first is brief. If focali-

REASONING. 36?

zation of brain-activity be the fundamental fact of reasonable
thought, we see why intense interest or concentrated pas
sion makes us think so much more truly and profoundly.
The persistent focalization of motion in certain tracts is the
cerebral fact corresponding to the persistent domination in
consciousness of the important feature of the subject.
When not 'focalized,' we are scatter-brained; but when
thoroughly impassioned, we never wander from the point
None but congruous and relevant images arise. When
roused by indignation or moral enthusiasm, how trenchant
are our reflections, how smiting are our words ! The whole
network of petty scruples and by-considerations which, at
ordinary languid times, surrounded the matter like a cob
web, holding back our thought, as Gulliver was pinned to
the earth by the myriad Lilliputian threads, are dashed
through at a blow, and the subject stands with its essential
and vital lines revealed.

The last point is relative to the theory that what was
acquired habit in the ancestor may become congenital ten
dency in the offspring. So vast a superstructure is raised
upon this principle that the paucity of empirical evidence
for it has alike been matter of regret to its adherents, and
of triumph to its opponents. In Chapter XXVIII we shall
see what we may call the whole beggarly array of proof.
In the human race, where our opportunities for observation
are the most complete, we seem to have no evidence what
ever which would support the hypothesis, unless it possibly
be the law that city-bred children are more apt to be
near-sighted than country children. In the mental world
we certainly do not observe that the children of great
travellers get their geography lessons with unusual ease,
or that a baby whose ancestors have spoken German for
thirty generations will, on that account, learn Italian any
the less easily from its Italian nurse. But if the con
siderations we have been led to are true, they explain
perfectly well why this law should not be verified in the
human race, and why, therefore, in looking for evidence
on the subject, we should confine ourselves exclusively to
lower animals. In them fixed habit is the essential and

368 PSYCHOLOGY.

characteristic law of nervous action. The brain grows to
the exact modes in which it has been exercised, and the in
heritance of these modes — then called instincts — would
have in it nothing surprising. But in man the negation of
all fixed modes is the essential characteristic. He owes his
whole pre-eminence as a reasoner, his whole human quality
of intellect, we may say, to the facility with which a given
mode of thought in him may suddenly be broken up into
elements, which recombine anew. Only at the price of in
heriting no settled instinctive tendencies is he able to settle
every novel case by the fresh discovery by his reason of
novel principles. He is, par excellence, the educable animal.
If, then, the law that habits are inherited were found exem
plified in him, he would, in so far forth, fall short of his
human perfections ; and, when we survey the human races,
we actually do find that those which are most instinctive at
the outset are those which, on the whole, are least educated
in the end. An untutored Italian is, to a great extent, a
man of the world ; he has instinctive perceptions, tendencies
to behavior, reactions, in a word, upon his environment,
which the untutored German wholly lacks. If the latter be
not drilled, he is apt to be a thoroughly loutish personage ;
but, on the other hand, the mere absence in his brain of
definite innate tendencies enables him to advance by the de
velopment, through education, of his purely reasoned think
ing, into complex regions of consciousness that the Italian
may probably never approach.

We observe an identical difference between men as a
whole and women as a whole. A young woman of twenty re
acts with intuitive promptitude and security in all the usual
circumstances in which she may be placed.* Her likes

* Social and domestic circumstances, that is, not material ones. Per
ceptions of social relations seem very keen in persons whose dealings with
the material world are confined to knowing a few useful objects, princi
pally animals, plants, and weapons. Savages and boors are often as tact
ful and astute socially as trained diplomatists. In general, it is provable
that the consciousness of how one stands with other people occupies a rela
tively larger and larger part of the mind, the lower one goes in the scale
of culture. Woman's intuitions, so fine in the sphere of personal relations,
are seldom first-rate in the way of mechanics. All boys teach themselves
how a clock goes ; few girls. Hence Dr. Whately's jest, "Woman is the
unreasoning animal, and pokes the fire from on top!"

REASONING. 369

and dislikes are formed ; her opinions, to a great extent, the
same that they will be through life. Her character is, in
fact, finished in its essentials. How inferior to her is a boy
of twenty in all these respects ! His character is still gelat
inous, uncertain what shape to assume, ' trying it on ' in
every direction. Feeling his power, yet ignorant of the
manner in which he shall express it, he is, when compared
with his sister, a being of no definite contour. But this
absence of prompt tendency in his brain to set into particu
lar modes is the very condition which insures that it shall
ultimately become so much more efficient than the woman's.
The very lack of preappointed trains of thought is the
ground on which general principles and heads of classifi
cation grow up ; and the masculine brain deals with new
and complex matter indirectly by means of these, in a
manner which the feminine method of direct intuition, ad
mirably and rapidly as it performs within its limits, can
vainly hope to cope with.

In looking back over the subject of reasoning, one feels
how intimately connected it is with conception ; and one
realizes more than ever the deep reach of that principle of
selection on which so much stress was laid towards the close
of Chapter IX. As the art of reading (after a certain stage
in one's education) is the art of skipping, so the art of being
wise is the art of knowing what to overlook. The first effect
on the mind of growing cultivated is that processes once
multiple get to be performed by a single act. Lazarus has
called this the progressive ' condensation ' of thought.
But in the psychological sense it is less a condensation than
a loss, a genuine dropping out and throwing overboard of
conscious content. Steps really sink from sight. An ad
vanced thinker sees the relations of his topics in such
masses and so instantaneously that when he comes to
explain to younger minds it is often hard to say which
grows the more perplexed, he or the pupil. In every uni
versity there are admirable investigators who are notori
ously bad lecturers. The reason is that they never spon
taneously see the subject in the minute articulate way in
which the student needs to have it offered to his slow

370 PSYCHOLOGY.

reception. They grope for the links, but the links dc not
€ome. Bowditch, who translated and annotated Laplace's
Mecanique Celeste, said that whenever his author prefaced
a proposition by the words 'it is evident,' he knew that
many hours of hard study lay before him.

When two minds of a high order, interested in kindred
subjects, come together, their conversation is chiefly re-
markable for the summariness of its allusions and the
rapidity of its transitions. Before one of them is half
through a sentence the other knows his meaning and
replies. Such genial play with such massive materials,
such an easy flashing of light over far perspectives, such
careless indifference to the dust and apparatus that ordi
narily surround the subject and seem to pertain to its
essence, make these conversations seem true feasts for
gods to a listener who is educated enough to follow them
at all. His mental lungs breathe more deeply, in an atmos
phere more broad and vast than is their wont. On the
other hand, the excessive explicitness and short-windedness
of an ordinary man are as wonderful as they are tedious to
the man of genius. But we need not go as far as the ways
of genius. Ordinary social intercourse will do. There the
charm of conversation is in direct proportion to the possi
bility of abridgment and elision, and in inverse ratio to the
need of explicit statement. With old friends a word stands
for a whole story or set of opinions. With new-comers
everything must be gone over in detail. Some persons
have a real mania for completeness, they must express
every step. They are the most intolerable of companions,
and although their mental energy may in its way be great,
they always strike us as weak and second-rate. In short,
the essence of plebeianism, that which separates vulgarity
from aristocracy, is perhaps less a defect than an excess,
the constant need to animadvert upon matters which for
the aristocratic temperament do not exist. To ignore, to
disdain to consider, to overlook, are the essence of the
* gentleman.' Often most provokingly so ; for the things
ignored may be of the deepest moral consequence. But in
the very midst of our indignation with the gentleman, we
have a consciousness that his preposterous inertia and neg*

REASONING. 371

ativeness in the actual emergency is, somehow or other,
•allied with his general superiority to ourselves. It is not
only that the gentleman ignores considerations relative to
conduct, sordid suspicions, fears, calculations, etc., which
the vulgarian is fated to entertain ; it is that he is silent
where the vulgarian talks ; that he gives nothing but results
where the vulgarian is profuse of reasons ; that he does not
explain or apologize ; that he uses one sentence instead of
twenty ; and that, in a word, there is an amount of intersti
tial thinking, so to call it, which it is quite impossible to
get him to perform, but which is nearly all that the vul
garian mind performs at all. All this suppression of the
secondary leaves the field clear, — for higher flights, should
they choose to come. But even if they never came, what
thoughts there were would still manifest the aristocratic
type and wear the well-bred form. So great is our sense
of harmony and ease in passing from the company of a phi-
listine to that of an aristocratic temperament, that we are
almost tempted to deem the falsest views and tastes as held
by a man of the world, truer than the truest as held by a
common person. In the latter the best ideas are choked,
obstructed, and contaminated by the redundancy of their
paltry associates. The negative conditions, at least, of an
atmosphere and a free outlook are present in the former.
I may appear to have strayed from psychological an
alysis into aesthetic criticism. But the principle of selec
tion is so important that no illustrations seem redundant
which may help to show how great is its scope. The
upshot of what I say simply is that selection implies rejec
tion as well as choice ; and that the function of ignoring, of
inattention, is as vital a factor in mental progress as the
function of attention itself.

CHAPTER XXIII.

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT.

THE reader will not have forgotten, in the jungle of
purely inward processes and products through which the
last chapters have borne him, that the final result of them
all must be some form of bodily activity due to the escape
of the central excitement through outgoing nerves. The
whole neural organism, it will be remembered, is, physio
logically considered, but a machine for converting stimuli
into reactions ; and the intellectual part of our life is knit
up with but the middle or * central ' portion of the machine's
operations. Let us now turn to consider the final or emer
gent operations, the bodily activities, and the forms of con
sciousness connected therewithal.

Every impression which impinges on the incoming
nerves produces some discharge down the outgoing ones,
whether we be aware of it or not. Using sweeping terms
and ignoring exceptions, we might say that every possible feel
ing produces a movement, and that the movement is a movement
of the entire organism, and of each and all its parts. What
happens patently when an explosion or a flash of lightning
startles us, or when we are tickled, happens latently with
every sensation which we receive. The only reason why we
do not feel the startle or tickle in the case of insignificant
sensations is partly its very small amount, partly our obtuse-
ness. Professor Bain many years ago gave the name of the
Law of Diffusion to this phenomenon of general discharge,
and expressed it thus : " According as an impression is ac
companied with Feeling, the aroused currents diffuse them
selves over the brain, leading to a general agitation of the
moving organs, as well as affecting the viscera."

372

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT. 373

In cases where the feeling is strong the law is too famil
iar to require proof. As Prof. Bain says :

" Each of us knows in our own experience that a sudden shock of
feeling is accompanied with movements of the body generally, and with
other effects. When no emotion is present, we are quiescent ; a slight
feeling is accompanied with slight manifestations ; a more intense shock
has a more intense outburst. Every pleasure and every pain, and every
mode of emotion, has a definite wave of effects, which our observation
makes known to us ; and we apply the knowledge to infer other men's
feelings from their outward display. . . . The organs first and promi
nently affected, in the diffused wave of nervous influence, are the mov
ing members, and of these, by preference, the features of the face (with
the ears in animals), whose movements constitute the expression of the
countenance. But the influence extends to all the parts of the moving
system, voluntary and involuntary ; while an important series of effects
are produced on the glands and viscera— the stomach, lungs, heart , kid
neys, skin, together with the sexual and mammary organs. . . . The
circumstance is seemingly universal, the proof of it does not require a
citation of instances in detail ; on the objectors is thrown the burden of
adducing unequivocal exceptions to the law. " *

There are probably no exceptions to the diffusion of
every impression through the nerve-centres. The effect of
the wave through the centres may, however, often be to
interfere with processes, and to diminish tensions already
existing there ; and the outward consequences of such
inhibitions may be the arrest of discharges from the
inhibited regions and the checking of bodily activities
already in process of occurrence. When this happens it
probably is like the draining or siphoning of certain chan
nels by currents flowing through others. When, in walk
ing, we suddenly stand still because a sound, sight, smell, or
thought catches our attention, something like this occurs.
But there are cases of arrest of peripheral activity which
depend, not on central inhibition, but on stimulation of
centres which discharge outgoing currents of an inhibitory
sort. Whenever we are startled, for example, our heart
momentarily stops or slows its beating, and then palpitates
with accelerated speed. The brief arrest is due to an out
going current down the pneumogastric nerve. This nerve,
when stimulated, stops or slows the heart-beats, and this

* Emotions and Will, pp. 4, 5.

374 PSYCHOLOGY.

particular effect of startling fails to occur if the nerve

be cut.

In general, however, the stimulating effects of a sense-
impression preponderate over the inhibiting effects, so that
we may roughly say, as we began by saying, that the wave
of discharge produces an activity in all parts of the body.
The task of tracing out all the effects of any one incoming
sensation has not yet been performed by physiologists.
Kecent years have, however, begun to enlarge our informa
tion ; and although I must refer to special treatises for the
full details, I can briefly string together here a number of
separate observations which prove the truth of the law of
diffusion.

First take effects upon the circulation. Those upon the
heart we have just seen. Haller long ago recorded that
the blood from an open vein flowed out faster at the beat of
a drum.* In Chapter III. (p. 98) we learned how instan
taneously, according to Mosso, the circulation in the brain
is altered by changes of sensation and of the course of
thought. The effect of objects of fear, shame, and anger
upon the blood-supply of the skin, especially the skin of
the face, are too well known to need remark. Sensations of
the higher senses produce, according to Couty and Char-
pentier, the most varied effects upon the pulse-rate and
blood-pressure in dogs. Fig. 81, a pulse-tracing from these
authors, shows the tumultuous effect on a dog's heart of
hearing the screams of another dog. The changes of
blood-pressure still occurred when the pneumogastric
nerves were cut. showing the vaso-motor effect to be direct
and not dependent on the heart. When Mosso invented
that simple instrument, the plethysmograph, for recording
the fluctuations in volume of the members of the body, what
most astonished him, he says, "in the first experiments
which he made in Italy, was the extreme unrest of the
blood-vessels of the hand, which at every smallest emotion,
whether during waking or during sleep, changed their vol
ume in surprising fashion." t Figure 82 (from Fere $

* Of. Fere . Sensation et Mouvement (1887), p. 56.
f La Paura (1884), p. 117. Compare Fere : Sensation et Mouvement,
chap. xvn.

J Revue Philosophique, xxiv. 570.

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT.

375

X

376

PSYCHOLOGY.

shows the way in which the pulse of one subject was
modified by the exhibition of a red light lasting from the
moment marked a to that marked b.

FIG. 82.

The effects upon respiration of sudden sensory stimuli
are also too well known to need elaborate comment. We
' catch our breath ' at every sudden sound. We * hold our
breath ' whenever our attention and expectation are strongly

Fio. 83.- Respiratory curve of B: a, with eyes open; 6, with eyes closed.

engaged, and we sigh when the tension of the situation is
relieved. When a fearful object is before us we pant and
cannot deeply inspire ; when the object makes us angry it
is, on the contrary, the act of expiration which is hard.
I subjoin a couple of figures from Fere which explain them-

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT.

selves. They show the effects of light upon the breathing
of two of his hysteric patients.*

Fio. 84.-Respiratory curve of L: a, with yellow light; 6, with green light; c, with red
light. The red has the strongest effect.

On the sweat-glands, similar consequences of sensorial
stimuli are observed. Tarchanoff, testing the condition of
the sweat-glands by the power of the skin to start a gal-

* Revue Phil., xxiv. pp. 566-7.— For further information about the rela
tions between the brain and respiration, see Danilewsky's Essay in the Bio-
logisches Centralblatt, u. 690.

378 PSYCHOLOGY.

vanic current through electrodes applied to its surface,,
found that " nearly every kind of nervous activity, from the
simplest sensations and impressions, to voluntary motions
and the highest forms of mental exertion, is accompanied
by an increased activity in the glands of the skin."* On
the pupil observations are recorded by Sanders which show
that a transitory dilatation follows every sensorial stimulus
applied during sleep, even if the stimulus be not strong
enough to wake the subject up. At the moment of awak
ing there is a dilatation, even if strong light falls on the
eye.f The pupil of children can easily be observed to
dilate enormously under the influence of fear. It is said to
dilate in pain and fatigue ; and to contract, on the contrary,
in rage.

As regards effects on the abdominal viscera, they unques
tionably exist, but very few accurate observations have
been made4

The bladder, bowels, and uterus respond to sensations,
even indifferent ones. Mosso and Pellicani, in their plethys-
mographic investigations on the bladder of dogs, found
all sorts of sensorial stimuli to produce reflex contractions
of this organ, independent of those of the abdominal walls.
They call the bladder ' as good an sesthesiometer as the
iris,' and refer to the not uncommon reflex effects of psy
chic stimuli in the human female upon this organ. § M.
Fere has registered the contractions of the sphincter ani
which even indifferent sensations will produce. In some
pregnant women the foatus is felt to move after almost
every sensorial excitement received by the mother. The
only natural explanation is that it is stimulated at such
moments by reflex contractions of the womb.[ That the
glands are affected in emotion is patent enough in the case
of the tears of grief, the dry mouth, moist skin, or diar-

* Quoted from the report of Tarchanoff's paper (in Pflilger's Archiv,
XL vi. 46) in the American Journal of Psych. , n. 652.

f Archiv f. Psychiatrie, vn. 652 ; ix. 129.

| Sensation et Mouvement, 57-8.

§ R. Accad. dei Lincei (1881-2). I follow the report in Hofmann F.
Schwalbe's Jahresbericht, x. n. 93.

|| Cf. Fere, Sensation et Mouvement, chap. xiv.

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT. 379

rhoaa of fear, the biliary disturbances which sometimes
follow upon rage, etc. The watering of the mouth at the
sight of succulent food is well known. It is difficult to
follow the smaller degrees of all these reflex changes, but
it can hardly be doubted that they exist in some degree,
even where they cease to be traceable, and that all our
sensations have some visceral effects. The sneezing pro
duced by sunshine, the roughening of the skin (gooseflesh)
which certain strokings, contacts, and sounds, musical or
non-musical, provoke, are facts of the same order as the
shuddering and standing up of the hair in fear, only of less
degree.

Effects on Voluntary Muscles. Every sensorial stimulus
not only sends a special discharge into certain particular
muscles dependent on the special nature of the stimulus in
question — some of these special discharges we have studied
in Chapter XI, others we shall examine under the heads
of Instinct and Emotion — but it innervates the muscles
generally. M. Fere has given very curious experimental
proofs of this. The strength of contraction of the subject's
hand was measured by a self -registering dynamometer.
Ordinarily the maximum strength, under simple experimen
tal conditions, remains the same from day to day. But if
simultaneously with the contraction the subject received a
sensorial impression, the contraction was sometimes weak
ened, but more often increased. This reinforcing effect has
received the name of dynamogeny. The dynamogenic value of
simple musical notes seems to be proportional to their loud-
ness and height. Where the notes are compounded into sad
strains, the muscular strength diminishes. If the strains are
gay, it is increased.— The dynamogenic value of colored lights
varies with the color. In a subject* whose normal strength
was expressed by 23, it became 24 when a blue light was

*The figures given are from an hysterical subject, and the differences
are greater than normal. M. Fere considers that the unstable nervous
system of the'hysteric (' ces grenouilles de la psychologic ') shows the law
on a quantitatively exaggerated scale, without altering the qualitative rela
tions. The effects remind us a little of the influence of sensations upon
minimal sensations of other orders discovered by Urbantschitsch, and re
ported on page 29 of this volume.

PSYCHOLOGY.

thrown on the eyes, 28 for green, 30 for yellow, 35 for orange,
and 42 for red. Ked is thus the most exciting color.
Among tastes, sweet has the lowest value, next comes salt,
then bitter, and finally sour, though, as M. Fere remarks,
such a sour as acetic acid excites the nerves of pain and
smell as well as of taste. The stimulating effects of tobacco-
smoke, alcohol, beef-extract (which is innutritions), etc., etc.,
may be partly due to a dynamogenic action of this sort.—
Of odors, that of musk seems to have a peculiar dynamo
genic power. Fig. 85 is a copy of one of M. Fere's dyna-
mographic tracings, which explains itself. The smaller
contractions are those without stimulus ; the stronger ones
are due to the influence of red rays of light.

FIG. 85.

Everyone is familiar with the patellar reflex, or jerk up
wards of the foot, which is produced by smartly tapping
the tendon below the knee-pan when the leg hangs over
the other knee. Drs. "Weir Mitchell and Lombard have
found that when other sensations come in simultaneously
with the tap, the jerk is increased.* Heat, cold, pricking,
itching, or faradic stimulation of the skin, sometimes strong
optical impressions, music, all have this dynamogenic effect,
which also results whenever voluntary movements are set
up in other parts of the body, simultaneously with the
tap.t

These ' dynamogenic ' effects, in which one stimulation

* Mitchell in (Philadelphia) Medical News (Feb. 13 and 20, 1886); Lom
bard in American Journal of Psychology (Oct. 1887).

f Prof. H. P. Bowditch has made the interesting discovery that if the
reinforcing movement be as much as 0.4 of a second late, the reinforce
ment fails to occur, and is transformed into a positive inhibition of the
knee-jerk for retardations of between 0.4' and 1.7'. The knee-jerk fails
to be modified at all by voluntary movements made later than 1.7' after
the patellar ligament is tapped (see Boston Med. and Surg. Journ., May ff\
1888).

THE PRODUCTION OF MOVEMENT. 381

simply reinforces another already under way, must not be
confounded with reflex acts properly so called, in which new
activities are originated by the stimulus. All instinctive
performances and manifestations of emotion are reflex acts.
But underneath those of which we are conscious there seem
to go on continually others smaller in amount, which
probably in most persons might be called fluctuations of
muscular tone, but which in certain neurotic subjects can
be demonstrated ocularly. M. Fere figures some of them
in the article to which I have already referred.*

Looking back over all these facts, it is hard to doubt the
truth of the law of diffusion, even where verification is be
yond reach. A process set up anywhere in the centres reverber
ates every 'ivhere, and in some way or other affects the organism
throughout, making its activities either greater or less. We
are brought again to the assimilation which was expressed
on a previous page of the nerve-central mass to a good con
ductor charged with electricity, of which the tension can
not be changed anywhere without changing it everywhere.

Herr Schneider has tried to show, by an ingenious and
suggestive zoological review,t that all the special movements
which highly evolved animals make are differentiated from
the two originally simple movements, of contraction and ex
pansion, in which the entire body of simple organisms takes
part. The tendency to contract is the source of all the
self-protective impulses and reactions which are later de
veloped, including that of flight. The tendency to expand
splits up, on the contrary, into the impulses and instincts of
an aggressive kind, feeding, fighting, sexual intercourse, etc.
Schneider's articles are well worth reading, if only for the
careful observations on animals which they embody. I cite
them here as a sort of evolutionary reason to add to the
mechanical a priori reason why there ought to be the
diffusive wave which our a posteriori instances have shown
to exist.

I will now proceed to a detailed study of the more im-

* Revue Phil., xxiv. 572 ff.

f In the Viertel jahrschrift filr wiss. Philos. , m. 294.

332 PSYCHOLOGY.

portant classes of movement consequent upon cerebro-
mental change. They may be enumerated as —

1) Instinctive or Impulsive Performances ;

2) Expressions of Emotion ; and

3) Voluntary Deeds;

and each shall have a chapter to itsell

CHAPTER XXIV *

INSTINCT.

INSTINCT is usually defined as the faculty of acting in such a
way as to produce certain ends, without foresight of the ends,
and without previous education in the performance. That
instincts, as thus defined, exist on an enormous scale in the
animal kingdom needs no proof. They are the functional
correlatives of structure. With the presence of a certain
organ goes, one may say, almost always a native aptitude
for its use.

' ' Has the bird a gland for the secretion of oil ? She knows instinc
tively how to press the oil from the gland, and apply it to the feather.
Has the rattlesnake the grooved tooth and gland of poison ? He knows
without instruction how to make both structure and function most ef
fective against his enemies. Has the silk- worm the function of secret
ing the fluid silk ? At the proper time she winds the cocoon such as she
has never seen, as thousands before have done ; and thus without in
struction, pattern, or experience, forms a safe abode for herself in the
period of transformation. Has the hawk talons ? She knows by in
stinct how to wield them effectively against the helpless quarry, "f

A very common way of talking about these admirably
definite tendencies to act is by naming abstractly the pur
pose they subserve, such as self-preservation, or defence, or
care for eggs and young — and saying the animal has an in
stinctive fear of death or love of life, or that she has an in
stinct of self-preservation, or an instinct of maternity and
the like. But this represents the animal as obeying ab
stractions which not once in a million cases is it possible it
<;an have framed. The strict physiological way of interpret-

* This chapter has already appeared (almost exactly as now printed) in
the form of magazine articles in Scribner's Magazine and in the Popular
Science Monthly for 1887.

t P. A. Chadbourne : Instinct, p. 28 (New York, 1872).

384 PSYCHOLOGY.

ing the facts leads to far clearer results. The actions we call
instinctive all conform to the general reflex type ; they are called
forth by determinate sensory stimuli in contact with the
animal's body, or at a distance in his environment. The
cat runs after the mouse, runs or shows fight before the
dog, avoids falling from walls and trees, shuns fire and
water, etc., not because he has any notion either of life or
of death, or of self, or of preservation. He has probably at
tained to no one of these conceptions in such a way as to re
act definitely upon it. He acts in each case separately,
and simply because he cannot help it; being so framed that
when that particular running thing called a mouse appears
in his field of vision he must pursue ; that when that par
ticular barking and obstreperous thing called a dog appears
there he must retire, if at a distance, and scratch if close by ;
that he must withdraw his feet from water and his face
from flame, etc. His nervous system is to a great extent a
preorganized bundle of such reactions — they are as fatal as
sneezing, and as exactly correlated to their special excitants
as it is to its own. Although the naturalist may, for his own
convenience, class these reactions under general heads, he
must not forget that in the animal it is a particular sensation
or perception or image which calls them forth.

At first this view astounds us by the enormous number
of special adjustments it supposes animals to possess ready-
made in anticipation of the outer things among which they
are to dwell. Can mutual dependence be so intricate and
go so far ? Is each thing born fitted to particular other
things, and to them exclusively, as locks are fitted to their
keys? Undoubtedly this must be believed to be so. Each
nook and cranny of creation, down to our very skin and
entrails, has its living inhabitants, with organs suited to
the place, to devour and digest the food it harbors and to
meet the dangers it conceals ; and the minuteness of adap
tation thus shown in the way of structure knows no bounds.
Even so are there no bounds to the minuteness of adapta
tion in the way of conduct which the several inhabitants
display.

The older writings on instinct are ineffectual wastes of
words, because their authors never came down to this defi-

INSTINCT. 385

nite and simple point of view, but smothered everything in
vague wonder at the clairvoyant and prophetic power of
the animals — so superior to anything in man — and at the
beneficence of God in endowing them with such a gift. But
God's beneficence endows them, first of all, with a nervous
system ; and, turning our attention to this, makes instinct
immediately appear neither more nor less wonderful than
all the other facts of life.

Every instinct is an impulse. "Whether we shall call such
impulses as blushing, sneezing, coughing, smiling, or dodg
ing, or keeping time to music, instincts or not, is a mere
matter of terminology. The process is the same through
out. In his delightfully fresh and interesting work, Der
Thierische Wille, Herr G. H. Schneider subdivides im
pulses (Triebe) into sensation-impulses, perception-im
pulses, and idea-impulses. To crouch from cold is a sen
sation-impulse ; to turn and follow, if we see people run
ning one way, is a perception-impulse ; to cast about for
cover, if it begins to blow and rain, is an imagination-im
pulse. A single complex instinctive action may involve
successively the awakening of impulses of all three classes.
Thus a hungry lion starts to seek prey by the awakening in
him of imagination coupled with desire ; he begins to stalk
it when, on eye, ear, or nostril, he gets an impression of its
presence at a certain distance ; he springs upon it, either
when the booty takes alarm and flees, or when the distance
is sufficiently reduced ; he proceeds to tear and devour it
the moment he gets a sensation of its contact with his
claws and fangs. Seeking, stalking, springing, and devour
ing are just so many different kinds of muscular contrac
tion, and neither kind is called forth by the stimulus ap
propriate to the other.

Schneider says of the hamster, which stores corn in its
hole:

" If we analyze the propensity of storing, we find that it consists of
three impulses : First, an impulse to pick up the nutritious object, due
to perception ; second, an impulse to carry it off into the dwelling-place,
due to the idea of this latter ; and third, an impulse to lay it down
there, due to the sight of the place. It lies in the nature of the ham
ster that it should never see a full ear of corn without feeling a desire

386 PSYCHOLOGY.

to strip it ; it lies in its nature to feel, as soon as its cheek-pouches are
filled, an irresistible desire to hurry to its home ; and finally, it lies in
its nature that the sight of the storehouse should awaken the impulse
to empty the cheeks" (p. 208).

In certain animals of a low order the feeling of having
executed one impulsive step is such an indispensable part
of the stimulus of the next one, that the animal cannot
make any variation in the order of its performance.

Now, why do the various animals do what seem to us such
strange things, in the presence of such outlandish stimuli ?
Why does the hen, for example, submit herself to the
tedium of incubating such a fearfully uninteresting set of
objects as a nestful of eggs, unless she have some sort of a
prophetic inkling of the result? The only answer is ad
hominem. We can only interpret the instincts of brutes by
what we know of instincts in ourselves. Why do men al
ways lie down, when they can, on soft beds rather than on
hard floors? Why do they sit round the stove on a cold
day? Why, in a room, do they place themselves, ninety-
nine times out of a hundred, with their faces towards its
middle rather than to the wall ? Why do they prefer saddle
of mutton and champagne to hard-tack and ditch-water ?
Why does the maiden interest the youth so that everything
about her seems more important and significant than any
thing else in the world ? Nothing more can be said than
that these are human ways, and that every creature likes its
own ways, and takes to the following them as a matter of
course. Science may come and consider these ways, and
find that most of them are useful. But it is not for the
sake of their utility that they are followed, but because at
the moment of following them we feel that that is the only
appropriate and natural thing to do. Not one man in a
billion, when taking his dinner, ever thinks of utility. He
eats because the food tastes good and makes him want
more. If you ask him why he should want to eat more of
what tastes like that, instead of revering you as a philoso
pher he will probably laugh at you for a fool. The con
nection between the savory sensation and the act it awakens
is for him absolute and selbstverstdndlichy an ' a priori syn-

INSTINCT. 3b7

thesis ' of the most perfect sort, needing no proof but its
own evidence. It takes, in short, what Berkeley calls a
mind debauched by learning to carry the process of making
the natural seem strange, so far as to ask for the why of any
instinctive human act. To the metaphysician alone can
such questions occur as : Why do we smile, when pleased,
and not scowl? Why are we unable to talk to a crowd
as we talk to a single friend? Why does a particular
maiden turn our wits so upside-down ? The common man
can only say, " Of course we smile, of course our heart pal
pitates at the sight of the crowd, of course we love the maiden,
that beautiful soul clad in that perfect form, so palpably
and flagrantly made from all eternity to be loved !"

And so, probably, does each animal feel about the par
ticular things it tends to do in presence of particular ob
jects. They, too, are a priori syntheses. To the lion it is
the lioness which is made to be loved ; to the bear, the she-
bear. To the broody hen the notion would probably seem
monstrous that there should be a creature in the world to
whom a nestful of eggs was not the utterly fascinating and
precious and never-to-be-too-much-sat-upon object which
it is to her.*

Thus we may be sure that, however mysterious some
animals' instincts may appear to us, our instincts will appear
no less mysterious to them. And we may conclude that, to
the animal which obeys it, every impulse and every step of
every instinct shines with its own sufficient light, and seema
at the moment the only eternally right and proper thing to
do. ^ It is done for its own sake exclusively. What volup-

*"It would be very simple-minded to suppose that bees follow their
queen, and protect her and care for her, because they are aware that with
out her the hive would become extinct. The odor or the aspect of their
queen is manifestly agreeable to the bees— that is why they love her so.
Does not all true love base itself on agreeable perceptions much more than
on representations of utility ?" (G. H. Schneider, Der Thierische Wille,
p. 187.) A priori, there is no reason to suppose that any sensation might not
in some animal cause any emotion and any impulse. To us it seems un
natural that an odor should directly excite anger or fear; or a color, lust.
Yet there are creatures to which some smells are quite as frightful as any
sounds, and very likely others to which color is as much a sexual irritant
as form.

388 PSYCHOLOGY.

tuous thrill may not shake a fly, when she at last discovers
the one particular leaf, or carrion, or bit of dung, that out
of all the world can stimulate her ovipositor to its dis
charge ? Does not the discharge then seem to her the only
fitting thing ? And need she care or know anything about
the future maggot and its food ?

Since the egg-laying instincts are simple examples to con
sider, a few quotations about them from Schneider may be
serviceable :

"The phenomenon so often talked about, so variously interpreted,
so surrounded with mystification, that an insect should always lay her
eggs in a spot appropriate to the nourishment of her young, is no more
marvellous than the phenomenon that every animal pairs with a mate
capable of bearing posterity, or feeds on materials capable of affording
him nourishment. . . . Not only the choice of a place for laying the
eggs, but all the various acts for depositing and protecting them, are
occasioned by the perception of the proper object, and the relation of
this perception to the various stages of maternal impulse. When the
burying beetle perceives a carrion, she is not only impelled to approach
it and lodge her eggs in it, but also to go through the movements re
quisite for burying it; just as a bird who sees his hen-bird is impelled
to caress her, to strut around her, dance before her, or in some other
way to woo her; just as a tiger, when he sees an antelope, is impelled
to stalk it, to pounce upon it, and to strangle it. When the tailor-bee
cuts out pieces of rose-leaf, bends them, carries them into a caterpillar-
or mouse-hole in trees or in the earth, covers their seams again with
other pieces, and so makes a thimble-shaped case — when she fills this
with honey and lays an egg in it, all these various appropriate expres
sions of her will are to be explained by supposing that at the time when
the eggs are ripe within her, the appearance of a suitable caterpillar- or
mouse-hole and the perception of rose-leaves are so correlated in the
insect with the several impulses in question, that the performances fol
low as a matter of course when the perceptions take place. . . .

" The perception of the empty nest, or of a single egg, seems in birds
to stand in such a close relation to the physiological functions of ovipa-
ration, that it serves as a direct stimulus to these functions, while the
perception of a sufficient number of eggs has just the opposite effect.
It is well known that hens and ducks lay more eggs if we keep remov
ing them than if we leave them in the nest. The impulse to sit arises,
as a rule, when a bird sees a certain number of eggs in her nest. If
this number is not yet to be seen there, the ducks continue to lay,
although they perhaps have laid twice as many eggs as they are accus
tomed to sit upon. . . . That sitting, also, is independent of any idea of
purpose and is a pure perception-impulse is evident, among other things,

INSTINCT. 389

from the fact that many birds, e.g. wild ducks, steal eggs from each
other. . . . The bodily disposition to sit is, it is true, one condi
tion [since broody hens will sit where there are no. eggs], but the
perception of the eggs i? the other condition of the activity of
the incubating impulse. The propensity of the cuckoo and of the
cow-bird to lay their eggs in the nests of other species must also be
interpreted as a pure perception-impulse. These birds have no bodily
disposition to become broody, and there is therefore in them no connec'
tion between the perception of an egg and the impulse to sit upon it.
Eggs ripen, however, in their oviducts, and the body tends to get rid of
them. And since the two birds just named do not drop their eggs any
where on the ground, but in nests, which are the only places where they
may preserve the species, it might easily appear that such preservation
of the species was what they had in view, and that they acted with full
consciousness of the purpose. But this is not so. ... The cuckoo is
simply excited by the perception of quite determinate sorts of nest,
which already contain eggs, to drop her own into them, and throw the
others out, because this perception is a direct stimulus to these acts.
It is impossible that she should have any notion of the other bird com-
ing and sitting on her egg." *

INSTINCTS NOT ALWAYS BLIND OB INVAKIABLB.

Remember that nothing is said yet of the origin of in
stincts, but only of the constitution of those that exist fully
formed. How stands it with the instincts of mankind ?

Nothing is commoner than the remark that Man differs
from lower creatures by the almost total absence of instincts,
and the assumption of their work in him by ' reason.' A
fruitless discussion might be waged on this point by two
theorizers who were careful not to define their terms.
' Reason ' might be used, as it often has been, since Kant,
not as the mere power of ' inferring,' but also as a name for
the tendency to obey impulses of a certain lofty sort, such as
duty, or universal ends. And ' instinct ' might have its sig
nificance so broadened as to cover all impulses whatever,
even the impulse to act from the idea of a distant fact, as
well as the impulse to act from a present sensation. "Were
the word instinct used in this broad way, it would of course
be impossible to restrict it, as we began by doing, to actions
done with no prevision of an end. We must of course
avoid a quarrel about words, and the facts of the case are

* Der Thierische Wille, pp. 282-3.

390 PSYCHOLOGY.

really tolerably plain. Man has a far greater variety of
impulses than any lower animal ; and any one of these im
pulses, taken in itself, is as ' blind ' as the lowest instinct
can be ; but, owing to man's memory, power of reflection,
and power of inference, they come each one to be felt by
him, after he has once yielded to them and experienced
their results, in connection with a foresight of those results.
In this condition an impulse acted out may be said to be
acted out, in part at least, for the sake of its results. It is
obvious that every instinctive act, in an animal tvith memory,
must cease to be ' blind ' after being once repeated, and must be
accompanied with foresight of its ' end ' just so far as that
end may have fallen under the animal's cognizance. An
insect that lays her eggs in a place where she never sees
them hatched must always do so ' blindly ; ' but a hen who has
already hatched a brood can hardly be assumed to sit with
perfect ' blindness ' on her second nest. Some expectation
of consequences must in every case like this be aroused ;
and this expectation, according as it is that of something
desired or of something disliked, must necessarily either
re-enforce or inhibit the mere impulse. The hen's idea of
the chickens would probably encourage her to sit ; a rat's
memory, on the other hand, of a former escape from a trap
would neutralize his impulse to take bait from anything
that reminded him of that trap. If a boy sees a fat hop-
ping-toad, he probably has incontinently an impulse (espe
cially if with other boys) to smash the creature with a stone,
which impulse we may suppose him blindly to obey. But
something in the expression of the dying toad's clasped
hands suggests the meanness of the act, or reminds him of
sayings he has heard about the sufferings of animals being
like his own ; so that, when next he is tempted by a toad,
an idea arises which, far from spurring him again to the
torment, prompts kindly actions, and may even make him
the toad's champion against less reflecting boys.

It is plain, then, that, no matter how well endowed, an animal
may originally be in the way of instincts, his resultant actions
ivill be much modified if the instincts combine with experience,
if in addition to impulses he have memories, associations,
inferences, and expectations, on any considerable scale. An

INSTINCT. 391

object O, on which he has an instinctive impulse to react in
the manner A, would directly provoke him to that reaction.
But O has meantime become for him a sign of the nearness
of P, on which he has an equally strong impulse to react in
the manner B, quite unlike A. So that when he meets O
the immediate impulse A and the remote impulse B strug
gle in his breast for the mastery. The fatality and unifor
mity said to be characteristic of instinctive actions will be
so little manifest that one might be tempted to deny to him
altogether the possession of any instinct about the object
O. Yet how false this judgment would be ! The instinct
about O is there ; only by the complication of the associa
tive machinery it has come into conflict with another in
stinct about P.

Here we immediately reap the good fruits of our simple
physiological conception of what an instinct is. If it be a
mere excito-motor impulse, due to the pre-existence of a
certain ' reflex arc ' in the nerve-centres of the creature, of
course it must follow the law of all such reflex arcs. One
liability of such arcs is to have their activity 'inhibited,' by
other processes going on at the same time. It makes no
difference whether the arc be organized at birth, or ripen
spontaneously later, or be due to acquired habit, it must
take its chances with all the other arcs, and sometimes
succeed, and sometimes fail, in drafting off the currents
through itself. The mystical view of an instinct would
make it invariable. The physiological view would require
it to show occasional irregularities in any animal in whom
the number of separate instincts, and the possible entrance
of the same stimulus into several of them, were great. And
such irregularities are what every superior animal's in
stincts do show in abundance.*

* In the instincts of mammals, and even of lower creatures, the uniform
ity and infallibility which, a generation ago, were considered as essential
characters do not exist. The minuter study of recent years has found con
tinuity, transition, variation, and mistake, wherever it has looked for them,
and decided that what is called an instinct is usually only a tendency to
act in a way of which the average is pretty constant, but which need not
be mathematically 'true.' Cf. on this point Darwin's Origin of Species:
Romanes's Mental Evol., chaps, xi to xvi incl., and Appendix; W. L.
Lindsay's Mind in Lower Animals, vol. i. 133-141 ; n. chaps, v, xx ;

392 PSYCHOLOGY.

Wherever the mind is elevated enough to discriminate ;
wherever several distinct sensory elements must combine
to discharge the reflex-arc ; wherever, instead of plumping
into action instantly at the first rough intimation of what
sort of a thing is there, the agent waits to see which one of
its kind it is and what the circumstances are of its appearance;
wherever different individuals and different circumstances
can impel him in different ways ; wherever these are the
conditions — we have a masking of the elementary constitu
tion of the instinctive life. The whole story of our dealings
with the lower wild animals is the history of our taking
advantage of the way in which they judge of everything by
its mere label, as it were, so as to ensnare or kill them.
Nature, in them, has left matters in this rough way, and
made them act always in the manner which would be
oftenest right. There are more worms unattached to hooks
than impaled upon them ; therefore, on the whole, says
Nature to her fishy children, bite at every worm and take
your chances. But as her children get higher, and their
lives more precious, she reduces the risks. Since what
seems to be the same object may be now a genuine food
and now a bait ; since in gregarious species each individual
may prove to be either the friend or the rival, according to
the circumstances, of another ; since any entirely unknown
object may be fraught with weal or woe, Nature implants
contrary impulses to act on many classes of things, and leaves
it to slight alterations in the conditions of the individual
case to decide which impulse shall carry the day. Thus,
greediness and suspicion, curiosity and timidity, coyness
and desire, bashfulness and vanity, sociability and pug
nacity, seem to shoot over into each other as quickly, and
to remain in as unstable equilibrium, in the higher birds
and mammals as in man. They are all impulses, congenital,
blind at first, and productive of motor reactions of a rigor
ously determinate sort. Each one of them, then, is an
instinct, as instincts are commonly defined. But they con
tradict each other — ' experience ' in each particular oppor-

and K. Semper's Conditions of Existence in Animals, where a great many
instances will be found.

INSTINCT. 393

tunity of application usually deciding the issue. The animal
that exhibits them loses the l instinctive ' demeanor and appears
to lead a life of hesitation and choice, an intellectual life ;
not, however, because he has no instincts — rather because he has
so many that they block each other's path.

Thus, then, without troubling ourselves about the words
instinct and reason, we may confidently say that however
uncertain man's reactions upon his environment may some
times seem in comparison with those of lower creatures, the
uncertainty is probably not due to their possession of any
principles of action which he lacks. On the contrary, man
possesses all the impulses that they have, and a great many more
besides. In other words, there is no material antagonism
between instinct and reason. Eeason, per se, can inhibit
no impulses ; the only thing that can neutralize an impulse
is an impulse the other way. Eeason may, however, make
an inference ivhich ivill excite the imagination so as to set loose
the impulse the other way ; and thus, though the animal
richest in reason might be also the animal richest in in
stinctive impulses too, he would never seem the fatal au
tomaton which a merely instinctive animal would be.

Let us now turn to human impulses with a little more
detail. All we have ascertained so far is that impulses of
an originally instinctive character may exist, and yet not
betray themselves by automatic fatality of conduct. But
in man what impulses do exist? In the light of what has
been said, it is obvious that an existing impulse may not
always be superficially apparent even when its object is
there. And we shall see that some impulses may be masked
by causes of which we have not yet spoken.

TWO PRINCIPLES OF NON-UNIFORMITY IN INSTINCTS.

Were one devising an abstract scheme, nothing would
be easier than to discover from an animal's actions just how
many instincts he possessed. He would react in one way
only upon each class of objects with which his life had to
deal ; he would react in identically the same way upon
every specimen of a class ; and he would react invariably
during his whole life. There would be no gaps among his

394 PSYCHOLOGY.

instincts ; all would come to light without perversion or
disguise. But there are no such abstract animals, and no
where does the instinctive life display itself in such a way.
Not only, as we have seen, may objects of the same class
arouse reactions of opposite sorts in consequence of slight
changes in the circumstances, in the individual object, or in
the agent's inward condition ; but two other principles of
which we have not yet spoken, may come into play and
produce results so striking that observers as eminent as
Messrs. D. A. Spalding and Komanes do not hesitate to
call them ' derangements of the mental constitution,' and
to conclude that the instinctive machinery has got out
of gear.

These principles are those

1. Of the inhibition of instincts by habits; and

2. Of the transitoriness of instincts.

Taken in conjunction with the two former principles —
that the same object may excite ambiguous impulses, or sug
gest an impulse different from that which it excites, by sug
gesting a remote object — they explain any amount of de
parture from uniformity of conduct, without implying any
getting out of gear of the elementary impulses from which
the conduct flows.

1. The law of inhibition of instincts by habits is this :
When objects of a certain class elicit from an animal a certain
sort of reaction, it often happens that the animal becomes partial
to the first specimen of the class on which it has reacted, and ivill
not afterward react on any other specimen.

The selection of a particular hole to live in, of a partic
ular mate, of a particular feeding-ground, a particular variety
of diet, a particular anything, in short, out of a possible multi
tude, is a very wide-spread tendency among animals, even
those low down in the scale. The limpet will return to the
same sticking-place in its rock, and the lobster to its favorite
nook on the sea-bottom. The rabbit will deposit its dung in
the same corner ; the bird makes its nest on the same bough.
But each of these preferences carries with it an insensibility
to other opportunities and occasions — an insensibility which
can only be described physiologically as an inhibition of

INSTINCT. 395

new impulses by the habit of old ones already formed.
The possession of homes and wives of our own makes us
strangely insensible to the charms of those of other people.
Few of us are adventurous in the matter of food ; in fact,
most of us think there is something disgusting in a bill of
fare to which we are unused. Strangers, we are apt to
think, cannot be woith knowing, especially if they come
from distant cities, etc. The original impulse which got us
homes, wives, dietaries, and friends at all, seems to exhaust
itself in its first achievements and to leave no surplus
energy for reacting on new cases. And so it comes about
that, witnessing this torpor, an observer of mankind might
say that no instinctive propensity toward certain objects ex
isted at all. It existed, but it existed miscellaneously, or as
an instinct pure and simple, only before habit was formed.
A habit, once grafted on an instinctive tendency, restricts
the range of the tendency itself, and keeps us from reacting
on any but the habitual object, although other objects
might just as well have been chosen had they been the first-
comers.

Another sort of arrest of instinct by habit is where the
same class of objects awakens contrary instinctive impulses.
Here the impulse first followed toward a given individual
of the class is apt to keep him from ever awakening the
opposite impulse in us. In fact, the whole class may be
protected by this individual specimen from the application
to it of the other impulse. Animals, for example, awaken in
a child the opposite impulses of fearing and fondling. But
if a child, in his first attempts to pat a dog, gets snapped at
or bitten, so that the impulse of fear is strongly aroused, it
may be that for years to come no dog will excite in him the
impulse to fondle again. On the other hand, the greatest
natural enemies, if carefully introduced to each other when
young and guided at the outset by superior authority, set
tle down into those ' happy families ' of friends which we
see in our menageries. Young animals, immediately after
birth, have no instinct of fear, but show their dependence
by allowing themselves to be freely handled. Later, how
ever, they grow 'wild,' and, if left to themselves, will not
let man approach them. I am told by farmers in the

396 PSYCHOLOGY.

Adirondack wilderness that it is a very serious matter if a
cow wanders off and calves in the woods and is not found
for a week or more. The calf, by that time, is as wild and
almost as fleet as a deer, and hard to capture without vio
lence. But calves rarely show any particular wildness to
the men who have been in contact with them during the
first days of their life, when the instinct to attach them
selves is uppermost, nor do they dread strangers as they
would if brought up wild.

Chickens give a curious illustration of the same law.
Mr. Spalding's wonderful article on instinct shall supply us
with the facts. These little creatures show opposite in
stincts of attachment and fear, either of which may be
aroused by the same object, man. If a chick is born in the
absence of the hen, it

lkwill follow any moving object. And, when guided by sight alone,
they seem to have no more disposition to follow a hen than to follow a
duck or a human being. Unreflecting lookers-on, when they saw chick
ens a day old running after me," says Mr. Spalding, "and older ones
following me for miles, and answering to my whistle, imagined that I
must have some occult power over the creatures : whereas I had simply
allowed them to follow me from the first. There is the instinct to follow;
and the ear, prior to experience, attaches them to the right object." *

But if a man presents himself for the first time when
the instinct of fear is strong, the phenomena are altogether
reversed. Mr. Spalding kept three chickens hooded until
they were nearly four days old, and thus describes their
behavior :

tk Each of them, on being unhooded, evinced the greatest terror to
me, dashing off in the opposite direction whenever I sought to approach
it. The table on which they were unhooded stood before a window, and
each in its turn beat against the window like a wild bird. One of them
darted behind some books, andr squeezing itself into a corner, remained
cowering for a length of time. We might guess at the meaning of this
strange and exceptional wildness ; but the odd fact is enough for my
present purpose. Whatever might have been the meaning of this
marked change in their mental constitution — had they been unhooded
on the previous day they would have run to me instead of from me — it
could not have been the effect of experience ; it must have resulted
wholly from changes in their own organizations." f

* Spalding, Macmillan's Magazine, Feb. 1873, p. 287.
f Ibid. p. 289.

INSTINCT. 397

Their case was precisely analogous to that of the Adi
rondack calves. The two opposite instincts relative to the
same object ripen in succession. If the first one engenders
a habit, that habit will inhibit the application of the second
instinct to that object. All animals are tame during the
earliest phase of their infancy. Habits formed then limit
the effects of whatever instincts of wildness may later be
evolved.

Mr. Romanes gives some very curious examples of the
way in which instinctive tendencies may be altered by the
habits to which their first * objects ' have given rise. The
cases are a little more complicated than those mentioned in
the text, inasmuch as the object reacted on not only starts
a habit which inhibits other kinds of impulse toward it (al
though such other kinds might be natural), but even modi
fies by its own peculiar conduct the constitution of the
impulse which it actually awakens.

Two of the instances in question are those of hens who
hatched out broods of chicks after having (in three previ
ous years) hatched ducks. They strove to coax or to com
pel their new progeny to enter the water, and seemed much
perplexed at their unwillingness. Another hen adopted a
brood of young ferrets which, having lost their mother,
were put under her. During all the time they were left
with her she had to sit on the nest, for they could not wan
der like young chicks. She obeyed their hoarse growling
as she would have obeyed her chickens' peep. She combed
out their hair with her bill, and " used frequently to stop
and look with one eye at the wriggling nestful, with an in
quiring gaze, expressive of astonishment." At other times
she would fly up with a loud scream, doubtless because the
orphans had nipped her in their search for teats. Finally,
a Brahma hen nursed a young peacock during the enor
mous period of eighteen months, and never laid any eggs
during all this time. The abnormal degree of pride which
she showed in her wonderful chicken is described by Dr.
Romanes as ludicrous.*

* For the cases in full see Mental Evolution in Animals, pp. 213-217.

398 PSYCHOLOGY.

2. Tliis leads us to the law of transit oriness, which is
this : Many instincts ripen at a certain o,ge and then fade away.
A consequence of this law is that if, during the time of
such an instinct's vivacity, objects adequate to arouse it are
met with, a habit of acting on them is formed, which re
mains when the original instinct has passed away ; but that
if no such objects are met with, then no habit will be
formed; and, later on in life, when the animal meets the
objects, he will altogether fail to react, as at the earlier
epoch he would instinctively have done.

No doubt such a law is restricted. Some instincts are
far less transient than others — those connected with feed
ing and ' self-preservation ' may hardly be transient at all,
and some, after fading out for a time, recur as strong as
ever, e.g., the instincts of pairing and rearing young. The
law, however, though not absolute, is certainly very wide
spread, and a few examples will illustrate just what it
means.

In the chickens and calves above mentioned, it is ob
vious that the instinct to follow and become attached fades
out after a few days, and that the instinct of flight then
takes its place, the conduct of the creature toward man be
ing decided by the formation or non-formation of a certain
habit during those days. The transiency of the chicken's
instinct to follow is also proved by its conduct toward the
hen. Mr. Spalding kept some chickens shut up till they
were comparatively old, and, speaking of these, he says :

" A chicken that has not heard the call of the mother till until eight
or ten days old then hears it as if it heard it not. I regret to find that
on this point my notes are not so full as I could wish, or as they might
have been. There is, however, an account of one chicken that could
not be returned to the mother when ten days old. The hen followed it,
and tried to entice it in every way ; still, it continually left her and ran
to the house or to any person of whom it caught sight. This it per
sisted in doing, though beaten back with a small branch dozens of
times, and, indeed, cruelly maltreated. It was also placed under the
mother at night, but it again left her in the morning."

The instinct of sucking is ripe in all mammals at birth,
and leads to that habit of taking the breast which, in the
human infant, may be prolonged by daily exercise long be-

INSTINCT. 399

yond its usual term of a year or a year and a half. But the
instinct itself is transient, in the sense that if, for any rea
son, the child be fed by spoon during the first few days of
its life and not put to the breast, it may be no easy matter
after that to make it suck at all. So of calves. If their
mother die, or be dry, or refuse to let them suck for a day
or two, so that they are fed by hand, it becomes hard to
get them to suck at all when a new nurse is provided. The
ease with which sucking creatures are weaned, by simply
breaking the habit and giving them food in a new way,
shows that the instinct, purely as such, must be entirely
extinct.

Assuredly the simple fact that instincts are transient,
and that the effect of later ones may be altered by the
habits which earlier ones have left behind, is a far more
philosophical explanation than the notion of an instinctive
constitution vaguely 'deranged' or 'thrown out of gear.'

I have observed a Scotch terrier, born on the floor of a
stable in December, and transferred six weeks later to a
carpeted house, make, when he was less than four months
old, a very elaborate pretence of burying things, such as
gloves, etc., with which he had played till he was tired.
He scratched the carpet with his forefeet, dropped the ob
ject from his mouth upon the spot, and then scratched all
about it (with both fore- and hind-feet, if I remember
rightly), and finally went away and let it lie. Of course, the
act was entirely useless. I saw him perform it at that age,
some four or five times, and never again in his life. The
conditions were not present to fix a habit which should last
when the prompting instinct died away. But suppose
meat instead of a glove, earth instead of a carpet, hunger-
pangs instead of a fresh supper a few hours later, and it is
easy to see how this dog might have got into a habit of
burying superfluous food, which might have lasted all his
life. Who can swear that the strictly instructive part of
the food-burying propensity in the wild Canidce may not be
as short-lived as it was in this terrier ?

A similar instance is given by Dr. H. D. Schmidt * of
New Orleans:

* Transactions of American Neurological Association, vol. i. p. 129

(1875).

400 PSYCHOLOGY.

" I may cite the example of a young squirrel which I had tamed, a
number of years ago, when serving in the army, and when I had suffi
cient leisure and opportunity to study the habits of animals. In the
autumn, before the winter sets in, adult squirrels bury as many nuts,
as they can collect, separately, in the ground. Holding the nut firmly
between their teeth, they first scratch a hole in the grond, and, after
pointing their ears in all directions to convince themselves that no
enemy is near, they ram—the head, with the nut still between the front
teeth, serving as a sledge-hammer— the nut into the ground, and then fill
up the hole by means of their paws. The whole process is executed with
great rapidity, and, as it appeared to me, always with exactly the same
movements ; in fact, it is done so well that I could never discover the
traces of the burial-ground. Now, as regards the young squirrel, which,
of course, never had been present at the burial of a nut, I observed that,
after having eaten a number of hickory-nuts to appease its appetite, it
would take one between its teeth, then sit upright and listen in all
directions. Finding all right, it would scratch upon the smooth blanket
on which I was playing with it as if to make a hole, then hammer with
the nut between its teeth upon the blanket, and finally perform all the
motions required to fill up a hole— in the air; after which it would
jump away, leaving the nut, of course, uncovered."

The anecdote, of course, illustrates beautifully the close
relation of instinct to reflex action— a particular perception
calls forth particular movements, and that is all. Dr.
Schmidt writes me that the squirrel in question soon passed
away from his observation. It may fairly be presumed
that, if he had been long retained prisoner in a cage, he
would soon have forgotten his gesticulations over the hick
ory-nuts.

One might, indeed, go still further with safety, and ex
pect that, if such a captive squirrel were then set free, he
would never afterwards acquire this peculiar instinct of his
tribe.*

Leaving lower animals aside, and turning to human in
stincts, we see the law of transiency corroborated on the

* "Mr. Spalding," says Mr. Lewes (Problems of Life and Mind, prob.
I. chap. n. § 22, note), "tells me of a friend of his who reared a gosling
in the kitchen, away from all water ; when this bird was some months
old, and was taken to a pond, it not only refused to go into the water, but
when thrown in scrambled out again, as a hen would have done. Here
was an instinct entirely suppressed." See a similar observation on duck
lings in T.R. R. Stebbing : Essays on Darwinism (London, 1871), p. 73.

INSTINCT. 401

widest scale by the alternation of different interests and
passions as human life goes on. With the child, life is all
play and fairy-tales and learning the external properties of
' things ;' with the youth, it is bodily exercises of a more
systematic sort, novels of the real world, boon-fellowship
and song, friendship and love, nature, travel and adven
ture, science and philosophy ; with the man, ambition and
policy, acquisitiveness, responsibility to others, and the
selfish zest of the battle of life. If a boy grows up alone
at the age of games and sports, and learns neither to play
ball, nor row, nor sail, nor ride, nor skate, nor fish, nor
shoot, probably he will be sedentary to the end of his days ;
and, though the best of opportunities be afforded him for
learning these things later, it is a hundred to one but he will
pass them by and shrink back from the effort of taking
those necessary first steps the prospect of which, at an
earlier age, would have filled him with eager delight. The
sexual passion expires after a protracted reign ; but it is
well known that its peculiar manifestations in a given in
dividual depend almost entirely on the habits he may form
during the early period of its activity. Exposure to bad
company then makes him a loose liver all his days;
chastity kept at first makes the same easy later on. In all
pedagogy the great thing is to strike the iron while hot,
and to seize the wave of the pupil's interest in each succes
sive subject before its ebb has come, so that knowledge
may be got and a habit of skill acquired — a headway of in
terest, in short, secured, on which afterward the individual
may float. There is a happy moment for fixing skill in
drawing, for making boys collectors in natural history, and
presently dissectors and botanists ; then for initiating them
into the harmonies of mechanics and the wonders of physi
cal and chemical law. Later, introspective psychology
and the metaphysical and religious mysteries take their
turn ; and, last of all, the drama of human affairs and
worldly wisdom in the widest sense of the term. In each
of us a saturation-point is soon reached in all these things ;
the impetus of our purely intellectual zeal expires, and un
less the topic be one associated with some urgent personal
need that keeps our wits constantly whetted about it, we

402 PSYCHOLOGY.

settle into an equilibrium, and live on what we learned
when our interest was fresh and instinctive, without adding
to the store. Outside of their own business, the ideas
gained by men before they are twenty-five are practically
the only ideas they shall have in their lives. They cannot
get anything new. Disinterested curiosity is past, the
mental grooves and channels set, the power of assimilation
gone. If by chance we ever do learn anything about some
entirely new topic we are afflicted with a strange sense of
insecurity, and we fear to advance a resolute opinion. But,
with things learned in the plastic days of instinctive curi
osity we never lose entirely our sense of being at home.
There remains a kinship, a sentiment of intimate acquaint
ance, which, even when we know we have failed to keep
abreast of the subject, flatters us with a sense of power
over it, and makes us feel not altogether out of the pale.

Whatever individual exceptions might be cited to this
are of the sort that 'prove the rule.'

To detect the moment of the instinctive readiness for
the subject is, then, the first duty of every educator. As
for the pupils, it would probably lead to a more earnest
temper on the part of college students if they had less be
lief in their unlimited future intellectual potentialities, and
could be brought to realize that whatever physics and polit
ical economy and philosophy they are now acquiring are, for
better or worse, the physics and political economy and
philosophy that will have to serve them to the end.

The natural conclusion to draw from this transiency of
instincts is that most instincts are implanted for the sake of
giving rise to habits, and that, this purpose once accomplished,
the instincts themselves, as such, have no raison d'etre in the
psychical economy, and consequently fade away. That occa
sionally an instinct should fade before circumstances per
mit of a habit being formed, or that, if the habit be formed,
other factors than the pure instinct should modify its
course, need not surprise us. Life is full of the imperfect
adjustment to individual cases, of arrangements which, tak
ing the species as a whole, are quite orderly and regular.
Instinct cannot be expected to escape this general risk.

INSTINCT. 403

SPECIAL HUMAN INSTINCTS.

Let us now test our principles by turning to human
instincts in more detail. We cannot pretend in these pages
to be minute or exhaustive. But we can say enough to set
all the above generalities in a more favorable light. But
first, what kind of motor reactions upon objects shall we
count as instincts? This, as aforesaid, is a somewhat
arbitrary matter. Some of the actions aroused in us by
objects go no further than our own bodies. Such is the
bristling up of the attention when a novel object is per
ceived, or the ' expression ' on the face or the breathing
apparatus of an emotion it may excite. These movements
merge into ordinary reflex actions like laughing when
tickled, or making a wry face at a bad taste. Other actions
take effect upon the outer world. Such are flight from a
wild beast, imitation of what we see a comrade do, etc. On
the whole it is best to be catholic, since it is very hard to
draw an exact line ; and call both of these kinds of activity
instinctive, so far as either may be naturally provoked by
the presence of specific sorts of outward fact.

Professor Preyer, in his careful little work, ' Die Seele
des Kindes,' says " instinctive acts are in man few in
number, and, apart from those connected with the sexual
passion, difficult to recognize after early youth is past."
And he adds, " so much the more attention should we pay
to the instinctive movements of new-born babies, suck
lings, and small children." That instinctive acts should be
easiest recognized in childhood would be a very natural
effect of our principles of transitoriness, and of the restric
tive influence of habits once acquired ; but we shall see how
far they are from being ' few in number ' in man. Professor
Preyer divides the movements of infants into impulsive,
reflex, and instinctive. By impulsive movements he means
random movements of limbs, body, and voice, with no aim,
and before perception is aroused. Among the first reflex
movements are crying on contact with the air, sneezing,
snuffling, snoring, coughing, sighing, sobbing, gagging, vomiting,
hiccuping, starting, moving the limbs when tickled, touched, or
Uoivn upon, etc., etc.

404 PSYCHOLOGY.

Of the movements called by him instinctive in the child,
Professor Preyer gives a full account. Herr Schneider does
the same ; and as their descriptions agree with each other
and with what other writers about infancy say, I will base
my own very brief statement on theirs.

Sucking : almost perfect at birth ; not coupled with any
congenital tendency to seek the breast, this being a later
acquisition. As we have seen, sucking is a transitory in
stinct.

Biting an object placed in the mouth, chewing and grind
ing the teeth ; licking sugar ; making characteristic grimaces
over bitter and sweet tastes ; spitting out.

Clasping an object which touches the fingers or toes.
Later, attempts to grasp at an object seen at a distance.
Pointing at such objects, and making a peculiar sound ex
pressive of desiret which, in my own three children, was the
first manifestation of speech, occurring many weeks before
other significant sounds.

Carrying to the mouth of the object, when grasped. This
instinct, guided and inhibited by the sense of taste, and
combined with the instincts of biting, chewing, sucking,
spitting-out, etc., and with the reflex act of swallowing,
leads in the individual to a set of habits which constitute
his function of alimentation, and which may or may not be
gradually modified as life goes on.

Crying at bodily discomfort, hunger, or pain, and at
solitude. Smiling at being noticed, fondled, or smiled at
by others. It seems very doubtful whether young infants
have any instinctive fear of a terrible or scowling face. 1
have been unable to make my own children, under a year
old, change their expression when I changed mine ; at most
they manifested attention or curiosity. Preyer instances a
protrusion of the lips, which, he says, may be so great as to
remind one of that in the chimpanzee, as an instinctive
expression of concentrated attention in the human infant.

Turning the head aside as a gesture of rejection, a gesture
usually accompanied with a frown and a bending back oi
the body, and with holding the breath.

Holding head erect.

Sitting up.

INSTINCT. 405

Standing.

Locomotion. The early movements of children's limbs
are more or less symmetrical. Later a baby will move his
legs in alternation if suspended in the air. But until the
impulse to walk awakens by the natural ripening of the
nerve-centres, it seems to make no difference how often the
child's feet may be placed in contact with the ground ; the
legs remain limp, and do not respond to the sensation of
contact in the soles by muscular contractions pressing down
wards. No sooner, however, is the standing impulse born,
than the child stiffens his legs and presses downward as
soon as he feels the floor. In some babies this is the first
locomotory reaction. In others it is preceded by the in
stinct to creep, which arises, as I can testify, often in a very
sudden way. Yesterday the baby sat quite contentedly
wherever he was put ; to-day it has become impossible to
keep him sitting at all, so irresistible is the impulse, aroused
by the sight of the floor, to throw himself forward upon his
hands. Usually the arms are too weak, and the ambitious
little experimenter falls on his nose. But his perseverance
is dauntless, and he ends in a few days by learning to travel
rapidly around the room in the quadrupedal way. The
position of the legs in ' creeping ' varies much from one
-child to another. My own child, when creeping, was often
observed to pick up objects from the floor with his mouth,
a phenomenon which, as Dr. O. W. Holmes has remarked,
like the early tendency to grasp with the toes, easily lends
itself to interpretation as a reminiscence of prehuman an
cestral habits.

The walking instinct may awaken with no less sudden
ness, and its entire education be completed within a week's
compass, barring, of course, a little 'grogginess' in the
gait. Individual infants vary enormously ; but on the whole
it is safe to say that the mode of development of these
locomotor instincts is inconsistent with the account given
by the older English associationist school, of their being
results of the individual's education, due altogether to the
gradual association of certain perceptions with certain hap
hazard movements and certain resultant pleasures. Mr-

406 PSYCHOLOGY.

Bain has tried,* by describing the demeanor of new-born
lambs, to show that locomotion is learned by a very rapid
experience. But the observation recorded proves the
faculty to be almost perfect from the first ; and all others
who have observed new-born calves, lambs, and pigs agree
that in these animals the powers of standing and walking,
and of interpreting the topographical significance of sights
and sounds, are all but fully developed at birth. Often in
animals who seem to be ' learning ' to walk or fly the sem
blance is illusive. The awkwardness shown is not due to
the fact that ' experience ' has not yet been there to asso
ciate the successful movements and exclude the failures, but
to the fact that the animal is beginning his attempts before
the co-ordinating centres have quite ripened for their work.
Mr. Spalding's observations on this point are conclusive as
to birds.

" Birds," he says, " do not learn to fly. Two years ago I shut up
five unfledged swallows in a small box, not much larger than the nest
from which they were taken. The little box, which had a wire front,
was hung on the wall near the nest, and the young swallows were fed by
their parents through the wires. In this confinement, where they could
not even extend their wings, they were kept until after they were fully
fledged. ... On going to set the prisoners free, one was found
dead. . . . The remaining four were allowed to escape one at a time.
Two of these were perceptibly wavering and unsteady in their flight.
One of them, after a flight of some ninety yards, disappeared among
some trees." No. 3 and No. 4 "never flew against anything, nor was
there, in their avoiding objects, any appreciable difference between
them and the old birds. No. 3 swept round the Wellingtonia, and No.
4 rose over the hedge, just as we see the old swallows doing every hour
of the day. I have this summer verified these observations. Of two
swallows I had similarly confined, one, on being set free, flew a yard or
two close to the ground, rose in the direction of a beech-tree, which it
gracefully avoided ; it was seen for a considerable time sweeping round
the beeches and performing magnificent evolutions in the air high above
them. The other, which was observed to beat the air with its wings
more than usual, was soon lost to sight behind some trees. Titmice,
tomtite, and wrens I have made the subjects of similar observations, and
with similar results." *

In the light of this report, one may well be tempted to
make a prediction about the human child, and say that if a

* Senses and Intellect 3d ed. pp. 413-675.
t Nature, xn. 507 (1875).

INSTINCT. 407

baby were kept from getting on his feet for two or three
weeks after the first impulse to walk had shown itself in
him, — a small blister on each sole would do the business, —
he might then be expected to walk about as well, through
the mere ripening of his nerve-centres, as if the ordinary
process of * learning ' had been allowed to occur during all
the blistered time. It is to be hoped that some scientific
widower, left alone with his offspring at the critical moment,
may ere long test this suggestion on the living subject.
Climbing on trees, fences, furniture, banisters, etc., is a well-
marked instinctive propensity which ripens after the fourth
year.

Vocalization. This may be either musical or significant.
Yery few weeks after birth the baby begins to express its
spirits by emitting vowel sounds, as much during inspira
tion as during expiration, and will lie on its back cooing
and gurgling to itself for nearly an hour. But this singing
has nothing to do with speech. Speech is sound significant.
During the second year a certain number of significant
sounds are gradually acquired ; but talking proper does not
set in till the instinct to imitate sounds ripens in the nervous
system; and this ripening seems in some children to be
quite abrupt. Then speech grows rapidly in extent and
perfection. The child imitates every word he hears uttered,
and repeats it again and again with the most evident plea
sure at his new power. At this time it is quite impossible
to talk itiih him, for his condition is that of ' Echolalia,' —
instead of answering the question, he simply reiterates it.
The result is, however, that his vocabulary increases very
fast ; and little by little, with teaching from above, the
young prattler understands, puts words together to express
his own wants and perceptions, and even makes intelligent
replies. From a speechless, he has become a speaking,
animal. The interesting point with regard to this instinct
is the oftentimes very sudden birth of the impulse to imi
tate sounds. Up to the date of its awakening the child may
have been as devoid of it as a dog. Four days later his
whole energy may be poured into this new channel. The
habits of articulation formed during the plastic age of
childhood are in most persons sufficient to inhibit the for-

408 PSYCHOLOGY.

mation of new ones of a fundamentally different sort — wit
ness the inevitable ' foreign accent ' which distinguishes
the speech of those who learn a language after early youth.
Imitation. The child's first words are in part vocables
of his own invention, which his parents adopt, and whichv
as far as they go, form a new human tongue upon the earth ;
and in part they are his more or less successful imitations
of words he hears the parents use. But the instinct of
imitating gestures develops earlier than that of imitating
sounds, — unless the sympathetic crying of a baby when it
hears another cry may be reckoned as imitation of a sound.
Professor Preyer speaks of his child imitating the protru
sion of the father's lips in its fifteenth week. The various
accomplishments of infancy, making ' pat-a-cake,' saying
' bye-bye,' * blowing out the candle,' etc., usually fall well
inside the limits of the first year. Later come all the various
imitative games in which childhood revels, playing ' horse,'
' soldiers,' etc., etc. And from this time onward man is
essentially the imitative animal. His whole educability
and in fact the whole history of civilization depend on
this trait, which his strong tendencies to rivalry, jealousy,
and acquisitiveness reinforce. ' Humani nihil a me alienwn
puto,' is the motto of each individual of the species ; and
makes him, whenever another individual shows a power
or superiority of any kind, restless until he can exhibit it
himself. But apart from this kind of imitation, of which
the psychological roots are complex, there is the more
direct propensity to speak and walk and behave like
others, usually without any conscious intention of so
doing. And there is the imitative tendency which shows
itself in large masses of men, and produces panics, and
orgies, and frenzies of violence, and which only the
rarest individuals can actively withstand. This sort of
imitativeness is possessed by man in common with other
gregarious animals, and is an instinct in the fullest sense
of the term, being a blind impulse to act as soon as a cer
tain perception occurs. It is particularly hard not to imi
tate gaping, laughing, or looking and running in a certain
direction, if we see others doing so. Certain mesmerized
subjects must automatically imitate whatever motion their

INSTINCT. 409

operator makes before their eyes.* A successful piece of
mimicry gives to both bystanders and mimic a peculiar
kind of aesthetic pleasure. The dramatic impulse, the ten
dency to pretend one is someone else, contains this pleasure
of mimicry as one of its elements. Another element seems
to be a peculiar sense of power in stretching one's own
personality so as to include that of a strange person. In
young children this instinct often knows no bounds. For
a few months in one of my children's third year, he liter
ally hardly ever appeared in his own person. It was
always, " Play I am So-and-so, and you are So-and-so, and
the chair is such a thing, and then we'll do this or that."
If you called him by his name, H., you invariably got the
reply, " I'm not H., I'm a hyena, or a horse-car," or what
ever the feigned object might be. He outwore this impulse
after a time ; but while it lasted, it had every appearance
of being the automatic result of ideas, often suggested by
perceptions, working out irresistible motor effects. Imita
tion shades into

Emulation or Rivalry, a very intense instinct, especially
rife with young children, or at least especially undisguised.
Everyone knows it. Nine-tenths of the work of the world
is done by it. We know that if we do not do the task some
one else will do it and get the credit, so we do it. It has
very little connection with sympathy, but rather more with
pugnacity, which we proceed in turn to consider.

Pugnacity; anger; resentment. In many respects man
is the most ruthlessly ferocious of beasts. As with all
gregarious animals, ' two souls,' as Faust says, * dwell with
in his breast,' the one of sociability and helpfulness, the
other of jealousy and antagonism to his mates. Though in
a general way he cannot live without them, yet, as regards
certain individuals, it often falls out that he cannot live
with them either. Constrained to be a member of a tribe,
he still has a right to decide, as far as in him lies, of which
other members the tribe shall consist. Killing off a few

* See, for some excellent pedagogic remarks about doing yourself what
you want to get your pupils to do, and not simply telling them to do it,
Baumann, Haudbuch der Moral (1879), p. 32 ff.

410 PSYCHOLOGY.

obnoxious ones may often better the chances of those that
remain. And killing off a neighboring tribe from whom
no good thing comes, but only competition, may materially
better the lot of the whole tribe. Hence the gory cradle,
the bellum omnium contra omnes, in which our race was
reared ; hence the fickleness of human ties, the ease with
which the foe of yesterday becomes the ally of to-day, the
friend of to-day the enemy of to-morrow ; hence the fact that
we, the lineal representatives of the successful enactors of
one scene of slaughter after another, must, whatever more
pacific virtues we may also possess, still carry about with
us, ready at any moment to burst into flame, the smoulder
ing and sinister traits of character by means of which they
lived through so many massacres, harming others, but
themselves unharmed.

Sympathy is an emotion as to whose instinctiveness psy
chologists have held hot debate, some of them contending
that it is no primitive endowment, but, originally at least,
the result of a rapid calculation of the good consequences
to ourselves of the sympathetic act. Such a calculation,
at first conscious, would grow more unconscious as it be
came more habitual, and at last, tradition and association
aiding, might prompt to actions which could not be distin
guished from immediate impulses. It is hardly needful to
argue against the falsity of this view. Some forms of sym
pathy, that of mother with child, for example, are surely
primitive, and not intelligent forecasts of board and lodg
ing and other support to be reaped in old age. Danger to
the child blindly and instantaneously stimulates the mother
to actions of alarm or defence. Menace or harm to the
adult beloved or friend excites us in a corresponding
way, often against all the dictates of prudence. It is true
that sympathy does not necessarily follow from the mere
fact of gregariousness. Cattle do not help a wounded com
rade ; on the contrary, they are more likely to dispatch
him. But a dog will lick another sick dog, and even bring
him food ; and the sympathy of monkeys is proved by
many observations to be strong. In man, then, we may lay
it down that the sight of suffering or danger to others is
a direct exciter of interest, and an immediate stimulus, if

INSTINCT. 411

no complication hinders, to acts of relief. There is noth
ing unaccountable or pathological about this— nothing to
justify Professor Bain's assimilation of it to the 'fixed
ideas ' of insanity, as ' clashing with the regular outgoings
of the will.' It may be as primitive as any other 'outgo
ing,' and may be due to a random variation selected, quite
as probably as gregariousness and maternal love are, even
in Spencer's opinion, due to such variations.

It is true that sympathy is peculiarly liable to inhibi
tion from other instincts which its stimulus may call forth.
The traveller whom the good Samaritan rescued may well
have prompted such instinctive fear or disgust in the priest
and Levite who passed him by, that their sympathy could
not come to the front. Then, of course, habits, reasoned
reflections, and calculations may either check or reinforce
one's sympathy ; as may also the instincts of love or hate,
if these exist, for the suffering individual. The hunting
and pugnacious instincts, when aroused, also inhibit our
sympathy absolutely. This accounts for the cruelty of
collections of men hounding each other on to bait or tor
ture a victim. The blood mounts to the eyes, and sympa
thy's chance is gone.*

The hunting instinct has an equally remote origin in the
evolution of the race.f The hunting and the fighting in-

* Sympathy has been enormously written about in books on Ethics. A
very good recent chapter is that by Thos. Fowler: The Principles of Morals
part n. chap. n.

f " I must now refer to a very general passion which occurs in boys who
are brought up naturally, especially in the country. Everyone knows
what pleasure a boy takes in the sight of a butterfly, fish, crab or other
animal, or of a bird's nest, and what a strong propensity he has for pulling
apart, breaking, opening, and destroying all complex objects, how he de-
ights in pulling out the wings and legs of flies, and tormenting one animal
>r another, how greedy he is to steal secret dainties, with what irresistible
strength the plundering of birds' nests attracts him without his havino- the
least intention of eating the eggs or the young birds. This fact has long
been familiar, and is daily remarked by teachers; but an explanation of
these impulses which follow upon a mere perception of the objects, with-
t in most cases any representation being aroused of a future pleasure to
3e gained, has as yet been given by no one, and yet the impulses are very
easy to explain. In many cases it will be said that the boy pulls things
apart from curiosity. Quite correct : but whence comes this curiosity, thia
irresistible desire to open everything and see what is inside ? What makes

412 PSYCHOLOGY.

stinct combine in many manifestations. They both snpport
the emotion of anger ; they combine in the fascination which
stories of atrocity have for most minds ; and the utterly
blind excitement of giving the rein to our fury when our blood
is up (an excitement whose intensity is greater than that
of any other human passion save one) is only explicable as an
impulse aboriginal in character, and having more to do with
immediate and overwhelming tendencies to muscular dis
charge than to any possible reminiscences of effects of ex
perience, or association of ideas. I say this here, because
the pleasure of disinterested cruelty has been thought a
paradox, and writers have sought to show that it is no
primitive attribute of our nature, but rather a resultant
of the subtile combination of other less malignant ele
ments of mind. This is a hopeless task. If evolution and
the survival of the fittest be true at all, the destruction
of prey and of human rivals must have been among the
most important of man's primitive functions, the fighting
and the chasing instincts must have become ingrained.
Certain perceptions must immediately, and without the in
tervention of inferences and ideas, have prompted emotions
and motor discharges ; and both the latter must, from
the nature of the case, have been very violent, and therefore,
when unchecked, of an intensely pleasurable kind. It is just
because human bloodthirstiness is such a primitive part of
us that it is so hard to eradicate, especially where a fight
or a hunt is promised as part of the fun.*

the boy take the eggs from the nest and destroy them when he never thinks
of eating them ? These are effects of an hereditary instinct, so strong that
warnings and punishments are unable to counteract it " (Schneider: Der
Menschliche Wille, p. 224. See also Der Thierische W'lle, pp. 180-2.)

* It is not surprising, in view of the facts of animal bistory and evolu
tion, that the very special object blood should have become the stimulus
for a very special interest and excitement. That the sight of it should
make people faint is strange. Less so that a child who sees his blood flow
should forthwith become much more frightened than by the mere feeling
of the cut. Horned cattle often, though not always, becoipe furiously
excited at the smell of blood. In some abnormal human being.* the sight
or thought of it exerts a baleful fascination. " B and his father v*ere at a
neighbor's one evening, and, while paring apples, the old man accidentally
cut his hand so severely as to cause the blood to flow profusely. B was
observed to become restless, nervous, pale, and to have undergone a peculiar

INSTINCT. 413

As Rochef oucauld says, there is something in the misfor
tunes of our very friends that does not altogether displease
us ; and an apostle of peace will feel a certain vicious thrill
run through him, and enjoy a vicarious brutality, as he turns
to the column in his newspaper at the top of which * Shock
ing Atrocity ' stands printed in large capitals. See how the
crowd flocks round a street-brawl ! Consider the enormous
annual sale of revolvers to persons, not one in a thousand
of whom has any serious intention of using them, but of
whom each one has his carnivorous self-consciousness
agreeably tickled by the notion, as he clutches the handle
of his weapon, that he will be rather a dangerous customer
to meet. See the ignoble crew that escorts every great
pugilist — parasites who feel as if the glory of his brutality
rubbed off upon them, and whose darling hope, from day to
day, is to arrange some set-to of which they may share the
rapture without enduring the pains ! The first blows at a
prize-fight are apt to make a refined spectator sick ; but his
blood is soon up in favor of one party, and it will then seem
as if the other fellow could not be banged and pounded and
mangled enough — the refined spectator would like to rein
force the blows himself. Over the sinister orgies of blood
of certain depraved and insane persons let a curtain be
drawn, as well as over the ferocity with which otherwise
fairly decent men may be animated, when (at the sacking of
a town, for instance), the excitement of victory long de-
change in demeanor. Taking advantage of the distraction produced by
the accident, B escaped from the house and proceeded to a neighboring
farm-yard, where he cut the throat of a horse, killing it." Dr. D. H. Tuke,
commenting on this man's case (Journal of Mental Science, October,
1885), speaks of the influence of blood upon him — his whole life had been
one chain of cowardly atrocities— and continues : " There can be no doubt
that with some individuals it constitutes a fascination. . . . We might
speak of a mania sanguinis. Dr. Savage admitted a man from France into
Bethlehem Hospital some time ago, one of whose earliest symptoms of in
sanity was the thirst for blood, which he endeavored to satisfy by going to
an abattoir in Paris. The man whose case I have brought forward had the
same passion for gloating over blood, but had no attack of acute mania.
The sight of blood was distinctly a delight to him, and at any time blood
aroused in him the worst elements of his nature. Instances will easily be
recalled in which murderers, undoubtedly insane, have described the in
tense pleasure they experienced in the warm blood of children."

414 PSYCHOLOGY.

layed, the sudden freedom of rapine and of lust, the con
tagion of a crowd, and the impulse to imitate and outdo, all
combine to swell the blind drunkenness of the killing-in
stinct, and carry it to its extreme. No ! those who try to
account for this from above downwards, as if it resulted from
the consequences of the victory being rapidly inferred, and
from the agreeable sentiments associated with them in the
imagination, have missed the root of the matter. Our fe
rocity is blind, and can only be explained from beloiv. Could
we trace it back through our line of descent, we should see
it taking more and more the form of a fatal reflex response,
and at the same time becoming more and more the pure
and direct emotion that it is.*

In childhood it takes this form. The boys who pull
out grasshoppers' legs and butterflies' wings, and disem
bowel every frog they catch, have no thought at all about the
matter. The creatures tempt their hands to a fascinating
occupation, to which they have to yield. It is with them
as with the ' boy-fiend ' Jesse Pomeroy, who cut a little
girl's throat, 'just to see how she'd act.' The normal pro
vocatives of the impulse are all living beasts, great and
small, toward which a contrary habit has not been formed
—all human beings in whom we perceive a certain intent
towards us, and a large number of human beings who offend
us peremptorily, either by their look, or gait, or by some
circumstance in their lives which we dislike. Inhibited by
sympathy, and by reflection calling up impulses of an op
posite kind, civilized men lose the habit of acting out their
pugnacious instincts in a perfectly natural way, and a pass
ing feeling of anger, with its comparatively faint bodily ex-

" Bombonnel, having rolled with a panther to the border of a ravine,
gets his head awaj' from the open mouth of the animal, and by a prodi
gious effort rolls her into the abyss. He gets up, blinded, spitting a mass of
blood, not knowing exactly what the situation is. He thinks only of one
thing, that he shall probably die of his wounds, but that before dying he
must take vengeance on the panther. « I didn't think of my pain,' he tells
us. ' Possessed entirely by the fury with which I was transported, I drew
my hunting-knife, and not understanding what had become of the beast, I
sought for her on every side in order to continue the struggle. It was in
this plight that the Arabs found me when they arrived.'" (Quoted by
Guyan, La Morale sans Obligation, etc., p. 210.)

INSTINCT. 415

pressions, may be the limit of their physical combativeness.
Such a feeling as this may, however, be aroused by a wide
range of objects. Inanimate things, combinations of color
and sound, bad bills of fare, may in persons who combine
fastidious taste with an irascible temperament produce
real ebullitions of rage. Though the female sex is often
said to have less pugnacity than the male, the difference
seems connected more with the extent of the motor con
sequences of the impulse than with its frequency. Women
take offence and get angry, if anything, more easily than men,
but their anger is inhibited by fear and other principles of
their nature from expressing itself in blows. The hunting-
instinct proper seems to be decidedly weaker in them than
in men. The latter instinct is easily restricted by habit to
certain objects, which become legitimate 'game,' while
other things are spared. If the hunting-instinct be not ex
ercised at all, it may even entirely die out, and a man may
enjoy letting a wild creature live, even though he might easily
kill it. Such a type is now becoming frequent ; but there
is no doubt that in the eyes of a child of nature such a
personage would seem a sort of moral monster.

Fear is a reaction aroused by the same objects that
arouse ferocity. The antagonism of the two is an interest
ing study in instinctive dynamics. We both fear, and wish
to kill, anything that may kill us ; and the question which
of the two impulses we shall follow is usually decided by
some one of those collateral circumstances of the particular
case, to be moved by which is the mark of superior mental
natures. Of course this introduces uncertainty into the
reaction ; but it is an uncertainty found in the higher
brutes as well as in men, and ought not to be taken as
proof that we are less instinctive than they. Fear has
bodily expressions of an extremely energetic kind, and
stands, beside lust and anger, as one of the three most ex
citing emotions of which our nature is susceptible. The
progress from brute to man is characterized by nothing so
much as by the decrease in frequency of proper occasions
for fear. In civilized life, in particular, it has at last be
come possible for large numbers of people to pass from the
cradle to the grave without ever having had a pang of genu-

416 PSYCHOLOGY.

ine fear. Many of us need an attack of mental disease to
teach us the meaning of the word. Hence the possibility
of so much blindly optimistic philosophy and religion.
The atrocities of life become ' like a tale of little meaning
though the words are strong ;' we doubt if anything like us
ever really was within the tiger's jaws, and conclude that
the horrors we hear of are but a sort of painted tapestry
for the chambers in which we lie so comfortably at peace
with ourselves and with the world.

Be this as it may, fear is a genuine instinct, and one of
the earliest shown by the human child. Noises seem es
pecially to call it forth. Most noises from the outer world,
to a child bred in the house, have no exact significance.
They are simply startling. To quote a good observer, M.
Perez :

" Children between three and ten months are less often alarmed by
visual than by auditory impressions. In cats, from the fifteenth day,
the contrary is the case. A child, three and a half months old, in the
midst of the turmoil of a conflagration, in presence of the devouring
flames and ruined walls, showed neither astonishment nor fear, but
smiled at the woman who was taking care of him, while his parents
were busy. The noise, however, of the trumpet of the firemen, wrho
were approaching, and that of the wheels of the engine, made him
start and cry. At this age I have never yet seen an infant startled at a
flash of lightning, even when intense; but I have seen many of them
alarmed at the voice of the thunder. . . . Thus fear comes rather by
the ears than by the eyes, to the child without experience. It is nat
ural that this should be reversed,. or reduced, in animals organized to
perceive danger afar. Accordingly, although I have never seen a child
frightened at his first sight of fire, I have many a time seen young dogs,
young cats, young chickens, and young birds frightened thereby. ... I
picked up some years ago a lost cat about a year old. Some months
afterward at the onset of cold weather I lit the fire in the grate of my
study, which was her reception-room. She first looked at the flame in
a very frightened way. I brought her near to it. She leaped away
and ran to hide under the bed. Although the fire was lighted every day,
it was not until the end of the winter that I could prevail upon her to
stay upon a chair near it. The next winter, however, all apprehension
had disappeared. . . . Let us, then, conclude that there are hereditary
dispositions to fear, which are independent of experience, but which
experiences may end by attenuating very considerably. In the human
infant I believe them to be particularly connected with the ear.'1*

* Psychologic de 1'Enfant, pp. 72-74. In an account of a young gorilla
quoted from Falkenstein,by R. Hartmann (' Anthropoid Apes,' International

INSTINCT. 417

The effect of noise in heightening any terror we may
feel in adult years is very marked. The howling of the
storm, whether on sea or land, is a principal cause of our
anxiety when exposed to it. The writer has been interested
in noticing in his own person, while lying in bed, and kept
awake by the wind outside, how invariably each loud gust
of it arrested momentarily his heart. A dog, attacking us,
is much more dreadful by reason of the noises he makes.

Strange men, and strange animals, either large or small,
excite fear, but especially men or animals advancing toward
us in a threatening way. This is entirely instinctive and
antecedent to experience. Some children will cry with
terror at their very first sight of a cat or dog, and it will
often be impossible for weeks to make them touch it.
Others will wish to fondle it almost immediately. Certain
kinds of ' vermin,' especially spiders and snakes, seem to
excite a fear unusually difficult to overcome. It is impos
sible to say how much of this difference is instinctive and
how much the result of stories heard about these creatures.
That the fear of ' vermin ' ripens gradually, seemed to me
to be proved in a child of my own to whom I gave a live
frog once, at the age of six to eight months, and again when
he was a year and a half old. The first time he seized it
promptly, and holding it, in spite of its struggling, at last
got its head into his mouth. He then let it crawl up his
breast, and get upon his face, without showing alarm. But
the second time, although he had seen no frog and heard
no story about a frog between whiles, it was almost impos
sible to induce him to touch it. Another child, a year old,
eagerly took some very large spiders into his hand. At
present he is afraid, but has been exposed meanwhile to
the teachings of the nursery. One of my children from her
birth upwards saw daily the pet pug-dog of the house, and
never betrayed the slightest fear until she was (if I recol-

3cientific Series, vol. LII (New York, 1886), p. 265), it is said: "He very
much disliked strange noises. Thunder, the rain falling on the skylight,
and especially the long-drawn note of a pipe or trumpet, threw him into
such agitation as to cause a sudden affection of the digestive organs, and
it became expedient to keep him at a distance. When he was slightly in
disposed, we made use of this kind of music with results as successful as
if we had administered purgative medicine."

418 PSYCHOLOGY.

lect rightly) about eight months old. Then the instinct
suddenly seemed to develop, and with such intensity that
familiarity had no mitigating effect. She screamed when
ever the dog entered the room, and for many months re
mained afraid to touch him. It is needless to say that no
change in the pug's unfailingly friendly conduct had any
thing to do with this change of feeling in the child.

Preyer tells of a young child screaming with fear on
being carried near to the sea. The great source of terror
to infancy is solitude. The teleology of this is obvious, as
is also that of the infant's expression of dismay — the never-
failing cry — on waking up and finding himself alone.

Black tilings, and especially dark places, holes, caverns,
etc., arouse a peculiarly gruesome fear. This fear, as well
as that of solitude, of being l lost,' are explained after a
fashion by ancestral experience. Says Schneider :

" It is a fact that men, especially in childhood, fear to go into a dark
cavern or a gloomy wood. This feeling of fear arises, to be sure,
partly from the fact that we easily suspect that dangerous beasts may
lurk in these localities— a suspicion due to stories we have heard and
read. But, on the other hand, it is quite sure that this fear at a certain
perception is also directly inherited. Children who have been carefully
guarded from all ghost-stories are nevertheless terrified and cry if led
into a dark place, especially if sounds are made there. Even an adult
can easily observe that an uncomfortable timidity steals over him in a
lonely wood at night, although , he may have the fixed conviction that
not the slightest danger is near.

"This feeling of fear occurs in many men even in their own house
after dark, although it is much stronger in a dark cavern or forest. The
fact of such instinctive fear is easily explicable when we consider that
our savage ancestors through innumerable generations were accustomed
to meet with dangerous beasts in caverns, especially bears, and were
for the most part attacked by such beasts during the night and in the
woods, and that tnus an inseparable association between the perceptions
of darkness of caverns and woods, and fear took place, and was
inherited."*

High places cause fear of a peculiarly sickening sort,
though here, again, individuals differ enormously. The
utterly blind instinctive character of the motor impulses
here is shown by the fact that they are almost always

* Der Menschliche Wille, p. 224.

INSTINCT. 419

entirely unreasonable, but that reason is powerless to
suppress them. That they are a mere incidental peculiarity
of the nervous system, like liability to sea-sickness, or love
of music, with no teleological significance, seems more than
probable. The fear in question varies so much from one per
son to another, and its detrimental effects are so much more
obvious than its uses, that it is hard to see how it could be
a selected instinct. Man is anatomically one of the best
fitted of animals for climbing about high places. The best
psychical complement to this equipment would seem to be
a * level head ' when there, not a dread of going there at
all. In fact, the teleology of fear, beyond a certain
point, is very dubious. Professor Mosso, in his interesting
monograph, * La Paura ' (which has been translated into
French), concludes that many of its manifestations must be
considered pathological rather than useful ; Bain, in several
places, expresses the same opinion ; and this, I think, is
surely the view which any observer without a priori preju
dices must take. A certain amount of timidity obviously
adapts us to the world we live in, but the fear-paroxysm is
surely altogether harmful to him who is its prey.

Fear of the supernatural is one variety of fear. It is
difficult to assign any normal object for this fear, unless it
•were a genuine ghost. But, in spite of psychical research-
societies, science has not yet adopted ghosts ; so we can only
say that certain ideas of supernatural agency, associated
with real circumstances, produce a peculiar kind of horror.
This horror is probably explicable as the result of a combi
nation of simpler horrors. To bring the ghostly terror to its
maximum, many usual elements of the dreadful must com
bine, such as loneliness, darkness, inexplicable sounds, espe
cially of a dismal character, moving figures half discerned
(or,if discerned, of dreadful aspect), and a vertiginous baffling
of the expectation. This last element, which is intellectual,
is very important. It produces a strange emotional
* curdle ' in our blood to see a process with which we are
familiar deliberately taking an unwonted course. Any
one's heart would stop beating if he perceived his chair
sliding unassisted across the floor. The lower animals
appear to be sensitive to the mysteriously exceptional as

420 PSYCHOLOGY.

well as ourselves. My friend Professor W. K Brooks, of
the Johns Hopkins University, told me of his large and
noble dog being frightened into a sort of epileptic fit by a
bone being drawn across the floor by a thread which the
dog did not see. Darwin and Eomanes have given similar
experiences.* The idea of the supernatural involves that
the usual should be set at naught In the witch and hob
goblin supernatural, other elements still of fear are brought
in — caverns, slime and ooze, vermin, corpses, and the like.f
A human corpse seems normally to produce an instinctive
dread,which is no doubt somewhat due to its mysteriousness,
and which familiarity rapidly dispels. But, in view of the
fact that cadaveric, reptilian, and underground horrors play
so specific and constant a part in many nightmares and
forms of delirium, it seems not altogether unwise to ask
whether these forms of dreadful circumstance may not at a
former period have been more normal objects of the envi
ronment than now. The ordinary cock-sure evolutionist
ought to have no difficulty in explaining these terrors, and
the scenery that provokes them, as relapses into the
consciousness of the cave-men, a consciousness usually
overlaid in us by experiences of more recent date.

There are certain other pathological fears, and certain
peculiarities in the expression of ordinary fear, which
might receive an explanatory light from ancestral con
ditions, even infra-human ones. In ordinary fear, one may

* Cf. Romanes, Mental Evolution, etc., p. 156.

f In the ' Overland Monthly ' for 1887, a most interesting article on
Laura Bridgman's writings has been published by Mr. E. C. Sandford.
Among other reminiscences of her early childhood, while she still knew
nothing of the sign-language, the wonderful blind deaf-mute records the
following item in her quaint language : "My father [he was a farmer and
probably did his own butchering] used to enter his kitchen bringing some
killed animals in and deposited them on one of sides of the room many
times. As I perceived it it make me shudder with terror because I did not
know what the matter was. I hated to approach the dead. One morning
I went to take a short walk with my Mother. I went into a snug house for
some time. They took me into a room where there was a coffin. I put
my hand in the coffin & felt something so queer. It frightened me
unpleasantly. I found something dead wrapped in a silk h'd'k'f so care
fully. It must have been a body that had had vitality. ... I did not like
to venture to examine the body for I was confounded."

INSTINCT 421

either run, or remain semi-paralyzed. The latter condition
reminds us of the so-called death-shamming instinct shown
by many animals. Dr. Lindsay, in his work ' Mind in
Animals,' says this must require great self-command in
those that practise it. But it is really no feigning of death
at all, and requires no self-command. It is simply a terror-
paralysis which has been so useful as to become hereditary.
The beast of prey does not think the motionless bird, insect,
or crustacean dead. He simply fails to notice them at all ;
because his senses, like ours, are much more strongly
excited by a moving object than by a still one. It is the
same instinct which leads a boy playing ' I spy ' to hold
his very breath when the seeker is near, and which makes
the beast of prey himself in many cases motionlessly lie in
wait for his victim or silently ' stalk ' it, by rapid ap
proaches alternated with periods of immobility. It is the
opposite of the instinct which makes us jump up and down
and move our arms when we wish to attract the notice of
some one passing far away, and makes the shipwrecked
sailor frantically wave a cloth upon the raft where he is
floating when a distant sail appears. Now, may not the
statue-like, crouching immobility of some melancholiacs,
insane with general anxiety and fear of everything, be in
some way connected with this old instinct ? They can give
no reason for their fear to move ; but immobility makes them
feel safer and more comfortable. Is not this the mental
state of the * feigning ' animal ?

Again, take the strange symptom which has been de
scribed of late years by the rather absurd name of agora
phobia. The patient is seized with palpitation and ter
ror at the sight of any open place or broad street which
he has to cross alone. He trembles, his knees bend, he
may even faint at the idea. Where he has sufficient self-
command he sometimes accomplishes the object by keep
ing safe under the lee of a vehicle going across, or join
ing himself to a knot of other people. But usually he
slinks round the sides of the square, hugging the houses
as closely as he can. This emotion has no utility in a
civilized man, but when we notice the chronic agora
phobia of our domestic cats, and see the tenacious way

422 PSYCHOLOGY.

in which many wild animals, especially rodents, cling to
cover, and only venture on a dash across the open as a
desperate measure — even then making for every stone or
bunch of weeds which may give a momentary shelter — when
we see this we are strongly tempted to ask whether such an
odd kind of fear in us be not due to the accidental resur
rection, through disease, of a sort of instinct which may in
some of our ancestors have had a permanent and on the
whole a useful part to play ?

Appropriation or Acquisitiveness. The beginnings of ac
quisitiveness are seen in the impulse which very young
children display, to snatch at, or beg for, any object which
pleases their attention. Later, when they begin to speak,
among the first words they emphasize are ' me ' and ' mine.' *
Their earliest quarrels with each other are about questions
of ownership ; and parents of twins soon learn that it con
duces to a quiet house to buy all presents in impartial du
plicate. Of the later evolution of the proprietary instinct I
need not speak. Everyone knows how difficult a thing it is
not to covet whatever pleasing thing we see, and how the
sweetness of the thing often is as gall to us so long as it is
another's. When another is in possession, the impulse to
appropriate the thing often turns into the impulse to harm
him — what is called envy, or jealousy, ensues. In civilized
life the impulse to own is usually checked by a variety of
considerations, and only passes over into action under cir
cumstances legitimated by habit and common consent, an
additional example of the way in which one instinctive ten
dency may be inhibited by others. A variety of the propri
etary instinct is the impulse to form collections of the same
sort of thing. It differs much in individuals, and shows in
a striking way how instinct and habit interact. For, al-

* I lately saw a boy of five (who had been told the story of Hector and
Achilles) teaching his younger brother, aged three, how to play Hector,
wHle he himself should play Achilles, and chase him round the walls of
Troy. Having armed themselves, Achilles advanced, shouting "Where's
my Patroklos ? " Whereupon the would-be Hector piped up, quite distract
ed from his role, ' ' Where's my Patroklos ? I want a Patroklos ! I want a
Patroklos ! " — and broke up the game. Of what kind of a thing a Patroklos
might be he had, of course, no notion— enough that his brother had one,
for him to claim one too.

INSTINCT. 423

though a collection of any given thing — like postage-stamps
— need not be begun by any given person, yet the chances
are that if accidentally it be begun by a person with the col
lecting instinct, it will probably be continued. The chief
interest of the objects, in the collector's eyes, is that they
are a collection, and that they are his. Kivalry, to be sure,
inflames this, as it does every other passion, yet the objects
of a collector's mania need not be necessarily such as are
generally in demand. Boys will collect anything that they
see another boy collect, from pieces of chalk and peach-pits
up to books and photographs. Out of a hundred students
whom I questioned, only four or five had never collected
anything.*

The associationist psychology denies that there is any
blind primitive instinct to appropriate, and would explain all
acquisitiveness, in the first instance, as a desire to secure the
' pleasures ' which the objects possessed may yield ; and, sec
ondly, as the association of the idea of pleasantness with the
holding of the thing, even though the pleasure originally got
by it was only gained through its expense or destruction.
Thus the miser is shown to us as one who has transferred
to the gold by which he may buy the goods of this life all
the emotions which the goods themselves would yield ; and
who thereafter loves the gold for its own sake, preferring
the means of pleasure to the pleasure itself. There can be
little doubt that much of this analysis a broader view of
the facts would have dispelled. ' The miser ' is an abstrac
tion. There are all kinds of misers. The common sort,
the excessively niggardly man, simply exhibits the psycho
logical law that the potential has often a far greater influ
ence over our mind than the actual. A man will not marry
now, because to do so puts an end to his indefinite potenti
alities of choice of a partner. He prefers the latter. He
will not use open fires or wear his good clothes, because the
day may come when he will have to use the furnace or
dress in a worn-out coat, ' and then where will he be ? '

* In • The Nation ' for September 3, 1886, President G. S. Hall has
given some account of a statistical research on Boston school-boys, by Miss
Wiltse, from which it appears that only nineteen out of two hundred and
twenty-nine had made no collections.

424 PSYCHOLOGY.

For him, better the actual evil than the fear of it ; and so
it is with the common lot of misers. Better to live poor
now, with the power of living rich, than to live rich at the
risk of losing the power. These men value their gold, not
for its own sake, but for its powers. Demonetize it, and see
how quickly they will get rid of it ! The associationist the
ory is, as regards them, entirely at fault : they care noth
ing for the gold in se.

With other misers there combines itself with this pref
erence of the power over the act the far more instinctive
element of the simple collecting propensity. Every one
collects money, and when a man of petty ways is smitten
with the collecting mania for this object he necessarily be
comes a miser. Here again the associationist psychology
is wholly at fault. The hoarding instinct prevails widely
among animals as well as among men. Professor Silliman
has thus described one of the hoards of the California
wood-rat, made in an empty stove of an unoccupied house :

" I found the outside to be composed entirely of spikes, all laid
with symmetry, so as to present the points of the nails outward. In the
centre of this mass was the nest, composed of finely-divided fibres of
hemp-packing. Interlaced with the spikes were the following : about
two dozen knives, forks, and spoons ; all the butcher's knives, three
in number ; a large carving-knife, fork, and steel ; several large plugs
of tobacco, ... an old purse containing some silver, matches, and
tobacco ; nearly all the small tools from the tool-closets, with several
large augers, ... all of which must have been transported some dis
tance, as they were originally stored in different parts of the house. . . .
The outside casing of a silver watch was disposed of -in one part of
the pile, the glass of the same watch in another, and the works
in still another."*

In every lunatic asylum we find the collecting instinct
developing itself in an equally absurd way. Certain pa
tients will spend all their time picking pins from the
floor and hoarding them. Others collect bits of thread,
buttons, or rags, and prize them exceedingly. Now, 'the
Miser ' par excellence of the popular imagination and of
melodrama, the monster of squalor and misanthropy, is
simply one of these mentally deranged persons. His in
tellect may in many matters be clear, but his instincts,

* Quoted in Lindsay, ' Mind in Lower Animals,' vol. n. p. 151.

INSTINCT. 425

especially that of ownership, are insane, and their insanity
has no more to do with the association of ideas than with
the precession of the equinoxes. As a matter of fact his
hoarding usually is directed to money ; but it also includes
almost anything besides. Lately in a Massachusetts. town
there died a miser who principally hoarded newspapers.
These had ended by so filling all the rooms of his good-
sized house from floor to ceiling that his living-space was
restricted to a few narrow channels between them. Even
as I write, the morning paper gives an account of the
emptying of a miser's den in Boston by the City Board of
Health. What the owner hoarded is thus described :

u He gathered old newspapers, wrapping-paper, incapacitated um
brellas, canes, pieces of common wire, cast-off clothing, empty barrels,
pieces of iron, old bones, battered tin-ware, fractured pots, and bushels
of such miscellany as is to be found only at the city 'dump.' The
empty barrels were filled, shelves were filled, every hole and corner was
filled, and in order to make more storage-room, ' the hermit ' covered
his store-room with a network of ropes, and hung the ropes as full as
they could hold of his curious collections. There was nothing one could
think of that wasn't in that room. As a wood-sawyer, the old man had
never thrown away a saw-blade or a wood-buck. The bucks were rheu
matic and couldn't stand up, and the saw-blades were worn down to
almost nothing in the middle. Some had been actually worn in two,
but the ends were carefully saved and stored away. As a coal-heaver,
the old man had never cast off a worn-out basket, and there were
dozens of the remains of the old things, patched up with canvas and
rope-yarns, in the store-room. There were at least two dozen old bats,
fur, cloth, silk, and straw," etc.

Of course there may be a great many * associations of
ideas ' in the miser's mind about the things he hoards. He
is a thinking being, and must associate things; but, without
an entirely blind impulse in this direction behind all his
ideas, such practical results could never be reached.*

Kleptomania, as it is called, is an uncontrollable impulse
to appropriate, occurring in persons whose ' associations
of ideas' would naturally all be of a counteracting sort.

* Cf . Flint, Mind, vol. i. pp. 330-333 ; Sully, iUd. p. 567. Most
people probably have the impulse to keep bits of useless finery, old tools,
pieces of once useful apparatus, etc. ; but it is normally either inhibited at
the outset by reflection, or, if yielded to, the objects soon grow displeasing
%nd are thrown away.

426 PSYCHOLOGY.

Kleptomaniacs often promptly restore, or permit to be re
stored, what they have taken ; so the impulse need not be
to keep, but only to take. But elsewhere hoarding com
plicates the result. A gentleman, with whose case I am
acquainted, was discovered, after his death, to have a hoard
in his barn of all sorts of articles, mainly of a trumpery
sort, but including pieces of silver which he had stolen
from his own dining-room, and utensils which he had stolen
from his own kitchen, and for which he had afterward
bought substitutes with his own money.

Constructiveness is as genuine and irresistible an instinct
in man as in the bee or the beaver. Whatever things are
plastic to his hands, those things he must remodel into
shapes of his own, and the result of the remodelling, how
ever useless it may be, gives him more pleasure than the
original thing. The mania of young children for breaking
and pulling apart whatever is given them is more often
the expression of a rudimentary constructive impulse than
of a destructive one. ' Blocks ' are the playthings of
which they are least apt to tire. Clothes, weapons,
tools, habitations, and works of art are the result of the
discoveries to which the plastic instinct leads, each individ
ual starting where his forerunners left off, and tradition
preserving all that once is gained. Clothing, where not
necessitated by cold, is nothing but a sort of attempt to re
model the human body itself — an attempt still better shown
in the various tattooings, tooth-filings, scarrings, and other
mutilations that are practised by savage tribes. As for
habitation, there can be no doubt that the instinct to seek
a sheltered nook, open only on one side, into which he may
retire and be safe, is in man quite as specific as the in
stinct of birds to build a nest. It is not necessarily in the
shape of a shelter from wet and cold that the need comes
before him, but lie feels less exposed and more at home
when not altogether uninclosed than when lying all abroad.
Of course the utilitarian origin of this instinct is obvious.
But to stick to bare facts at present and not to trace
origins, we must admit that this instinct now exists, and
probabty always has existed, since man was man. Habits

INSTINCT. 427

of the most complicated kind are reared upon it. But
even in the midst of these habits we see the blind instinct
cropping out ; as, for example, in the fact that we feign a
shelter within a shelter, by backing up beds in rooms with
their heads against the wall, and never lying in them the
other way— just as dogs prefer to get under or upon some
piece of furniture to sleep, instead of lying in the middle
of the room. The first habitations were caves and leafy
grottoes, bettered by the hands ; and we see children to
day, when playing in wild places, take the greatest delight
in discovering and appropriating such retreats and ' play
ing house ' there.

Play. The impulse to play in special ways is certainly
instinctive. A boy can no more help running after another
boy who runs provokingly near him, than a kitten can help
running after a rolling ball. A child trying to get into its
own hand some object which it sees another child pick up,
and the latter trying to get away with the prize, are just as
much slaves of an automatic prompting as are two chickens
or fishes, of which one has taken a big morsel into its moutli
and decamps with it, while the other darts after in pursuit.
All simple active games are attempts to gain the excitement
yielded by certain primitive instincts, through feigning that
the occasions for their exercise are there. They involve
imitation, hunting, fighting, rivalry, acquisitiveness, and
construction, combined in various ways ; their special rules
are habits, discovered by accident, selected by intelligence,
and propagated by tradition ; but unless they were founded'
in automatic impulses, games would lose most of their zest.
The sexes differ somewhat in their play-impulses. As
Schneider says :

"The little boy imitates soldiers, models clay into an oven, builds
houses, makes a wagon out of chairs, rides on horseback upon a stick,
drives nails with the hammer, harnesses his brethren and comrades
together and plays the stage-driver, or lets himself be captured as a
wild horse by some one else. The girl, on the contrary, plays with her
doll, washes and dresses it, strokes it, clasps and kisses it, puts it to
bed and tucks it in, sings it a cradle-song, or speaks with it as if it •
were a living being. . . . This fact that a sexual difference exists in
the play-impulse, that a boy gets more pleasure from a horse and

428 PSYCHOLOGY.

rider and a soldier than from a doll, while with the girl the opposite is
the case, is proof that an hereditary connection exists between the
perception of certain things (horse, doll, etc.), and the feeling of pleas
ure, as well as between this latter and the impulse to play." *

There is another sort of human play, into which higher
aesthetic feelings enter. I refer to that love of festivities,
ceremonies, ordeals, etc., which seems to be universal in our
species. The lowest savages have their dances, more or
less formally conducted. The various religions have their
solemn rites and exercises, and civic and military power
symbolize their grandeur by processions and celebrations
of divers sorts. We have our operas and parties and mas
querades. An element common to all these ceremonial
games, as they may be called, is the excitement of con
certed action as one of an organized crowd. The same
acts, performed with a crowd, seem to mean vastly more
than when performed alone. A walk with the people on
a holiday afternoon, an excursion to drink beer or coffee
at a popular * resort,' or an ordinary ball-room, are ex
amples of this. Not only are we amused at seeing so
many strangers, but there is a distinct stimulation at
feeling our share in their collective life. The percep
tion of them is the stimulus ; and our reaction upon it is
our tendency to join them and do what they are doing,
and our unwillingness to be the first to leave off and go
home alone. This seems a primitive element in our nature,
as it is difficult to trace any association of ideas that could
lead up to it ; although, once granting it to exist, it is very
easy to see what its uses to a tribe might be in facilitating
prompt and vigorous collective action. The formation of
armies and the undertaking of military expeditions would
be among its fruits. In the ceremonial games it is but the
impulsive starting-point. What particular things the crowd
then shall do, depends for the most part on the initiative of
individuals, fixed by imitation and habit, and continued by
tradition. The co-operation of other aesthetic pleasures
with games, ceremonial or other, has a great deal to do
with the selection of such as shall become stereotyped and

* Der Menschliclio Wille, p. 205.

INSTINCT. 429

habitual. The peculiar form of excitement called by Pro
fessor Bain the emotion of pursuit, the pleasure of a cres-
cendc, is the soul of many common games. The immense
extent of the play-activities in human life is too obvious to
be more than mentioned.*

Curiosity. Already pretty low down among vertebrates
we find that any object may excite attention, provided it be
only novel, and that attention may be followed by approach
and exploration by nostril, lips, or touch. Curiosity and
fear form a couple of antagonistic emotions liable to be
awakened by the same outward thing, and manifestly both
useful to their possessor. The spectacle of their alternation
is often amusing enough, as in the timid approaches and
scared wheelings which sheep or cattle will make in the
presence of some new object they are investigating. I have
seen alligators in the water act in precisely the same way
towards a man seated on the beach in front of them — grad
ually drawing near as long as he kept still, frantically
careering back as soon as he made a movement. Inasmuch
as new objects may always be advantageous, it is better
that an animal should not absolutely fear them. But, inas
much as they may also possibly be harmful, it is better
that he should not be quite indifferent to them either, but
on the whole remaining on the qui vive, ascertain as much
about them, and what they may be likely to bring forth, a&
he can, before settling down to rest in their presence.
Some such susceptibility for being excited and irritated by
the mere novelty, as such, of any movable feature of the
environment must form the instinctive basis of all human
curiosity; though, of course, the superstructure absorbs
contributions from so many other factors of the emotional
life that the original root may be hard to find. With what

* Professor Lazarus (Die Reize des Spieles, Berlin, 1883, p. 44) denies
that we have an instinct to play, and says the root of the matter is the aver
sion to remain unoccupied, which substitutes a sham occupation when no
real one is ready. No doubt this is true; but why the particular forms of
sham occupation? The elements of all bodily games and of ceremonial
games are given by direct excito-motor stimulations — just as when puppies
chase one another and swallows have a parliament.

430 PSYCHOLOGY.

is called scientific curiosity, and with metaphysical wonder,
the practical instinctive root has probably nothing to do.
The stimuli here are not objects, but ways of conceiving
objects ; and the emotions and actions they give rise to are
to be classed, with many other aesthetic manifestations, sen
sitive and motor, as incidental features of our mental life,
The philosophic brain responds to an inconsistency or a
gap in its knowledge, just as the musical brain responds to
a discord in what it hears. At certain ages the sensitiveness
to particular gaps and the pleasure of resolving particular
puzzles reach their maximum, and then it is that stores of
scientific knowledge are easiest and most naturally laid in.
But these effects may have had nothing to do with the uses
for which the brain was originally given ; and it is probably
only within a few centuries, since religious beliefs and
economic applications of science have played a prominent
part in the conflicts of one race with another, that they may
have helped to 'select' for survival a particular type of
brain. I shall have to consider this matter of incidental
and supernumerary faculties in Chapter XXVIII.

Sociability and Shyness. As a gregarious animal, man
is excited both by the absence and by the presence of his
kind. To be alone is one of the greatest of evils for him.
Solitary confinement is by many regarded as a mode of
torture too cruel and unnatural for civilized countries to
adopt. To one long pent up on a desert island, the sight
of a human footprint or a human form in the distance
would be the most tumultuously exciting of experiences.
In morbid states of mind, one of the commonest symptoms
is the fear of being alone. This fear may be assuaged by
the presence of a little child, or even of a baby. In a case
of hydrophobia known to the writer, the patient insisted
on keeping his room crowded with neighbors all the while,
so intense was his fear of solitude. In a gregarious ani
mal, the perception that he is alone excites him to vigorous
activity. Mr. Galton thus describes the behavior of the
South African cattle whom he had such good opportunities
for observing :

" Although the ox has little affection for, or interest in, his fellows,
he cannot endure even a momentary separation from his herd. If he

INSTINCT. 431

oe separated from it by stratagem or force, he exhibits every sign of
mental agony; he strives with all his might to get back again, and when
he succeeds he plunges into its middle to bathe his whole body with the
comfort of closest companionship.1' *

Man is also excited by the presence of his kind. The
bizarre actions of dogs meeting strange dogs are not alto
gether without a parallel in our own constitution. We
<jannot meet strangers without a certain tension, or talk to
them exactly as to our familiars. This is particularly the
case if the stranger be an important personage. It may then
happen that we not only shrink from meeting his eye, but
actually cannot collect our wits or do ourselves any sort
of justice in his presence.

" This odd state of mind," says Darwin, t " is chiefly recognized by
the face reddening, by the eyes being averted or cast down, and by
awkward, nervous movements of the body. . . . Shyness seems to de
pend on sensitiveness to the opinion, whether good or bad, of others,
more especially with respect to external appearance. Strangers neither
know nor care anything about our conduct or character, but they may,
and often do, criticise our appearance. . . . The consciousness of any
thing peculiar, or even new, in the dress, or any slight blemish on the
person, and more especially on the face — points which are likely to
attract the attention of strangers — makes the shy intolerably shy. I On
the other hand, in those cases in which conduct, and not personal ap
pearance, is concerned, we are much more apt to be shy in the pres
ence of acquaintances whose judgment we in some degree value than
in that of strangers. . . . Some persons, however, are so sensitive that
the mere act of speaking to almost any one is sufficient to rouse their
self -consciousness, and a slight blush is the result. Disapprobation . . .
causes shyness and blushing much more readily than does approbation.
. . . Persons who are exceedingly shy are rarely shy in the presence of
those with whom they are quite familiar, and of whose good opinion
and sympathy they are quite assured ; for instance, a girl in presence
of her mother. . . . Shyness . . . is closely related to fear ; yet it is
distinct from fear in the ordinary sense. A shy man dreads the notice
of strangers, but can hardly be said to be afraid of them ; he may be as
bold as a hero in battle, and yet have no self-confidence about trifles in
the presence of strangers. Almost every one is extremely nervous

* Inquiries into Human Faculty, p. 72.

f Expression of the Emotions (New York, 1873), p. 330.

| " The certainty that we are well dressed, " a charming woman has said.
*' gives us a peace of heart compared to which that yielded by the cousola-
tions of religion is as nothing. "

432 PSYCHOLOGY.

when first addressing a public assembly, and most men remain so
through their lives."

As Mr. Darwin observes, a real dread of definite conse
quences may enter into this ' stage-fright ' and complicate
the shyness. Even so our shyness before an important per
sonage may be complicated by what Professor Bain calls
* servile terror,' based on representation of definite dangers
if we fail to please. But both stage-fright and servile terror
may exist with the most indefinite apprehensions of danger,
and, in fact, when our reason tells us there is no occasion
for alarm. We must, therefore, admit a certain amount of
purely instinctive perturbation and constraint, due to the
consciousness that we have become objects for other people's
eyes. Mr. Darwin goes on to say : " Shyness comes on at
a very early age. In one of my own children, two years and
three months old, I saw a trace of what certainly appeared
to be shyness directed toward myself, after an absence from
home of only a week." Every parent has noticed the same
sort of thing. Considering the despotic powers of rulers in
savage tribes, respect and awe must, from time immemorial,
have been emotions excited by certain individuals ; and
stage-fright, servile terror, and shyness, must have had as
copious opportunities for exercise as at the present time.
Whether these impulses could ever have been useful, and
selected for usefulness, is a question which, it would seem,
can only be answered in the negative. Apparently they
are pure hindrances, like fainting at sight of blood or dis
ease, sea-sickness, a dizzy head on high places, and cer
tain squeamishnesses of aesthetic taste. They are incidental
emotions, in spite of which we get along. But they seem
to play an important part in the production of two other
propensities, about the instinctive character of which a good
deal of controversy has prevailed. I refer to cleanliness
and modesty, to which we must proceed, but not before we
have said a word about another impulse closely allied to
shyness. I mean —

Secretiveness, which, although often due to intelligent
calculation and the dread of betraying our interests in some
more or less definitely foreseen way, is quite as often a blind

INSTINCT. 433

propensity, serving no useful purpose, and is so stubborn
and ineradicable a part of the character as fully to deserve
a place among the instincts. Its natural stimuli are unfa
miliar human beings, especially those whom we respect. Its
reactions are the arrest of whatever we are saying or doing
when such strangers draw nigh, coupled often with the pre
tense that we were not saying or doing that thing, but possibly
something different. Often there is added to this a disposi
tion to mendacity when asked to give an account of ourselves.
With many persons the first impulse, when the door-bell
rings, or a visitor is suddenly announced, is to scuttle out
of the room, so as not to be 'caught.' When a person at
whom we have been looking becomes aware of us, our im
mediate impulse may be to look the other way, and pretend
we have not seen him. Many friends have confessed to
me that this is a frequent phenomenon with them in
meeting acquaintances in the street, especially unfamiliar
ones. The bow is a secondary correction of the primary
feint that we do not see the other person. Probably most
readers will recognize in themselves, at least, the start, the
nascent disposition, on many occasions, to act in each and all
of these several ways. That the ' start ' is neutralized by
second thought proves it to come from a deeper region
than thought. There is unquestionably a native impulse
in every one to conceal love-affairs, and the acquired im
pulse to conceal pecuniary affairs seems in many to be
almost equally strong. It is to be noted that even where
a given habit of concealment is reflective and deliberate,
its motive is far less often definite prudence than a vague
aversion to have one's sanctity invaded and one's personal
concerns fingered and turned over by other people. Thus,
some persons will never leave anything with their name
written on it, where others may pick it up — even in the
woods, an old envelope must not be thrown on the ground.
Many cut all the leaves of a book of which they may be
reading a single chapter, so that no one shall know which
one they have singled out, and all this with no definite notion
of harm. The impulse to conceal is more apt to be pro
voked by superiors than by equals or inferiors. How dif
ferently do boys talk together when their parents are not

434 PSYCHOLOGY.

by ! Servants see more of their masters' characters than
masters of servants'. * Where we conceal from our equals
and familiars, there is probably always a definite element
of prudential prevision involved. Collective secrecy, mys
tery, enters into the emotional interest of many games, and
is one of the elements of the importance men attach to
freemasonries of various sorts, being delightful apart from
any end.

Cleanliness. Seeing how very filthy savages and excep
tional individuals among civilized people may be, philoso
phers have doubted whether any genuine instinct of clean
liness exists, and whether education and habit be not re
sponsible for whatever amount of it is found. Were it an
instinct, its stimulus would be dirt, and its characteristic
reaction the shrinking from contact therewith, and the
cleaning of it away after contact had occurred. Now, if
some animals are cleanly, men may be so, and there can be
no doubt that some kinds of matter are natively repugnant,
both to sight, touch, and smell — excrementitious and putrid
things, blood, pus, entrails, and diseased tissues, for exam
ple. It is true that the shrinking from contact with these
things may be inhibited very easily, as by a medical educa
tion ; and it is equally true that the impulse to clean them
away may be inhibited by so slight an obstacle as the thought
of the coldness of the ablution, or the necessity of getting
up to perform it. It is also true than an impulse to clean
liness, habitually checked, will become obsolete fast enough.
But none of these facts prove the impulse never to have been

* Thackeray, in his exquisite Roundabout Paper, ' On a Chalk-Mark on
the Door,' says: "You get truth habitually from equals only; so, my
good Mr. Holyshade, don't talk to me about the habitual candor of the
young Etonian of high birth, or I have my own opinion of your candor or
discernment when you do. No. Tom Bowling is the soul of honor, and
has been true to Black-eyed Syousan since the last time they parted at
Wapping Old Stairs ; but do you suppose Tom is perfectly frank, familiar,
and above-board in his conversation with Admiral JNelson, K.C.B. ?
There are secrets, prevarications, fibs, if you will, between Tom and the
admiral — between your crew (of servants) and their captain. I know I
hire a worthy, clean, agreeable, and conscientious male or female hypo
crite at so many guineas a year to do so and so for me. Were he other
than hypocrite, I would send him about his business."

INSTINCT. 435

there.* It seems to be there in all cases ; and then to be
particularly amenable to outside influences, the child hav-
iiig his own degree of squeamislmess about what he shall
touch or eat, and later being either hardened or made more
fastidious still by the habits he is forced to acquire and the
examples among which he lives.

Examples get their hold on him in this way, that a partic
ularly evil-smelling or catarrhal or lousy comrade is rather
offensive to him, and that he sees the odiousness in another
of an amount of dirt to which he would have no sponta
neous objection if it were on his own skin. That we dislike
in others things ivhich we tolerate in ourselves is a law of our
aesthetic nature about which there can be no doubt. But
as soon as generalization and reflection step in, this judging
of others leads to a new way of regarding ourselves. " Who
taught you politeness? The impolite," is, I believe, a
Chinese proverb. The concept, < dirty fellow/ which we
have formed, becomes one under which we personally
shrink from being classed; and so we 'wash up,' and set
ourselves right, at moments when our social self-conscious
ness is awakened, in a manner toward which no strictly in
stinctive native prompting exists. But the standard of
cleanliness attained in this way is not likely to go beyond
the mutual tolerance for one another of the members of the
tribe, and hence may comport a good deal of actual filth.

Modesty, Shame. Whether there be an mstinctive impulse
to hide certain parts of the body and certain acts is perhaps
even more open to doubt than whether there be an instinct
of cleanliness. Anthropologists have denied it, and in the
utter shamelessness of infancy and of many savage tribes
have seemed to find a good basis for their views. It must,
however, be remembered that infancy proves nothing, and
that, as far as sexual modesty goes, the sexual impulse itself
works directly against it at times of excitement, and with
reference to certain people; and that habits of immodesty

* The insane symptom called " mysophobia." or dread of foulness,
which leads a patient to wash his hands perhaps a hundred times a day,
hardly seems explicable without supposing a primitive impulse to clean,
one's self of which it is, as it were, the convulsive exaggeration.

436 PSYCHOLOGY.

contracted with those people may forever afterwards inhibit
it any impulse to be modest towards them. This would ac
count for a great deal of actual immodesty, even if an origi
nal modest impulse were there. On the other hand, the
modest impulse, if it do exist, must be admitted to have a
singularly ill-defined sphere of influence, both as regards the
presences that call it forth, and as regards the acts to
which it leads. Ethnology shows it to have very little
backbone of its own, and to follow easily fashion and ex
ample. Still, it is hard to see the ubiquity of some sort of
tribute to shame, however perverted — as where female
modesty consists in covering the face alone, or immodesty
in appearing before strangers unpainted — and to believe it
to have no impulsive root whatever. Now, what may the
impulsive root be ? I believe that, for one thing, it is shyness,
the feeling of dread that unfamiliar persons, as explained
above, may inspire us withal. Such persons are the origi
nal stimuli to our modesty.* ' But the actions of modesty
are quite different from the actions of shyness. They con
sist of the restraint of certain bodily functions, and of the
covering of certain parts ; and why do such particular
actions necessarily ensue ? That there may be in the human
animal, as such, a * blind ' and immediate automatic impulse
to such restraints and coverings in respect-inspiring pres
ences is a possibility difficult of actual disproof. But it
seems more likely, from the facts, that the actions of
modesty are suggested to us in a roundabout way ; and
that, even more than those of cleanliness, they arise from
the application in the second instance to ourselves of judg
ments primarily passed upon our mates. It is not easy to
believe that, even among the nakedest savages, an unusual
degree of cynicism and indecency in an individual should
not beget a certain degree of contempt, and cheapen him
in his neighbor's eyes. Human nature is sufficiently homo-

* " We often find modesty coming in only in the presence of foreigners,
especially of clothed Europeans. Only before these do the Indian women
in Brazil cover themselves with their girdle, only before these do the
women on Timor conceal their bosom. In Australia we find the same
thing happening." (Th. Waitz, Anthropologie der Naturvolker, vol. I. p.
358.) The author gives bibliographical references, which I omit.

INSTINCT. 437

geneous for us to be sure that everywhere reserve must in
spire some respect, and that persons who suffer every liberty
are persons whom others disregard. Not to be like such
people, then, would be one of the first resolutions sug
gested by social self-consciousness to a child of nature just
emerging from the unreflective state. And the resolution
would probably acquire effective pungency for the first
time when the social self-consciousness was sharpened into
a real fit of shyness by some person being present whom it
was important not to disgust or displease. Public opinion
would of course go on to build its positive precepts upon
this germ ; and, through a variety of examples and experi
ences, the ritual of modesty would grow, until it reached
the New England pitch of sensitiveness and range, making
us say stomach instead of belly, limb instead of leg, retire
instead of go to bed, and forbidding us to call a female dog
by name.

At bottom this amounts to the admission that, though
in some shape or other a natural and inevitable feature of
human life, modesty need not necessarily be an instinct in
the pure and simple excito-motor sense of the term.

Love. Of all propensities, the sexual impulses bear on
their face the most obvious signs of being instinctive, in
the sense of blind, automatic, and untaught. The teleology
they contain is often at variance with the wishes of the in
dividuals concerned ; and the actions are performed for no
assignable reason but because Nature urges just that way.
Here, if ever, then, we ought to find those characters of
fatality, infallibility, and uniformity, which, we are told,
make of actions done from instinct a class so utterly apart.
But is this so ? The facts are just the reverse : the sexual
instinct is particularly liable to be checked and modified
by slight differences in the individual stimulus, by the
inward condition of the agent himself, by habits once ac
quired, and by the antagonism of contrary impulses operat
ing on the mind. One of these is the ordinary shyness
recently described ; another is what might be called the
anti-sexual instinct, the instinct of personal isolation, the
actual repulsiveness to us of the idea of intimate contact

438 PSYCHOLOGY.

with most of the persons we meet, especially those of
our own sex.* Thus it comes about that this strongest
passion of all, so far from being the most ' irresistible,'
may, on the contrary, be the hardest one to give rein to,
and that individuals in whom the inhibiting influences are
potent may pass through life and never find an occasion to
have it gratified. There could be no better proof of the
truth of that proposition with which we began our study
of the instinctive life in man, that irregularity of behavior
may come as well from the possession of too many instincts
as from the lack of any at all.

The instinct of personal isolation, of which we have
spoken, exists more strongly in men with respect to one
another, and more strongly in women with respect to men.
In women it is called coyness, and has to be positively
overcome by a process of wooing before the sexual instinct
inhibits it and takes its place. As Darwin has shown in
his book on the ' Descent of Man and Sexual Selection,' it
has played a vital part in the amelioration of all higher
animal types, and is to a great degree responsible for what
ever degree of chastity the human race may show. It
illustrates strikingly, however, the law of the inhibition of
instincts by habits — for, once broken through with a given
person, it is not apt to assert itself again ; and habitually
broken through, as by prostitutes, with various persons, it
may altogether decay. Habit also fixes it in us toward
certain individuals : nothing is so particularly displeasing
as the notion of close personal contact with those whom
we have long known in a respectful and distant way.
The fondness of the ancients and of modern Orientals for
forms of unnatural vice, of which the notion affects us with
horror, is probably a mere case of the way in which this
instinct may be inhibited by habit. We can hardly sup
pose that the ancients had by gift of Nature a propensity
< >f which we are devoid, and were all victims of what is
now a pathological aberration limited to individuals. It is
more probable that with them the instinct of physical aver-

* To most of us it is even unpleasant to sit down in a chair still warm
from occupancy by another person's body. To many, hand-shaking is
disagreeable.

INSTINCT. 439

sion toward a certain class of objects was inhibited early in
life by habits, formed under the influence of example; and that
then a kind of sexual appetite, of which very likely most
men possess the germinal possibility, developed itself in an
unrestricted way. That the development of it in an abnormal
way may check its development in the normal way, seems
to be a well- ascertained medical fact. And that the direc
tion of the sexual instinct towards one individual tends to
inhibit its application to other individuals, is a law, upon
which, though it suffers many exceptions, the whole regime
of monogamy is based. These details are a little unpleas
ant to discuss, but they show so beautifully the correctness
of the general principles in the light of which our review
has been made, that it was impossible to pass them over
unremarked.

Jealousy is unquestionably instinctive.

Parental Love is an instinct stronger in woman than in
man, at least in the early childhood of its object. I need
do little more than quote Schneider's lively description of
it as it exists in her :

" As soon as a wife becomes a mother her whole thought and feel
ing, her whole being, is altered. Until then she had only thought of
her own well-being, of the satisfaction of her vanity ; the whole world
appeared made only for her ; everything that went on about her was
only noticed so far as it had personal reference to herself ; she asked
of every one that he should appear interested in her, pay her the requi
site attention, and as far as possible fulfil her wishes. Now, how
ever, the centre of the world is no longer herself, but her child. She
does not think of her own hunger, she must first be sure that the child
is fed. It is nothing to her that she herself is tired and needs rest, so
long as she sees that the child's sleep is disturbed ; the moment it stirs
she awakes, though far stronger noises fail to arouse her now. She,
who formerly could not bear the slightest carelessness of dress, and
touched everything with gloves, allows herself to be soiled by the in
fant, and doea not shrink from seizing its clouts with her naked hands.
Now, she has the greatest patience with the ugly, piping cry-baby
(Schreihals), whereas until now every discordant sound, every slightly
unpleasant noise, made her nervous. Every limb of the still hideous
little being appears to her beautiful, every movement fills her with de
light. She has, in one word, transferred her entire egoism to the child,
and lives only in it. Thus, at least, it is in all unspoiled, naturally-bred

440 PSYCHOLOGY.

mothers, who, alas ! seem to be growing rarer ; and thus it is with all .
the higher animal-mothers. The maternal joys of a cat, for example,
are not to be disguised. With an expression of infinite comfort she
stretches out her fore-legs to offer her teats to her children, and moves
her tail with delight when the little hungry mouths tug and suck. . . .
But not only the contact, the bare look of the offspring affords end
less delight, not only because the mother thinks that the child will some
day grow great and handsome and bring her many joys, but because
she has received from Nature an instinctive love for her children. She
does not herself know why she is so happy, and why the look of the
child and the care of it are so agreeable, any more than the young man
can give an account of why he loves a maiden, and is so happy when
she is near. Few mothers, in caring for their child, think of the proper
purpose of maternal love for the preservation of the species. Such a
thought may arise in the father's mind ; seldom in that of the mother.
The latter feels only . . . that it is an everlasting delight to hold the
being which she has brought forth protectingly in her arms, to dress it,
to wash it, to rock it to sleep, or to still its hunger."

So far the worthy Schneider, to whose words may be
added this remark, that the passionate devotion of a mother
—ill herself, perhaps— to a sick or dying child is perhaps
the most simply beautiful moral spectacle that human life
affords. Contemning every danger, triumphing over every
difficulty, outlasting all fatigue, woman's love is here in
vincibly superior to anything that man can show.

These are the most prominent of the tendencies which
are worthy of being called instinctive in the human species.*

* Some will, of course, find the list too large, others too small. With
the boundaries of instinct fading into reflex action below, and into ac
quired habit or suggested activity above, it is likely that there will always
be controversy about just what to include under the class-name. Shall we
add the propensity to walk along a curbstone, or any other narrow path, to
the list of instincts ? Shall we subtract secretiveness, as due to shyness or
to fear? Who knows? Meanwhile our physiological method has this in
estimable advantage, that such questions of limit have neither theoretical
nor practical importance. The facts once noted, it matters little how they
are named. Most authors give a shorter list than that in the text. The
phrenologists add adhesiveness, inhabitiveness, love of approbation, etc.,
etc., to their list of ' sentiments,' which in the main agree with our list of
instincts. Fortlage, in his System der Psychologie, classes among the
Triebe all the vegetative physiological functions. Santlus (Zur Psychologie
der Menschlichen Triebe, Leipsic, 1864) says there are at bottom but three
instincts, that of 'Being,' that of 'Function,' and that ot 'Life,' The
' Instinct of Being ' he subdivides into animal, embracing the activities of

INSTINCT. 441

It will be observed that no other mammal, not even tlw
monkey, shows so large an array. In a perfectly-rounded
development, every one of these instincts would start a
habit toward certain objects and inhibit a habit toward cer
tain others. Usually this is the case ; but, in the one
sided development of civilized life, it happens that the
timely age goes by in a sort of starvation of objects, and
the individual then grows up with gaps in his psychic con
stitution which future experiences can never fill. Compare
the accomplished gentleman with the poor artisan or trades
man of a city : during the adolescence of the former,
objects appropriate to his growing interests, bodily and
mental, were offered as fast as the interests awoke, and, as
a consequence^ he is armed and equipped at every angle to
meet the world. Sport came to the rescue and completed
his education where real things were lacking. He has
tasted of the essence of every side of human life, being
sailor, hunter, athlete, scholar, fighter, talker, dandy, man
of affairs, etc., all in one. Over the city poor boy's youth
no such golden opportunities were hung, and in his man
hood no desires for most of them exist. Fortunate it is for
him if gaps are the only anomalies his instinctive life pre
sents ; perversions are too often the fruit of his unnatural
bringing up.

all the senses ; and psychical, embracing the acts of the intellect and of
the ' transempiric consciousness. ' The ' Instinct of Function ' he divides
into sexual, inclinational (friendship, attachment, honor) ; and moral (re
ligion, philanthropy, faith, truth, moral freedom, etc.). The 'Instinct of
Life ' embraces conservation (nutrition, motion) ; sociability (imitation,
juridical and ethical arrangements) ; and personal interest (love of inde
pendence and freedom, acquisitiveness, self-defence). Such a muddled
list as this shows how great are the &Ar- ^ages of the physiological analysis
we have used.

CHAPTEK XXV.*

THE EMOTIONS.

IN speaking of the instincts it has been impossible tc
keep them separate from the emotional excitements which
go with them. Objects of rage, love, fear, etc., not only
prompt a man to outward deeds, but provoke characteristic
alterations in his attitude and visage, and affect his breath
ing, circulation, and other organic functions in specific ways.
When the outward deeds are inhibited, these latter emotional
expressions still remain, and we read the anger in the face,
though the blow may not be struck, and the fear betrays
itself in voice and color, though one may suppress all other
sign. Instinctive reactions and emotional expressions thus
shade imperceptibly into each other. Every object that excites
an instinct excites an emotion as well. Emotions, however,
fall short of instincts, in that the emotional reaction usually
terminates in the subject's own body, whilst the instinctive
reaction is apt to go farther and enter into practical rela
tions with the exciting object.

Emotional reactions are often excited by objects with
which we have no practical dealings. A ludicrous object,
for example, or a beautiful object are not necessarily ob
jects to which we do anything ; we simply laugh, or stand
in admiration, as the case may be. The class of emotional,
is thus rather larger than that of instinctive, impulses,
commonly so called. Its stimuli are more numerous, and
its expressions are more internal and delicate, and often
less practical. The physiological plan and essence of the
two classes of impulse, however, is the same.

As with instincts, so with emotions, the mere memory or
imagination of the object may suffice to liberate the excite-

* Parts of this chapter have already appeared in an article published
in 1884 in Mind.

442

THE EMOTIONS. 443

ment. One may get angrier in thinking over one's insult
than at the moment of receiving it ; and we melt jnore over
a mother who is dead than we ever did when she was living.
In the rest of the chapter I shall use the word object of
emotion indifferently to mean one which is physically
present or one which is merely thought of.

It would be tedious to go through a complete list of the
reactions which characterize the various emotions. For
that the special treatises must be referred to. A few ex
amples of their variety, however, ought to find a place
here. Let me begin with the manifestations of Grief as
a Danish physiologist, C. Lange, describes them : *

" The chief feature in the physiognomy of grief is perhaps its para
lyzing effect on the voluntary movements. This effect is by no means
as extreme as that which fright produces, being seldom more than that
degree of weakening which makes it cost an effort to perform actions
usually done with ease. It is, in other words, a feeling of weariness ;
and (as in all weariness) movements are made slowly, heavily, without
strength, unwillingly, and with exertion, and are limited to the fewest
possible. By this the grieving person gets his outward stamp : he walks
slowly, unsteadily, dragging his feet and hanging his arms. His voice is
weak and without resonance, in consequence of the feeble activity of the
muscles of expiration and of the larynx. He prefers to sit still, sunk in
himself and silent. The tonicity or ' latent innervation ' of the muscles
is strikingly diminished. The neck is bent, the head hangs ('bowed
down ' with grief), the relaxation of the cheek- and jaw-muscles makes
the face look long and narrow, the jaw may even hang open. The eyes
appear large, as is always the case where the orbicularis muscle is para
lyzed, but they may often be partly covered by the upper lid which
droops in consequence of the laming of its own levator. With this
condition of weakness of the voluntary nerve- and muscle-apparatus
of the whole body, there coexists, as aforesaid, just as in all states of
similar motor weakness, a subjective feeling of weariness and heavi
ness, of something which weighs upon one; one feels 'downcast,'
' oppressed,' % laden,' one speaks of his ' weight of sorrow,' one must
' bear up ' under it, just as one must ' keep down ' his anger. Many
there are who ' succumb ' to sorrow to such a degree that they literally
cannot stand upright, but sink or lean against surrounding objects, fall
on their knees, or, like. Romeo in the monk's cell, throw themselves
upon the earth in their despair.

' ' But this weakness of the entire voluntary motor apparatus (the
so-called apparatus of ' animal ' life) is only one side of the physiology
of grief. Another side, hardly less important, and in its consequences

* Ueber Gemuthsbewegungen, uebersetzt von H. Kurella (Leipzig, 1887).

444 PSYCHOLOGY.

perhaps even more so, belongs to another subdivision of the motor appa
ratus, namely, the involuntary or ' organic ' muscles, especially those
which are found in the walls of the blood-vessels, and the use of which
is, by contracting, to diminish the latter's calibre. These muscles and
their nerves, forming together the l vaso-motor apparatus,1 act in grief
contrarily to the voluntary motor apparatus. Instead of being paralyzed,
like the latter, the vascular muscles are more strongly contracted than
usual, so that the tissues arid organs of the body become anaemic. The
immediate consequence of this bloodlessness is pallor and shrunken-
ness, and the pale color and collapsed features are the peculiarities
which, in connection with the relaxation of the visage, give to the victim
of grief his characteristic physiognomy, and often give an impression
of emaciation which ensues too rapidly to be possibly due to real dis
turbance of nutrition, or waste uncompensated by repair. Another
regular consequence of the bloodlessness of the skin is a feeling of cold,
and shivering. A constant symptom of grief is sensitiveness to cold,
and difficulty in keeping warm. In grief, the inner organs are unques
tionably anaemic as well as the skin. This is of course not obvious to
the eye, but many phenomena prove it. Such is the diminution of the
various secretions, at least of such as are accessible to observation.
The mouth grows dry, the tongue sticky, and a bitter taste ensues
which, it would appear, is only a consequence of the tongue's dryness.
[The expression 'bitter sorrow' may possibly arise from this.] In
nursing women the milk diminishes or altogether dries up. There is
one of the most regular manifestations of grief, which apparently con
tradicts these other physiological phenomena, and that is the weeping,
with its profuse secretion of tears, its swollen reddened face, red eyes,
and augmented secretion from the nasal mucous membrane."

Lange goes on to suggest that this may be a reaction
from a previously contracted vaso-motor state. The expla
nation seems a forced one. The fact is that there are
changeable expressions of grief. The weeping is as apt as
not to be immediate, especially in women and children.
Some men can never weep. The tearful and the dry phases
alternate in all who can weep, sobbing storms being fol
lowed by periods of calm ; and the shrunken, cold, and
pale condition which Lange describes so well is more char
acteristic of a severe settled sorrow than of an acute mental
pain. Properly we have two distinct emotions here, both
prompted by the same object, it is true, but affecting differ
ent persons, or the same person at different times, and
feeling quite differently whilst they last, as anyone's con
sciousness will testify. There is an excitement during the
crying fit which is not without a certain pungent pleasure

THE EMOTIONS. 445

of its own ; but it would take a genius for felicity to dis
cover any dash of redeeming quality in the feeling of dry
and shrunken sorrow. — Our author continues :

u If the smaller vessels of the lungs contract so that these organs
become anemic, we have (as is usual under such conditions) the feeling
of insufficient breath, and of oppression of the chest, and these tor
menting sensations increase the sufferings of the griever, who seeks
relief by long-drawn sighs, instinctively, like every one who lacks
breath from whatever cause.*

* The bronchial tubes may be contracted as well as the ramifications of
the pulmonary artery. Professor J. Henle has, amongst his Anthropolo-
gische Vortrage, an exquisite one on the ' Natural History of the Sigh,' in
which he represents our inspirations as the result of a battle between the
red muscles of our skeleton, ribs, and diaphragm, and the white ones of
the lungs, which seek to narrow the calibre of the air-tubes. "In the
normal state the former easily conquer, but under other conditions they
either conquer with difficulty or are defeated. ... The contrasted emo
tions express themselves in similarly contrasted wise, by spasm and paraly
sis of the unstriped muscles, and for the most part alike in all the organs
which are provided with them, as arteries, skin, and bronchial tubes. The
contrast among the emotions is generally expressed by dividing them into
exciting and depressing ones. It is a remarkable fact that the depressing
emotions, like fear,, horror, disgust, increase the contraction of these smooth
muscles, whilst the exciting emotions, like joy, anger, etc., make them
relax. Contrasts of temperature act similarly, cold like the depressing,
and warmth like the exciting, emotions. Cold produces pallor and goose-
flesh, warmth smooths out the skin and widens the vessels. If one notices
the uncomfortable mood brought about by strained expectation, anxiety
before a public address, vexation at an unmerited affront, etc., one finds that
the suffering part of it concentrates itself principally in the chest, and that
it consists in a soreness, hardly to be called pain, felt in the middle of the
breast and due to an unpleasant resistance which is offered to the move
ments of inspiration, and sets a limit to their extent. The insufficiency of
the diaphragm is obtruded upon consciousness, and we try by the aid of
the external voluntary chest-muscles to draw a deeper breath. [This is the
sigh. ] If we fail, the unpleasantness of the situation is increased, for then to
our mental distress is added the corporeally repugnant feeling of lack of air,
a slight degree of suffocation. If, on the contrary, the outer muscles over
come the resistance of the inner ones, the oppressed breast is lightened.
We think we speak symbolically when we speak of a stone weighing on
our heart, or of a burden rolled from off our breast. But really we only
express the exact fact, for we should have to raise the entire weight of the
atmosphere (about 820 kilog.) at each inspiration, if the air did not balance
it by streaming into our lungs." (P. 55.) It must not be forgotten that an
inhibition of the inspiratory centre similar to that produced by exciting
the superior laryngeal nerve may possibly play a part in these phenomena.
For a very interesting discussion of the respiratory difficulty and its cornice-

446 PSYCHOLOGY

" The anaemia of the brain in grief is shown by intellectual inertia,
dullness, a feeling of mental weariness, effort, and indisposition to
work, often by sleeplessness. Indeed it is the anaemia of the motor
centres of the brain which lies at the bottom of all that weakening of
the voluntary powers of motion which we described in the first instance."

My impression is that Dr. Lange simplifies and univer
salizes the phenomena a little too much in this description,
and in particular that he very likely overdoes the anaemia-
business. But such as it is, his account may stand as a
favorable specimen of the sort of descriptive work to which
the emotions have given rise.

Take next another emotion, Fear, and read what Mr. Dar
win says of its effects :

" Fear is often preceded by astonishment, and is so far akin to it
that both lead to the senses of sight and hearing being instantly aroused.
In both cases the eyes and mouth are widely opened and the eyebrows
raised. The frightened man at first stands like a statue, motionless and
breathless, or crouches down as if instinctively to escape observation.
The heart beats quickly and violently, so that it palpitates or knocks
against the ribs ; but it is very doubtful if it then works more efficiently
than usual, so as to send a greater supply of blood to all parts of the
body ; for the skin instantly becomes pale as during incipient f aintness.
This paleness of the surface, however, is probably in large part, or is ex
clusively, due to the vaso-motor centre being affected in such a manner
as to cause the contraction of the small arteries of the skin. That the
skin is much affected under the sense of great fear, we see in the mar
vellous manner in wThich perspiration immediately exudes from it. This
exudation is all the more remarkable, as the surface is then cold, and
hence the term, a cold sweat ; whereas the sudorific glands are properly
excited into action when the surface is heated. The hairs also on the
skin stand erect, and the superficial muscles shiver. In connection with
the disturbed action of the heart the breathing is hurried. The salivary
glands act imperfectly; the mouth becomes dry and is often opened and
shut. I have also noticed that under slight fear there is strong tendency to
yawn. One of the best marked symptoms is the trembling of all the mus
cles of the body ; and this is often first seen in the lips. From this cause,
and from the dryness of the mouth, the voice becomes husky or indis
tinct or may altogether fail. k Obstupui steteruntque comae, et vox fau-
cibus ha3sit.' . . . As fear increases into an agony of terror, we behold,
as under all violent emotions, diversified results. The heart beats wild-

tion with anxiety and fear, see ' A Case of Hydrophobia ' by the lamented
Thos. B. Curtis in the Boston Med. and Surgr. Journal, Nov. 7 and 14,
1878, aud remarks thereou by James J. Putnam, ibid. Nov. 21.

THE EMOTIONS. 447

Iv or must fail to act and faintness ensue ; there is a death-like pallor ;
the breathing is labored ; the wings of the nostrils are widely dilated ;
there is a gasping and convulsive motion of the lips, a tremor on the
hollow cheek, a gulping and catching of the throat ; the uncovered and
protruding eyeballs are fixed on the object of terror ; or they may roll
restlessly from side to side, hue illuc volens oculos totumque pererrat.
The pupils are said to be enormously dilated. All the muscles of the
body may become rigid or may be thrown into convulsive movements.
The hands are alternately clenched and opened, often with a twitching
movement. The arms may be protruded as if to avert some dreadful
danger, or may be thrown wildly over the head. The Rev. Mr. Hagen-
auer has seen this latter action in a terrified Australian. In other cases
there is a sudden and uncontrollable tendency to headlong flight ; and
so strong is this that the boldest soldiers may be seized with a sudden
panic.1'*

Finally take Hatred, and read the synopsis of its possible
effects as given by Sig. Mantegazza : t

"Withdrawal of the head backwards, withdrawal of the trunk;
projection forwards of the hands, as if to defend one's self against the
hated object ; contraction or closure of the eyes ; elevation of the upper
lip and closure of the nose,— these are all elementary movements of turn
ing away. Next threatening movements, as : intense frowning ; eyes
wide open ; display of teeth ; grinding teeth and contracting jaws ;
opened mouth with tongue advanced ; clenched fists ; threatening action
of arms ; stamping with the feet ; deep inspirations— panting ; growling
and various cries ; automatic repetition of one word or syllable ; sud
den weakness and trembling of voice ; spitting. Finally, various mis
cellaneous reactions and vaso-motor symptoms: general trembling ; con
vulsions of lips and facial muscles, of limbs and of trunk; acts of violence
to one's self, as biting fist or nails ; sardonic laughter ; bright redness
of face ; sudden pallor of face ; extreme dilatation of nostrils ; stand
ing up of hair on head."

Were we to go through the whole list of emotions which
have been named by men, and study their organic mani
festations, we should but ring the changes on the elements
which these three typical cases involve. Rigidity of this
muscle, relaxation of that, constriction of arteries here, dila
tation there, breathing of this sort or that, pulse slowing
or quickening, this gland secreting and that one dry, etc.,
etc. We should, moreover, find that our descriptions had no

* Origin of the Emotions, Darwin, pp. 290-2.

f La Physionomie et 1'Expression dea Sentiments (Paris, 1885), p. 140.

448 PSYCHOLOGY.

absolute truth ; that they only applied to the average man ;
that every one of us, almost, has some personal idiosyncrasy
of expression, laughing or sobbing differently from his
neighbor, or reddening or growing pale where others do
not. We should find a like variation in the objects which
excite emotion in different persons. Jokes at which one
explodes with laughter nauseate another, and seem blas
phemous to a third ; and occasions which overwhelm me with
fear or bashfulness are just what give you the full sense of
ease and power. The internal shadings of emotional feel
ing, moreover, merge endlessly into each other. Language
has discriminated some of them, as hatred, antipathy, ani
mosity, dislike, aversion, malice, spite, vengefulness, ab
horrence, etc., etc. ; but in the dictionaries of synonyms we
find these feelings distinguished more by their severally
appropriate objective stimuli than by their conscious or
subjective tone.

The result of all this flux is that the merely descriptive
literature of the emotions is one of the most tedious parts
of psychology. And not only is it tedious, but you feel
that its subdivisions are to a great extent either fictitious
or unimportant, and that its pretences to accuracy are a
sham. But unfortunately there is little psychological writ
ing about the emotions which is not merely descriptive.
As emotions are described in novels, they interest us, for
we are made to share them. We have grown acquainted
with the concrete objects and emergencies which call
them forth, and any knowing touch of introspection which
may grace the page meets with a quick and feeling
response. Confessedly literary works of aphoristic philos
ophy also flash lights into our emotional life, and give us a
fitful delight. But as far as " scientific psychology" of the
emotions goes, I may have been surfeited by too much
reading of classic works on the subject, but I should as
lief read verbal descriptions of the shapes of the rocks on
a New Hampshire farm as toil through them again. They
give one nowhere a central point of view, or a deductive
or generative principle. They distinguish and refine and
specify in infinitum without ever getting on to another logi
cal level. Whereas the beauty of all truly scientific work

THE EMOTIONS. 449

is to get to ever deeper levels. Is there no way out from this
level of individual description in the case of the emotions ?
I believe there is a way out, but I fear that few will take it.
The trouble with the emotions in psychology is that
they are regarded too much as absolutely individual things.
So long as they are set down as so many eternal and sacred
psychic entities, like the old immutable species in natural
history, so long all that can be done with them is reverently
to catalogue their separate characters, points, and effects.
But if we regard them as products of more general causes
(as ' species ' are now regarded as products of heredity and
variation), the mere distinguishing and cataloguing becomes
of subsidiary importance. Having the goose which lays
the golden eggs, the description of each egg already laid is
a minor matter. Now the general causes of the emotions
are indubitably physiological. Prof. C. Lange, of Copen
hagen, in the pamphlet from which I have already quoted,
published in 1885 a physiological theory of their constitu
tion and conditioning, which I had already broached the
previous year in an article in Mind. None of the criti
cisms which I have heard of it have made me doubt its
essential truth. I will therefore devote the next few pages
to explaining what it is. I shall limit myself in the first
instance to what may be called the coarser emotions, grief,
fear, rage, love, in which every one recognizes a strong
organic reverberation, and afterwards speak of the subtler
emotions, or of those whose organic reverberation is less
obvious and strong.

EMOTION FOLLOWS UPON THE BODILY EXPRESSION IN
THE COABSER EMOTIONS AT LEAST.

Our natural way of thinking about these coarser emo
tions is that the mental perception of some fact excites the
mental affection called the emotion, and that this latter
state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression. My
theory, on the contrary, is that the bodily changes follow di
rectly the perception of the exciting fact, and that our feeling of
the same changes as they occur is the emotion. Common -sense
says, we lose our fortune, are sorry and weep ; we meet a

450 PS YCHOLOG Y.

bear, are frightened and run ; we are insulted by a rival,
are angry and strike. The hypothesis here to be defended
says that this order of sequence is incorrect, that the one
mental state is not immediately induced by the other, that
the bodily manifestations must first be interposed between,
and that the more rational statement is that we feel sorry
because we cry, angry because we strike, afraid because
we tremble, and not that we cry, strike, or tremble, be
cause we are sorry, angry, or fearful, as the case may be.
Without the bodily states following on the perception, the
latter would be purely cognitive in form, pale, colorless,
destitute of emotional warmth. We might then see the
bear, and judge it best to run, receive the insult and deem
it right to strike, but we should not actually feel afraid or
angry.

Stated in this crude way, the hypothesis is pretty sure
to meet with immediate disbelief. And yet neither many
nor far-fetched considerations are required to mitigate its
paradoxical character, and possibly to produce conviction
of its truth.

To begin with, no reader of the last two chapters will
be inclined to doubt the fact that objects do excite bodily
changes by a preorganized mechanism, or the farther fact
that the changes are so indefinitely numerous and subtle that the
entire organism may be called a sounding-board , which every
change of consciousness, however slight, may make rever
berate. The various permutations and combinations of
which these organic activities are susceptible make it ab
stractly possible that no shade of emotion, however slight,
should be without a bodily reverberation as unique, when
taken in its totality, as is the mental mood itself. The
immense number of parts modified in each emotion is what
makes it so difficult for us to reproduce in cold blood the
total and integral expression of any one of them. We may
catch the trick with the voluntary muscles, but fail with
the skin, glands, heart, and other viscera. Just as an arti
ficially imitated sneeze lacks something of the reality, so
the attempt to imitate an emotion in the absence of its
normal instigating cause is apt to be rather * hollow-'

The next thing to be noticed is this, that every one of the

THE EMOTIONS. 451

bodily changes, whatsoever it be, is FELT, acutely or obscurely, the
moment it occurs. If the reader has never paid attention to
this matter, he will be both interested and astonished to
learn how many different local bodily feelings he can detect
in himself as characteristic of his various emotional moods.
It would be perhaps too much to expect him to arrest the
tide of any strong gust of passion for the sake of any such
curious analysis as this ; but he can observe more tranquil
states, and that may be assumed here to be true of the
greater which is shown to be true of the less. Our whole
cubic capacity is sensibly alive ; and each morsel of it con
tributes its pulsations of feeling, dim or sharp, pleasant,
painful, or dubious, to that sense of personality that every
one of us unfailingly carries with him. It is surprising what
little items give accent to these complexes of sensibility.
When worried by any slight trouble, one may find that the
focus of one's bodily consciousness is the contraction, often
quite inconsiderable, of the eyes and brows. When mo
mentarily embarrassed, it is something in the pharynx that
compels either a swallow, a clearing of the throat, or a
slight cough ; and so on for as many more instances as
might be named. Our concern here being with the general
view rather than with the details, I will not linger to discuss
these, but, assuming the point admitted that every change
that occurs must be felt, I will pass on.

I now proceed to urge the vital point of my whole
theory, which is this : If we fancy some strong emotion, and
then try to abstract from our consciousness of it all the feelings
of its bodily symptoms, we find we have nothing left behind, no
' mind-stuff ' out of which the emotion can be constituted,
and that a cold and neutral state of intellectual perception
is all that remains. It is true that, although most people
when asked say that their introspection verifies this state
ment, some persist in saying theirs does not. Many cannot
be made to understand the question. When you beg them
to imagine away every feeling of laughter and of tendency
to laugh from their consciousness of the ludicrousness of
an object, and then to tell you what the feeling of its ludi
crousness would be like, whether it be anything more than
the perception that the object belongs to the class * funny,'

452 PSYCHOLOGY.

they persist in replying that the thing proposed is a
physical impossibility, and that they always must laugh if
they see a funny object. Of course the task proposed is
not the practical one of seeing a ludicrous object and anni
hilating one's tendency to laugh. It is the purely specu
lative one of subtracting certain elements of feeling from
an emotional state supposed to exist in its fulness, and say
ing what the residual elements are. I cannot help think
ing that all who rightly apprehend this problem will agree
with the proposition above laid down. What kind of an
emotion of fear would be left if the feeling neither of
quickened heart-beats nor of shallow breathing, neither of
trembling lips nor of weakened limbs, neither of goose-flesh
nor of visceral stirrings, were present, it is quite impossible
for me to think. Can one fancy the state of rage and pic
ture no ebullition in the chest, no flushing of the face, no dil
atation of the nostrils, no clenching of the teeth, no impulse
to vigorous action, but in their stead limp muscles, calm
breathing, and a placid face ? The present writer, for one,
certainly cannot. The rage is as completely evaporated as
the sensation of its so-called manifestations, and the only
thing that can possibly be supposed to take its place is some
cold-blooded and dispassionate judicial sentence, confined
entirely to the intellectual realm, to the effect that a certain
person or persons merit chastisement for their sins. In
like manner of grief : what would it be without its tears, its
sobs, its suffocation of the heart, its pang in the breast
bone ? A feelingless cognition that certain circumstances are
deplorable, and nothing more. Every passion in turn tells
the same story. A purely disembodied human emotion is
a nonentity. I do not say that it is a contradiction in the
nature of things, or that pure spirits are necessarily con
demned to cold intellectual lives ; but I say that for us,
emotion dissociated from all bodily feeling is inconceivable.
The more closely I scrutinize my states, the more persuaded
I become that whatever moods, affections, and passions I
have are in very truth constituted by, and made up of,
those bodily changes which we ordinarily call their expres
sion or consequence ; and the more it seems to me that if I
were to become corporeally anaesthetic, I should be ex-

THE EMOTIONS. 453

eluded from the life of the affections, harsh and tender
alike, and drag out an existence of merely cognitive or in
tellectual form. Such an existence, although it seems to
li^ve been the ideal of ancient sages, is too apathetic to be
keenly sought after by those born pfter the revival of the
worship of sensibility, a few generations ago.

Let not this view be called materialistic. It is neither
m ore nor less materialistic than any other view which says
th,-at our emotions are conditioned by nervous processes.
No \reader ot t^is book is likely to rebel against such a
sayiirg so long a& it is expressed in general terms ; and
if any^ one still finds materialism in the thesis now de
fended/' that must be because of the special processes in
voked, "jjrhey are %nsational processes, processes due to
inward currents aret up by physical happenings. Sfrtfi
processes ijave,it is true, always been regarded by the
platonizers in psychology as having something peculiarly
base about them. But our emotions must always be in
wardly what they are, whatever be the physiological ground
of their apparition. If they are deep, pure; worthy, spirit
ual facts on any conceivable theory of their physiological
source, they remain no less deep, pure, spiritual, and
worthy of regard on this present sensational theory. They
carry their own inner measure of worth with them ; and it
is just as logical to use the present theory of the emotions
for proving that sensational processes need not be vile and
material, as to use their vileness and materiality as a proof
that such a theory cannot be true.

If such a theory is true, then each emotion is the result
ant of a sum of elements, and each element is caused by a
physiological process of a sort already well known, The
elements are all organic changes, and each of them is the
reflex effect of the exciting object. Definite questions now '
immediately arise — questions very different from those
which were the only possible ones without this view. Those
were questions of classification : " Which are the proper gen
era of emotion, and which the species under each ?" or of
description: "By what expression is each emotion char
acterized?" The questions now are causal: Just what
changes does this object and what changes does that object

454 PSYCHOLOGY.

excite ?" and " How come they to excite these particular
changes and not others ?" We step from a superficial to a
deep order of inquiry. Classification and description are
the lowest stage of science. They sink into the background
the moment questions of genesis are formulated, and remain
important only so far as they facilitate our answering these.
Now the moment the genesis of an emotion is accounted f o r,
as the arousal by an object of a lot of reflex acts which axe
forthwith felt, we immediately see why there is KJ limit to the
number of possible different emotions which w^y exist, and why
the emotions of different individuals may '^'ry indefinitely., both
as to their constitution and as to ^ojects which cal1! them
forth. Fo:r there i& nothing sacranfntal or eternally fixed
in reflex Action. Any sort of reflex effect is possible, and
J.Qife,T.cjs actually vary indefinitely, as \£ know. ;

4 'We have all seen men dumb, instead of ftlkative. with joy; we
have, seen fright drive the blood into the head of ^s vi ^ctim, instead of
making him pale ; we have seen grief run restlessly about lamenting,
instead of sitting bo wed down and mute ; etc., etc., and this naturally
enough, for one and the same cause can work differently on different
men's blood-vessels (since these do not always react alike), whilst more
over the impulse on its way through the brain to the vaso-motor centre
is differently influenced by different earlier impressions in the form of
recollections or associations of ideas." *

In short, any classification of the emotions is seen to be as
true and as ' natural ' as any other , if it only serves some pur
pose ; and such a question as " What is the * real ' or ' typical '
expression of anger, or fear ?" is seen to have no objective
meaning at all. Instead of it we now have the question as
to how any given ' expression ' of anger or fear may have
come to exist ; and that is a real question of physiological
mechanics on the one hand, and of history on the other,,
which (like all real questions) is in essence answerable,
although the answer may be hard to find. On a later page
I shall mention the attempts to answer it which have been
made.

DIFFICULTY OF TESTING THE THEORY EXPERIMENTALLY.

I have thus fairly propounded what seems to me the
most fruitful way of conceiving of the emotions. It must

* Lange, op. cit. p. 75.

THE EMOTIONS. 455

be admitted that it is so far only a hypothesis, only pos
sibly a true conception, and that much is lacking to its
definite proof. The only way coercively to disprove it,
however, would be to take some emotion, and then exhibit
qualities of feeling in it which should be demonstrably ad
ditional to all those which could possibly be derived from
the organs affected at the time. But to detect with cer
tainty such purely spiritual qualities of feeling would
obviously be a task beyond human power. We have, as
Professor Lange says, absolutely no immediate criterion by
which to distinguish between spiritual and corporeal feel
ings; and, I may add, the more we sharpen our introspection,
the more localized all our qualities of feeling become (see
above, Vol. I. p. 300) and the more difficult the discrimina
tion consequently grows.*

A positive proof of the theory would, on the • ther hand,
be given if we could find a subject absolutely anaesthetic
iuside and out, but not paralytic, so that emotion-inspiring
objects might evoke the usual bodily expressions from him,
but who, on being consulted, should say that no subjective
emotional affection was felt. Such a man would be like one
who, because he eats, appears to bystanders to be hungry,
but who afterwards confesses that he had no appetite at
all. Cases like this are extremely hard to find. Medical
literature contains reports, so far as I know, of * ut three.
In the famous one of Kemigius Leins no mention is made
by the reporters of his emotional condition. In Dr. G.
Winter's case f the patient is said to be inert and phleg
matic, but no particular attention, as I learn from Dr. W.,
was paid to his psychic condition. In the extraordinary
case reported by Professor Strumpell (to which I must refer
later in another connection) J we read that the patient, a
shoemaker's apprentice of fifteen, entirely anaesthetic, inside

* Professor H5ffding, in his excellent treatise on Psychology, admits
(p. 342) the mixture of bodily sensation with purely spiritual affection
in the emotions. He does not, however, discuss the difficulties of discern
ing the spiritual affection (nor even show that he has fairly considered
them) in his contention that it exists.

f Ein Fall von allgemeiner Anaesthesie (Heidelberg, 1882).

j Ziemssen's Deutsches Archiv ftir klinische Medicin, xxn. 321

458 PSYCHOLOGY.

, and out, with the exception of one eye and one ear, had
1 shown shame on the occasion of soiling his bed, and grief,
when a formerly favorite dish was set before him, at the
thought that he could no longer taste its flavor. Dr. Strum-
pell is also kind enough to inform me that he manifested
surprise, fear, and anger on certain occasions. In observ
ing him, however, no such theory as the present one seems
to have been thought of ; and it always remains possible
that, just as he satisfied his natural appetites and neces
sities in cold blood, with no inward feeling, so his emotional
expressions may have been accompanied by a quite cold
heart* Any new case which turns up of generalized anaes
thesia ought to be carefully examined as to the inward
emotional sensibility as distinct from the 'expressions ' of
emotion which circumstances may bring forth.

Objections Considered.

Let me now notice a few objections. The replies will
make the theory still more plausible.

First Objection. There is no real evidence, it may be said,
"^The not very uncommon cases of hysterical hemiansesthesia are not
complete enough to be utilized in this inquiry. Moreover, the recent re
searches, of which some account was given in Chapter IV, tend to show
that hysterical anaesthesia is not a real absence of sensibility, but a ' disso
ciation/ as M. Pierre Janet calls it, or splitting-off of certain sensations
from the rest of the person's consciousness, this rest forming the self which
remains connected with the ordinary organs of expression. The split-off
consciousness forms a secondary self ; and M. Janet writes me that he sees
no reason why sensations whose ' dissociation ' from the body of conscious
ness makes the patient practically anaesthetic, might not, nevertheless,
contribute to the emotional life of the patient. They do still contribute to
the function of locomotion; for in his patient L. there was no ataxia in spite
of the anaesthesia. M. Janet writes me, apropos of his anaesthetic patient
L., that she seemed to ' suifer by hallucination.' " I have often pricked or
bnrned her without warning, and when she did not see me. She never
moved, and evidently perceived notlrng. But if afterwards in her move
ments she caught sight of her wounded arm, and saw on her skin a little
drop of blood resulting from a slight cut, she would begin to cry out and
lament as if she suffered a great deal. ' My blood flows,' she said one day ;
'1 must be suffering a great deal!' She suffered by hallucination,
sort of suffering is very general in hysterics. It is enough for them to re
ceive the slightest hint of a modification in their body, when their imagina
tion fills up the rest and invents changes that were not felt.' See the
remarks published at a later date in Janet's Automatisme Psychologique.
pp. 214-15.

THE EMOTIONS, 451

for the assumption that particular perceptions do produce
wide-spread bodily effects by a sort of immediate physical
influence, antecedent to the arousal of an emotion or emo
tional idea ?

Reply. There is most assuredly such evidence. In
listening to poetry, drama, or heroic narrative we are often
surprised at the cutaneous shiver which like a sudden wave
flows over us, and at the heart-swelling and the lachrymal
effusion that unexpectedly catch us at intervals. In listen
ing to music the same is even more strikingly true. If we
abruptly see a dark moving form in the woods, our heart
stops beating, and we catch our breath instantly and before
any articulate idea of danger can arise. If our friend goes
near to the edge oi a precipice, we get the well-known feel
ing of ' all-overishness.' and we shrink back, although we
positively know him to be safe, and have no distinct imagi
nation of his fall. The writer well remembers his aston
ishment, when a boy of seven or eight, at fainting when he
saw a horse bled. The blood was in a bucket, with a stick
in it, and, if memory does not deceive him, he stirred
it round and saw it drip from the stick with no feeling
save that of childish curiosity. Suddenly the world grew
black before his eyes, his ears began to buzz, and he knew
no more. He had never heard of the sight of blood pro
ducing faintness or sickness, and he had so little repugnance
to it, and so little apprehension of any other sort of danger
from it, that even at that tender age, as he well remembers,
he could not help wondering how the mere physical pres
ence of a pailful of crimson fluid could occasion in him
such formidable bodily effects.

Professor Lange writes :

" No one has ever thought of separating the emotion produced by
An unusually loud sound from the true inward affections. No one
hesitates to call it a sort of fright, and it shows the ordinary signs of
fright. And yet it is by no means combined with the idea of danger,
or in any way occasioned by associations, memories, or other mental
processes. The phenomena of fright follow the noise immediately with
out a trace of * spiritual ' fear. Many men can never grow used to
standing beside a cannon when it is fired off, although they perfectly
know that there is danger neither for themselves nor for others — the
bare sound is too much for them. " *

* Ov. cit. p. 63.

458 PSYCHOLOGY.

Imagine two steel knife-blades with their keen edges
crossing each other at right angles, and moving to and fro.
Our whole nervous organization is ' on-edge ' at the thought ;
and yet what emotion can be there except the unpleasant
nervous feeling itself, or the dread that more of it may come ?
The entire fund and capital of the emotion here is the
senseless bodily effect which the blades immediately arouse.
This case is typical of a class : where an ideal emotion
Beems to precede the bodily symptoms, it is often nothing
but an anticipation of the symptoms themselves. One who
has already fainted at the sight of blood may witness the
preparations for a surgical operation with uncontrollable
heart-sinking and anxiety. He anticipates certain feelings,
and the anticipation precipitates their arrival. In cases of
morbid terror the subjects often confess that what possesses
them seems, more than anything, to be fear of the fear itself.
In the various forms of what Professor Bain calls * tender
emotion,' although the appropriate object must usually be
directly contemplated before the emotion can be aroused,
yet sometimes thinking of the symptoms of the emotion
itself may have the same effect. In sentimental natures
the thought of 'yearning' will produce real 'yearning/
And, not to speak of coarser examples, a mother's imagi
nation of the caresses she bestows on her child may arouse
a spasm of parental longing.

In such cases as these we see plainly how the emotion
both begins and ends with what we call its effects or mani
festations. It has no mental status except as either the
vivid feeling of the manifestations, or the idea of them ;
and the latter thus constitute its entire material, and sum
and substance. And these cases ought to make us see
how in all cases the feeling of the manifestations may play
a much deeper part in the constitution of the emotion than
we are wont to suppose.

The best proof that the immediate cause of emotion is
a physical effect on the nerves is furnished by those patho
logical coses in which the emotion is objectless. One of the
chief merits, in fact, of the view which I propose seems
to be that we can so easily formulate by its mean* Datho.

THE EMOTIONS. 459

logical cases and normal cases under a common scheme.
In every asylum we find examples of absolutely unmotived
fear, anger, melancholy, or conceit ; and others of an
equally unmotived apathy which persists in spite of the
best of outward reasons why it should give way. In the
former cases we must suppose the nervous machinery to be
so ' labile ' in some one emotional direction that almost
every stimulus (however inappropriate) causes it to upset
in that way, and to engender the particular complex
of feelings of which the psychic body of the emotion
consists. Thus, to take one special instance, if inability
to draw deep breath, fluttering of the heart, and that
peculiar epigastric change felt as * precordial anxiety,'
with an irresistible tendency to take a somewhat crouching
attitude and to sit still, and with perhaps other visceral
processes not now known, all spontaneously occur together
in a certain person ; his feeling of their combination is the
emotion of dread, and he is the victim of what is known as
morbid fear. A friend who has had occasional attacks of
this most distressing of all maladies tells me that in his
case the whole drama seems to centre about the region of
the heart and respiratory apparatus, that his main effort
during the attacks is to get control of his inspirations and
to slow his heart, and that the moment he attains to breath
ing deeply and to holding himself erect, the dread, ipso
facto, seems to depart*

The emotion here is nothing but the feeling of a bodily
state, and it has a purely bodily cause.

It must be confessed that there are cases of morbid fear in which
objectively the heart is not much perturbed. These, however, fail to prove
anything against our theory, for it is of course possible that the cortical
Centres normally percipient of dread as a complex of cardiac and other
organic sensations due to real bodily change, should become primarily ex
cited m brain-disease, and give rise to an hallucination of the changes
being there,— an hallucination of dread, consequently, coexistent with a
•omparatively calm pulse, etc. I say it is possible, for I am ignorant of
observations which might test the fact. Trance, ecstasy, etc offer analo
jrons examples,-not to speak of ordinary dreaming. Under all these con
itions one may have the liveliest subjective feelings, either of eye or ear

the more visceral and emotional sort, as a result of pure nerre-ceutral
mvity, and yet, as I believe, with complete peripheral repose

460 PSYCHOLOGY.

1 ' All physicians who have been much engaged in general practice
hare seen cases of dyspepsia in which constant low spirits and occa
sional attacks of terror rendered the patient's condition pitiable in the
extreme. I have observed these cases often, and have watched them
closely, and I have never seen greater suffering of any kind than I have
witnessed during these attacks. . . . Thus, a man is suffering from
what we call nervous dyspepsia. Some day, we will suppose in the
middle of the afternoon, without any warning or visible cause, one of
these attacks of terror comes on. The first thing the man feels is great
but vague discomfort. Then he notices that his heart is beating much
too violently. At the same time shocks or flashes as of electrical dis
charges, so violent as to be almost painful, pass one after another
through his body and limbs. Then in a few minutes he falls into a
condition of the most intense fear. He is not afraid of anything ; he is
simply afraid. His mind is perfectly clear. He looks for a cause of
his wretched condition, but sees none. Presently his terror is such
that he trembles violently and utters low moans ; his body is damp
with perspiration; his mouth is perfectly dry ; and at this stage there
are no tears in his eyes, though his suffering is intense. When the
climax of the attack is reached and passed, there is a copious flow of
tears, or else a mental condition in which the person weeps upon the
least provocation. At this stage a large quantity of pale urine is passed.
Then the heart's action becomes again normal, and the attack passes
off." *

Again :

" There are outbreaks of rage so groundless and unbridled that
all must admit them to be expressions of disease. For the medical
layman hardly anything can be more instructive than the observation
of such a pathological attack of rage, especially when it presents itself
pure and unmixed with other psychical disturbances. This happens in
that rather rare disease named transitory mania. The patient predis
posed to this — otherwise an entirely reasonable person — will be attacked
suddenly without the slightest outward provocation, and thrown (to use
the words of the latest writer on the subject, O. Schwartzer, Die transito-
rische Tobsucht, Wien, 1880), * into a paroxysm of the wildest rage, with
a feartul and blindly furious impulse to do violence and destroy.'
He flies at those about him ; strikes, kicks, and throttles whomever he
can catch ; dashes every object about which he can lay his hands on;
breaks and crushes what is near him; tears his clothes; shouts, howls,
and roars, with eyes that flash and roll, and shows meanwhile all those
symptoms of vaso-motor congestion which we have learned to know as
the concomitants of anger. His face is red, swollen, his cheeks hot, hia
eyes protuberant and their whites bloodshot, the heart beats vie-

*-R. M. Bucke: Man's Moral Nature (N. Y., 1879), p. 97.

THE EMOTIONS 461

lently, the pulse marks 100-120 strokes a minutes. The arteries of the
neck are full and pulsating, the veins are swollen, the saliva flows. The
fit lasts only a few hours, and ends suddenly with a sleep of from 8 to
12 hours, on waking from which the patient has entirely forgotten what
has happened." *

In these (outwardly) causeless emotional conditions the
particular paths which are explosive are discharged by any
and every incoming sensation. Just as, when we are seasick,
every smell, every taste, every sound, every sight, every
movement, every sensible experience whatever, augments
our nausea, so the morbid terror or anger is increased by
each and every sensation which stirs up the nerve-centres.
Absolute quiet is the only treatment for the time. It
seems impossible not to admit that in all this the bodily
condition takes the lead, and that the mental emotion fol
lows. The intellect may, in fact, be so little affected as to
play the cold-blooded spectator all the while, and note the
absence of a real object for the emotion. f

A few words from Henle may close my reply to this first
objection :

"Does it not seem as if the excitations Of the bodily nerves met the
ideas half way, in order to raise the latter to the height of emotions ?
[Note how justly this expresses our theory !] That they do so is proved
by the cases in which particular nerves, when specially irritable, share
in the emotion and determine its quality. When one is suffering from
an open wound, any grievous or horrid spectacle will cause pain in the

* Lange, op. cit. p. 61.

f I am inclined to think that in some hysteriform conditions of grief,
rage, etc., the visceral disturbances are less strong than those which go to
outward expression. We have then a tremendous verbal display with a
hollow inside. Whilst the bystanders are wrung with compassion, or
pale with alarm, the subject all the while lets himself go, but feels his insin
cerity, and wonders how long he can keep up the performance. The attacks
are often surprisingly si ddeu in their onset. The treatment here is to in
timidate the patient by a stronger will. Take out your temper, if he takes
out his — "Nay, if thou'lt mouth, I'll rant as well as thou." These are the
cases of apparently great bodily manifestation with comparatively little
real subjective emotion, which may be used to throw discredit on the the
ory advanced in the text. — It is probable that the visceral manifestations in
these cases are quite disproportionately slight, compared with those of the
vocal organs. The subject's state is somewhat similar to that of an actor
who does not feel his part.

462 PSYCHOLOGY.

wound. In sufferers from heart-disease there is developed a psychic
excitability, which is often incomprehensible to the patients themselves,
but which comes from the heart's liability to palpitate. I said that the
very quality of the emotion is determined by the organs disposed to
participate in it. Just as surely as a dark foreboding, rightly grounded
on inference from the constellations, will be accompanied by a feeling
of oppression in the chest, so surely will a similar feeling of oppression,
when due to disease of the thoracic organs, be accompanied by ground'
less forebodings. So small a thing as a bubble of air rising from the
stomach through the oesophagus, and loitering on its way a few minutes
and exerting pressure on the heart, is able during sleep to occasion a
nightmare, and during waking to produce a vague anxiety. On the
other hand, we see that joyous thoughts dilate our blood-vessels, and
that a suitable quantity of wine, because it dilates the vessels, also dis
poses us to joyous thoughts. If both the jest and the wine work to
gether, they supplement each other in producing the emotional effect,
and our demands on the jest are the more modest in proportion as the
wine takes upon itself a larger part of the task. " *

Second Objection. If our theory be true, a necessary
corollary of it ought to be this : that any voluntary and
cold-blooded arousal of the so-called manifestations of a
special emotion ought to give us the emotion itself. Now
this (the objection says) is not found to be the case. An
actor can perfectly simulate an emotion and yet be inwardly
cold ; and we can all pretend to cry and not feel grief ;
and feign laughter without being amused.

Reply. In the majority of emotions this test is inappli
cable ; for many of the manifestations are in organs over
which we have no voluntary control. Few people in pre
tending to cry can shed real tears, for example. But,
within the limits in which it can be verified, experience
corroborates rather than disproves the corollary from our
theory, upon which the present objection rests. Every
one knows how panic is increased by flight, and how the
giving way to the symptoms of grief or anger increases
those passions themselves. Each fit of sobbing makes the
sorrow more acute, and calls forth another fit stronger still,
until at last repose only ensues with lassitude and with the

* Op. cit. p. 72. — Lange lays great stress on the neurotic drugs, as parts
of his proof that influences of a physical nature upon the body are the
first thing in order in the production of emotions.

THE EMOTIONS. 463

Apparent exhaustion of the machinery. In rage, it is no
torious how we ' work ourselves up ' to a climax by re
peated outbreaks of expression. Refuse to express a pas
sion, and it dies. Count ten before venting your anger,
and its occasion seems ridiculous. Whistling to keep up
courage is no mere figure of speech. On the other hand,
sit all day in a moping posture, sigh, and reply to every
thing with a dismal voice, and your melancholy lingers.
There is no more valuable precept in moral education than
this, as all who have experience know : if we wish to con
quer undesirable emotional tendencies in ourselves, we
must assiduously, and in the first instance cold-bloodedly,
go through the outward movements of those contrary dispo
sitions which we prefer to cultivate. The reward of persis
tency will infallibly come, in the fading out of the sullen-
ness or depression, and the advent of real cheerfulness and
kindliness in their stead. Smooth the brow, brighten the
eye, contract the dorsal rather than the ventral aspect of
the frame, and speak in a major key, pass the genial com
pliment, and your heart must be frigid indeed if it do not
gradually thaw !

This is recognized by all psychologists, only they fail to
see its full import. Professor Bain writes, for example :

" We find that a feeble [emotional] wave ... is suspended inwardly
by being arrested outwardly ; the currents of the brain and the agita
tion of the centres die away if the external vent is resisted at every
point. It is by such restraint that we are in the habit of suppressing
pity, anger, fear, pride — on many trifling occasions. If so, it is a fact
that the suppression of the actual movements has a tendency to sup
press the nervous currents that incite them, so that the external quies
cence is followed by the internal. The effect would not happen in any
case if there were not some dependence of the cerebral wave upon the
free outward vent or manifestation. ... By the same interposition
we may summon up a dormant feeling. By acting out the external
manifestations, we gradually infect the nerves leading to them, and
finally waken up the diffusive current by a sort of action ab extra. . . .
Thus it is that we are sometimes able to assume a cheerful tone of mind
by forcing a hilarious expression.*

* Emotions and Will, pp. 361-8.

464 PSYCHOLOGY.

We have a mass of other testimony of similar effect.
Burke, in his treatise on the Sublime and Beautiful, writes
as follows of the physiognomist Campanella :

" This man, it seems, had not only made very accurate observations
on human faces, but was very expert in mimicking such as were in any
way remarkable. When he had a mind to penetrate into the inclinations
of those he had to deal with, he composed his face, his gesture, and his
whole body, as nearly as he could, into the exact similitude of the per
son he intended to examine ; and then carefully observed what turn of
mind he seemed to acquire by the change. So that, says my author, he
was able to enter into the dispositions and thoughts of people as effec
tually as if he had been changed into the very men. I have often ob
served [Burke now goes on in his own person] that, on mimicking tha
looks and gestures of angry, or placid, or frightened, or daring men, I
have involuntarily found my mind turned to that passion whose appear
ance I strove to imitate ; nay, I am convinced it is hard to avoid itr
though one strove to separate the passion from its corresponding ges
tures." *

Against this it is to be said that many actors who per
fectly mimic the outward appearances of emotion in face,
gait, and voice declare that they feel no emotion at alL
Others, however, according to Mr. Wm. Archer, who has
made a very instructive statistical inquiry among them,
say that the emotion of the part masters them whenever
they play it well.f Thus :

"'I often turn pale,' writes Miss Isabel Bateman, 'in scenes of
terror or great excitement. I have been told this many times, and I
can feel myself getting very cold and shivering and pale in thrilling
situations.' 'When I am playing rage or terror,' writes Mr. Lionel
Brough, ' I believe I do turn pale. My mouth gets dry, my tongue-
cleaves to my palate. In Bob Acres, for instance (in the last act), I

* Quoted by Dugald Stewart, Elements, etc. (Hamilton's ed.), in. 140,
Fechner (Vorschule der Aesthetik, 156) says almost the same thing of him
self : "One may find by one's own observation that the imitation of the
bodily expression of a mental condition makes us understand it much
better than the merely looking on. ... When I walk behind some one
whom I do not know, and imitate as accurately as possible his gait and
carriage, I get the most curious impression of feeling as the person himself
must feel. To go tripping and mincing after the fashion of a young wo
man puts one, so to speak, in a feminine mood of mind."

f 'The Anatomy of Acting,' in Longman's Magazine, vol. xi. pp. 266,
375, 498 (1888), since repuT khed in book form.

THE EMOTIONS. 465

have to continually moisten my mouth, or I shall become inarticulate.
I have to u swallow the lump," as I call it.' All artists who have had
much experience of emotional parts are absolutely unanimous. . . .
' Playing with the brain,' says Miss Alma Murray, ' is far less fatiguing
than playing with the heart. An adventuress taxes the physique far
less than a sympathetic heroine. Muscular exertion has comparatively
little to do with it.' . . . 'Emotion while acting, 'writes Mr. Howe, 'will
induce perspiration much more than physical exertion. I always per
spired profusely while acting Joseph Surface, which requires little or
no exertion.' . . . 4 1 suffer from fatigue,' writes Mr. Forbes Robertson,
4 in proportion to the amount of emotion I may have been called upon
to go through, and not from physical exertion. ' . . . c Though I have
played Othello,' writes Mr. Coleman, ' ever since I was seventeen (at
nineteen I had the honor of acting the Moor to Macready's lago), hus
band my resources as I may, this is the one part, the part of parts,
which always leaves me physically prostrate. I have never been able to
find a pigment that would stay on my face, though I have tried every
preparation in existence. Even the titanic Edwin Forrest told me that
he was always knocked over in Oftiello, and I have heard Charlea
Kean, Phelps, Brooke, Dillion, say the same thing. On the other hand,
I have frequently acted Richard III. without turning a hair.' " *

The explanation for the discrepancy amongst actors is
probably that which these quotations suggest. The vis-
ceral and organic part of the expression can be suppressed
in some men, but not in others, and on this it is probable
that the chief part of the felt emotion depends. Coquelin
and the other actors who are inwardly cold are probably
able to affect the dissociation in a complete way. Prof.
Sikorsky of Kieff has contributed an important article on
the facial expression of the insane to the Neurologisches
Centralblatt for 1887. Having practised facial mimicry
himself a great deal, he says :

** When I contract my facial muscles in any mimetic combination, 1
feel no emotional excitement, so that the mimicry is in the fullest sense
of the word artificial, although quite irreproachable from the expressive
point of view.'1 f

We find, however, from the context that Prof. S.'s prac
tice before the mirror has developed in him such a virtu
osity in the control of his facial muscles that he can entirely
disregard their natural association and contract them in
any order of grouping, on either side of the face isolatedly,

* P. 394. f P. 496.

466 PSYCHOLOGY.

and each one alone. Probably in liim the facial mimicry
is an entirely restricted and localized thing, without sym
pathetic changes of any sort elsewhere.

Third Objection. Manifesting an emotion, so far from
increasing it, makes it cease. Rage evaporates after a good
outburst ; it is pent-up emotions that " work like madness
in the brain."

Eeply. The objection fails to discriminate between
what is felt during and what is felt after the manifestation.
During the manifestation the emotion is always felt. In
the normal course of things this, being the natural channel
of discharge, exhausts the nerve-centres, and emotional
calm ensues. But if tears or anger are simply suppressed,
whilst the object of grief or rage remains unchanged before
the mind, the current which would have invaded the nor
mal channels turns into others, for it must find some out
let of escape. It may then work different and worse effects
later on. Thus vengeful brooding may replace a burst of
indignation ; a dry heat may consume the frame of one wrho
fain would weep, or he may, as Dante says, turn to stone
within ; and then tears or a storming fit may bring a grate
ful relief. This is when the current is strong enough to
strike into a pathological path when the normal one is
dammed. When this is so, an immediate outpour may be
best. But here, to quote Prof. Bain again :

" There is nothing more implied than the fact that an emotion may
be too strong to be resisted, and we only waste our strength in the
endeavor. If we are really able to stem the torrent, there is no more
reason for refraining from the attempt than in the case of weaker
feelings. And undoubtedly the habitual control of the emotions is not
to be attained without a systematic restraint, extended to weak and
strong."

When we teach children to repress their emotional talk
and display, it is not that they may/eeZ more — quite the
reverse. It is that they may think more ; for, to a certain
extent, whatever currents are diverted from the regions
below, must swell the activity of the thought-iracts of the
brain. In apoplexies and other brain injuries we get the
opposite condition — an obstruction, namely, to the passage

THE EMOTIONS. 467

of currents among the thought-tracts, and with this an in
creased tendency of objects to start downward currents
into the organs of the body. The consequence is tears,
laughter, and temper-fits, on the most insignificant provo
cation, accompanying a proportional feebleness in logical
thought and the power of volitional attention and decision, —
just the sort of thing from which we try to wean our child.
It is true that we say of certain persons that " they would
feel more if they expressed less." And in another class of
persons the explosive energy with which passion manifests
itself on critical occasions seems correlated with the way
in which they bottle it up during the intervals. But these
are only eccentric types of character, and within each type
the law of the last paragraph prevails. The sentimentalist
is so constructed that ' gushing ' is his or her normal mode
of expression. Putting a stopper on the 'gush ' will only
to a limited extent cause more ' real ' activities to take its
place ; in the main it will simply produce listlessness. On
the other hand, the ponderous and bilious ' slumbering vol
cano,' let him repress the expression of his passions as he
will, will find them expire if they get no vent at all ; whilst
if the rare occasions multiply which he deems worthy of
their outbreak, he will find them grow in intensity as life
proceeds. On the whole, I cannot see that this third ob
jection carries any weight.

If our hypothesis is true, it makes us realize more deeply
than ever how much our mental life is knit up with our
corporeal frame, in the strictest sense of the term. Rap
ture, love, ambition, indignation, and pride, considered as
feelings, are fruits of the same soil with the grossest bodily
sensations of pleasure and of pain. But the reader will
remember that we agreed at the outset to aifirm this cnly
of what we then called the ' coarser ' emotions, and that
those inward states of emotional sensibility which appeared
devoid at first sight of bodily results should be left out of
our account. We must now say a word or two about these
latter feelings, the * subtler ' emotions, as we then agreed to
call them.

468 PSYCHOLOGY.

THE SUBTLER EMOTION'S.

These are the moral, intellectual, and aesthetic feelings,
Concords of sounds, of colors, of lines, logical consistencies,
teleological fitnesses, affect us with a pleasure that seems
ingrained in the very form of the representation itself, and
to borrow nothing from any reverberation surging up from
the parts below the brain. The Herbartian psychologists
have distinguished feelings due to the form in which ideas
may be arranged. A mathematical demonstration may be
as 'pretty,' and an act of justice as ' neat,' as a drawing or
a tune, although the prettiness and neatness seem to have
nothing to do with sensation. We have, then, or some of
us seem to have, genuinely cerebral forms of pleasure and
displeasure, apparently not agreeing in their mode of pro
duction with the ' coarser ' emotions we have been analyzing.
And it is certain that readers whom our reasons have hitherto
failed to convince will now start up at this admission, and
consider that by it we give up our whole case. Since musi
cal perceptions, since logical ideas, can immediately arouse
a form of emotional feeling, they will say, is it not more
natural to suppose that in the case of the so-called ' coarser *
emotions, prompted by other kinds of objects, the emotional
feeling is equally immediate, and the bodily expression
something that comes later and is added on?

In reply to this we must immediately insist that aesthetic
emotion, pure and simple, the pleasure given us by certain
lines and masses, and combinations of colors and sounds, is
an absolutely sensational experience, an optical or auricular
feeling that is primary, and not due to the repercussion
backwards of other sensations elsewhere consecutively
aroused. To this simple primary and immediate pleasure
in certain pure sensations and harmonious combinations
of them, there may, it is true, be added secondary pleas
ures ; and in the practical enjoyment of works of art by
the masses of mankind these secondary pleasures play a
great part. The more classic one's taste is, however, the
less relatively important are the secondary pleasures felt to
be in comparison with those of the primary sensation as it

THE EMOTIONS. 469

comes in.* Classicism and romanticism have their battles
over this point. Complex suggestiveness, the awakening of

* Even the feelings of the lower senses may have this secondary escort,
due to the arousing of associational trains which reverberate. A flavor
may f airly .shake us by the ghosts of ' banquet halls deserted, ' which it sud
denly calls up; or a smell may make us feel almost sick with the waft it
brings over our memory of ' gardens that are ruins, and pleasure-houses that
are dust.' "In the Pyrenees, "says M. Guy au, " after a summer-day's tramp
carried to the extreme of fatigue, I met a shepherd and asked him for some
milk. He went to fetch from his hut, under which a brook ran, a jar of
milk plunged in the water and kept at a coldness which was almost icy.
In drinking this fresh milk into which all the mountain had put its perfume,
and of which each savory swallow seemed to give new life, I certainly ex
perienced a series of feelings which the word agreeable is insufficient to
designate. It was like a pastoral symphony, apprehended by the taste in
stead of by the ear" (quoted by F. Paulhan from ' Les Problemes de I'^Es-
thetique Contemporaiue, p. 63). — Compare the dithyrambic about whiskey
of Col. R. Ingersoll, to which the presidential campaign of 1888 gave such
notoriety: " I send you some of the most wonderful whiskey that ever
drove the skeleton from a feast or painted landscapes in the brain of man.
It is the mingled souls of wheat and corn. In it you will find the sunshine
and shadow that chase each other over the billowy fields, the breath of
June, the carol of the lark, the dews of the night, the wealth of summer,
and autumn's rich content — all golden with imprisoned light. Drink it,
and you will hear the voice of men and maidens singing the ' Harvest
Home/ mingled with the laughter of children. Drink it, and you will feel
within your blood the star-lit dawns, the dreamy, tawny dusks of many
perfect days. For forty years this liquid joy has been within the happy
staves of oak, longing to touch the lips of man."— It is in this way that I
should reply to Mr. Gurney's criticism on my theory. My "view," this
writer says (Mind, ix. 425), " goes far to confound the two things which in
my opinion it is the prime necessity of musical psychology to distinguish
— the effect chiefly sensuous of mere streams or masses of finely colored
sound, and the distinctive musical emotion to which the form of a sequence
of sound, its melodic and harmonic individuality, even realized in complete
silence, is the vital and essential object. It is with the former of these two
very different things that the physical reactions, the stirring of the hair—
the tingling and the shiver — are by far most markedly connected. ... If I
may speak of myself, there is plenty of music from which I have received
as much emotion in silent representation as when presented by the finest
orchestra; but it is with the latter condition that I almost exclusively asso
ciate the cutaneous tingling and hair-stirring. But to call rny enjoyment
of the/0?*w, of the note-after-noteness of a melody a mere critical ' judgment
of right ' [see below, p. 472] would really be to deny to me the power of
expressing a fact of simple and intimate expression in English. It is quint-
essentially emotion. . . . Now there are hundreds of other bits of music
.... which I judge to be right without receiving an iota of the emotion.
For purposes of emotion they are to me like geometrical demonstrations or

470 PSYCHOLOGY.

vistas of memory and association, and the stirring of our
flesh with picturesque mystery and gloom, make a work of
art romantic. The classic taste brands these effects as coarse
and tawdry, and prefers the naked beauty of the optical and
auditory sensations, unadorned with frippery or foliage. To
the romantic mind, on the contrary, the immediate beauty
of these sensations seems dry and thin. I am of course not
discussing which view is right, but only showing that the dis
crimination between the primary feeling of beauty, as a
pure incoming sensible quality, and the secondary emotions
which are grafted thereupon, is one that must be made.

These secondary emotions themselves are assuredly for
the most part constituted of other incoming sensations
aroused by the diffusive wave of reflex effects which the
beautiful object sets up. A glow, a pang in the breast,
a shudder, a fulness of the breathing, a flutter of the
heart, a shiver down the back, a moistening of the eyes, a
stirring in the hypogastrium, and a thousand unnamable
symptoms besides, may be felt the moment the beauty
excites us. And these symptoms also result when we are ex
cited by moral perceptions, as of pathos, magnanimity, or
courage. The voice breaks and the sob rises in the strug
gling chest, or the nostril dilates and the fingers tighten,
whilst the heart beats, etc., etc.

As far as these ingredients of the subtler emotions go,
then, the latter form no exception to our account, but
rather an additional illustration thereof. In all cases of
intellectual or moral rapture we find that, unless there be
coupled a bodily reverberation of some kind with the mere

like acts of integrity performed in Peru. " The Beethoven-rightness of which
Gurney then goes on to speak, as something different from the Clementi-
rightness (even when the respective pieces are only heard in idea), is prob
ably a purely auditory-sensational thing. The Clernenti-rightness also ;
only, for reasons impossible to assign, the Clementi form does not give the
same sort of purely auditory satisfaction as the Beethoven form, and might
better be described perhaps negatively as non-wrong, i.e., free from posi
tively unpleasant acoustic quality. In organizations as musical as Mr.
Gurney's, purely acoustic form gives so intense a degree of sensible pleas
ure that the lower bodily reverberation is of no account. But I repeat that
I see nothing in the facts which Mr. Gurney cites, to lead one to believe
in an emotion divorced from sensational processes of any kind.

THE EMOTIONS. 471

thought of the object and cognition of its quality ; unless
we actually laugh at the neatness of the demonstration or
witticism ; unless we thrill at the case of justice, or tingle
at the act of magnanimity; our state of mind can hardly be
called emotional at all. It is in fact a mere intellectual
perception of how certain things are to be called — neat,
right, witty, generous, and the like. Such a judicial state
of mind as this is to be classed among awarenesses of truth;
it is a cognitive act. As a matter of fact, however, the
moral and intellectual cognitions hardly ever do exist thus
unaccompanied. The bodily sounding-board is at work, as
careful introspection will show, far more than we usually
suppose. Still, where long familiarity with a certain class
of effects, even aesthetic ones, has blunted mere emotional
excitability as much as it has sharpened taste and judg
ment, we do get the intellectual emotion, if such it can be
called, pure and undefiled. And the dryness of it, the
paleness, the absence of all glow, as it may exist in a
thoroughly expert critic's mind, not only shows us what
an altogether different thing it is from the ' coarser ' emo
tions we considered first, but makes us suspect that almost
the entire difference lies in the fact that the bodily sound
ing-board, vibrating in the one case, is in the other mute.
"Not so very bad" is, in a person of consummate taste,
apt to be the highest limit of approving expression. " Rien
ne me choque" is said to have been Chopin's superlative of
praise of new music. A sentimental layman would feel,
and ought to feel, horrified, on being admitted into such a
critic's mind, to see how cold, how thin, how void of human
significance, are the motives for favor or disfavor that
there prevail. The capacity to make a nice spot on the
wall will outweigh a picture's whole content ; a foolish
trick of words will preserve a poem ; an utterly meaning
less fitness of sequence in one musical composition set at
naught any amount of * expressiveness ' in another.

I remember seeing an English couple sit for more than
an hour on a piercing February day in the Academy at
Venice before the celebrated ' Assumption ' by Titian ;
and when I, after being chased from room to room by the
cold, concluded to get into the sunshine as fast as possible

472 PSYCHOLOGY.

and let the pictures go, but before leaving drew reverently
near to them to learn with what superior forms of suscepti
bility they might be endowed, all I overheard was the
woman's voice murmuring : " What a deprecatory expression
her face wears ! What self-abnegaf ion ! How umvorthy
she feels of the honor she is receiving!" Their honest
hearts had been kept warm all the time by a glow of spuri
ous sentiment that would have fairly made old Titian sick,
Mr. Ruskin somewhere makes the (for him terrible) admis
sion that religious people as a rule care little for pictures,
and that when they do care for them they generally prefer
the worst ones to the best. Yes ! in every art, in every
science, there is the keen perception of certain relations
being right or not, and there is the emotional flush and thrill
consequent thereupon. And these are two things, not one.
In the former of them it is that experts and masters are at
home. The latter accompaniments are bodily commotions
that they may hardly feel, but that may be experienced in
their fulness by cretins and philistines in whom the critical
judgment is at its lowest ebb. The ' marvels ' of Science,
about which so much edifying popular literature is written,
are apt to be ' caviare ' to the men in the laboratories. And
even divine Philosophy itself, which common mortals con
sider so * sublime ' an occupation, on account of the vast-
ness of its data and outlook, is too apt to the practical
philosopher himself to be but a sharpening and tightening
business, a matter of ' points,' of screwing down things, of
splitting hairs, and of the * intent ' rather than the ' extent '
of conceptions. Very little emotion here ! — except the
effort of setting the attention fine, and the feeling of ease
and relief (mainly in the breathing apparatus) when the
inconsistencies are overcome and the thoughts run smoothly
for a while. Emotion and cognition seem then parted even
in this last retreat ; and cerebral processes are almost feel-
ingless, so far as we can judge, until they summon help
from parts below.

NO SPECIAL BBAIN-CENTRES FOB EMOTION.

If the neural process underlying emotional conscious
ness be what I have now sought to prove it, the physi-

THE EMOTIONS. 473

ology of the brain becomes a simpler matter than has been
hitherto supposed. Sensational, associational, and motor
elements are all that the organ need contain. The physi
ologists who, during the past few years, have been so in
dustriously exploring the brain's functions, have limited
their explanations to its cognitive and volitional per
formances. Dividing the brain into sensory and motor
centres, they have found their division to be exactly paral
leled by the analysis made by empirical psychology of
the perceptive and volitional parts of the mind into their
simplest elements. But the emotions have been so ignored
in all these researches that one is tempted to suppose that
if these investigators were asked for a theory of them
in brain-terms, they would have to reply, either that they
had as yet bestowed no thought upon the subject, or that
they had found it so difficult to make distinct hypotheses
that the matter lay among the problems of the future, only
to be taken up after the simpler ones of the present should
have been definitively solved.

And yet it is even now certain that of two things con
cerning the emotions, one must be true. Either separate
and special centres, affected to them alone, are their brain-
seat, or else they correspond to processes occurring in the
motor and sensory centres already assigned, or in others
like them, not yet known. If the former be the case, we
must deny the view that is current, and hold the cortex to
be something more than the surface of ' projection ' for every
sensitive spot and every muscle in the body. If the latter
be the case, we must ask whether the emotional process
in the sensory or motor centre be an altogether peculiar
one, or whether it resembles the ordinary perceptive pro
cesses of which those centres are already recognized to be
the seat. Now if the theory I have defended be true, the
latter alternative is all that it demands. Supposing the
cortex to contain parts, liable to be excited by changes
in each special sense-organ, in each portion of the skin,
in each muscle, each joint, and each viscus, and to contain
absolutely nothing else, we still have a scheme capable of
representing the process of the emotions. An object falls
on a sense-organ, affects a cortical part, and is perceived ;

474 PSYCHOLOGY.

or else the latter, excited inwardly, gives rise to an idea of
the same object. Quick as a flash, the reflex currents pass
down through their preordained channels, alter the con
dition of muscle, skin, and viscus ; and these alterations,
perceived, like the original object, in as many portions of
the cortex, combine with it in consciousness and transform
it from an object-simply-apprehended into an object-
emotionally-felt. No new principles have to be invoked,
nothing postulated beyond the ordinary reflex circuits, and
the local centres admitted in one shape or another by all
to exist.

EMOTIONAL DIFFERENCES BETWEEN INDIVIDUALS.

The revivability in memory of the emotions, like that of all
the feelings of the lower senses, is very small. We can
remember that we underwent grief or rapture, but not just
how the grief or rapture felt. This difficult ideal reviva
bility is, however, more than compensated in the case of
the emotions by a very easy actual revivability. That
is, we can produce, not remembrances of the old grief
or rapture, but new griefs and raptures, by summoning up
a lively thought of their exciting cause. The cause is now
only an idea, but this idea produces the same organic
irradiations, or almost the same, which were produced by
its original, so that the emotion is again a reality. We
have ' recaptured ' it. Shame, love, and anger are particu
larly liable to be thus revived by ideas of their object.
Professor Bain admits * that " in their strict character of
emotion proper, they [the emotions] have the minimum of
revivability ; but being always incorporated with the sensa
tions of the higher senses, they share in the superior reviv
ability of sights and sounds." But he fails to point out
that the revived sights and sounds may be ideal without
ceasing to be distinct ; whilst the emotion, to be distinct,
must become real again. Prof. Bain seems to forget that
an * ideal emotion ' and a real emotion prompted by an
ideal object are two very different things.

* In his chapter on ' Ideal Emotion, ' to which the reader is referred for
farther details on this subject.

THE EMOTIONS. 476

An emotional temperament on the one hand, and a
lively imagination for objects and circumstances on the other,
are thus the conditions, necessary and sufficient, for an
abundant emotional life. No matter how emotional the
temperament may be, if the imagination be poor, the oc
casions for touching off the emotional trains will fail to be
realized, and the life will be pro tanto cold and dry. This
is perhaps a reason why it may be better that a man of
thought should not have too strong a visualizing power.
He is less likely to have his trains of meditation disturbed
by emotional interruptions. It will be remembered that
Mr. Galton found the members of the Royal Society and of
the French Academy of Sciences to be below par in visual
izing power. If I may speak of myself, I am far less able
to visualize now, at the age of 46, than in my earlier years ;
and I am strongly inclined to believe that the relative slug
gishness of my emotional life at present is quite as much
connected with this fact as it is with the invading torpor of
hoary eld, or with the omnibus-horse routine of settled pro
fessional and domestic life. I say this because I occasion
ally have a flash of the old stronger visual imagery, and I
notice that the emotional commentary, so to call it, is then
liable to become much more acute than is its present wont.
Charcot's patient, whose case is given above on p. 58 ff.,
complained of his incapacity for emotional feeling after his
optical images - —re gone. His mother's death, which in
former times would have wrung his heart, left him quite
cold ; largely, as he himself suggests, because he could form
no definite visual image of the event, and of the effect of
the loss on the rest of the family at home.

One final generality about the emotions remains to be
noted : They blunt themselves by repetition more rapidly than
any other sort of feeling. This is due not only to the gen
eral law of ' accommodation ' to their stimulus which we
saw to obtain of all feelings whatever, but to the peculiar
fact that the « diffusive wave ' of reflex effects tends always
to become more narrow. It seems as if it were essentially
meant to be a provisional arrangement, on the basis of
which precise and determinate reactions might arise. The
more we exercise ourselves at anything, the fewer muscles

476 PSYCHOLOGY.

we employ ; and just so, the oftener we meet an object,
the more definitely we think and behave about it ; and
the less is the organic perturbation to which it gives rise.
The first time we saw it we could perhaps neither act nor
think at all, and had no reaction but organic perturbation.
The emotions of startled surprise, wonder, or curiosity were
the result. Now we look on with absolutely no emotion.*
This tendency to economy in the nerve-paths through which
our sensations and ideas discharge, is the basis of all growth
in efficiency, readiness, and skill. Where would the general,
the surgeon, the presiding chairman, be, if their nerve-cur
rents kept running down into their viscera, instead of keep
ing up amid their convolutions ? But what they gain for prac
tice by this law, they lose, it must be confessed, for feeling.
For the world-worn and experienced man, the sense of
pleasure which he gets from the free and powerful flow of
thoughts, overcoming obstacles as they arise, is the only
compensation for that freshness of the heart which he once
enjoyed. This free and powerful flow means that brain-
paths of association and memory have more and more
organized themselves in him, and that through them the
stimulus is drafted off into nerves which lead merely to the
writing finger or the speaking tongue. t The trains of intel
lectual association, the memories, the logical relations, may,

* Those feelings which Prof. Bain calls ' emotions of relativity,' excite
ment of novelty, wonder, rapture of freedom, sense of power, hardly
survive any repetition of the experience. But as the text goes on to ex
plain, and as Goethe as quoted by Prof. Hoffding says, this is because " the
so*ul is inwardly grown larger without knowing it, and can no longer be
filled by that first sensation. The man thinks that he has lost, but really he
has gained. What he has lost in rapture, he has gained in inward growth."
" It is," as Prof. Hoffding himself adds, in a beautiful figure of speech,
" with our virgin feelings, as with the first breath drawn by the new-born
child, in which the lung expands itself so that it can never be emptied to
the same degree again. No later breath can feel just like that first one." On
this whole subject of emotional blunting, compare Hoffding's Psychologic,
vi. E., and Bain's Emotions and Will, chapter iv. of the first part.

f M. Fr. Paulhan, in a little work full of accurate observations of de
tail (Les Phenomeues Affectifs et les Lois de leur Apparition), seems to me
rather to turn the truth upside down by his formula that emotions are due
to an inhibition of impulsive tendencies. One kind of emotion, namely,
uneasiness, annoyance, distress, does occur when any definite impulsive
tendency is checked, and all of M. P.'s illustrations are drawn from this

THE EMOTIONS. 477

however, be voluminous in the extreme. Past emotions
may be among the things remembered. The more of all
these trains an object can set going in us, the richer our
cognitive intimacy with it is. This cerebral sense of rich
ness seems itself to be a source of pleasure, possibly
even apart from the euphoria which from time to time comes
up from respiratory organs. If there be such a thing as a
purely spiritual emotion, I should be inclined to restrict
it to this cerebral sense of abundance and ease, this
feeling, as Sir W. Hamilton would call it, of unimpeded
and not overstrained activity of thought. Under ordinary
conditions, it is a fine and serene but not an excited state
of consciousness. In certain intoxications it becomes
exciting, and it may be intensely exciting. I can hardly
imagine a more frenzied excitement than that which
goes with the consciousness of seeing absolute truth, which
characterizes the coming to from nitrous-oxide drunken
ness. Chloroform, ether, and alcohol all produce this
deepening sense of insight into truth ; and with all of them
it may be a ' strong ' emotion ; but then there also coine
with it all sorts of • strange bodily feelings and changes in
the incoming sensibilities. I cannot see my way to affirming
that the emotion is independent of these. I will concede,
however, that if its independence is anywhere to be main
tained, these theoretic raptures seem the place at which
to begin the defence.

THE GENESIS OF THE VARIOUS EMOTIONS.

On a former page (pp. 453-4) I said that two questions,
and only two, are important, if we regard the emotions as
constituted by feelings due to the diffusive wave.

(1) What special diffusive effects do the various special ob
jective and subjective experiences excite ? and

(2) How come they to excite them ?

The works on physiognomy and expression are all of
them attempts to answer question 1. As is but natural, the

sort. The other emotions are themselves primary impulsive tendencies, of
a diffusive sort (involving, as M. P. rightly says, a multiplicite des phe-
nomdnes); and just in proportion as more and more of these multiple ten
dencies are checked, and replaced by some few narrow forms of discharge,
does the original emotion tend to disappear.

478 PSYCHOLOGY.

effects upon the face have received the most careful atten
tion. The reader who wishes details additional to those
given above on pp. 443-7 is referred to the works men
tioned in the note below. *

As regards question 2, some little progress has of recent
years been made in answering it. Two things are certain :

a. The facial muscles of expression are not given us
simply for expression's sake ;f

b. Each muscle is not affected to some one emotion ex
clusively, as certain writers have thought.

Some movements of expression can be accounted for
as weakened repetitions of movements which formerly (when
they were stronger) were of utility to the subject. Others
are similarly weakened repetitions of movements which
under other conditions were physiologically necessary effects.
Of the latter reactions the respiratory disturbances in
anger and fear might be taken as examples — organic
reminiscences, as it were, reverberations in imagination
of the blowings of the man making a series of combative
efforts, of the pantings of one in precipitate flight. Such
at least is a suggestion made by Mr. Spencer which has
found approval. And he also was the first, so far as I
know, to suggest that other movements in anger and fear
could be explained by the nascent excitation of formerly
useful acts.

" To have in a slight degree," he says, " such psychical states as ac
company the reception of wounds, and are experienced during flight, is
to be in a state of what we call fear. And to have in a slight degree
such psychical states as the processes of catching, killing, and eating
imply, is to have the desires to catch, kill, and eat. That the pro
pensities to the acts are nothing else than nascent excitations of the

* A list of the older writings on the subject is given in Mantegazza's
work, La Physionomie et PExpression, chap, i; others in Darwin's first
chapter. Bell's Anatomy of Expression, Mosso's La Paura, Pidcrit's
WissenschaftJiches System der Mimik und Physiognomik, Duchenne's
Mecanisme de la Physionomie Humaine, are, besides Lange and Darwin,
the most useful works with which I am acquainted. Compare also Sully:
Sensation and Intuition, chap. n.

f One must remember, however, that just in so far forth as sexual
selection may have played a part in determining the human organism, selec
tion of expressive faces must have increased the average mobility of the
hmruin countenance.

THE EMOTIONS. 479

psychic-ill state involved in the acts, is proved by the natural language
of the propensities. Fear, when strong, expresses itself in cries, in
efforts to escape, in palpitations, in tremblings ; and these are just the
manifestations that go along with an actual suffering of the evil feared.
The destructive passion is shown in a general tension of the muscular
system, in gnashing of teeth and protrusion of the claws, in dilated eyes
and nostrils, in growls ; and these are weaker forms of the actions that
accompany the killing of prey. To such objective evidences every one
can add subjective evidences. Every one can testify that the psychical
state called fear consists of mental representations of certain painful
results ; and that the one called anger consists of mental representa
tions of the actions and impressions which would occur while inflicting
some kind of pain." *

About i'ear I shall have more to say presently. Mean
while the principle of revival in weakened form of reactions
meful in more violent dealings with the object inspiring the
emotion, has found many applications. So slight a symptom
as the snarl or sneer, the one-sided uncovering of the upper
teeth, is accounted for by Darwin as a survival from the time
when our ancestors had large canines, and unfleshed them
(as dogs now do) for attack. Similarly the raising of the
eyebrows in outward attention, the opening of the mouth
in astonishment, come, according to the same author, from
the utility of these movements in extreme cases. The raising
of the eyebrows goes with the opening of the eye for better
vision ; the opening of the mouth with the in tensest listening,
and with the rapid catching of the breath which precedes
muscular effort. The distention of the nostrils in anger
is interpreted by Spencer as an echo of the way in which
our ancestors had to breathe when, during combat, their
" mouth was filled up by a part of an antagonist's body
that had been seized (!)." The trembling of fear is supposed
by Mantegazza to be for the sake of warming the blood(!).
The reddening of the face and neck is called by Wundt a
compensatory arrangement for relieving the brain of the
blood-pressure which the simultaneous excitement of the
heart brings with it. The effusion of tears is explained
both by this author and by Darwin to be a blood-with
drawing agency of a similar sort. The contraction of the
muscles around the eyes, of which the primitive use is to

*Psychol.,§213.

480 PSYCHOLOGY.

protect those organs from being too much gorged with
blood during the screaming fits of infancy, survives in
adult life in the shape of the frown, which instantly comes
over the brow when anything difficult or displeasing pre
sents itself either to thought or action.

' ' As the habit of contracting the brows has been followed by infants
during innumerable generations, at the commencement of every crying
or screaming fit," says Darwin, " it has become firmly associated with
the incipient sense of something distressing or disagreeable. ' Hence,
under similar circumstances, it would be apt to be continued during
maturity, although never then developed, into a crying fit. Screaming
or weeping begins to be voluntarily restrained at an early period of life,
whereas frowning is hardly ever restrained at any age."*

The intermittent expirations which constitute laughter
have, according to Dr. Hecker, the purpose of counteract
ing the anaemia of the brain, which he supposes to be
brought about by the action of the joyous or comic stimulus
upon the vaso- motor nerves, t A smile is the weak vestige
of a laugh. The tight closure of the mouth in all effort is
useful for retaining the air in the lungs so as to fix the chest
and give a firm basis of insertion for the muscles of the
flanks. Accordingly, we see the lips compress themselves
upon every slight occasion of resolve. The blood-pressure
has to be high during the sexual embrace ; hence the palpi-

* Weeping in childhood is almost as regular a symptom of anger as it
is of grief, which would account (on Darwin's principles) for the frown of
anger. Mr. Spencer has an account of the angry frown as having arisen
through the survival of the fittest, by its utility in keeping the sun out of
one's eyes when engaged in mortal combat (!). (Principles of Psychology, n.
546.) Professor Mosso objects to any explanation of the frown by its
utility for vision, that it is coupled, during emotional excitement, with
a dilatation of the pupil which is very unfavorable for distinct vision, and
that this ought to have been weeded out by natural selection, if natural
selection had the power to fix the frown (see La Paura, chap. ix. § vi).
Unfortunately this very able author speaks as if all the emotions affected
the pupil in the same way. Fear certainly does make it dilate. But
Gratiolet is quoted by Darwin and others as saying that the pupils con
tract in anger. I have made no observations of my own on the point, and
Mosso 's earlier paper on the pupil (Turin, 1875) I have not seen. I must
repeat, with Darwin, that we need more minute observations on this
subject.

•f Physiologic u. Psychologic des Lachens und des Komischen (Berlin,
1873), pp. 13-15.

THE EMOTIONS. 481

tations, and hence also the tendency to caressing action,
which accompanies tender emotion in its fainter forms.
Other examples might be given ; but these are quite
enough to show the scope of the principle of revival of
useful action in weaker form.

Another principle, to which Darwin perhaps hardly
does sufficient justice, may be called the principle of
reacting similarly to analogous-feeling stimuli. There is a
whole vocabulary of descriptive adjectives common to im
pressions belonging to different sensible spheres — experi
ences of all classes are siceet, impressions of all classes rich
or solid, sensations of all classes sharp. Wundt and Piderit
accordingly explain many of our most expressive reactions
upon moral causes as symbolic gustatory movements. As
soon as any experience arises which has an affinity with the
feeling of sweet, or bitter, or sour, the same movements are
executed which would result from the taste in point.*
" All the states of mind which language designates by the
metaphors bitter, harsh, sweet, combine themselves, there
fore, with the corresponding mimetic movements of the
mouth." Certainly the emotions of disgust and satisfac
tion do express themselves in this mimetic way. Disgust is
an incipient regurgitation or retching, limiting its expres
sion often to the grimace of the lips and nose ; satisfaction
goes with a sucking smile, or tasting motion of the lips.
In Mantegazza's loose if learned work, the attempt is made,
much less successfully, to bring in the eye and ear as ad
ditional sources of symbolically expressive reaction. The
ordinary gesture of negation — among us, moving the head
about its axis from side to side — is a reaction originally used
by babies to keep disagreeables from getting into their
mouth, and may be observed in perfection in any nursery. t

* These movements are explained Ideologically, in the first instance,
by the efforts which the tongue is forced to make to adapt itself to the
better perception or avoidance of the sapid body. (Cf. Physiol. Psych., n.
423.)

f Professor Henle derives the negative wag of the head from an incipi
ent shudder, and remarks how fortunate is the abbreviation, as when a lady
declines a partner in the ballroom. The clapping of the hands for ap
plause he explains as a symbolic abridgment of an embrace. The pro-

482 PSYCHOLOGY.

It is now evoked where the stimulus is only an unwelcome
idea. Similarly the nod forward in affirmation is after the
analogy of taking food into the mouth. The connection of
the expression of moral or social disdain or dislike, es
pecially in women, with movements having a perfectly defi
nite original olfactory function, is too obvious for comment.
Winking is the effect of any threatening surprise, not only
of what puts the eyes in danger ; and a momentary aver
sion of the eyes is very apt to be one's first symptom of re
sponse to an unexpectedly unwelcome proposition. — These
may suffice as examples of movements expressive from
analogy.

But if certain of our emotional reactions can be ex
plained by the two principles invoked — and the reader will
himself have felt how conjectural and fallible in some of
the instances the explanation is — there remain many reac
tions which cannot so be explained at all, and these we must
write down for the present as purely idiopathic effects of
the stimulus. Amongst them are the effects on the viscera
and internal glands, the dryness of the mouth and diar
rhoea and nausea of fear, the ]iver-disturbances which some
times produce jaundice after excessive rage, the urinary
secretion of sanguine excitement, and the bladder-contrac
tion of apprehension, the gaping of expectancy, the * lump
in the throat' of grief, the tickling there and the swallow
ing of embarrassment, the * precordial ' anxiety ' of dread,
the changes in the pupil, the various sweatings of the skin,
cold or hot, local or general, and its flushings, together
with other symptoms which probably exist but are too
hidden to have been noticed or named. It seems as if even
the changes of blood-pressure and heart-beat during emo
tional excitement might, instead of being teleologically de
termined, prove to be purely mechanical or physiological
outpourings through the easiest drainage-channels — the
pneumogastrics and sympathetic nerves happening under
ordinary circumstances to be such channels.

trusion of the lips (der prufetide Zug) which goes with all sorts of dubious
and questioning states of mind is derived by Dr. Piderit from the tasting
movement which we can see on any one's mouth when deciding whether a
wine is good or not.

THE EMOTIONS. 483

Mr. Spencer argues that the smallest muscles must be
such channels ; and instances the tail in dogs, cats, and
birds, the ears in horses, the crest in parrots, the face and
fingers in man, as the first organs to be moved by emotional
stimuli.* This principle (if it be one) would apply still
more easily to the muscles of the smaller arteries (though
not exactly to the heart) ; whilst the great variability of the
circulatory symptoms would also suggest that they are de
termined by causes into which utility does not enter. The
quickening of the heart lends itself, it is true, rather easily
to explanation by inherited habit, organic memory of more
violent excitement ; and Darwin speaks in favor of this
view (see his Expression, etc., pp. 74-5). But, on the
other hand, we have so many cases of reaction which are
indisputably pathological, as we may say, and which could
never be serviceable or derived from what was serviceable,
that I think we should be cautious about pushing our ex
planations of the varied heart-beat too far in the teleological
direction. Trembling, which is found in many excitements
besides that of terror, is, pace Mr. Spencer and Sig. Mante-
gazza, quite pathological. So are terror's other strong
symptoms. Professor Mosso, as the total result of his
study, writes as follows :

" We have seen that the graver the peril becomes, the more do the
reactions which are positively harmful to the animal prevail in number
and in efficacy. We already saw that the trembling and the palsy make
it incapable of flight or defence ; we have also convinced ourselves that
in the most decisive moments of danger we are less able to see [or to
think] than when we are tranquil. In face of such facts we must admit
that the phenomena of fear cannot all be accounted for by ' selection.'
Their extreme degrees are morbid phenomena which show an imperfec
tion in the organism. We might almost say that Nature had not been

* Loc. cit. % 497. Why a dog's face-muscles are not more mobile than
they are Mr. Spencer fails to explain, as also why different stimuli should
innervate these small muscles in such different ways, if easy drainage be
the only principle involved. Charles Bell accounted for the special part
played by the facial muscles in expression by their being accessory mi\scle»
of respiration, governed by nerves whose origin is close to the respiratory
centre in the medulla oblongata. They are an adjuvant of voice, and like
it their function is communication. (See Bell's Anatomy of Expression,
Appendix by Alexander Shaw.)

484 PSYCHOLOGY.

able to frame a substance which should be excitable enough to com
pose the brain and spinal marrow, and yet which should not be so ex
cited by exceptional stimulation as to overstep in its reactions those
physiological bounds which are useful to the conservation of the crea
ture."*

Professor Bain, if I mistake not, had long previously
commented upon fear in a similar way.

Mr. Darwin accounts for many emotional expressions
by what he calls the principle of antithesis. In virtue of
this principle, if a certain stimulus prompted a certain set
of movements, then a contrary-feeling stimulus would
prompt exactly the opposite movements, although these
might otherwise have neither utility nor significance. It is
in this wise that Darwin explains the expression of impo
tence, raised eyebrows, and shrugged shoulders, dropped
arms and open palms, as being the antithesis of the frown
ing brow, the thrown-back shoulders, and clenched fists of
rage, which is the emotion of power. No doubt a certain
number of movements can be formulated under this law ;
but whether it expresses a causal principle is more than
doubtful. It has been by most critics considered the least
successful of Darwin's speculations on this subject.

To sum up, we see the reason for a few emotional re
actions ; for others a possible species of reason may be
guessed ; but others remain for which no plausible reason
can even be conceived. These may be reactions which are
purely mechanical results of the way in which our nervous
centres are framed, reactions which, although permanent
in us now, may be called accidental as far as their origin
goes. In fact, in an organism as complex as the nervous
system there must be many such reactions, incidental to
others evolved for utility's sake, but Avhich would never
themselves have been evolved independently, for any utility
they might possess. Sea-sickness, the love of music, of
the various intoxicants, nay, the entire aesthetic life of man,
shall have to trace to this accidental origin, f It would be
foolish to suppose that none of the reactions called emo
tional could have arisen in this gwcm'-accidental way.

* La Paura, Appendice, p. 295. f See below, p. 627.

THE EMOTIONS. 485

This is all I have to say about the emotions. If one
should seek to name each particular one of them of which
the human heart is the seat, it is plain that the limit to their
number would lie in the introspective vocabulary of the
seeker, each race of men having found names for some
shade of feeling which other races have left undiscrimi
nated. If then we should seek to break the emotions, thus
enumerated, into groups, according to their affinities, it is
again plain that all sorts of groupings would be pos
sible, according as we chose this character or that as a
basis, and that all groupings would be equally real and
true. The only question would be, does this grouping or
that suit our purpose best? The reader may then class
the emotions as he will, as sad or joyous, sthenic or
asthenic, natural or acquired, inspired by animate or inani
mate things, formal or material, sensuous or ideal, direct
or reflective, egoistic or non-egoistic, retrospective, pros
pective or immediate, organismally or environmentally
initiated, or what more besides. All these are divisions
which have been actually proposed. Each of them has its
merits, and each one brings together some emotions which
the others keep apart. For a fuller account, and for other
classificatory schemes, I refer to the Appendix to Bain's
Emotions and the Will, and to Mercier's, Stanley's, and
Bead's articles on the Emotions, in Mind, vols. ix, x, and XL
In vol. ix. p. 421 there is also an article by the lamented
Edmund Gurney in criticism of the view which in this
chapter I continue to defend.

CHAPTEE XXVI.*

WILL.

DESIKE, wish, will, are states of mind which everyone
knows, and which no definition can make plainer. We de
sire to feel, to have, to do, all sorts of things which at the
moment are not felt, had, or done. If with the desire there
goes a sense that attainment is not possible, we simply wish ;
but if we believe that the end is in our power, we will that
the desired feeling, having, or doing shall be real ; and real
it presently becomes, either immediately upon the willing
or after certain preliminaries have been fulfilled.

The only ends which follow immediately upon our will
ing seem to be movements of our own bodies. Whatever
feelings and havings we may will to get, come in as results
of preliminary movements which we make for the purpose-^
This fact is too familiar to need illustration; so that we may
start with the proposition that the only direct outward
effects of our will are bodily movements. The mechanism
of production of these voluntary movements is what befalls
us to study now. The subject involves a good many sepa
rate points which it is difficult to arrange in any continu
ous logical order. I will treat of them successively in the
mere order of convenience ; trusting that at the end the
reader will gain a clear and connected view.

The movements we have studied hitherto have been
automatic and reflex, and (on the first occasion of their per
formance, at any rate) unforeseen by the agent. The move-i
ments to the study of which we now address ourselves,!
being desired and intended beforehand, are of course donej

* Parts of this chapter have appeared in an essay called " The Feeling
of Effort," published in the Anniversary Memoirs of the Boston Society of
Natural History, 1880 ; and parts in Scribner's Magazine for Feb. 1888.

486

WILL. 487

with full prevision of what they are to be. It follows from
this that voluntary movements must be secondary, not primary
functions of our organism. This is the first point to under
stand in the psychology of Volition. Keflex, instinctive,
and emotional movements are all primary performances.
The nerve-centres are so organized that certain stimuli pull
the trigger of certain explosive parts ; and a creature going
through one of these explosions for the first time under
goes an entirely novel experience. The other day I was
standing at a railroad station with a little child, when an
express-train went thundering by. The child, who was
near the edge of the platform, started, winked, had his
breathing convulsed, turned pale, burst out crying, and ran
frantically towards me and hid his face. I have no doubt
that this youngster was almost as much astonished by his
own behavior as he was by the train, and more than I was,
who stood by. Of course if such a reaction has many times
occurred we learn what to expect of ourselves, and can then
foresee our conduct, even though it remain as involuntary
and uncontrollable as it was before. But if, in voluntary
action properly so-called, the act must be foreseen, it fol-|
lows that no creature not endowed with divinatory power!
can perform an act voluntarily for the first time. Well, we
are no more endowed with prophetic vision of what move
ments lie in our power, than we are endowed with pro
phetic vision of what sensations we are capable of receiving.
As we must wait for the sensations to be given us, so we
must wait for the movements to be performed involun
tarily,* before we can frame ideas of what either of
these things are. We learn all our possibilities by the
way of experience. When a particular movement, having
once occurred in a random, reflex, or involuntary way, has
left an image of itself in the memory, then the movement
can be desired again, proposed as an end, and deliberately
willed. But it is impossible to see how it could be willed
before.

* I am abstracting at present for simplicity's sake, and so as to keep to
the elements of the matter, from the learning of acts by seeing others do
them.

488 PSYCHOLOGY.

A supply of ideas of the various movements that are possible^
left in the memory by experiences of their involuntary perform-}
ance is thus the first prerequisite of the voluntary life.

Now the same movement involuntarily performed may
leave many different kinds of ideas of itself in the memory.
If performed by another person, we of course see it, or we
feel it if the moving part strikes another part of our own
body. Similarly we have an auditory image of its effects
if it produces sounds, as for example when it is one of the
movements made in vocalization, or in playing on a musical
instrument. All these remote effects of the movement, as
we may call them, are also produced by movements which
we ourselves perform ; and they leave innumerable ideas
in our mind by which we distinguish each movement
from the rest. It looks distinct ; it feels distinct to some
distant part of the body which it strikes ; or it sounds dis
tinct. These remote effects would then, rigorously speak
ing, suffice to furnish the mind with the supply of ideas
required.

But in addition to these impressions upon remote or
gans of sense, we have, whenever we perform a movement
ourselves, another set of impressions, those, namely, which
come up from the parts that are actually moved. These
kinwsthetic impressions, as Dr. Bastian has called them, are
so many resident effects of the motion. Not only are our
muscles supplied with afferent as well as with efferent
nerves, but the tendons, the ligaments, the articular sur
faces, and the skin about the joints are all sensitive, and,
being stretched and squeezed in ways characteristic of each
particular movement, give us as many distinctive feelings
as there are mo^ ements possible to perform.

It is by these resident impressions that we are made
conscious of passive movements — movements communicated
to our limbs by others. If you lie with closed eyes, and
another person noiselessly places your arm or leg in any
arbitrarily chosen attitude, you receive an accurate feeling
of what attitude it is, and can immediately reproduce it
yourself in the arm or leg of the opposite side. Similarly
a man waked suddenly from sleep in the dark is aware of
how he finds himself lying. At least this is what happens

WILL. 489

the nervous apparatus is normal. But in cases of
disease we sometimes find that the resident impressions do
not normally excite the centres, and that then the sense of
attitude is lost. It is only recently that pathologists have
begun to study these anaesthesias with the delicacy which
they require ; and we have doubtless yet a great deal to
learn about them. The skin may be anaesthetic, and the
muscles may not feel the cramp-like pain which is pro
duced by faradic currents sent through them, and yet the
sense of passive movement may be retained. It seems, in
fact, to persist more obstinately than the other forms of
sensibility, for cases are comparatively common in which
all the other feelings in the limb but this one of attitude are
lost. In Chapter XX I have tried to make it appear that
the articular surfaces are probably the most important
source of the resident kinaesthetic feelings. But the
determination of their special organ is indifferent to our
present quest. It is enough to know that the existence
of these feelings cannot be denied.

When the feelings of passive movement as well as all
the other feelings of a limb are lost, we get such results as
are given in the following account by Professor A. Strum-
pell of his wonderful anaesthetic boy, whose only sources of
feeling were the right eye and the left ear : *

' ' Passive movements could be imprinted on all the extremities to the
greatest extent, without attracting the patient's notice. Only in
violent forced hyperextension of the joints, especially of the knees,
there arose a dull vague feeling of strain, but this was seldom precisely
localized. We have often, after bandaging the eyes of the patient,
carried him about the room, laid him on a table, given to his arms and
legs the most fantastic and apparently the most inconvenient attitudes,
without his having a suspicion of it. The expression of astonishment
in his face, when all at once the removal of the handkerchief revealed
his situation, is indescribable in words. Only when his head was made
to hang away down he immediately spoke of dizziness, but could not
assign its ground. Later he sometimes inferred from the sounds con
nected with the manipulation that something special was being done
with him .... He had no feelings of muscular fatigue. If, with his
eyes shut, we told him to raise his arm and to keep it up, he did so
without trouble. After one or two minutes, however, the arm began to

*Deutsches Arcniv f. Klin. Medicin, xxn. 321.

490 PSYCHOLOGY.

tremble and sink without his being aware of it. He asserted still his
ability to keep it up. ... Passively holding still his fingers did not
affect him. He thought constantly that he opened and shut his hand,
whereas it was really fixed.'1

Or we read of cases like this :

" Voluntary movements cannot be estimated the moment the patient
ceases to take note of them by his eyes. Thus, after having made him
close his eyes, if one asks him to move one of his limbs either wholly or
in part, he does it but cannot tell whether the effected movement is
'.large or small, strong or weak, or even if it has taken place at all. And
when he opens his eyes after moving his leg from right to left, for
example, he declares that he had a very inexact notion of the extent of
the effected movement. ... If, having the intention of executing a
certain movement, I prevent him, he does riot perceive it, and supposes
the limb to have taken the position he intended to give it." *

Or this :

"The patient, when his eyes were closed in the middle of an
unpractised movement, remained with the extremity in the position it
had when the eyes closed and did not complete the movement properly.
Then after some oscillations the limb gradually sank by reason of its
weight (the sense of fatigue being absent). Of this the patient was not
aware, and wondered, when he opened his eyes, at the altered position
of his limb." f

A similar condition can be readily reproduced experi
mentally in many hypnotic subjects. All that is needed is
to tell a suitably predisposed person during the hypnotic
trance that he cannot feel his limb, and he will be quite
unaware of the attitudes into which you may throw it.J

All these cases, whether spontaneous or experimental,
show the absolute need of guiding sensations of some kind
for the successful carrying out of a concatenated series of
movements. It is, in fact, easy to see that, just as where the
chain of movements is automatic (see above, Vol. I. p. 116\
each later movement of the chain has to be discharged by
the impression which the next earlier one makes in being

* Landry : Memoire snr la Paralysie du Sens Musculaire, Gazette des
Hdpitaux, 1855, p. 270.

f Takacs : Ueber die Verspatung der Emptindungsleitung, Archiv fttr
Psychiatrie, Bd. x. Heft 2, p. 533. Concerning all such cases see the re
marks made above on pp. 205-6.

t Proceedings of American Soc. for Psychical Research, p. 95.

WILL. 491

executed, so also, where the chain is voluntary, we need to
know at each movement just where we are in it, if we are to
will intelligently what the next link shall be. A man with
no feeling of his movements might lead off never so well,
and yet be sure to get lost soon and go astray.* But
patients like those described, who get no kinaesthetic
impressions, can still be guided by the sense of sight
Thus Striimpell says of his boy :

' ' One could always observe how his eye was directed first to the
object held before him, then to his own arm; and how it never ceased

* In reality the movement cannot even be started correctly in some
cases without the kinaesthetic impression. Thus Dr. Striimpell relates
how turning over the boy's hand made him bend the little finger instead of
the forefinger, when his eye was closed. " Ordered to point, e.g., towards
the left with his left arm, the arm was usually raised straight forward, and
then wandered about in groping uncertainty, sometimes getting the right
position and then leaving it again. Similarly with the lower limbs. If the
patient, lying in bed, had, immediately after the tying of his eyes, to lay
the left leg over the right, it often happened that he moved it farther over
towards the left, and that it lay over the side of the bed in apparently
the most intolerably-uncomfortable position. The turning of the head,
too. from right to left, or towards certain objects known to the patient, only
ensued correctly when the patient, immediately before his eye was bandaged,
specially refreshed his perception as to what the required movement was
to be." In another anaesthetic of Dr. Strumpell's (described in the same
essay) the arm could not be moved at all unless the eyes were opened,
however energetic the volition. The variations in these hysteric cases are
great. Some patients cannot move the anaesthetic part at all when the eyes
are closed. Others move it perfectly well, and can even write continuous
sentences with the anaesthetic hand. The causes of such differences are as
yet incompletely unexplored. M. Binet suggests (Revue Philosophique,
xxv. 478) that in those who cannot move the hand at all the sensation of
light is required as a 'dynamogenic ' agent (see above, p 377); and that in
those who can move it skilfully the anaesthesia is only a pseudo-insensi
bility and that the limb is in reality governed by a dissociated or secondary
consciousness. This latter explanation is certainly correct. Professor
G. E. Milller (Pfltiger's Archiv, XLV. 90) invokes the fact of individual
differences of imagination to account for the cases who cannot write at all.
Their kinaesthetic images properly so called may be weak, he says, and
their optical images insufficiently powerful to supplement them without a
' rillip ' from sensation. Janet's observation that hysteric anaesthesias may
carry amnesias with them would perfectly legitimate Muller's supposition.
What we now want is a minute examination of the individual cases.
Meanwhile Binet 's article above referred to, and Bastian's paper in Brain
for April 1887, contain important discussions of the question. In a later
note I shall return to the subject again (see p. 520).

492 PSYCHOLOGY.

to follow the latter during its entire movement. All his voluntary
movements took place under the unremitting lead of the eye, which as
an indispensable guide, was never untrue to its functions."

So in the Landry case :

"With his eyes open, he easily opposes the thumb to each of the
other fingers ; with his eyes closed, the movement oil opposition occurs,
but the thumb only by chance meets the finger which it seeks. With
his eyes open he is able, without hesitation, to bring his two hands
together ; but when his eyes are closed his hands seek one another in
space, and only meet by chance."

In Charles Bell's well-known old case of anaesthesia the
Tvoman could only hold her baby safely in her arms so long
as she looked at it. I have myself reproduced a similar
condition in two hypnotic subjects whose arm and hand
were made anaesthetic without being paralyzed. They could
write their names when looking, but not when their eyes
were closed. The modern mode of teaching deaf mutes to
articulate consists in making them attentive to certain
laryngeal, labial, thoracic, and other sensations, the repro
duction of which becomes a guide to their vocalization.
Normally it is the remoter sensations which we receive by
the ear which keep us from going astray in our speech.
The phenomena of aphasia show this to be the usual case.*

This is perhaps all that need be said about the existence
of passive sensations of movement and their in dispensable -
ness for our voluntary activity. We may consequently set
it down as certain that, whether or no there be anything else in
the mind at the moment when we consciously will a certain actt
a mental conception made up of memory-images of these sensa
tions, defining which special act it is, must be there.

Now is there anything else in the mind when we wiU to do an
act ? We must proceed in this chapter from the simpler to
the more complicated cases. My first thesis accordingly is,
that there need be nothing else, and that in perfectly simple vol-

* Professor Beaunis found that the accuracy with which a certain tenor
sang was not lost when his vocal cords were made anaesthetic by cocain.
He concludes that the guiding sensations here are resident in the laryngeal
muscles themselves. They are much more probably in the ear. (Beaunis,
Les Sensations Internes (1889), p. 253).

WILL. 493

untary acts there is nothing else, in the mind but the kincesthetic.
idea, thus defined, of ivhat the act is to be.

A powerful tradition in Psychology will have it that
something additional to these images of passive sensation
is essential to the mental determination of a voluntary act.
There must, of course, be a special current of energy going
out from the brain into the appropriate muscles during the
act ; and this outgoing current (it is supposed) must have
in each particular case a feeling sui generis attached to it, or
else (it is said) the mind could never tell which particular
current, the current to this muscle or the current to that one,
was the right one to use. This feeling of the current of out
going energy has received from Wundt the name of the
feeling of inner vation. I disbelieve in its existence, and must
proceed to criticise the notion of it, at what I fear may to
some prove tedious length.

At first sight there is something extremely plausible in
the feeling of innervation. The passive feelings of move
ment with which we have hitherto been dealing all come
after the movement's performance. But wherever a move
ment is difficult and precise, we become, as a matter of fact,
acutely aware in advance of the amount and direction of
energy which it is to involve. One has only to play ten
pins or billiards, or throw a ball, to catch his will in the
act, as it were, of balancing tentatively its possible efforts,
and ideally rehearsing various muscular contractions nearly
correct, until it gets just the right one before it, when it
says ' Now go ! ' This premonitory weighing feels so much
like a succession of tentative sallyings forth of power into
the outer world, followed by correction just in time to avoid
the irrevocable deed, that the notion that outgoing nerve-
currents rather than mere vestiges of former passive sensi
bility accompany it, is a most natural one to entertain.

We find accordingly that most authors have taken the
existence of feelings of innervation as a matter of course.
Bain, Wundt, Helmholtz, and Mach defend them most
explicitly. But in spite of the authority which such writers
deservedly wield, I cannot help thinking that they are in
this instance wrong,— that the discharge into the motor
nerves is insentient, and that all our ideas of movement, in-

494 PSYCHOLOGY.

eluding those of tlie effort wliicli it requires, as well as those
of its direction, its extent, its strength, and its velocity, are
images of peripheral sensations, either ' remote,' or resident in
the moving parts, or in other parts which sympathetically act
with them in consequenceof the ' diffusive wave.'

A priori, as I shall show, there is no reason why there
should be a consciousness of the motor discharge, and there
is a reason why there should not be such a consciousness.
The presumption is thus against the existence of the feeling
of innervation ; and the burden of proving it falls upon those
who believe in it. If the positive empirical evidence which
they offer prove also insufficient, then their case falls to the
ground, and the feeling in question must be ruled out of
court.

In the first place, then, let me show that the assumption
of the feeling of innervation is unnecessary.

I cannot help suspecting that the scholastic prejudice
that ' the effect must be already in some way contained in the
cause ' has had something to do with making psychologists
so ready to admit the feeling of innervation. The outgoing
current being the effect, what psychic antecedent could
contain or prefigure it better than a feeling of it ? But
if we take a wide view, and consider the psychic ante
cedents of our activities at large, we see that the scholastic
maxim breaks down everywhere, and that its verification
in this instance would rather violate than illustrate the
general rule. In the diffusive wave, in reflex action, and
in emotional expression, the movements which are the
effects are in no manner contained by anticipation in the
stimuli which are their cause. The latter are subjective
sensations or objective perceptions, which do not in the
slightest degree resemble or prefigure the movements. But
we get them, and, presto ! there the movements are ! They
are knocked out of us, they surprise us. It is just cause
for wonder, as our chapter on Instinct has shown us;
that such bodily consequences should follow such men
tal antecedents. We explain the mystery tant bien que
mal by our evolutionary theories, saying that lucky varia
tions and heredity have gradually brought it about that

WILL. 495

this particular pair of terms should have grown into a uni
form sequence. Meanwhile why any state of consciousness
at all should precede a movement, we know not — the tw i
things seem so essentially discontinuous. But if a state of
consciousness there must be, why then it may, for aught
we can see, as easily be one sort of a state as another. It
is swallowing a camel and straining at a gnat for a man (all
of whose muscles will on certain occasions contract at a
sudden touch or sound) to suppose that on another occasion
the idea of the feelings about to be produced by their con
traction is an insufficient mental signal for the latter^ and to
insist that an additional antecedent is needed in the shape
of 'a feeling of the outgoing discharge.'

No ! for aught we can see, and in the light of general
analogy, the kinsesthetic ideas, as we have defined them, or
images of incoming feelings of attitude and motion, are as
likely as any feelings of innervation are, to be the last
psychic antecedents and determiners of the various cur
rents downwards into the muscles from the brain. The
question " What are the antecedents and determinants ?" is
a question of fact, to be decided by whatever empirical evi
dence may be found.*

* As the feeling of heat, for example, is the last psychic antecedent of
sweating, as the feeling of bright light is that of the pupil's contraction, as
the sight or smell of carrion is that of the movements of disgust, as the
remembrance of a blunder may be that of a blush, so the idea of a move
ment's sensible effects might be that of the movement itself. It is true
that the idea of sweating will not commonly make us sweat, nor that of
blushing make us blush. But in certain nauseated states the idea of vom
iting will make us vomit; and a kind of sequence which is in this case
realized only exceptionally might be the rule with the so-called voluntary
muscles It all depends on the nervous connections between the centres
of ideation and the discharging paths. These may differ from one sort of
centre to another. They do differ somewhat from one individual to an
other Many persons never blush at the idea of their blunders, but only
when the actual blunder is committed; others blush at the idea; and some
do uot blush at all. According to Lotze, with some persons " It is possible
to weep at will by trying to recall that peculiar feeling in the trigeminal
nerve which habitually precedes tears. Some can even succeed in sweating
voluntarily, by the lively recollection of the characteristic skin -sensations,
and the voluntary reproduction of an indescribable sort of feeling of relax
ation, which ordinarily precedes the flow of perspiration." (Med. Psych.,
p. 303.) The commoner type of exceptional case is that in which the idea
of the stimulus, not that of the effects, provokes the effects. Thus wo

496 PSYCHOLOGY.

But before considering the empirical evidence, let me
go on to show that there is a certain a priori reason why
the kin&sthetic images OUGHT to be the last psychic antecedents of
the outgoing currents, and why we should expect these currents
to be insentient; tvhy, in shorty the soi-disant feelings of inner-
vation should NOT exist.

It is a general principle in Psychology that conscious
ness deserts all processes where it can no longer be of use.
The tendency of consciousness to a minimum of complica
tion is in fact a dominating law. The law of parsimony in
logic is only its best known case. We grow unconscious
of every feeling which is useless as a sign to lead us to our
ends, and where one sign will suffice others drop out, and
that one remains, to work alone. We observe this in the
whole history of sense-perception, and in the acquisition
of every art. We ignore which eye we see with, because a
fixed mechanical association has been formed between our
motions and each retinal image. Our motions are the
ends of our seeing, our retinal images the signals to these
ends. If each retinal image, whichever it be, can suggest
automatically a motion in the right direction, what need
for us to know whether it be in the right eye or the left ?

read of persons who contract their pupils at will by strongly imagining a
brilliant light. A gentleman once informed me (strangely enough I can
not recall who he was, but I have an impression of his being a medical man)
that he could sweat at will by imagining himself on the brink of a precipice.
The sweating palms of fear are sometimes producible by imagining a ter
rible object (cf. Manouvrier in Rev. Phil., xxn. 203). One of my students,
whose eyes were made to water by sitting in the dentist's chair before a
bright window, can now shed tears by imagining that situation again.
One might doubtless collect a large number of idiosyncratic cases of this
sort. They teach us how greatly the centres vary in their power to dis
charge through certain channels. All that we need, now, to account for
the differences observed between the psychic antecedents of the volun
tary and involuntary movements is that centres producing ideas of the
movement's sensible effects should be able to instigate the former, but be
out of gear with the latter, unless in exceptional individuals. The famous
case of Col. Townsend, who could stop his heart at will, is well known.
See, on this whole matter, D. H. Tuke: Illustrations of the Influence of
the Mind on the Body, chap. xiv. § 3; also J. Braid: Observations on
Trance or Human Hybernation (1850). The latest reported case of volun
tary control of the heart is by Dr. S. A. Pease, in Boston Medical and Sur
gical Journal, May 30, 1889.

WILL. 497

That knowledge would be superfluous complication. So in
acquiring any art or voluntary function. The marksman
ends by thinking only of the exact position of the goal, the
singer only of the perfect sound, the balancer only of the
point of the pole whose oscillations he must counteract.
The associated mechanism has become so perfect in all
these persons that each variation in the thought of the
end is functionally correlated with the one movement
fitted to bring the latter about. Whilst they were tyros,
they thought of their means as well as their end : the
marksman of the position of his gun or bow, or the weight
of his stone ; the pianist of the visible position of the note
on the keyboard ; the singer of his throat or breathing ; the
balancer of his feet on the rope, or his hand or chin under
the pole. But little by little they succeeded in dropping
all this supernumerary consciousness, and they became
secure in their movements exactly in proportion as they
did so.

Now if we analyze the nervous mechanism of voluntary
action, we shall see that by virtue of this principle of par
simony in consciousness the motor discharge ought to be
devoid of sentience. If we call the immediate psychic an
tecedent of a movement the latter's mental cite, all that is
needed for invariability of sequence on the movement's
part is a, fixed connection between each several mental cue,
and one particular movement. For a movement to be pro
duced with perfect precision, it suffices that it obey in
stantly its own mental cue and nothing else, and that this
mental cue be incapable of awakening any other movement.
Now the simplest possible arrangement for producing vol
untary movements would be that the memory-images of
the movement's distinctive peripheral effects, whether resi
dent or remote,* themselves should severally constitute the
mental cues, and that no other psychic facts should inter
vene or be mixed up with them. For a million different
voluntary movements, we should then need a million dis-

* Prof. Harless, in an article which in many respects forestalls what I
have to say (Der Apparat des Willens, in Fichte's Zeitschrift f. Philos.,
Bd. 88, 1861), uses the convenient word Effectsbild to designate these
images.

498 PSYCHOLOGY.

tinct processes in the brain-cortex (each corresponding to
the idea cr memory-image of one movement), and a million
distinct paths of discharge. Everything would then be
unambiguously determined, and if the idea were right, the
movement would be right too. Everything after the idea
might then be quite insentient, and the motor discharge
itself could be unconsciously performed.

The partisans of the feeling of innervation, however,
say that the motor discharge itself must be felt, and that
it, and not the idea of the movement's distinctive effects,
must be the proper mental cue. Thus the principle of
parsimony is sacrificed, and all economy and simplicity are
lost. For what can be gained by the interposition of this
relay of feeling between the idea of the movement and the
movement? Nothing on the score of economy of nerve-
tracts ; for it takes just as many of them to associate a
million ideas of movement with a million motor centres,
each with a specific feeling of innervation attached to its
discharge, as to associate the same million ideas with a
million insentient motor centres. And nothing on the score
of precision ; for the -only conceivable way in which the
feelings of innervation might further precision would be by
giving to a mind whose idea of a movement was vague, a sort
of halting stage with sharper imagery on which to collect
its wits before uttering its fiat. But not only are the con
scious discriminations between our kinsesthetic ideas much
sharper than any one pretends the shades of difference be
tween feelings of innervation to be, but even were this not
the case, it is impossible to see how a mind with its idea
vaguely conceived could tell out of a lot of Innervations-
gefuMe, were they never so sharply differentiated, which one
fitted that idea exactly, and which did not. A sharply con
ceived idea will, on the other hand, directly awaken a dis
tinct movement as easily as it will awaken a distinct feeling
of innervation. If feelings can go astray through vague
ness, surely the fewer steps of feeling there are interposed
the more securely we shall act. We ought then, on a
priori grounds alone, to regard the Innervationsgefuhl as
a pure encumbrance, and to presume that the peripheral
ideas of movement are sufficient mental cues.

WILL. 499

The presumption being thus against the feelings of in-
nervation, those who defend their existence are bound to
prove it by positive evidence. The evidence might be di
rect or indirect. If we could introspectively feel them as
something plainly distinct from the peripheral feelings and
ideas of movement which nobody denies to be there, that
would be evidence both direct and conclusive. Unfor
tunately it does not exist.

There is no introspective evidence of the feeling of innerva-
tion, Wherever we look for it and think we have grasped
it, we find that we have really got a peripheral feeling or
image instead — an image of the way in which we feel when
the innervation is over, and the movement is in process of
doing or is done. Our idea of raising our arm, for example,
or of crooking our finger, is a sense, more or less vivid, of
how the raised arm or the crooked finger feels. There is
no other mental material out of which such an idea might
be made. We cannot possibly have any idea of our ears'
motion until our ears have moved ; and this is true of every
other organ as well.

Since the time of Hume it has been a commonplace in
psychology that we are only conversant with the outward
results of our volition, and not with the hidden inner
machinery of nerves and muscles which are what it prima
rily sets at work.* The believers in the feeling of inner
vation readily admit this, but seem hardly alive to its con
sequences. It seems to me that one immediate conse
quence ought to be to make us doubt the existence of the
feeling in dispute. Whoever says that in raising his arm
he is ignorant of how many muscles he contracts, in what
order of sequence, and in what degrees of intensity, ex
pressively avows a colossal amount of unconsciousness of
the processes of motor discharge. Each separate muscle
at any rate cannot have its distinct feeling of innervation.
Wundt,t who makes such enormous use of these hypo-

* The best modern statement I know is by Jaccoud: Des Paraplegics et
de 1'Ataxie du Mouvement (Paris, 1864), p. 591.

f Leidesdorf u. Meynert's Vierteljsch. f . Psychiatric, Bd. i. Heft I. S.
36-7 (1867). Physiologische Psychologic, 1st ed. S. 316.

500 PSYCHOLOGY.

thetical feelings in his psychologic construction of space, is
himself led to admit that they have no differences of quality,
but feel alike in all muscles, and vary only in their degrees
of intensity. They are used by the mind as guides, not
of ivhich movement, but of how strong a movement, it is
making, or shall make. But does not this virtually sur
render their existence altogether ? *

For if anything be obvious to introspection it is that
the degree of strength of our muscular contractions is com
pletely revealed to us by afferent feelings coming from the
muscles themselves and their insertions, from the vicinity
of the joints, and from the general fixation of the larynx,
chest, face, and body, in the phenomenon of effort, objec
tively considered. When a certain degree of energy of con
traction rather than another is thought of by us, this com
plex aggregate of afferent feelings, forming the material of
our thought, renders absolutely precise and distinctive our
mental image of the exact strength of movement to be
made, and the exact amount of resistance to be overcome.

Let the reader try to direct his will towards a particu
lar movement, and then notice what constituted the direc
tion of the will. Was it anything over and above the no
tion of the different feelings to which the movement when
effected would give rise ? If we abstract from these feel
ings, will any sign, principle, or means of orientation be
left by which the will may innervate the right muscles
with the right intensity, and not go astray into the wrong
ones ? Strip off these images of result, and so far from
leaving us with a complete assortment of directions into
which our will may launch itself, you leave our conscious
ness in an absolute and total vacuum. If I will to write
"Peter" rather than "Paul," it is the thought of certain
digital sensations, of certain alphabetic sounds, of certain
appearances on the paper, and of no others, which im
mediately precedes the motion of my pen.

* Professor Fouillee, who defends them in the Revue Philosophique,
xxvin, 561 ff.. also admits (p. 574) that they are the same whatever be th*
movement, and that all our discrimination of which movement we are inner
vating is afferent, consisting of sensations after, and of sensory images
before, the act.

WILL. 501

If I will to utter the word Paid rather than Peter, it ih
the thought of my voice falling on my ear, and of certain
muscular feelings in my tongue, lips, and larynx, which
guide the utterance. All these are incoming feelings, and
between the thought of them, by which the act is mentally
specified with all possible completeness, and the act itself,
there is no room for any third order of mental phenome
non. There is indeed the fiat, the element of consent,
or resolve that the act shall ensue. This, doubtless, to
the reader's mind, as to my own, constitutes the essence of
the voluntariness of the act. This fiat will be treated of
in detail farther on. It may be entirely neglected here,
for it is a constant coefficient, affecting all voluntary
actions alike, and incapable of serving to distinguish them.
No one will pretend that its quality varies according as the
right arm, for example, or the left is used.

An anticipatory image, then, of the sensorial consequences^
of a movement, plus (on certain occasions) the fiat that these)
consequences shall become actual, is the only psychic state]
^vhich introspection lets us discern as the forerunner of our)
voluntary acts. There is no introspective evidence what
ever of any still later or concomitant feeling attached to
the efferent discharge. The various degrees of difficulty with
which the fiat is given form a complication of the utmost
importance, to be discussed farther on.

Now the reader may still shake his head and say :
" But can you seriously mean that all the wonderfully
exact adjustment of my action's strength to its ends is not
a matter of outgoing innervation ? Here is a cannon-ball,
and here a pasteboard box : instantly and accurately I
lift each from the table, the ball not refusing to rise
because my innervation was too weak, the box not flying
abruptly into the air because it was too strong. Could
representations of the movement's different sensory effects
im the two cases be so delicately foreshadowed in the
mind? or being there, is it credible that they should,
all unaided, so delicately graduate the stimulation of the
unconscious motor centres to their work?" Even so!
I reply to both queries. We have a most extremely deli
cate foreshadowing of the sensory effects. Why else the

502 PSYCHOLOGY.

start of surprise that runs through us if some one has
tilled the light-seeming box with sand before we try to
lift it, or has substituted for the cannon-ball which we
know a painted wooden imitation? Surprise can only
come from getting a sensation which differs from the one
we expect. But the truth is that when we know the objects
well, the very slightest difference from the expected weight
will surprise us, or at least attract our notice. With un
known objects we begin by expecting the weight made
probable by their appearance. The expectation of this
sensation innervates our lift, and we ' set ' it rather small
at first. An instant verifies whether it is too small. Our
expectation rises, i.e., we think in a twinkling of a setting
of the chest and teeth, a bracing of the back, and a more
violent feeling in the arms. Quicker than thought we have
them, and with them the burden ascends into the air.*
Bernhardt f has shown in a rough experimental way that
our estimation of the amount of a resistance is as delicately
graduated when our wills are passive, and our limbs made
to contract by direct local faradization, as when we our-

* Of. Souriau in Rev. Philosophique, xxn. 454.— Professor G. E.
Mtiller thus describes some of his experiments with weights : If, after
lifting a weight of 3000 grams a number of times we suddenly get a weight
of only 500 grams to lift, " this latter weight is then lifted with a velocity
which strikes every onlooker, so that the receptacle for the weight with all
its contents often flies high up as if it carried the arm along with it, and
the energy with which it is raised is sometimes so entirely out of propor
tion to the weight itself, that the contents of the receptacle are slung out
upon the table in spite of the mechanical obstacles which such a result has
to overcome. A more palpable proof that the trouble here is a wrong adap-
tation of the motor impulse could not be given." Pfltiger's Archiv, XLV.
47. Compare also p. 57, and the quotation from Bering on the same
page.

t Archiv fur Psychiatric, m. 618-635. Bernhardt strangely enough
iieems to think that what his experiments disprove is the existence of affer
ent muse liar feelings, not those of efferent innervation— apparently because
he deems that the peculiar thrill of the electricity ought to overpower all
other afferent feelings from the part But it is far more natural to inter
pret his results the other way, even aside from the certainty yielded by
other evidence that passive muscular feelings exist. This other evidence,
after being compendiously summed up by Sachs in Reichert und Du
Bois' Archiv (1874), pp. 174-188, is, as far as the anatomical and physio
logical grounds go, again thrown into doubt by Mays, Zeitschrift f. Bin-
logie, Bd. xx.

WILL. 503

selves innervate them. Ferrier * has repeated and verified
the observations. They admit of no great precision, and
too much stress should not be laid upon them either way ;
but at the very least they tend to show that no added deli
cacy would accrue to our perception from the consciousness
of the efferent process, even if it existed.

Since there is no direct introspective evidence for the
feelings of innervation, is there any indirect or circumstan
tial evidence ? Much is offered ; but on critical examina
tion it breaks down. Let us see what it is. Wundt says
that were our motor feelings of an afferent nature,

' ' it ought to be expected that they would increase and diminish with
the amount of outer or inner work actually effected in contraction.
This, however, is not the case, but the strength of the motor sensation
is purely proportional to the strength of the impulse to movement,
which starts from the central organ innervating the motor nerves.
This may be proved by observations made by physicians in cases of
morbid alteration in the muscular effect. A patient whose arm or leg
is half paralyzed, so that he can only move the limb with great effort,
has a distinct feeling of this effort : the limb seems to him heavier than
before, appearing as if weighted with lead ; he has, therefore, a sense
of more work effected than formerly, and yet the effected work is either
the same or even less. Only he must, to get even this effect, exert a
stronger innervation, a stronger motor impulse, than formerly." f

In complete paralysis, also, patients will be conscious
of putting forth the greatest exertion to move a limb which
remains absolutely still upon the bed, and from which of
course no afferent muscular or other feelings can come.;):

But Dr. Terrier in his Functions of the Brain (Am. Ed.

* Functions of the Brain, p. 228.

\ Vorlesungen iiber Menschen und Thierseele, i. 222.

J In some instances we get an opposite result. Dr. H. Charlton Bastian
(British Medical Journal (1869), p. 461, note), says :

" Ask a man whose lower extremities are completely paralyzed, whether,
when he ineffectually wills to move either of these limbs, he is conscious
of an expenditure of energy in any degree proportionate to that which he
would have experienced if his muscles had naturally responded to his voli
tion. He will tell us rather that he has a sense only of his utter power-
lessness, and that his volition is a mere mental act, carrying with it no feel
ings of expended energy such as he is accustomed to experience when his
muscles are in powerful action, and from which action and its consequences
alone, as I think, he can derive any adequate notion of resistance."

504 PSYCHOLOGY

pp. 222-4) disposes very easily of this line of argument
He says :

" It is necessary, however, to exclude movements altogether before
such an explanation [as Wundt's] can be adopted. Now, though the
hemiplegic patient cannot move his paralyzed limb, though he is con
scious of trying hard, yet he will be found to be making powerful mus
cular exertion of some kind. Vulpian has called attention to the fact,
and I have repeatedly verified it, that when a hemiplegic patient is
desired to close his paralyzed fist, in his endeavors to do so he uncon
sciously performs this action with the sound one. It is, in fact, almost
impossible to exclude such a source of complication, and unless this is
taken into account very erroneous conclusions as to the cause of the
sense of effort may be drawn. In the fact of muscular contraction and
the concomitant centripetal impressions, even though the action is not
euch as is desired, the conditions of the consciousness of effort exist
without our being obliged to regard it as depending on central innerva-
tion or outgoing currents.

' ' It is, however, easy to make an experiment of a simple nature
which will satisfactorily account for the sense of effort, even when these
unconscious contractions of the other side, such as hemiplegics make,
are entirely excluded.

' l If the reader will extend his right arm and hold his forefinger in
the position required for pulling the trigger of a pistol, he may without
actually moving his finger, but by simply making believe, experience a
consciousness of energy put forth. Here, then, is a clear case of con
sciousness of energy without actual contraction of the muscles either of
the one hand or the other, and without any perceptible bodily strain.
If the reader will again perform the experiment, and pay careful atten
tion to the condition of his respiration, he will observe that his con
sciousness of effort coincides with a fixation of the muscles of his chest,
and that in proportion to the amount of energy he feels he is putting
forth, he is keeping his glottis closed and actively contracting his res
piratory muscles. Let him place his finger as before, and continue
breathing all the time, and he will find that however much he may
direct his attention to his finger, he will experience not the slightest
trace of consciousness of effort until he has actually moved the finger
itself, and then it is referred locally to the muscles in action. It is only
when this essential and ever-present respiratory factor is, as it has been,
overlooked, that the consciousness of effort can with any degree of
plausibility be ascribed to the outgoing current. In the contraction of
the respiratory muscles there are the necessary conditions of centripetal
impressions, and these are capable of originating the general sense of
effort. When these active efforts are withheld, no consciousness of
effort ever arises, except in so far as it is conditioned by the local con
traction of the group of muscles towards which the attention ig directed,

WILL. 505

or by other muscular contractions called unconsciously into play in the
attempt.

1 ' I am unable to find a single case of consciousness of effort which
is not explicable in one or other of the ways specified. In all instances
the consciousness of effort is conditioned by the actual fact of muscular
contraction. That it is dependent on centripetal impressions generated
by the act of contraction, I have already endeavored to show. When
the paths of the centripetal impressions or the cerebral centres of the
same are destroyed, there is no vestige of a muscular sense. That the
central organs for the apprehension of the impressions originating from
muscular contraction are different from those which send out the motor
impulse, has already been established. But when Wundt argues that
this cannot be so, because then the sensation would always keep pace
with the energy of muscular contraction, he overlooks the important
factor of the fixation of the respiratory muscles, which is the basis of
the general sense of effort in all its varying degrees."

To these remarks of Ferrier's I have nothing to add.*
Any one may verify them, and they prove conclusively that
the consciousness of muscular exertion, being impossible
without movement effected somewhere, must be an afferent
and not an efferent sensation ; a consequence, and not an
antecedent, of the movement itself. An idea of the amount
of muscular exertion requisite to perform a certain move
ment can consequently be nothing other than an anticipa
tory image of the movement's sensible effects.

* Miinstei berg's words may be added : "In lifting an object in the
band I can discover no sensation of volitional energy 1 perceive in the
drst place a slight tension about the head, but that this results from a con
traction in the head muscles, and not from a feeling of the brain-discharge,
is shown by the simple fact that I get the tension on the right side of the
uead when I move the right arm, whereas the motor discharge takes place
in the opposite side of the brain. ... In maximal contractions ofbody-
tind limb-muscles there occur, as if it were to reinforce them, those special
contractions of the muscles of the face [especially frowning and clinching
teeth] and those tensions of the skin of the head. These sympathetic
movements, felt particularly on the side which makes the effort, are perhaps
the immediate ground why we ascribe our awareness of maximal contrac
tion to the region of the head, and call it u consciousness of force, instead
of a peripheral sensation." (Die Willenshandlung (1888), pp.73, 82.) Herr
Milnsterberg's work is a little masterpiece, which appeared after my text
was written, I shall have repeatedly to refer to it again, and cordially
recommend to the reader its most thorough refutation of the Innervations-
geftlhl-theory.

606 PSYCHOLOGY.

Driven thus from the body at large, where next shall the
circumstantial evidence for the feeling of innervation lodge
itself? Where but in the muscles of the eye, from which
small retreat it judges itself inexpugnable. Nevertheless,
that fastness too must fall, and by the lightest of bom
bardments. But, before trying the bombardment, let us
recall our general principles about optical vertigo, or illu
sory appearance of movement in objects.

We judge that an object moves under two distinct sets
of circumstances :

1. When its image moves on the retina, and we know
that the eye is still.

2. When its image is stationary on the retina, and we
know that the eye is moving. In this case we feel that we
follow the object.

In either of these cases a mistaken judgment about the
state of the eye will produce optical vertigo.

If in case 1 we think our eye is still when it is really
moving, we get a movement of the retinal image which
we judge to be due to a real outward motion of the
object. This is what happens after looking at rushing
water, or through the windows of a moving railroad car, or
after turning on one's heel to giddiness. The eyes, without
our intending to move them, go through a series of invol
untary rotations, continuing those they were previously
obliged to make to keep objects in view. If the objects had
been whirling by to our right, our eyes when turned to
stationary objects will still move slowly towards the right.
The retinal image upon them will then move like that of an
object passing to the left. We then try to catch it by vol
untarily and rapidly rotating the eyes to the left, when the
involuntary impulse again rotates the eyes to the right, con
tinuing the apparent motion ; and so the game goes on.
(See above, pp. 89-91.)

If in case 2 we think our eyes moving when they are in
reality still, we shall judge that we are following a moving
object when we are but fixating a steadfast one. Illusions
of this kind occur after sudden and complete paralysis of
special eye muscles, and the partisans of feelings of efferent

WILL. 507

innervation regard them as experimenta crucis. Helmholtz
writes : *

" When the external rectus muscle of the right eye, or its nerve, is
'paralyzed, the eye can no longer be rotated to the right side. So long
as the patient turns it only to the nasal side it makes regular move
ments, and he perceives correctly the position of objects in the visual
field. So soon, however, as he tries to rotate it outwardly, i.e., towards
the right, it ceases to obey his will, stands motionless in the middle of
its course, and the objects appear flying to the right, although position
of eye and retinal image are unaltered, t

" In such a case the exertion of the will is followed neither by actual
movement of the eye, nor by contraction of the muscle in question,
nor even by increased tension in it. The act of will prodttced absolutely
no effect beyond the nervous system, and yet we judge of the direction
of the line of vision as if the will had exercised its normal effects. We
believe it to have moved to the right, and since the retinal image is-
unchanged, we attribute to the object the same movement we have er
roneously ascribed to the eye. . . . These phenomena leave no room
for doubt that we only judge the direction of the line of sight by the
effort of will with which we strive to change the position of our eyes.
There are also certain weak feelings in our eyelids, . . . and further
more in excessive lateral rotations we feel a fatiguing strain in the
muscles. But all these feelings are too faint and vague to be of use in
the perception of direction. We feel then what impulse of the will, and
how strong a one, we apply to turn our eye into a given position."

Partial paralysis of the same muscle, paresis, as it has
been called, seems to point even more conclusively to the
same inference, that the will to innervate is felt independ
ently of all its afferent results. I will quote the account
given by a recent authority, $ of the effects of this accident :

" When the nerve going to an eye muscle, e.g., the external rectus
of one side, falls into a state of paresis, the first result is that the same
volitional stimulus, which under normal circumstances would have per
haps rotated the eye to its extreme position outwards, now is competent
to effect only a moderate outward rotation, say of 20°. If now, shutting:
the sound eye, the patient looks at an object situated just so far out-

* Physiologische Optik, p. 600.

f [The left and sound eye is here supposed covered. If both eyes look
at the same field there are double images which still more perplex the judg
ment. The patient, however, learns to see correctly before many days or
weeks are over. — W. J.J

t Alfred Graefe, in Handbuch der gesammten Augenheilkunde, Bd.
vi. pp. 18-21.

508 PSYCHOLOGY.

wards from the paretic eye that this latter must turn 20° in order to
see it distinctly, the patient will feel as if he had moved it not only 20°
towards the side, but into its extreme lateral position, for the impulse
of innervation requisite for bringing it into view is a perfectly conscious
act, whilst the diminished state of contraction of the paretic muscle lies
for the present out of the ken of consciousness. The test proposed by
von Graefe, of localization by the sense of touch, serves to render evi
dent the error which the patient now makes. If we direct him to touch
rapidly the object looked at, with the fore-finger of the hand of the same
side, the line through which the finger moves will not be the line of
sight directed 20° outward, but will approach more nearly to the ex
treme possible outward line of vision. "

A stone-cutter with the external rectus of the left eye
paralyzed, will strike his hand instead of his chisel with his
hammer, until experience has taught him wisdom.

It appears as if here the judgment of direction could only
arise from the excessive innervation of the rectus when the
object is looked at. All the afferent feelings must be iden
tical with those experienced when the eye is sound and the
judgment is correct. The eyeball is rotated just 20° in the
one case as in the other, the image falls on the same part
of the retina, the pressures on the eyeball and the tensions
of the skin and conjunctiva are identical. There is only
one feeling which can vary, and lead us to our mistake.
That feeling must be the effort which the will makes, mod
erate in the one case, excessive in the other, but in both
-cases an efferent feeling, pure and simple.

Beautiful and clear as this reasoning seems to be, it is
based on am incomplete inventory of the afferent data. The
writers have all omitted to consider what is going on in the
other eye. This is kept covered during the experiments, to
prevent double images, and other complications. But if its
condition under these circumstances be examined, it will
be found to present changes which must result in strong
afferent feelings. And the taking account of these feelings
demolishes in an instant all the conclusions which the au
thors from whom I have quoted base upon their supposed
absence. This I will now proceed to show.*

* Professor G. E. Muller (Zur Grundlegung der Psychophysik (1878),
p. 318, WHS the first to explain the phenomenon after the manner advocated

WILL.

509

Take first the case of complete paralysis and assume the
right eye affected. Suppose the patient desires to rotate
his gaze to an object situated in the extreme right of the
field of vision. As Hering has so beautifully shown, both
eyes move by a common act of innervation, and in this
instance both move towards the right. But the paralyzed
right eye stops short in the middle of its course, the object
still appearing far to the sight of its fixation point. The
left sound eye, meanwhile, although covered, continues its
rotation until the extreme rightward limit thereof has been
reached. To an observer looking at both eyes the left will
seem to squint. Of course this continued and extreme ro
tation produces afferent feelings of rightward motion in the
eyeball, which momentarily overpower the faint feelings
of central position in the diseased and uncovered eye. The
patient feels by his left eyeball as if he were following an
object which by his right retina he perceives he does not
overtake. All the conditions of optical vertigo are here
present : the image stationary on the retina, and the erro
neous conviction that the eyes are moving.

The objection that a feeling in the left eyeball ought not
to produce a conviction that the right eye moves, will be
considered in a moment. Let us meanwhile turn to the

in the text. Still unacquainted with his book, 1 published my own simi
lar explanation two years later.

"Professor Mach in his wonderfully original little work 'Beitrage zur
Analyse der Einpfindungen,' p 57, describes an artificial way of getting
translocation, and explains the effect likewise by the feeling of innervation.
"Turn your eyes," he says, " as far as possible towards the left and press
against the right sides of the orbits two large lumps of putty. If you then
try to look as quickly as possible towards the right, this succeeds, on ac
count of the incompletely spherical form of the eyes, only imperfectly, and
the objects consequently appear translocated very considerably towards the
right. The bare will to look rightwards gives to all images on the retina a
greater rightwards value, to express it shortly. The experiment is at first
surprising."— I regret to say that I cannot myself make it succeed— I know
not for what reason But even where it does succeed it seems to me that
the conditions are much too complicated for Professor Mach's theoretic con-
elusions to be safely drawn. The putty squeezed into the orbit, and the
pressure of the eyeball against it must give rise to peripheral sensations
strong enough, at any rate (if only of the right kind), to justify any amount
of false perception of our eyeball's position, quite apart from the iunerva-
tion feelings which Professsor Mach supposes to coexist.

510 PSYCHOLOGY.

ease of simple paresis with apparent translocation 01 the
field.

Here the right eye succeeds in fixating the object, but
observation of the left eye will reveal to an observer the
fact that it squints just as violently inwards as in the former
case. The direction which the finger of the patient takes
in pointing to the object, is the direction of this squinting
and covered left eye. As Graefe says (although he fails to
seize the true import of his own observation), " It appears
to have been by no means sufficiently noticed how signifi
cantly the direction of the line of sight of the secondarily
deviating eye [i.e., of the left,] and the line of direction of
the pointed finger agree."

The translocation would, in a word, be perfectly ex
plained could we suppose that the sensation of a certain
degree of rotation in the left eyeball were able to suggest
to the patient the positign of an object whose image falls
on the right retina alone. * Can, then, a feeling in one eyo

* An illusion in principle exactly analogous to that of the patient under
discussion can be produced experimentally in anyone in a way which
Hering has described in his Lehre von Binocularen Sehen, pp. 12-14. I wiU
quote Helmhoitz's account of it, which is especially valuable as coming
from a believer in the Innervationsgefuhl : "Let the two eyes first look
parallel, then let the right eye be closed whilst the left still looks at the in
finitely distant object a. The directions of both eyes will thus remain un
altered, and a will be seen in its right place. Now accommodate the left
eye for a point / [a needle in Hering's experiment] lying on the optical
axis between it and a, only very near. The position of the left eye and its
optical axis, as well as the place of the retinal image upon it ... are
wholly unaltered by this movement, But the consequence is that an ap
parent movement of the object occurs — a movement towards the left, As
soon as we accommodate again for distance the object returns to its old
place. Now what alters itself in this experiment is only the position of the
closed right eye : its optical axis, when the effort is made to accommodate
for the point/, also converges towards this point. . . . Conversely it is
possible for me to make my optical axes diverge, even with closed eyes, go
that in the above experiment the right eye should turn far to the right of
«. This divergence is but slowly reached, and gives me therefore no
illusory movement. But when I suddenly relax my effort to make it, and
the right optical axis springs back to the parallel position, I immediately
see the object which the left eye fixates shift its position towards the left.
Thus not only the position of the seeing eye a, but also that of the closed
eye b, influences our judgment of the direction in which the seen object

WILL. 5ll

be confounded with a feeling in the other? It most as
suredly can, for not only Bonders and Adamiik, by their
vivisections, butHering by his exquisite optical experiments,
have proved that the apparatus of innervation for both
eyes is single, and that they function as one organ — a
double eye, according to Hering, or what Helmholtz calls
a Cydopenauge. The retinal feelings of this double organ,
singly innervated, are naturally undistinguished as respects
our knowing whether they belong to the left retina or to
the right. We use them only to tell us where their objects
lie. It takes long practice directed specially ad hoc to
teach us on which retina the sensations severally fall. Simi
larly the different sensations which arise from the posi
tions of the eyeballs are used exclusively as signs of the
position of objects ; an object directly fixated being local
ized habitually at the intersection of the two optical axes,
but without any separate consciousness on our part that
the position of one axis is different from another. All we
are aware of is a consolidated feeling of a certain ' strain '
in the eyeballs, accompanied by the perception that just
so far in front and so far to the right or to the left there is
an object which we see. So that a * muscular ' process in
one eye is as likely to combine with a retinal process in the
other eye to effect a perceptive judgment, as two processes
in one eye are likely so to combine.

Another piece of circumstantial evidence for the feelings
of innervation is that adduced by Professor Mach, as fol
lows :

" If we stand on a bridge, and look at the water flowing beneath,
we usually feel ourselves at rest, whilst the water seems in motion.
Prolonged looking at the water, however, commonly has for its result
to make the bridge with the observer and surroundings suddenly seem
to movo in the direction opposed to that of the water, whilst the water
itself assumes the appearance of standing still. The relative motion of
the objects is in both cases the same, and there must therefore be some

lies. The open eye remaining fixed, and the closed eye moving towards
the right or left, the object seen by the open eye appears also to move to
wards the right or left. " (Physiol. Optik, pp. 607-8.)

512 PSYCHOLOGY.

adequate physiological ground why sometimes one, sometimes the other
part of them is felt to move. In order to investigate the matter con-

/ veniently, I had the simple

apparatus constructed which
is represented in Fig. 86. An
oil-cloth with a simple pattern
is horizontally stretched over
two cylinders (each 2 metres
long and 3 feet apart) and kept
in uniform motion by the help
of a crank. Across the cloth,
FlG- 86 and some 30 cm. above it, is

stretched a string, with a knot #, which serves as a fixation-point for
the eye of the observer. If the observer follow with his eyes the
pattern of the cloth as it moves, he sees it in movement, himself and the
surroundings at rest. But if he looks at the knot, he soon feels as
if the entire room were moving contrary to the direction of the cloth,
whilst the latter seems to stand still. This change in the mode of
looking comes about in more or less time according to one's momentary
disposition, but usually it takes but a few seconds. If one once under
stands the point, one can make the two appearances alternate at will.
Every following of the oil-cloth makes the observer stationary ; every
fixation of the knot or inattention to the oil-cloth, so that its pattern
becomes blurred, sets him in apparent motion." *

Professor Mach proceeds to explain the phenomenon as
follows:

" Moving objects exert, as is well known, a peculiar motor stimulation
upon the eye, they draw our attention and our look after them. If the
look really follows them ... we assume that they move. But if the
eye, instead of following the moving objects, remains steadfastly at
rest, it must be that the constant stimulus to motion which it receives
is neutralized by an equally constant current of innervation flowing
into its motor apparatus. But this is just what would happen if the
steadfastly fixated point were itself moving uniformly in the other di
rection, and we were following it with our eyes. When this comes
about, whatever motionless things are looked at must appear in mo
tion.''!

The knot a?, the string, we ourselves, and all our sta-

* Beitrage zur Analyse der Empfindungen, p. 65.
P. 68.

WILL. 613

tionary surroundings thus appear in movement, according
to Mach, because we are constantly innervating our eye
balls to resist the drag exerted upon them by the pattern
or the flowing waves. I have myself repeated the observa
tion many times above flowing streams, but have never suc
ceeded in getting the full illusion as described by Mach.
I gain a sense of the movement of the bridge and of my
own body, but the river never seems absolutely to stop : it
still moves in one direction, whilst I float away in the other.
But, be the illusion partial or complete, a different ex
planation of it from Professor Mach's seems to me the
more natural one to adopt. The illusion is said to cease
when, our attention being fully fixed on the moving oil-cloth,
we perceive the latter for what it is; and to recommence, on
the contrary, when we perceive the oil-cloth as a vaguely
moving background behind an object which we directly
fixate and whose position with regard to our own body is
unchanged. This, however, is the sort of consciousness
which we have whenever we are ourselves borne in a vehicle,
on horseback, or in a boat. As we and our belongings go
one way, the whole background goes the other. I should
rather, therefore, explain Professor Mach's illusion as
similar to the illusion at railroad-stations described above
on page 90. The other train moves, but it makes ours seem
to move, because, filling the window as it does, it stands for
the time being as the total background. So here, the
water or oil-cloth stands for us as background iiberhaupt
whenever we seem to ourselves to be moving over it. The
relative motion felt by the retina is assigned to that one of
its components which we look at more in itself and less as
a mere repoussoir. This may be the knot above the oil
cloth or the bridge beneath our feet, or it may be, on the
other hand, the oil-cloth's pattern or the surface of the
swirling stream. Similar changes may be produced in the
apparent motion of the moon and the clouds through which
it shines, by similarly altering the attention. Such altera
tions, however, in our conception of which part of the vis
ual field is substantive object and which part background,
seem to have no connection with feelings of innervation. I

514 PS TCHOLOG T.

cannot, therefore, regard the observation of Prof. Mach as
any proof that the latter feelings exist.*

The circumstantial evidence for the feeling of innervation
thus seems to break down like the introspective evidence.
But not only can we rebut experiments intended to prove
it, we can also adduce experiments which disprove it. A
person who moves a limb voluntarily must innervate it in
any case, and if he feels the innervation he ought to be able
to use the feeling to define what his limb is about, even
though the limb itself were anaesthetic. If, however, the
limb be totally anaesthetic, it turns out that he does not
know at all how much work it performs in its contraction — in
other words, he has no perception of the amount of inner
vation which he exerts. A patient examined by Messrs.
Gley and Marillier beautifully showed this. His entire
arms, and his trunk down to the navel, were insensible both
superficially and deeply, but his arms were not paralyzed :

' ' We take three stone bottles — two of them are empty and weigh
each 250 grams; the third is full of mercury and weighs 1850 grams.
We ask L ... to estimate their weight and tell us which is heaviest.
He declares that he finds them all three alike. With many days of in
terval we made two series of six experiments each. The result was always
the same. The experiment, it need hardly be said, was arranged in

* I owe the interpretation in the text to my friend and former student, Mr.
E. S. Drown, whom I set to observe the phenomenon before I had observed
it myself. Concerning the vacillations in our interpretation of relative
motion over retina and skin, see above, p. 173.

Herr Miinsterberg gives additional reasons against the feeling of in
nervation, of which I will quote a couple. First, our ideas of movement are
all faint ideas, resembling in this the copies of sensations in memory. Were
they feelings of the outgoing discharge, they would be original states of
consciousness, not copies ; and ought by analogy to be mmd like other
original states. — Second, our unstriped muscles yield no feelings in con
tracting, nor can they be contracted at will, differing thus in t wo peculiari
ties from the voluntary muscles. What more natural than to suppose that
the two peculiarities hang together, and that the reason why we cannot con
tract our intestines, for example, at will, is, that we have no memory-images
of how their contraction feels ? Were the supposed innervation-feeling al
ways the 'mental cue,' one doesn't see why we might not have it even
where, as here, the contractions themselves are unfelt, and why it might
not bring the contractions about. (Die Willenshandlung, pp. 87-8.)

WILL. 515

such wise that he could be informed neither by sight nor by hearing.
He even declared, holding in his hand the bottleful of mercury, that
he found it to have no weight. ... We place successively in his hand
(his eyes being still bandaged) a piece of modelling wax, a stick of hard
wood, a thick India-rubber tube, a newspaper folded up lengthwise and
rumpled, and we make him squeeze these several objects. He feels no
difference of resistance and does not even perceive that anything is in
his hand."*

M. Gley in another place t quotes experiments by Dr.
Bloch which prove that the sense which we have of our
limbs' position owes absolutely nothing to the feeling of in-
nervation put forth. Dr. Bloch stood opposite the angle of
a screen whose sides made an angle of about 90°, and tried
to place his hands symmetrically, or so that both should
fall on corresponding spots of the two screen-sides, which
were marked with squares for the purpose. The average
error being noted, one hand was then passively carried by
an assistant to a spot on its screen-side, and the other
actively sought the corresponding spot on the opposite
side. The accuracy of the correspondence proved to be
as great as when both arms were innervated voluntarily,
showing that the consciousness of innervation in the first
of the two experiments added nothing to the sense of the
limbs' position. Dr. Bloch then tried, pressing a certain
number of pages of a book between the thumb and fore
finger of one hand, to press an equal number between the
same fingers of the other hand. He did this just as well
when the fingers in question were drawn apart by India-
rubber bands as when they were uninterfered with, showing
that the physiologically much greater innervation-current
required in the former case had no effect upon the conscious
ness of the movement made, so far as its spatial character
at any rate was concerned.^

* Revue Philosophique. xxin. 442.

f Ibid. xx. 604.

\ Herr Stern berg (Pflilger's Archiv, xxxvn. p. 1) thinks that he proves
the feeling of innervation by the fact that when we have willed to make a
movement we generally think that it is made. We have already seen some
of the facts on pp. 105-6, above. 8. cites from Exner the fact that if we
put a piece of hard rubber between our back teeth and bite, our front teeth
seem actually to approach each other, although it is physically impossible

516 PSYCHOLOGY.

On the whole, then, it seems as probable as anything
can well be, that these feelings of in nervation do not exist.

for them to do so. He proposes the following experiment : Lay the palm
of the hand on a table with the forefinger overlapping its edge and flexed
back as far as possible, whilst the table keeps the other fingers extended ;
then try to flex the terminal joint of the forefinger without looking. You
do not do it, and yet you think that you do. Here again the innervation,,
according to the author, is felt as an executed movement. It seems to me,
as I said in the previous place, that the illusion is in all these cases due to
the inveterate association of ideas. Normally our will to move has always,
been followed by the sensation that we time moved, except when the
simultaneous sensation of an external resistance was there. The result is.
that where we feel no external resistance, and the muscles and tendons
tighten, the invariably associated idea is intense enough to be hallucinatory.
In the experiment with the teeth, the resistance customarily met with when
our masseters contract is a soft one. We do not close our teeth on a thing
like hard rubber once in a million times ; so when we do so, we imagine
the habitual result.— Persons with amputated limbs more often than not
continue to feel them as if they were still there, and can, moreover, give
themselves the feeling of moving them at will. The life-long seusorial
associate of the idea of 'working one's toes,' e.g. (uncorrected by any
opposite sensation, since no real sensation of non-movement can come
from non-existing toes), follows the idea and swallows it up. The man
thinks that his toes are 'working' (cf. Proceedings of American Soc. for
Psych. Research, p. 249).

Herr Loeb also comes to the rescue of the feeling of innervation with
observations of his own made after my text was written, but they convince
me no more than the arguments of others. Loeb's facts are these (Pfliiger's
Archiv, XLIV. p. 1): If we stand before a vertical surface., and if. with our
hands at different heights, we simultaneously make with them what seem to us
equally extensive movements, that movement always turns out really shorter
which is made with the arm whose muscles (in virtue of the arm's position)
are already the more contracted. The same result ensues when the arms are
laterally un symmetrical. Loeb assumes that both arms contract by virtue
of a common innervation, but that although this innervation is relatively
less effective upon the more contracted arm, our feeling of its equal
strength overpowers the disparity of the incoming sensations of movement
which the two limbs send back, and makes us think that the spaces they
traverse are the same. " The sensation of the extent and direction of our
voluntary movements depends accordingly upon the impulse of our will to
move, and not upon the feelings set up by the motion in the active organ ."
Now if this is the elementary law which Loeb calls it, why does it only
manifest its effect when both hands are moving simultaneously? Why
not when the same hand makes successive movements ? and especially why
not when both hands move symmetrically or at the same level, but one ^ of
them is weighted? A weighted hand surely requires a stronger innervation
than an unweighted one to move an equal distance upwards ; and yet, as
Loeb confesses, we do not tend to overestimate the path which it trav
erses under these circumstances. The fact is that the illusion which Loeb

WILL. 517

If the motor cells are distinct structures, they are as insen
tient as the motor nerve-trunks are after the posterior roots
are cut. If they are not distinct structures, but are only
the last sensory cells, those at the ' mouth of the funnel,' *
then their consciousness is that of kinsesthetic ideas and
sensations merely, and this consciousness accompanies the
rise of activity in them rather than its discharge. The en
tire content and material of our consciousness — conscious
ness of movement, as of all things else — is thus of periph
eral origin, and came to us in the first instance through
the peripheral nerves. If it be asked what we gain by this
sensationalistic conclusion, I reply that we gain at any rate
simplicity and uniformity. In the chapters on Space, on
Belief, on the Emotions, we found sensation to be a much
richer thing than is commonly supposed ; and this chapter
seems at this point to fall into line with those. Then, as
for sensationalism being a degrading belief, which abol
ishes all inward originality and spontaneity, there is this

has studied is a complex resultant of many factors. One of them, it seems
to me, is an instinctive tendency to revert to the type of the bilateral
movements of childhood. In adult life we move our arms for the most
part in alternation ; but in infancy the free movements of the arms are
almost always similar on both sides, symmetrical when ihe direction of
motion is horizontal, and with the hands on the same level when it is ver
tical. The most natural innervation, when the movements are rapidly per
formed, is one which takes the movement back to this form. Our estima
tion meanwhile of the lengths severally traversed by the two hands is
mainly based, as such estimations with closed eyes usually are (see Loeb's
•own earlier paper, Untersuchungen uber den FiMraum der Hand, in
Pfltiger's Archiv, XLI. 107), upon the apparent velocity and duration of
the movement. The duration is the same for both hands, since the move
ments begin and end simultaneously. The velocities of the two hands are
under the experimental conditions almost impossible of comparison. It is
well known how imperfect a discrimination of weights we have when we
' heft' them siuultaneously, one in either hand; and G. E. Muller has well
shown (Prtiiger's Archiv, XLV. 57) that the velocity of the lift is the main
factor in determining our judgment of weight. It is hardly possible to
conceive of more unfavorable conditions for making an accurate compari
son of the length of two movements than those which govern the experi
ments which are under discussion. The only prominent sign is the dura
tion, which would lead us to infer the equality of the two movements. We
consequently deem them equal, though a native tendency in our motor
centres keeps them from being so.

* This is by no means an unplausible opinion. See Vol I. p. 65.

518 PSYCHOLOGY.

to be said, that the advocates of inward spontaneity may be
turning their backs on its real citadel, when they make a
fight, on its behalf, for the consciousness of energy put forth
in the outgoing discharge. Let there be no such con
sciousness ; let all our thoughts of movements be of sen
sational constitution ; still in the emphasizing, choosing,
and espousing of one of them rather than another, in the
saying to it, 'be thou the reality for me,' there is ample
scope for our inward initiative to be shown. Here, it seems
to me, the true line between the passive materials and the
activity of the spirit should be drawn. It is certainly
false strategy to draw it between such ideas as are con
nected with the outgoing and such as are connected with
the incoming neural wave.*

If the ideas by which we discriminate between one
movement and another, at the instant of deciding in our
mind which one we shall perform, are always of sensorial
origin, then the question arises, " Of which sensorial order
need they be ? " It will be remembered that we distin
guished two orders of kinaesthetic impression, the remote
ones, made by the movement on the eye or ear or distant
skin, etc., and the resident ones, made on the moving parts,
themselves, muscles, joints, etc. Now do resident images,
exclusively, form what I have called the mental cue, or will
remote ones equally suffice ?

There can be no doubt whatever that the mental cue may be
either an image of the resident or of the remote kind. Although,
at the outset of our learning a movement, it would seem
that the resident feelings must come strongly before con
sciousness (cf. p. 487), later this need not be the case.
The rule, in fact, would seem to be that they tend to lapse

* Maine de Biran, Royer Collard, Sir John Herschel, Dr. Carpenter,
Dr. Martineau, all seem to posit a force-sense by which, in becoming
aware of an outer resistance to our will, we are taught the existence of an
outer world. I hold that every peripheral sensation gives us an outer
world. An insect crawling on our skin gives us as ' outward ' an impres
sion as a hundred pounds weighing on our back.— I have read M. A. Ber-
trand's criticism of my views (La Psychologic de 1'Effort, 1889); but as he
seems to think that I deny the feeling of effort altogether, I can get no
profit from it, despite his charming way of saying things.

WILL. 519

more and more from consciousness, and that the more
practised we become in a movement, the more ' remote ' do
the ideas become which form its mental cue. What we are
interested in is what sticks in our consciousness : everything
else we get rid of as quickly as we can. Our resident feel
ings of movement have no substantive interest for us at all,
as a rule. What interest us are the ends which the move
ment is to attain. Such an end is generally an outer im
pression on the eye or ear, or sometimes on the skin, nose,
or palate. Now let the idea of the end associate itself
definitely with the right motor innervation, and the thought
of the innervation's resident effects will become as great an
encumbrance as we formerly concluded that the feeling of
the innervation itself would be. The mind does not need it ;
the end alone is enough.

The idea of the end, then, tends more and more to make
itself all-sufficient. Or, at any rate, if the kinsesthetic ideas
are called up at all, they are so swamped in the vivid
kinsesthetic feelings by which they are immediately over
taken that we have no time to be aware of their separate
existence. As I write, I have no anticipation, as a thing
distinct from my sensation, of either the look or the digital
feel of the letters which flow from my pen. The words
chime on my mental ear, as it were, before I write them,
but not on my mental eye or hand. This comes from the
rapidity with which often-repeated movements follow on
their mental cue. An end consented to as soon as conceived
innervates directly the centre of the first movement of the
chain which leads to its accomplishment, and then the
whole chain rattles off gw<m-reflexly, as was described on
pp. 115-6 of Vol. I.

The reader will certainly recognize this to be true in
all fluent and unhesitating voluntary acts. The only special
fiat there is at the outset of the performance. A man says
to himself, " I must change my shirt," and involuntarily he
has taken off his coat, and his fingers are at work in their
accustomed manner on his waistcoat-buttons, etc.; or
we say, " I must go downstairs," and ere we know it we
have risen, walked, and turned the handle of the door ;— all
through the idea of an end coupled with a series of guiding

620 PSYCHOLOGY,

sensations which successively arise. It would seem indeed
that we fail of accuracy and certainty in our attainment of
the end whenever we are preoccupied with much ideal con
sciousness of the means. We walk a beam the better the
less we think of the position of our feet upon it. We pitch
or catch, we shoot or chop the better the less tactile and
muscular (the less resident), and the more exclusively optical,
(the more remote) our consciousness is. Keep your eye on
the place aimed at, and your hand will fetch it ; think of
your hand, and you will very likely miss your aim. Dr.
Southard found that he could touch a spot with a pencil-
point more accurately with a visual than with a tactile
mental cue. In the former case he looked at a small
object and closed his eyes before trying to touch it. In
the latter case he placed it with closed eyes, and then after
removing his hand tried to touch it again. The average
error with touch (when the results were most favorable)
was 17.13 mm. With sight it was only 12.37 mm.*— All
these are plain results of introspection and observation.
By what neural machinery they are made possible we need
not, at this present stage, inquire.

In Chapter XVIII we saw how enormously individuals
differ in respect to their mental imagery. In the type of
imagination called tactile by the French authors, it is prob
able that the kinsesthetic ideas are more prominent than in
my account. We must not expect too great a uniformity
in individual accounts, nor wrangle overmuch as to which
one ' truly ' represents the process. t

* Bowditch and Southard in Journal of Physiology, vol. in. No. 3. It
was found in these experiments that the maximum of accuracy was reached
when two seconds of time elapsed between locating the object by eye or
hand and starting to touch it. When the mark was located with one
hand, and the other hand had to touch it, the error was considerably
greater than when the same hand both located and touched it.

f The same caution must be shown in discussing pathological cases.
There are remarkable discrepancies in the effects of peripheral anaesthesia
upon the voluntary power. Such cases as I quoted in the text (p. 490) are
by no means the only type. In those cases the patients could move their
limbs accurately when the eyes were open, and inaccurately when they
were shut. In other cases, however, the anaesthetic patients cannot move
their limbs at all when the eyes are shut. (For reports of two such cases see
Bastian in 'Brain,' Binet in Rev. Philos., xxv. 478.) M. Binet explains

WILL. 521

I trust that I have now made clear what that ' idea of
a movement ' is which must precede it in order that it "be
voluntary. It is not the thought of the innervation which
the movement requires. It is the anticipation of the move
ment's sensible effects, resident or remote, and sometimes
very remote indeed. Such anticipations, to say the least,
determine whot our movements shall be. I have spoken all
along as if they also might determine that they shall be.
This, no doubt, has disconcerted many readers, for it cer
tainly seems as if a special fiat, or consent to the movement
were required in addition to the mere conception of it, in
many cases of volition ; and this fiat I have altogether left
out of my account. This leads us to the next point in the

these (hysterical) cases as requiring the 'dynamogenic ' stimulus of light (see
above, p. 377). They might, however, be cases of such congenitally defective
optical imagination that the ' mental cue' was normally ' tactile ;' and that
when this tactile cue failed through functional inertness of the kinaesthetic
centres, the only optical cue strong enough to determine the discharge had
to be an actual sensation of the eye. — There is still a third class of cases in
which the limbs have lost all sensibility, even for movements passively im
printed, but in which voluntary movements can be accurately executed
even when the eyes are closed. MM. Binet and Fere have reported some
of these interesting cases, which are found amongst the hysterical hemian-
sesthetics. They can, for example, write accurately at will, although their
eyes are closed and they have no feeling of the writing taking place, and
many of them do not know when it begins or stops. Asked to write re
peatedly the letter a, and then say how many times they have written it,
some are able to assign the number and some are not. Some of them admit
that they are guided by visual imagination of what is being done. Cf.
Archives de Physiologic, Oct. 1887, pp. 363-5. Now it would seem at
first sight that feelings of outgoing iunervation must exist in these cases
and be kept account of. There are no other guiding impressions, either
immediate or remote, of which the patient is conscious ; and unless feelings
of innervation be there, the writing would seem miraculous. But if such
feelings are present in these cases, and suffice to direct accurately the suc
cession of movements, why do they not suffice in those other anaesthetic
cases in which movement becomes disorderly when the eyes are closed.
Innervation is there, or there would be no movement ; why is the feeling
of the innervation gone ? The truth seems to be, as M. Binet supposes
(Rev. Philos., xxm. p. 479), that these cases are not arguments for the feel
ing of innervation. They are pathological curiosities ; and the patients are
not really anaesthetic, but are victims of that curious dissociation or splitting-
CD0 of one part of their consciousness from the rest which we are just begin
to understand, thanks to Messrs. Janet, Binet, and Gurney, and in which
the split-off part (in this case the kinaesthetic sensations) may nevertheless
remain to produce its usual effects. Compare what was said above, p. 491.

522 PSYCHOLOGY.

psychology of the Will. It can be the more easily treated
now that we have got rid of so much tedious preliminary
matter.

IDEO-MOTOR ACTION.

The question is this : Is the bare idea of a movement's sen
sible effects its sufficient mental cue (p. 497), or must there be
an additional mental antecedent, in the shape of a fiat, decision,
consent, volitional mandate, or other synonymous phenomenon of
consciousness, before the movement can follow ?

I answer : Sometimes the bare idea is sufficient, but
sometimes an additional conscious element, in the shape of
a fiat, mandate, or express consent, has to intervene and
precede the movement. The cases without a fiat constitute
the more fundamental, because the more simple, variety.
The others involve a special complication, which must be
fully discussed at the proper time. For the present let us
turn to ideo-motor action, as it has been termed, or the se
quence of movement upon the mere thought of it, as the
type of the process of volition.

Wherever movement follows unhesitatingly and immedi
ately the notion of it in the mind, we have ideo-motor action.
We are then aware of nothing between the conception and
the execution. All sorts of neuro-muscular processes come
between, of course, but we know absolutely nothing of
them. We think the act, and it is done ; and that is all
that introspection tells us of the matter. Dr. Carpenter,
who first used, I believe, the name of ideo-motor action,
placed it, if I mistake not, among the curiosities of our
mental life. The truth is that it is no curiosity, but simply
the normal process stripped of disguise. Whilst talking I
become conscious of a pin on the floor, or of some dust on
my sleeve. Without interrupting the conversation I brush
away the dust or pick up the pin. I make no express re
solve, but the mere perception of the object and the fleeting
notion of the act seem of themselves to bring the latter
about. Similarly, I sit at table after dinner and find
myself from time to time taking nuts or raisins out of the
dish and eating them. My dinner properly is over, and in
the heat of the conversation I am hardly aware of what I

WILL. 523

do, but the perception of the fruit and the fleeting notion
that I may eat it seem fatally to bring the act about.
There is certainly no express fiat here ; any more than there
is in all those habitual goings and comings and rearrange
ments of ourselves which fill every hour of the day, and
which incoming sensations instigate so immediately that it
is often difficult to decide whether not to call them reflex
rather than voluntary acts. We have seen in Chapter IV
that the intermediary terms of an habitual series of acts
leading to an end are apt to be of this quasi-smtomsitic sort.
As Lotze says :

" We see in writing or piano-playing a great number of very com
plicated movements following quickly one upon the other, the instigative
representations of which remained scarcely a second in consciousness,
certainly not long enough to awaken any other volition than the gen
eral one of resigning one's self without reserve to the passing over of rep
resentation into action. All the acts of our daily life happen in this
wise : Our standing up, walking, talking, all this never demands a dis
tinct impulse of the will, but is adequately brought about by the pure
flux of thought."*

In all this the determining condition of the unhesitating
and resistless sequence of the act seems to be the absence o}
my conflicting notion in the mind. Either there is nothing
else at all in the mind, or what is there does not conflict.
The hypnotic subject realizes the former condition. Ask
him what he is thinking about, and ten to one he will reply
* nothing.' The consequence is that he both believes every
thing he is told, and performs every act that is suggested.
The suggestion may be a vocal command, or it may be the
performance before him of the movement required. Hyp
notic subjects in certain conditions repeat whatever they

* Medicinische Psychologic, p. 293. In his admirably acute chapter
on the Will this author has most explicitly maintained the position that
what we call muscular exertion is an afferent and not an efferent feeling •
" We must affirm universally that in the muscular feeling we are not sen
sible of the force on its way to produce an effect, but only of the sufferance
already produced in our movable organs, the muscles, after the force has,
in a manner unobservable by us, exerted upon them its causality " (p. 311)'
How often the^ battles of psychology have to be fought over again, each
time with heavier armies and bigger trains, though not always with such
able generals !

524 PSYCHOLOGY.

hear you say, and imitate whatever they see you do. Dr.
Fere says that certain waking persons of neurotic type, if
one repeatedly close and open one's hand before their eyes,
soon begin to have corresponding feelings in their own fin
gers, and presently begin irresistibly to execute the move
ments which they see. Under these conditions of ' prepa
ration ' Dr. Fere found that his subjects could squeeze the
hand-dynamometer much more strongly than when abruptly
invited to do so. A few passive repetitions of a movement
will enable many enfeebled patients to execute it actively
with greater strength. These observations beautifully
show how the mere quickening of kinsesthetic ideas is
equivalent to a certain amount of tension towards discharge
in the c^tres.*

We know what it is to get out of bed on a freezing
morning in a room without a fire, and how the very vital
principle within us protests against the ordeal. Probably
most persons have lain on certain mornings for an hour at
a time unable to brace themselves to the resolve. We
think how late we shall be, how the duties of the day will
suffer ; we say, " I must get up, this is ignominious," etc. ;
but still the warm couch feels too delicious, the cold out
side too cruel, and resolution faints away and postpones
itself again and again just as it seemed on the verge of
bursting the resistance and passing over into the decisive
act. Now how do we ever get up under such circumstances ?
If I may generalize from my own experience, we more often
than not get up without any struggle or decision at all. We
suddenly find that we have got up. A fortunate lapse of
consciousness occurs ; we forget both the warmth and the
cold ; we fall into some revery connected with the day's
life, in the course of which the idea flashes across us,
" Hollo ! I must lie here no longer " — an idea which at that
lucky instant awakens no contradictory or paralyzing sug
gestions, and consequently produces immediately its appro
priate motor effects. It was our acute consciousness of
both the warmth and the cold during the period of struggle,

* Ch. Fere : Sensation et Mouvement (1887), chapter in.

WILL. 525

which paralyzed our activity then and kept our idea of ris
ing in the condition of wish and not of will. The moment
these inhibitory ideas ceased, the original idea exerted its
effects.

This case seems to me to contain in miniature form the
data for an entire psychology of volition. It was in fact
through meditating on the phenomenon in my own person
that I first became convinced of the truth of the doctrine
which these pages present, and which I need here illustrate
by no farther examples.* The reason why that doctrine is
not a self-evident truth is that we have so many ideas
which do not result in action. But it will be seen that in
every such case, without exception, that is because other
ideas simultaneously present rob them of their impulsive
power. But even here, and when a movement is inhibited
from completely taking place by contrary ideas, it will in-
cipiently take place. To quote Lotze once more :

"The spectator accompanies the throwing of a billiard-ball, or the
thrust of the swordsman, with slight movements of his arm; the un
taught narrator tells his story with many gesticulations; the reader
while absorbed in the perusal of a battle-scene feels a slight tension run
through his muscular system, keeping time as it were with the actions
he is reading of. These results become the more marked the more we
are absorbed in thinking of the movements which suggest them; they
grow fainter exactly in proportion as a complex consciousness, under
the dominion of a crowd of other representations, withstands the pass
ing over of mental contemplation into outward action."

The * willing-game,' the exhibitions of so-called 'mind-
reading,' or more properly muscle-reading, which have late
ly grown so fashionable, are based on this incipient obe
dience of muscular contraction to idea, even when the
deliberate intention is that no contraction shall occur, f

* Professor A. Bain (Senses and Intellect, pp. 336-48) and Dr. W. B.
Carpenter (Mental Physiology, chap, vi) give examples in abundance.

t For a full account, by an expert, of the 'willing-game,' see Mr.
Stuart Cumberland's article: A Thought-reader's Experiences in the Nine
teenth century, xx. 867. M. Gley has given a good example of ideo-
motor action in the Bulletins de la Societe de Psychologic Physiologique
for 1889. Tell a person to think intently of a certain name, and saying
that you will then force her to -write it, let her hold a pencil, and do you
yourself hold her hand. She will then probably trace the name involun
tarily, believing that you are forcing her to do it.

526 PSYCHOLOGY.

We may then lay it down for certain that every repre
sentation of a movement awakens in some degree the actual
movement which is its object; and awakens it in a maximum
degree whenever it is not kept from so doing by an antagonis
tic representation present simultaneously to the mind.

The express fiat, or act of mental consent to the move
ment, comes in when the neutralization of the antagonistic
and inhibitory idea is required. But that there is no express
fiat needed when the conditions are simple, the reader ought
now to be convinced. Lest, however, he should still share the
common prejudice that voluntary action without ' exertion
of will-power ' is Hamlet with the prince's part left out, I
will make a few farther remarks. The first point to start
from in understanding voluntary action, and the possible
occurrence of it with no fiat or express resolve, is the fact
that consciousness is in its very nature impulsive.* We do
not have a sensation or a thought and then have to add
something dynamic to it to get a movement. Every pulse
of feeling which we have is the correlate of some neural
activity that is already on its way to instigate a movement.
Our sensations and thoughts are but cross-sections, asTT
were, of currents whose essential consequence is motion,
and which no sooner run in at one nerve than they run out
again at another. The popular notion that mere conscious
ness as such is not essentially a forerunner of activity, that
the latter must result from some superadded ' will-force,'
is a very natural inference from those special cases in
which we think of an act for an indefinite length of time
without the action taking place. These cases, however, are
not the norm ; they are cases of inhibition by antagonistic

* I abstract here from the fact that a certain intensity of the conscious
ness is required for its impulsiveness to be effective in a complete degree.
There is an inertia in the motor processes as in all other natural things.
In certain individuals, and at, certain times (disease, fatigue), the inertia is
unusually great, and we may then have ideas of action which produce no
visible act, but discharge themselves into merely nascent dispositions to
activity or into emotional expression. The inertia of the motor parts here
plays the same role as is elsewhere played by antagonistic ideas. We shall
consider this restrictive inertia later on , it obviously introduces no essen
tial alteration into the law which the text lays down

WILL. 527

thoughts. When the blocking is released we feel as if an
inward spring were let loose, and this is the additional im
pulse QIC fiat upon which the act effectively succeeds. We
shall study anon the blocking and its release. Our higher
thought is full of it. But where there is no blocking, there
is naturally no hiatus between the thought-process and the
motor discharge. Movement is the natural immediate effect
of feeling, irrespective of ivhat the quality of the feeling may be.
It is so in reflex action, it is so in emotional .expression, it is so
in the voluntary life. Ideo-motor action is thus no paradox,
to be softened or explained away. It obeys the type of all
conscious action, and from it one must start to explain ac
tion in which a special fiat is involved.

It may be remarked in passing, that the inhibition of a
movement no more involves an express effort or command
than its execution does. Either of them may require it.
But in all simple and ordinary cases, just as the bare pres
ence of one idea prompts a movement, so the bare presence
of another idea will prevent its taking place. Try to feel
as if you were crooking your finger, whilst keeping it
straight. In a minute it will fairly tingle with the imagi
nary change of position ; yet it will not sensibly move, be
cause its not really moving is also a part of what you have in
mind. Drop this idea, think of the movement purely and
simply, with all breaks off; and, presto ! it takes place with
no effort at all.

A waking man's behavior is thus at all times the result
ant of two opposing neural forces. With unimaginable
fineness some currents among the cells and fibres of his
brain are playing on his motor nerves, whilst other cur
rents, as unimaginably fine, are playing on the first cur
rents, damming or helping them, altering their direction or
their speed. The upshot of it all is, that whilst the currents
must always end by being drained off through some motor
nerves, they are drained off sometimes through one set and
sometimes through another ; and sometimes they keep each
other in equilibrium so long that a superficial observer may
think they are not drained off at all. Such an observer
must remember, however, that from the physiological point
of view a gesture, an expression of the brow, or an expul-

528 PSYCHOLOGY.

sion of the breath are movements as much as an act of
locomotion is. A king's breath slays as well as an assas
sin's blow ; and the outpouring of those currents which the
magic imponderable streaming of our ideas accompanies
need not always be of an explosive or otherwise physically
conspicuous kind.

ACTION AFTER DELIBERATION.

We are now in a position to describe what happens in
deliberate action, or whan the mind is the seat of many ideas-
related to each other in antagonistic or in favorable ways.*
One of the ideas is that of an act. By itself this idea would
prompt a movement ; some of the additional considerations,
however, which are present to consciousness block the
motor discharge, whilst others, on the contrary, solicit it to
take place. The result is that peculiar feeling of inward
unrest known as indecision. Fortunately it is too familiar
to need description, for to describe it would be impossible.
As long as it lasts, with the various objects before the at
tention, we are said to deliberate ; and when finally the orig
inal suggestion either prevails and makes the movement
take place, or gets definitively quenched by its antagonists,
we are said to decide, or to utter our voluntary fiat in favor of
one or the other course. The reinforcing and inhibiting
ideas meanwhile are termed the reasons or motives by which
the decision is brought about.

The process of deliberation contains endless degrees of
complication. At every moment of it our consciousness
is of an extremely complex object, namely the exist
ence of the whole set of motives and their conflict, as ex
plained on p. 275 of Vol. I. Of this object, the totality of
which is realized more or less dimly all the while, certain
parts stand out more or less sharply at one moment in the

* I use the common phraseology here for mere convenience' sake. The
reader who has made himself acquainted with Chapter IX will always under
stand, when he hears of many ideas simultaneously present to the mind
and acting upon each other, that what is really meant is a mind with one
idea before it, of many objects, purposes, reasons, motives, related to each
other, some in a harmonious and some in an antagonistic way. With this
caution I shall not hesitate from time to time to fall into the popular
Lockian speech, erroneous though I believe it to be.

WILL. 529

foreground, and at another moment other parts, in conse
quence of the oscillations of our attention, and of the ' asso
ciative ' flow of our ideas. But no matter how sharp the
foreground-reasons may be, or how imminently close to
bursting through the dam and carrying the motor conse
quences their own way, the background, however dimly felt,
is always there ; and its presence (so long as the indecision
actually lasts) serves as an effective check upon the irrevo
cable discharge. The deliberation may last for weeks or
months, occupying at intervals the mind. The motives
which yesterday seemed full of urgency and blood and life
to-day feel strangely weak and pale and dead. But as little
to-day as to-morrow is the question finally resolved. Some
thing tells us that all this is provisional ; that the weakened
reasons will wax strong again, and the stronger weaken ;
that equilibrium is unreached ; that testing our reasons, not
obeying them, is still the order of the day, and that we
must wait awhile, patient or impatiently, until our mind
is made up ' for good and all.' This inclining, first to one
then to another future, both of which we represent as pos
sible, resembles the oscillations to and fro of a material
body within the limits of its elasticity. There is inward
strain, but no outward rupture. And this condition,
plainly enough, is susceptible of indefinite continuance, as
well in the physical mass as in the mind. If the elasticity
give way, however, if the dam ever do break, and the cur
rents burst the crust, vacillation is over and decision is
irrevocably there.

The decision may come in any one of many modes. I
will try briefly to sketch the most characteristic types of it,
merely warning the reader that this is only an introspective
account of symptoms and phenomena, and that all ques
tions of causal agency, whether neural or spiritual, are rele
gated to a later page.

The particular reasons for or against action are of course
infinitely various in concrete cases. But certain motives
are more or less constantly in play. One of these is im-
patience of the deliberative state; or to express it otherwise,
proneness to act or to decide merely because action and

530 PSYCHOLOGY.

decision are, as such, agreeable, and relieve the tension of
doubt and hesitancy. Thus it comes that we will often
take any course whatever which happens to be most vividly
before our minds, at the moment when this impulse to
decisive action becomes extreme.

Against this impulse we have the dread of the irrevocable,
which often engenders a type of character incapable of
prompt and vigorous resolve, except perhaps when sur
prised into sudden activity. These two opposing motives
twine round whatever other motives may be present at the
moment when decision is imminent, and tend to precipitate
or retard it. The conflict of these motives so far as they
alone affect the matter of decision is a conflict as to when it
shall occur. One says ' now,' the other says ' not yet.'

Another constant component of the web of motivation is
the impulse to persist in a decision once made. There is
no more remarkable difference in human character than
that between resolute and irresolute natures. Neither the
physiological nor the psychical grounds of this difference
have yet been analyzed. Its symptom is that whereas in
the irresolute all decisions are provisional and liable to be
reversed, in the resolute they are settled once for all and
not disturbed again. Now into every one's deliberations
the representation of one alternative will often enter with
such sudden force as to carry the imagination with itself
exclusively, and to produce an apparently settled decision
in its own favor. These premature and spurious decisions
are of course known to everyone. They often seem ridicu
lous in the light of the considerations that succeed them.
But it cannot be denied that in the resolute type of char
acter the accident that one of them has once been made
does afterwards enter as a motive additional to the more
genuine reasons why it should not be revoked, or if pro
visionally revoked, why it should be made again. How
many of us persist in a precipitate course which, but for a
moment of heedlessness, we might never have entered upon,
simply because we hate to * change our mind.'

WILL. 531

FIVE TYPES OF DECISION".

Turning now to the form of the decision itself, we may
distinguish four chief types. The first may be called the
reasonable type. It is that of those cases in which the
arguments for and against a given course seem gradually
and almost insensibly to settle themselves in the mind and
to end by leaving a clear balance in favor of one alternative,
which alternative we then adopt without effort or constraint.
Until this rational balancing of the books is consummated
we have a calm feeling that the evidence is not yet all in,
and this keeps action in suspense. But some day we wake
with the sense that we see the thing rightly, that no new
light will be thrown on the subject by farther delay, and
that the matter had better be settled now. In this easy
transition from doubt to assurance we seem to ourselves
almost passive ; the 'reasons which decide us appearing to
flow in from the nature of things, and to owe nothing to
our will. We have, however, a perfect sense of being free,
in that we are devoid of any feeling of coercion. The con
clusive reason for the decision in these cases usually is the
discovery that we can refer the case to a class upon which
we are accustomed to act unhesitatingly in a certain stereo
typed way. It may be said in general that a great part of
every deliberation consists in the turning over of all the
possible modes of conceiving the doing or not doing of the
act in point. The moment we hit upon a conception which
lets us apply some principle of action which is a fixed and
stable part of our Ego, our state of doubt is at an end.
Persons of authority, who have to make many decisions in
the day, carry with them a set of heads of classification,
each bearing its motor consequence, and under these they
seek as far as possible to range each new emergency as it-
occurs. It is where the emergency belongs to a species
without precedent, to which consequently no cut-and-dried
maxim will apply, that we feel most at a loss, and are
distressed at the indeterminateness of our task. As soon,
however, as we see our way to a familiar classification, we
are at ease again. In action as in reasoning, then, the great
thing is the qiiest of the right conception. The concrete dilem-

532 PSYCHOLOGY.

mas do not come to us with labels gummed upon their
backs. We may name them by many names. The wise
man is he who succeeds in finding the name which suits
the needs of the particular occasion best. A ' reasonable '
character is one who has a store of stable and worthy ends,
and who does not decide about an action till he has calmly
ascertained whether it be ministerial or detrimental to any
one of these.

In the next two types of decision, the final fiat occurs,
before the evidence is all 'in.' It often happens that no
paramount and authoritative reason for either course will
come. Either seems a case of a Good, and there is no
umpire as to which good should yield its place to the other.
We grow tired of long hesitation and inconclusiveness, and
the hour may come when we feel that even a bad decision is
better than no decision at all. Under these conditions it
will often happen that some accidental circumstance, super
vening at a particular movement upon our mental weariness,
will upset the balance in the direction of one of the alter
natives, to which then we feel ourselves committed, al
though an opposite accident at the same time might have
produced the opposite result.

In the second type of case our feeling is to a certain
extent that of letting ourselves drift with a certain in
different acquiescence in a direction accidentally deter
mined from without, with the conviction that, after all, we
might as well stand by this course as by the other, and
that things are in any event sure to turn out sufficiently
right.

In the third type the determination seems equally acci
dental, but it comes from within, and not from without.
It often happens, when the absence of imperative princi
ple is perplexing and suspense distracting, that we find our
selves acting, as it were, automatically, and as if by a spon
taneous discharge of our nerves, in the direction of one of
the horns of the dilemma. But so exciting is this sense of
motion after our intolerable pent-up state, that we eagerly
throw ourselves into it. ' Forward now ! ' we inwardly cry>
* though the heavens fall.' This reckless and exultant es-

WILL. 533

pousal of an energy so little premeditated by us that we
feel rather like passive spectators cheering on the display
of some extraneous force than like voluntary agents, is a
type of decision too abrupt and tumultuous to occur often
in humdrum and cool-blooded natures. But it is prob
ably frequent in persons of strong emotional endowment
and unstable or vacillating character. And in men of the
world-shaking type, the Napoleons, Luthers, etc., in whom
tenacious passion combines with ebullient activity, when by
any chance the passion's outlet has been dammed by scru
ples or apprehensions, the resolution is probably often of this
catastrophic kind. The flood breaks quite unexpectedly
through the dam. That it should so often do so is quite
sufficient to account for the tendency of these characters to
a fatalistic mood of mind. And the fatalistic mood itself
is sure to reinforce the strength of the energy just started
on its exciting path of discharge.

There is a fourth form of decision, which often ends
deliberation as suddenly as the third form does. It comes
when, in consequence of some outer experience or some
inexplicable inward charge, we suddenly pass from the easy
and careless to the sober and strenuous mood, or possibly the
other way. The whole scale of values of our motives and
impulses then undergoes a change like that which a change
of the observer's level produces on a view. The most
sobering possible agents are objects of grief and fear.
When one of these affects us, all * light fantastic ' notions
lose their motive power, all solemn ones find theirs multi
plied many-fold. The consequence is an instant abandon
ment of the more trivial projects with which we had been
dallying, and an instant practical acceptance of the more
grim and earnest alternative which till then could not
extort our mind's consent. All those 'changes of heart,1
* awakenings of conscience,' etc., which make new men of
so many of us, may be classed under this head. The char
acter abruptly rises to another 'level,' and deliberation
comes to an immediate end.*

* My attention was first emphatically called to this class of decisions by
my colleague, Professor C. C. Everett.

534 PSYCHOLOGY.

In the fifth and final type of decision, the feeling that
the evidence is all in, and that reason has balanced the
books, may be either present or absent. But in either case
we feel, in deciding, as if we ourselves by our own wilful
act inclined the beam ; in the former case by adding our
living effort to the weight of the logical reason which,
taken alone, seems powerless to make the act discharge ;
in the ]atter by a kind of creative contribution of something
instead of a reason which does a reason's work. The slow
dead heave of the will that is felt in these instances makes
of them a class altogether different subjectively from all
the three preceding classes. What the heave of the will
betokens metaphysically, what the effort might lead us to
infer about a will-power distinct from motives, are not
matters that concern us yet. Subjectively and phenome
nally, the feeling of effort, absent from the former decisions,
accompanies these. Whether it be the dreary resignation
for the sake of austere and naked duty of all sorts of rich
mundane delights, or whether it be the heavy resolve that
of two mutually exclusive trains of future fact, both sweet
and good, and with no strictly objective or imperative
principle of choice between them, one shall forevermore
become impossible, while the other shall become reality,
it is a desolate and acrid sort of act, an excursion into a lone
some moral wilderness. If examined closely, its chief differ
ence from the three former cases appears to be that in those
eases the mind at the moment of deciding on the trium
phant alternative dropped the other one wholly or nearly
out of sight, whereas here both alternatives are steadily
held in view, and in the very act of murdering the van
quished possibility the chooser realizes how much in that
instant he is making himself lose. It is deliberately
driving a thorn into one's flesh ; and the sense of in
ward effort with which the act is accompanied is an ele
ment which sets the fourth type of decision in strong contrast
with the previous three varieties, and makes of it an alto
gether peculiar sort of mental phenomenon. The immense
majority of human decisions are decisions without effort. In
comparatively few of them, in most people, does effort accom
pany the final act. We are, I think, misled into supposing that

WILL. 535

effort is more frequent than it is, by the fact that during
deliberation we so often have a feeling of how great an effort
it would take to make a decision now. Later, after the de
cision has made itself with ease, we recollect this and
erroneously suppose the effort also to have been made then.
The existence of the effort as a phenomenal fact in our
consciousness cannot of course be doubted or denied. Its
significance, on the other hand, is a matter about which the
gravest difference of opinion prevails. Questions as mo
mentous as that of the very existence of spiritual causality,
as vast as that of universal predestination or free-will, de
pend on its interpretation. It therefore becomes essential
that we study with some care the conditions under which
the feeling of volitional effort is found.

THE FEELING OF EFFOBT.

When, awhile back (p. 526), I said that consciousness (or
the neural process which goes with it) is in its very nature
impulsive, I added in a note the proviso that it must be
sufficiently intense. Now there are remarkable differences
in the power of different sorts of consciousness to excite
movement. The intensity of some feelings is practically
apt to be below the discharging point, whilst that of others
is apt to be above it. By practically apt, I mean apt under
ordinary circumstances. These circumstances may be
habitual inhibitions, like that comfortable feeling of the
dolcefar niente which gives to each and all of us a certain
dose of laziness only to be overcome by the acuteness of
the impulsive spur ; or they may consist in the native
inertia, or internal resistance, of the motor centres them
selves making explosion impossible until a certain inward
tension has been reached and overpast. These conditions
may vary from one person to another and in the same per
son from time to time. The neural inertia may wax or wane,
and the habitual inhibitions dwindle or augment. The in
tensity of particular thought-processes and stimulations
may also change independently, and particular paths of
association grow more pervious or less so. There thus re
sult great possibilities of alteration in the actual impul-

PSYCHOLOGY.

give efficacy of particular motives compared with others.
It is where the normally less efficacious motive becomes
more efficacious and the normally more efficacious one less
so that actions ordinarily effortless, or abstinences ordi
narily easy, either become impossible or are effected, if at
all, by the expenditure of effort. A little more description
will make it plainer what these cases are.

There is a certain normal ratio in the impulsive power of
different sorts of motive, which characterizes what may be called
ordinary healthiness of will, and which is departed from only
at exceptional times or by exceptional individuals. The
states of mind which normally possess the most impul
sive quality are either those which represent objects of
passion, appetite, or emotion— objects of instinctive reac
tion, in short ; or they are feelings or ideas of pleasure or of
pain ; or ideas which for any reason we have grown accus
tomed to obey so that the habit of reacting on them is in
grained ; or finally, in comparison with ideas of remoter
objects, they are ideas of objects present or near in space
and time. Compared with these various objects, all far-off
considerations, all highly abstract conceptions, unaccus
tomed reasons, and motives foreign to the instinctive history
of the race, have little or no impulsive power. They prevail,
when they ever do prevail, with effort ; and the normal, as
distinguished from the pathological, sphere of effort is thus
found wherever non-instinctive motives to behavior are to rule

the day.

Healthiness of will moreover requires a certain amount
of complication in the process which precedes the fiat or
the act. Each stimulus or idea, at the same time that it
wakens its own impulse, must arouse other ideas (associated
and consequential) with their impulses, and action must
follow, neither too slowly nor too rapidly, as the resultant
of all the forces thus engaged. Even when the decision is
very prompt, there is thus a sort of preliminary survey of
the field and a vision of which course is best before the
fiat comes. And where the will is healthy, the vision must
be right (i.e., the motives must be on the whole in a normal

WILL. 537

.ar not too unusual ratio to each other), and the action must
obey the vision's lead.

Unhealthiness of will may thus come about in many ways.
The action may follow the stimulus or idea too rapidly,
leaving no time for. the arousal of restraining associates —
we then have a precipitate will Or, although the associates
may come, the ratio which the impulsive and inhibitive
forces normally bear to each other may be distorted, and
we then have a will ivhich is perverse. The perversity, in
turn, may be due to either of many causes — too much in
tensity, or too little, here ; too much or too little inertia
there ; or elsewhere too much or too little inhibitory power.
If we compare the outward symptoms of perversity togetJier,
they fall into two groups, in one of which normal actions are
impossible, and in the other abnormal ones are irrepressi
ble. Briefly, we may call them respectively the obstructed and
the explosive will.

It must be kept in mind, however, that since the result
ant action is always due to the ratio between the obstructive
and the explosive forces which are present, we never can
tell by the mere outward symptoms to what elementary
cause the perversion of a man's will may be due, whether
to an increase of one component or a diminution of the
other. One may grow explosive as readily by losing the
usual brakes as by getting up more of the impulsive steam ;
and one may find things impossible as well through the en-
feeblement of the original desire as through the advent of
new lions in the path. As Dr. Clouston says, " the driver
may be so weak that he cannot control well-broken horses,
or the horses may be so hard-mouthed that no driver can
pull them up." In some concrete cases (whether of explo
sive or of obstructed will) it is difficult to tell whether the
trouble is due to inhibitory or to impulsive change. Gener
ally, "however, we can make a plausible guess at the truth.

^ r THE EXPLOSIVE WILL.

\ There is a normal type of character, for example, in
which impulses seem to discharge so promptly into move
ments that inhibitions get no time to arise. These are the

538 PSYCHOLOGY.

' dare-devil ' and ' mercurial ' temperaments, overflowing with
animation, and fizzling with talk, which are so common in the
Latin and Celtic races, and with which the cold-blooded and
long-headed English character forms so marked a contrast.
Monkeys these people seem to us, whilst we seem to them
reptilian. It is quite impossible to judge, as between an ob
structed and an explosive individual, which has the greatest
sum of vital energy. An explosive Italian with good per
ception and intellect will cut a figure as a perfectly tre
mendous fellow, on an inward capital that could be tucked
away inside of an obstructed Yankee and hardly let you
know that it was there. He will be the king of his company,
sing all the songs and make all the speeches, lead the parties,
carry out the practical jokes, kiss all the girls, fight the
men, and, if need be, lead the forlorn hopes and enterprises,
so that an onlooker would think he has more life in his little
finger than can exist in the whole body of a correct judicious
fellow. But the judicious fellow all the while may have all
these possibilities and more besides, ready to break out in
the same or even a more violent way, if only the brakes
were taken off. It is the absence of scruples, of conse- ,
quences, of considerations, the extraordinary simplification
of each moment's mental outlook, that gives to the explosive
individual such motor energy and ease ; it need not be the
greater intensity of any of his passions, motives, or thoughts.
As mental evolution goes on, the complexity of human con
sciousness grows ever greater, and with it the multiplication
of the inhibitions to which every impulse is exposed. But
this predominance of inhibition has a bad as well as a good
side ; and if a man's impulses are in the main orderly as
well as prompt, if he has courage to accept their conse
quences, and intellect to lead them to a successful end, he
is all the better for his hair-trigger organization, and for
not being ' sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought/
Many of the most successful military and revolutionary"^
characters in history have belonged to this simple but quick
witted impulsive type. Problems come much harder to
reflective and inhibitive minds. They can, it is true, solve
much vaster problems ; and they can avoid many a mis
take to which the men of impulse are exposed. But when

WILL. 539

the latter do not make mistakes, or when they are always
able to retrieve them, theirs is one of the most engaging and
indispensable of human types.*

In infancy, and in certain conditions of exhaustion as
well as in peculiar pathological states, the inhibitory power
may fail to arrest the explosions of the impulsive discharge.
We have then an explosive temperament temporarily real
ized in an individual who at other times may be of a rela
tively obstructed type. I cannot do better here than copy
a few pages from Dr. Clouston's excellent work : f

** Take a child of six months, and there is absolutely no such brain
power existent as mental inhibition ; no desire or tendency is stopped
by a mental act. ... At a year old the rudiments of the great
faculty of self-control are clearly apparent in most children. They
will resist the desire to seize the gas-flame, they will not upset
the milk- jug, they will obey orders to sit still when they want to run
about, all through a higher mental inhibition. But the power of
control is just as gradual a development as the motions of the hands.
. . . Look at a more complicated act, that will be recognized by any
competent physiologist to be automatic and beyond the control of any
ordinary inhibitory power, e.g., irritate and tease a child of one or two
years sufficiently, and it will suddenly strike out at you ; suddenly
strike at a man, and he will either perform an act of defence or offence,
or both, quite automatically, and without power of controlling himself.
Place a bright tempting toy before a child of a year, and it will be in
stantly appropriated. Place cold water before a man dying of thirst,
and he will take and drink it without power of doing otherwise. Ex-

*In an excellent article on The ' Mental Qualities of an Athlete ' in the
Harvard Monthly, vol. vi. p. 43, Mr. A. T. Dudley assigns the first place
to the rapidly impulsive temperament. " Ask him how, in some complex
trick, he performed a certain act, why he pushed or pulled at a certaic in
stant, and he will tell you he does not know , he did it by instinct ; or
rather his nerves and muscles did it of themselves. . . . Here is the dis
tinguishing feature of the good player .- the good player, confident in his
training and his practice, in the critical game trusts entirely to his impulse,
and does not think out every move. The poor player, unable to trust his
impulsive actions, is compelled to think carefully all the time. He thus
not only loses the opportunities through his slowness in comprehending the
whole situation, but, being compelled to think rapidly all the time, at crit
ical points becomes confused ; while the first rate player, not trying to
reason, but acting as impulse directs, is continually distinguishing himself
and plays the better under the greater pressure."

fT. S. Clouston, Clinical Lectures on Mental Diseases (London 1883),
pp. 310-318.

640 PSYCHOLOGY.

haustion of nervous energy always lessens the inhibitory power. Who
is not conscious of this ? ' Irritability ' is one manifestation of this.
Many persons have so small a stock of reserve brain-power — that most
valuable of all brain-qualities — that it is soon used up, and you see at
once that they lose their power of self-control very soon. They are an
gels or demons just as they are fresh or tired. That surplus store of
energy or resistive force which provides, in persons normally constituted,
that moderate excesses in all directions shall do no great harm so long
as they are not too often repeated, not being present in these people,
overwork, over-drinking, or small debauches leave them at the mercy
of their morbid impulses without power of resistance. . . . Woe to the
man who uses up his surplus stock of brain-inhibition too near the bitter
end, or too often ! . . . The physiological word inhibition can be used
synonymously with the psychological and ethical expression self-control,
or with the will when exercised in certain directions. It is the charac
teristic of most forms of mental disease for self-control to be lost, but
this loss is usually part of a general mental affection with melancholic,
maniacal, demented, or delusional symptoms as the chief manifestation
of the disease. There are other cases, not so numerous, where the loss
of the power of inhibition is the chief and by far the most marked
symptom. ... I shall call this form 'Inhibitory Insanity.' Some of
these cases have uncontrollable impulses to violence and destruction,
others to homicide, others to suicide prompted by no depressed feel
ings, others to acts of animal gratification (satyriasis, nympho-
mania, erotomania, bestiality), others to drinking too much alcohol
(dipsomania), others towards setting things on fire (pyromania), others
to stealing (kleptomania), and others towards immoralities of all sorts.
The impulsive tendencies and morbid desires are innumerable in kind.
Many of these varieties of Insanity have been distinguished by distinct
names. To dig up and eat dead bodies (necrophilism), to wander from
home and throw off the restraints of society (planomania), to act like a
wild beast (lycanthropia), etc. Action from impulse in all these direc
tions may take place from a loss of controlling power in the higher re
gions of the brain, or from an over-development of energy in certain
portions of the brain, which the normal power of inhibition cannot
control. The driver maybe so weak that he cannot control well-broken
horses, or the horses may be so hard-mouthed that no driver can pull
them up. Both conditions may arise from purely cerebral disorder ....
or may be reflex. . . . The ego, the man, the will, may be non-existent
for the time. The most perfect examples of this are murders done
during somnambulism or epileptic unconsciousness, or acts done in the
hypnotic state. There is no conscious desire to attain the object at all
in such cases. In other cases there is consciousness and memory
present, but no power of restraining action. The simplest example of
this is where an imbecile or dement, seeing something glittering, appro
priates it to himself, or when he commits indecent sexual acts. Through
disease a previously sane and vigorous-minded person may get into the

WILL. 541

same state. The motives that would lead other persons not to do such
acts do not operate in such persons. I have known a man steal who
said he had no intense longing for the article he appropriated at all, at
least consciously, but his will was in abeyance, and he could not resist
the ordinary desire of possession common to all human nature."

It is not only those technically classed imbeciles and
dements who exhibit this promptitude of impulse and tardi
ness of inhibition. Ask half the common drunkards you
know why it is that they fall so often a prey to temptation,
and they will say that most of the time they cannot telL
It is a sort of vertigo with them. Their nervous centres
have become a sluice-way pathologically unlocked by every
passing conception of a bottle and a glass. They do not thirst
for the beverage ; the taste of it may even appear repug
nant ; and they perfectly foresee the morrow's remorse.
But when they think of the liquor or see it, they find them
selves preparing to drink, and do not stop themselves : and
more than this they cannot say. Similarly a man may
lead a life of incessant love-making or sexual indulgence,
though what spurs him thereto seems rather to be sug
gestions and notions of possibility than any overweening
strength in his affections or lusts. He may even be physi
cally impotent all the while. The paths of natural (or it
may be unnatural) impulse are so pervious in these charac
ters that the slightest rise in the level of innervation pro
duces an overflow. It is the condition recognized in pathol
ogy as 'irritable weakness.' The phase known as nascency
or latency is so short in the excitement of the neural tissues
that there is no opportunity for strain or tension to accumu
late within them; and the consequence is that with all the
agitation and activity, the amount of real feeling engaged
may be very small. The hysterical temperament is the play
ground par excellence of this unstable equilibrium. One of
these subjects will be filled with what seems the most genu
ine and settled aversion to a certain line of conduct, and
the very next instant follow the stirring of temptation and
plunge in it up to the neck. Professor Eibot well gives the
name of ' Le Kegne des Caprices ' to the chapter in which
he describes the hysterical temperament in his interesting
little monograph 'The Diseases of the Will.'

542 PSYCHOLOGY.

Disorderly and impulsive conduct may, on the other
hand, come about where the neural tissues preserve their
proper inward tone, and where the inhibitory power is nor
mal or even unusually great. In such cases the strength of
the impulsive idea is preternaturally exalted, and what would
be for most people the passing suggestion of a possibility
becomes a gnawing, craving urgency to act. Works on in
sanity are full of examples of these morbid insistent ideas,
iu obstinately struggling against which the unfortunate
victim's soul often sweats with agony, ere at last it gets
swept away. One instance will stand for many ; M. Kibot
quotes it from Calmeil : *

" Glenadal, having lost his father in infancy, was brought up by his
mother, whom he adored. At sixteen, his character, till then good
iind docile, changed. He became gloomy and taciturn. Pressed with
questions by his mother, he decided at last to make a confession. ' To
you,' said he, ' I owe everything ; I love you with all my soul ; yet for
some time past an incessant idea drives me to kill you. Prevent so
terrible a misfortune from happening, in case some day the temptation
should overpower me : allow me to enlist.' Notwithstanding pressing
solicitations, he was firm in his resolve, went off, and was a good soldier.
Still a secret impulse stimulated him without cessation to desert in
order to come home and kill his mother. At the end of his term of
service the idea was as strong as on the first day. He enlisted for
another term. The murderous instinct persisted, but substituted
another victim. He no longer thought of killing his mother — the hor
rible impulse pointed day and night towards his sister-in-law. In order
to resist the second impulse, he condemned himself to perpetual exile.
At this time one of his old neighbors arrived in the regiment. Glena
dal confesses all his trouble. ' Be at rest,' said the other. ' Your crime
is impossible; your sister-in-law has just died.' At these words Glena
dal rises like a delivered captive. Joy fills his heart. He travels to the
home of his childhood, unvisited for so many years. But as he arrives
he sees his sister-in-law living. He gives a cry, and the terrible impulse
seizes him again as a prey. That very evening he makes his brother
tie him fast. * Take a solid rope, bind me like a wolf in the barn, and
go and tell Dr. Calmeil. . . . ' From him he got admission to an insane
asylum. The evening before his entrance he wrote to the director of
the establishment: 'Sir, I am to become an inmate of your house. I
shall behave there as if 1 were in the regiment. You will think me
cured. At moments perhaps I shall pretend to be so. Never believe
me. Never let me out on any pretext. If I beg to be released, double

* In his Maladies de la Volonte, p. 77.

WILL. 543

your watchfulness ; the only use I shall make of my liberty will be to
commit a crime which I abhor.' "

The craving for drink in real dipsomaniacs, or for opium
or chloral in those subjugated, is of a strength of which
normal persons can form no conception. "Were a keg
of rum in one corner of a room and were a cannon con
stantly discharging balls between me and it, I could not
refrain from passing before that cannon in order to get the
rum;" "If a bottle of brandy stood at one hand and the
pit of hell yawned at the other, and I were convinced that
I should be pushed in as sure as I took one glass, I could
not refrain :" such statements abound in dipsomaniacs'
mouths. Dr. Mussey of Cincinnati relates this case :

* ' A few years ago a tippler was put into an almshouse in this State.
Within a few days he had devised various expedients to procure rum,
but failed. At length, however, he hit upon one which was successful.
He went into the wood-yard of the establishment, placed one hand upon
the block, and with an axe in the other, struck it off at a single blow.
With the stump raised and streaming he ran into the house and cried,
4 Get some rum ! get some rum! my hand is off! ' In the confusion and
bustle of the occasion a bowl of rum was brought, into which he
plunged the bleeding member of his body, then raising the bowl to his
mouth, drank freely, and exultingly exclaimed, ' Now I am satisfied.'
Dr. J. E. Turner tells of a man who, while under treatment for inebriety,
during four weeks secretly drank the alcohol from six jars containing
morbid specimens. On asking him why he had committed this loath
some act, he replied: ' Sir, it is as impossible for me to control this dis
eased appetite as it is for me to control the pulsations of my heart.' " f

The passion of love may be called a monomania to
which all of us are subject, however otherwise sane. It
can coexist with contempt and even hatred for the ' object '
which inspires it, and whilst it lasts the whole life of the
man is altered by its presence. Alfieri thus describes the
struggles of his unusually powerful inhibitive power with
his abnormally excited impulses toward a certain lady :

"Contemptible in my own eyes, I fell into such a state of melan
choly as would, if long continued, inevitably have led to insanity or

* For other cases of ' impulsive insanity,' see H. Maudsley's Responsi
bility in Mental Disease, pp. 133-170, and Forbes Winslow's Obscure
Diseases of the Mind and Brain, chapters vr, vn, viii.

f Quoted by G. Burr, in an article on the Insanity of Inebriety in the
N. Y. Psychological and Medico-Legal Journal, Dec. 1874.

544 PSYCHOLOGY.

death. I continued to wear my disgraceful fetters till towards the end
of January, 1775, when my rage, which had hitherto so often been re
strained within bounds, broke forth with the greatest violence. On
returning one evening from the opera (the most insipid and tiresome
amusement in Italy), where I had passed several hours in the box of
the woman who was by turns the object of my antipathy and my love,
I took the firm determination of emancipating myself forever from her
yoke. Experience had taught me that flight, so far from enabling me
to persevere in my resolutions, tended on the contrary to weaken and
destroy them; I was inclined therefore to subject myself to a still more
severe trial, imagining from the obstinacy and peculiarity of my char
acter that I should succeed most certainly by the adoption of such
measures as. would compel me to make the greatest efforts. I deter
mined never to leave the house, which, as I have already said, was
exactly opposite that of the lady; to gaze at her windows, to see her go
in and out every day, to listen to the sound of her voice, though firmly
resolved that no advances on her part, either direct or indirect, no
tender remembrances, nor in short any other means which might be
employed, should ever again tempt me to a revival of our friendship. I
was determined to die or liberate myself from my disgraceful thraldom.
In order to give stability to my purpose, and to render it impossible for
me to waver without the imputation of dishonor, I communicated my
determination to one of my friends, who was greatly attached to me,
and whom I highly esteemed. He had lamented the state of mind into
which I had fallen, but not wishing to give countenance to my conduct,
and seeing the impossibility of inducing me to abandon it, he had for
some time ceased to visit at my house. In the few lines which I ad
dressed to him, I briefly stated the resolution I had adopted, and as a
pledge of my constancy I sent him a long tress of my ugly red hair. I
had purposely caused it to be cut off in order to prevent my going out,
as no one but clowns and sailors then appeared in public with short
hair. I concluded my billet by conjuring him to strengthen and aid my
fortitude by his presence and example. Isolated in this manner in my
own house, I prohibited all species of intercourse, and passed the first
fifteen days in uttering the most frightful lamentations and groans.
Some of my friends came to visit me, and appeared to commiserate my
situation, perhaps because I did not myself complain; but my figure
and whole appearance bespoke my sufferings. Wishing to read some
thing I had recourse to the gazettes, whole pages of which I frequently
ran over without understanding a single word. . . I passed more than
two months till the end of March 1775, in a state bordering on frenzy;
but about this time a new idea darted into my mind, which tended to
assuage my melancholy."

This was the idea of poetical composition, at which
Alfieri describes his first attempts, made under these dis
eased circumstances, and goes on :

WILL. 645

" The only good that occurred to me from this whim was that of
gradually detaching me from love, and of awakening my reason which
had so long lain dormant. I no longer found it necessary to cause my
self to be tied with cords to a chair, in order to prevent me from leaving
my house and returning to that of my lady. This had been one of the
expedients I devised to render myself wise by force. The cords were
concealed under a large mantle in which I was enveloped, and only one
hand remained at liberty. Of all those who came to see me, not one
suspected I was bound down in this manner. I remained in this situa
tion for whole hours; Elias, who was my jailer, was alone intrusted with
the secret. He always liberated me, as he had been enjoined, whenever
the paroxysms of my rage subsided. Of all the whimsical methods
which I employed, however, the most curious was that of appearing
in masquerade at the theatre towards the end of the carnival. Habited
as Apollo, I ventured to present myself with a lyre, on which I played
as well as I was able and sang some bad verses of my own composing.
Such effrontery was diametrically opposite to my natural character.
The only excuse I can offer for such scenes was my inability to resist an
imperious passion. I felt that it was necessary to place an insuperable
barrier between its object and me; and I saw that the strongest of all
was the shame to which I should expose myself by renewing an attach
ment which I had so publicly turned into ridicule." *

Often the insistent idea is of a trivial sort, but it may
wear the patient's life out. His hands feel dirty, they must
be washed. He knows they are not dirty ; yet to get rid of
the teasing idea he washes them. The idea, however, returns
in a moment, and the unfortunate victim, who is not in the
least deluded intellectually, will end by spending the whole
day at the wash-stand. Or his clothes are not ' rightly '
put on ; and to banish the thought he takes them off and
puts them on again, till his toilet consumes two or three
hours of time. Most people have the potentiality of this
disease. To few has it not happened to conceive, after get
ting into bed, that they may have forgotten to lock the
front door, or to turn out the entry gas. And few of us
have not on some occasion got up to repeat the perform
ance, less because they believed in the reality of its omis
sion than because only so could they banish the worrying
doubt and get to sleep, t

* Autobiography, Howells' edition (1877), pp. 192-6.

t See a paper on Insistent and Fixed Ideas by Dr. Cowles in American
Journal of Psychology, i. 222 ; and another on the so-called Insanity of
Doubt by Dr. Knapp, ibid. in. 1. The latter contains a partial bibliogiaphy
of the subject.

646 PSYCHOLOGY.

THE OBSTRUCTED WILL.

In striking contrast with the cases in which inhibition
is insufficient or impulsion in excess are those in which
impulsion is insufficient or inhibition of in excess. We all
know the condition described on p. 404 of Yol. I, in which the
mind for a few moments seems to lose its focussing power
and to be unable to rally its attention to any determinate
thing. At such times we sit blankly staring and do nothing.
The objects of consciousness fail to touch the quick or break
the skin. They are there, but do not reach the level of effect
iveness. This state of non-efficacious presence is the nor
mal condition of some objects, in all of us. Great fatigue
or exhaustion may make it the condition of almost all ob
jects ; and an apathy resembling that then brought about
is recognized in asylums under the name of abulia as a
symptom of mental disease. The healthy state of the will
requires, as aforesaid, both that vision should be right, and
that action should obey its lead. But in the morbid con
dition in question the vision may be wholly unaffected,
and the intellect clear, and yet the act either fails to follow
or follows in some other way. " Video meliora proboque,
deteriora sequor " is the classic expression of the latter con
dition of mind. The former it is to which the name abulia
peculiarly applies. The patients, says Guislain,

" are able to will inwardly, mentally, according to the dictates of reason.
They experience the desire to act, but they are powerless to act as they
should. . . . Their will cannot overpass certain limits : one would say
that the force of action within them is blocked up :' the I will does not
transform itself into impulsive volition, into active determination.
Some of these patients wonder themselves at the impotence with which
their will is smitten. If you abandon them to themselves, they pass
whole days in their bed or on a chair. If one speaks to them or excites
them, they express themselves properly though briefly ; and judge of
things pretty well. " *

In Chapter XXI, as will be remembered, it was said
that the sentiment of reality with which an object ap
pealed to the mind is proportionate (amongst other things)
to its efficacy as a stimulus to the will. Here we get the

* Quoted by Ribot, ov cit. p. 39.

WILL. 547

obverse side of the truth. Those ideas, objects, con
siderations, which (in these lethargic states) fail to get to the
•will, fail to draw blood, seem, in so far forth, distant and un
real. The connection of the reality of things with their
effectiveness as motives is a tale that has never yet been
fully told. The moral tragedy of human life comes almost
wholly from the fact that the link is ruptured which nor
mally should hold between vision of the truth and action,
and that this pungent sense of effective reality will not at
tach to certain ideas. Men do not differ so much in their
mere feelings and conceptions. Their notions of possibility
and their ideals are not as far apart as might be argued
from their differing fates. No class of them have better
sentiments or feel more constantly the difference between
the higher and the lower path in life than the hopeless
failures, the sentimentalists, the drunkards, the schemers,
the * dead-beats,' whose life is one long contradiction
between knowledge and action, and who, with full com
mand of theory, never get to holding their limp characters
erect. No one eats of the fruit of the tree of knowledge
as they do ; as far as moral insight goes, in comparison with
them, the orderly and prosperous philistines whom they
scandalize are sucking babes. And yet their moral
knowledge, always there grumbling and rumbling in the
background, — discerning, commenting, protesting, longing,
half resolving, — never wholly resolves, never gets its voice
out of the minor into the major key, or its speech out of
the subjunctive into the imperative mood, never breaks
the spell, never takes the helm into its hands. In such
characters as Eousseau and Kestif it would seem as if the
lower motives had all the impulsive efficacy in their
hands. Like trains with the right of way, they retain ex
clusive possession of the track. The more ideal motives
exist alongside of them in profusion, but they never get
switched on, and the man's conduct is no more influenced
by them than an express train is influenced by a wayfarer
standing by the roadside and calling to be taken aboard.
They are an inert accompaniment to the end of time ; and
the consciousness of inward hollowness that accrues from
habitually seeing the better only to do the worse, is one of

548 PSYCHOLOGY.

the saddest feelings one can bear with him through this
vale of tears.

We now see at one view when it is that effort complicates
volition. It does so whenever a rarer and more ideal im
pulse is called upon to neutralize others of a more instinc
tive and habitual kind ; it does so whenever strongly ex
plosive tendencies are checked, or strongly obstructive
conditions overcome. The dme bien nee, the child of the
sunshine, at whose birth the fairies made their gifts, does
not need much of it in his life. The hero and the neurotic
subject, on the other hand, do. Now our spontaneous way
of conceiving the effort, under all these circumstances, is as
an active force adding its strength to that of the motives
which ultimately prevail. When outer forces impinge upon
a body, we say that the resultant motion is in the line of
least resistance, or of greatest traction. But it is a curious
fact that our spontaneous language never speaks of volition
with effort in this way. Of course if we proceed a priori
and define the line of least resistance as the line that is
followed, the physical law must also hold good in the mental
sphere. But we feel, in all hard cases of volition, as if the
line taken, when the rarer and mere ideal motives prevail,
were the line of greater resistance, and as if the line of
coarser motivation were the more pervious and easy one,
even at the very moment when we refuse to follow it. He
who under the surgeon's knife represses cries of pain, or
he who exposes himself to social obloquy for duty's sake,
feels as if he were following the line of greatest temporary
resistance. He speaks of conquering and overcoming his
impulses and temptations.

But the sluggard, the drunkard, the coward, never talk
of their conduct in that way or say they resist their energy,
overcome their sobriety, conquer their courage, and so
forth. If in general we class all springs of action as pro-
pensities on the one hand and ideals on the other, the sen
sualist never says of his behavior that it results from a
victory over his ideals, but the moralist always speaks of
his as a victory over his propensities. The sensualist uses
terms of inactivity, says he forgets his ideals, is deaf to

WILL. 549

duty, and so forth ; which terms seem to imply that the
ideal motives per se can be annulled without energy or
•effort, and that the strongest mere traction lies in the line
of the propensities. The ideal impulse appears, in compar
ison with this, a still small voice which must be artificially
reinforced to prevail. Effort is what reinforces it, making
things seem as if, while the force of propensity were essen
tially a fixed quantity, the ideal force might be of various
amount. But what determines the amount of the effort
when, by its aid, an ideal motive becomes victorious over a
great sensual resistance ? The very greatness of the resist
ance itself. If the sensual propensity is small, the effort is
small. The latter is made great by the presence of a great
antagonist to overcome. And if a brief definition of ideal
or moral action were required, none could be given which
would better fit the appearances than this : It is action in
the line of the greatest resistance.

The facts may be most briefly symbolized thus, P stand
ing for the propensity, I for the ideal impulse, and E for
the effort :

I per se < P.
I + E > P.

In other words, if E adds itself to I, P immediately
offers the least resistance, and motion occurs in spite of it.

But the E does not seem to form an integral part of the
I. It appears adventitious and indeterminate in advance.
We can make more or less as we please, and if we make
enough we can convert the greatest mental resistance into
the least. Such, at least, is the impression which the facts
spontaneously produce upon us. But we will not discuss
the truth of this impression at present ; let us rather con
tinue our descriptive detail.

PLEASURE AND PAIN AS SPRINGS OP ACTION.

Objects and thoughts of objects start our action, but
the pleasures and pains which action brings modify its
course and regulate it ; and later the thoughts of the pleas
ures and the pains acquire themselves impulsive and in-

550 PSYCHOLOGY.

hibitive power. Not that the thought of a pleasure need
be itself a pleasure, usually it is the reverse — nessun mag-
gior dolore — as Dante says — and not that the thought of pain
meed be a pain, for, as Homer says, " griefs are often after
wards an entertainment." But as present pleasures are
tremendous reinforcers, and present pains tremendous in
hibitors of whatever action leads to them, so the thoughts
of pleasures and pains take rank amongst the thoughts
which have most impulsive and inhibitive power. The
precise relation which these thoughts hold to other thoughts
is thus a matter demanding some attention.

If a movement feels agreeable, we repeat and repeat it
as long as the pleasure lasts. If it hurts us, our muscular
contractions at the instant stop. So complete is the inhibi
tion in this latter case that it is almost impossible for a
man to cut or mutilate himself slowly and deliberately — his
hand invincibly refusing to bring on the pain. And there
are many pleasures which, when once we have begun to
taste them, make it all but obligatory to keep up the activ
ity to which they are due. So widespread and searching
is this influence of pleasures and pains upon our movements
that a premature philosophy has decided that these are
our only spurs to action, and that wherever they seem to
be absent, it is only because they are so far on among the
* remoter ' images that prompt the action that they are over
looked.

This is a great mistake, however. Important as is the
influence of pleasures and pains upon our movements, they
are far from being our only stimuli. With the manifesta
tions of instinct and emotional expression, for example, they
have absolutely nothing to do. Who smiles for the pleasure
of the smiling, or frowns for the pleasure of the frown ?
Who blushes to escape the discomfort of not blushing ?
Or who in anger, grief, or fear is actuated to the movements
which he makes by the pleasures which they yield ? In all
these cases the movements are discharged fatally by the
vis a tergo which the stimulus exerts upon a nervous system
framed to respond in just that way. The objects of our
rage, love, or terror, the occasions of our tears and smiles,

WILL. 551

whether they be present to our senses, or whether they be
merely represented in idea, have this peculiar sort of im
pulsive power. The impulsive quality of mental states is an
attribute behind which we cannot go. Some states of mind
have more of it than others, some have it in this direction,
and some in that. Feelings of pleasure and pain have it,
and perceptions and imaginations of fact have it, but neither
have it exclusively or peculiarly. It is of the essence of all
consciousness (or of the neural process which underlies it)
to instigate movement of some sort. That with one creature
and object it should be of one sort, with others of another
sort, is a problem for evolutionary history to explain.
However the actual impulsions may have arisen, they must
now be described as they exist ; and those persons obey a
curiously narrow teleological superstition who think them
selves bound to interpret them in every instance as effects
of the secret solicitancy of pleasure and repugnancy of
pain.*

* The silliness of the old-fashioned pleasure-philosophy saute aux yeux.
Take, for example, Prof. Bain's explanation of sociability and parental
love by the pleasures of touch: "Touch is the fundamental and generic
sense. . . . Even after the remaining senses are differentiated, the primary
sense continues to be a leading susceptibility of the miud. The soft warm
touch, if not a first-class influence, is at least an approach to that. The
combined power of soft contact and warmth amounts to a considerable
pitch of massive pleasure ; while there may be subtle influences not redu
cible to these two heads, such as we term, from not knowing anything
about them, magnetic or electric. The sort of thrill from taking a baby in
arms is something beyond mere warm touch ; and it may rise to the ecstatic
height, in which case, however, there may be concurrent sensations and
ideas. ... In mere tender emotion not sexual, there is nothing but the
sense of touch to gratify, unless we assume the occult magnetic influences.
. . . In a word, our love pleasures begin and end in sensual contact. Touch
is both the alpha and omega of affection. As the terminal and satisfying
sensation, the ne plus ultra, it must be a pleasure of the highest degree. . . .
Why should a more lively feeling grow up towards a fellow-being than
towards a perennial fountain ? [This ' should ' is simply delicious from
the more modern evolutionary point of view.] It must be that there is a
source of pleasure in the companionship of other sentient creatures, over
and above the help afforded by them in obtaining the necessaries of life.
To account for this, I can suggest nothing but the primary and independent
pleasure of the animal embrace." [Mind, this is said not of the sexual
interest, but of ' Sociability at Large.'] " For this pleasure every creature
is disposed to pay something, even when it is only fraternal. A certain

552 PSYCHOLOGY.

It might be that to reflection such a narrow teleology
would justify itself, that pleasures and pains might seem
the only comprehensible and reasonable motives for action, the
only motives on which we ought to act. That is an ethical
proposition, in favor of which a good deal may be said.
But it is not a psychological proposition ; and nothing fol
lows from it as to the motives upon which as a matter of
fact we do act. These motives are supplied by innumerable
objects, which innervate our voluntary muscles by a process
<as automatic as that by which they light a fever in our
breasts. If the thought of pleasure can impel to action,
surely other thoughts may. Experience only can decide
which thoughts do. The chapters on Instinct and Emotion
have shown us that their name is legion ; and with this
verdict we ought to remain contented, and not seek an illu
sory simplification at the cost of half the facts.

If in these our first acts pleasures and pains bear no
part, as little do they bear in our last acts, or those arti
ficially acquired performances which have become habitual.

amount of material benefit imparted is a condition of the full heartiness of a
responding embrace, the complete fruition of this primitive joy. In the
absence of those conditions the pleasure of giving . . . can scarcely be
accounted for ; we know full well that, without these helps, it would be a
very meagre sentiment in beings like ourselves. ... It seems to me that
there must be at the [parental instinct's] foundation that intense pleasure in
the embrace of the young which we find to characterize the parental feeling
throughout. Such a pleasure once created would associate itself with the
prevailing features and aspects of the young, and give to all of these their
very great interest. For the sake of the pleasure, the parent discovers the
necessity of nourishing the subject of it, and comes to regard the minister
ing function as a part or condition of the delight " (Emotions and Will,
pp. 126, 127, 132, 133, 140). Prof. Bain does not explain why a satin
cushion kept at about 98° F. would not on the whole give us the pleasure in
question more cheaply than our friends and babies do. It is true that the
cushion might lack the ' occult magnetic influences.' Most of us would
say that neither a baby's nor a friend's skin would possess them, were not
a tenderness already there. The youth who feels ecstasy shoot through
him when by accident the silken palm or even the ' vesture's hem ' of his
idol touches him, would hardly feel it were he not hard hit by Cupid in
advance. The love creates the ecstasy, not the ecstasy the love. And for
the rest of us can it possibly be that all our social virtue springs from an
appetite for the sensual pleasure of having our hand shaken, or being
slapped on the back ?

WILL. 553

All the daily routine of life, our dressing and undress
ing, the coming and going from our work or carrying
through of its various operations, is utterly without mental
reference to pleasure and pain, except under rarely realized
conditions. It is ideo- motor action. As I do not breathe
for the pleasure of the breathing, but simply find that I am
breathing, so I do not write for the pleasure of the writ
ing, but simply because I have once begun, and being in a
state of intellectual excitement which keeps venting itself
in that way, find that I am writing still. Who will pretend
rhat when he idly fingers his knife-handle at the table, it is
for the sake of any pleasure which it gives him, or pain
which he thereby avoids. We do all these things because
at the moment we cannot help it ; our nervous systems are
<so shaped that they overflow in just that way ; and for
many of our idle or purely ' nervous ' and fidgety perform
ances we can assign absolutely no reason at all.

Or what shall be said of a shy and unsociable man who
receives point-blank an invitation to a small party ? The
thing is to him an abomination ; but your presence exerts
a compulsion on him, he can think of no excuse, and so
says yes, cursing himself the while for what he does. He
is unusually sui compos who does not every week of his
life fall into some such blundering act as this. Such in
stances of voluntas invita show not only that our acts can
not all be conceived as effects of represented pleasure,
but that they cannot even be classed as cases of repre-
resented good. The class * goods ' contains many more gen
erally influential motives to action than the class ' pleas-
ants.' Pleasures often attract us only because we deem
them goods. Mr. Spencer, e.g., urges us to court pleasures
for their influence upon health, which comes to us as a good.
But almost as little as under the form of pleasures do our
acts invariably appear to us under the form of goods. All
diseased impulses and pathological fixed ideas are instances
to the contrary. It is the very badness of the act that gives
it then its vertiginous fascination. Remove the prohibi
tion, and the attraction stops. In my university days a
student threw himself from an upper entry window of one
of the college buildings and was nearly killed. Another

554 PSYCHOLOGY.

student, a friend of my own, had to pass the window daily in
coming and going from his room, and experienced a dread
ful temptation to imitate the deed. Being a Catholic, he told
his director, who said, ' All right ! if you must, you must,'
and added, ' Go ahead and do it,' thereby instantly quench
ing his desire. This director knew how to minister to a
mind diseased. But we need not go to minds diseased for
examples of the occasional tempting-power of simple bad
ness and unpleasantness as such. Every one who has a
wound or hurt anywhere, a sore tooth, e.g., will ever and
anon press it just to bring out the pain. If we are near a
new sort of stink, we must sniff it again just to verify once
more how bad it is. This very day I have been repeating
over and over to myself a verbal jingle whose mawkish
silliness was the secret of its haunting power. I loathed
yet could not banish it.

Believers in the pleasure-and-pain theory must thus,
if they are candid, make large exceptions in the application
of their creed. Action from ' fixed ideas ' is accordingly
a terrible stumbling-block to the candid Professor Bain.
Ideas have in his psychology no impulsive but only a ' guid
ing' function, whilst

11 The proper stimulus of the will, namely, some variety of pleasure
and pain, is needed to give the impetus. ... The intellectual link is
not sufficient for causing the deed to rise at the beck of the idea
(except in case of an kidee fixe') ;" but " should any pleasure spring
up or be continued, by performing an action that we clearly conceive,
the causation is then complete ; both the directing and the moving
powers are present." :

Pleasures and pains are for Professor Bain the « genuine
impulses of the will.' f

"Without an antecedent of pleasurable or painful feeling— actual
or ideal, primary or derivative— the will cannot be stimulated. Through

* Emotion and Will, p. 352. But even Bain's own description belies
his formula, for the idea appears as the ' moving ' and the pleasure as
the ' directing ' force.

f P. 398

WILL. 555

all the disguises that wrap up what we call motives, something of one
or other of these two grand conditions can be detected. " *

Accordingly, where Professor Bain finds an exception to
this rule, he refuses to call the phenomenon a * genuinely
voluntary impulse.' The exceptions, he admits, ' are those
furnished by never-dying spontaneity, habits, and fixed
ideas.' f Fixed ideas ' traverse the proper course of voli
tion.' t

" Disinterested impulses are wholly distinct from the attainment of
pleasure and the avoidance of pain. . . . The theory of disinterested
action, in the only form that I can conceive it, supposes that the action
of the will and the attainment of happiness do not square throughout. "§

Sympathy " has this in common with the Fixed Idea,
that it clashes with the regular outgoings of the will in
favor of our pleasures."!

Prof. Bain thus admits all the essential facts. Pleasure
and pain are motives of only part of our activity. But he
prefers to give to that part of the activity exclusively which
these feelings prompt the name of « regular outgoings ' and
1 genuine impulses ' of the will, IF and to treat all the rest as
mere paradoxes and anomalies, of which nothing rational
can be said. This amounts to taking one species of a
genus, calling it alone by the generic name, and ordering
the other co-ordinate species to find what names they may.
At bottom this is only verbal play. How much more con
ducive to clearness and insight it is to take the genus
' springs of action ' and treat it as a whole ; and then to
distinguish within it the species « pleasure and pain ' from
whatever other species may be found !

There is, it is true, a complication in the relation of
pleasure to action, which partly excuses those who make
it the exclusive spur. This complication deserves some
notice at our hands.

An impulse which discharges itself immediately is gen
erally quite neutral as regards pleasure or pain— the breath-

* p 354. f P. 355. J p. 390

§ Pp. 295-6. || P. 121.

1 Cf. also Bain's note to Jas. Mill's Analysis, vol. n. p. 305.

556 PSYCHOLOGY.

ing impulse, for example. If such an impulse is arrested,
however, by an extrinsic force, a great feeling of uneasiness
is produced— for instance, the dyspnoea of asthma. And
in proportion as the arresting force is then overcome, relief
acrues as when we draw breath again after the asthma sub
sides. The relief is a pleasure and the uneasiness a pain ;
and thus it happens that round all our impulses, merely as
such, there twine, as it were, secondary possibilities of
pleasant and painful feeling, involved in the manner in
which the act is allowed to occur. These pleasures and
pains of achievement, discharge, or fruition exist, no matter
what the original spring of action be. We are glad when
we have successfully got ourselves out of a danger, though
the thought of the gladness was surely not what suggested
to us to escape. To have compassed the steps towards a,
proposed sensual indulgence also makes us glad, and this
gladness is a pleasure additional to the pleasure originally
proposed. On the other hand, we are chagrined and dis
pleased when any activity, however instigated, is hindered
whilst in process of actual discharge. We are ' uneasy '
till the discharge starts up again. And this is just as true
when the action is neutral, or has nothing but pain in view
as its result, as when it was undertaken for pleasure's ex
press sake. The moth is probably as annoyed if hindered
from getting into the lamp-flame as the roue is if inter
rupted in his debauch ; and we are chagrined if prevented
from doing some quite unimportant act which would have
given us no noticeable pleasure if done, merely because the
prevention itself is disagreeable.

Let us now call the pleasure for tJie sake of which the
act may be done the pursued pleasure. It follows that, even
when no pleasure is pursued by an act, the act itself may be
the pleasantest line of conduct when once the impulse has
begun, on account of the incidental pleasure which then
attends its successful achievement and the pain which would
come of interruption. A pleasant act and an act pursuing a
'pleasure are in themselves, however, two perfectly distinct
conceptions, though they coalesce in one concrete phenome
non whenever a pleasure is deliberately pursued. I cannot
help thinking that it is the confusion of pursued pleasure

WILL. 557

with mere pleasure of achievement which makes the pleasure-
theory of action so plausible to the ordinary mind. We
feel an impulse, no matter whence derived; we proceed
to act ; if hindered, we feel displeasure ; and if successful,
relief. Action in the line of the present impulse is always for
the time being the pleasant course ; and the ordinary he
donist expresses this fact by saying that we act for the
sake of the pleasantness involved. But who does not see
that for this sort of pleasure to be possible, the impulse
must be there already as an independent fact ? The pleasure
of successful performance is the result of the impulse, not
its cause. You cannot have your pleasure of achievement
unless you have managed to get your impulse under head-
way beforehand by some previous means.

It is true that on special occasions (so complex is the
human mind) the pleasure of achievement may itself become a
pur sued pleasure; and these cases form another point on which
the pleasure-theory is apt to rally. Take a foot-ball game-
or a fox-hunt. Who in cold blood wants the fox for its
own sake, or cares whether the ball be at this goal or that ?
We know, however, by experience, that if we can once rouse
a certain impulsive excitement in ourselves, whether to over
take the fox, or to get the ball to one particular goal, the
successful venting of it over the counteracting checks will
fill us with exceeding joy. We therefore get ourselves de
liberately and artificially into the hot impulsive state. It
takes the presence of various instinct-arousing conditions to
excite it ; but little by little, once we are in the field, it
reaches its paroxysm ; and we reap the reward of our ex
ertions in that pleasure of successful achievement which,
far more than the dead fox or the goal-got ball, was the ob
ject we originally pursued. So it often is with duties.
Lots of actions are done with heaviness all through, and
not till they are completed does pleasure emerge, in the joy
of being done with them. Like Hamlet we say of each such
successive task,

" O cursed spite,
That ever I was born to set it right t "

and then we often add to the original impulse that set ue
on, this additional one, that " we shall feel so glad when,

658 PSYCHOLOGY.

well through with it," that thought also having its impulsive
spur. But because a pleasure of achievement can thus be
come a pursued pleasure upon occasion, it does not follow
that everywhere and always that pleasure must be what is
pursued. This, however, is what the pleasure-philosophers
seem to suppose. As well might they suppose, because no
steamer can go to sea without incidentally consuming coal,
and because some steamers may occasionally go to sea to
try their coal, that therefore no steamer can go to sea for
any other motive than that of coal-consumption.*

As we need not act for the sake of gaining the pleasure of
achievement, so neither need we act for the sake of escaping
the uneasiness of arrest. This uneasiness is altogether due
to the fact that the act is already tending to occur on other
grounds. And these original grounds are what impel to its
continuance, even though the uneasiness of the arrest may
upon occasion add to their impulsive power.

To conclude, I am far from denying the exceeding prom
inence and importance of the part which pleasures and
pains, both felt and represented, play in the motivation of
our conduct. But I must insist that it is no exclusive part,
and that co-ordinately with these mental objects innumer
able others have an exactly similar impulsive and inhibitive
power, f

If one must have a single name for the condition upon
which the impulsive and inhibitive quality of objects de
pends, one had better call it their interest. ' The interest-

* How much clearer Hume's head was than that of his disciples' ! "It
has been proved beyond all controversy that even the passions commonly
esteemed selfish carry the Mind beyond self directly to the object ; that
though the satisfaction of these passions gives us enjoyment, yet the pros
pect of this enjoyment is not the cause of the passions but, on the contrary,
the passion is antecedent to the enjoyment, and without the former the latter
could never possibly exist," etc. (Essay on the Different Species oi Philoso
phy, § 1, note near the end.)

f In favor of the view in the text, one may consult H. Sidgwick, Meth
ods of Ethics, book i. chap, iv; T. H. Green, Prolegomena to Ethics, bk
ni. chap. i. p. 179; Carpenter. Mental Physiol., chap vi , J. Martineau,
Types of Ethical Theory, part 11, bk. i, chap. n. i, and bk n, branch i.
chap. i. i. § 3. Against it see Leslie Stephen, Science of Ethics, chap. n.
§ ii ; H. Spencer, Data of Ethics, §§ 9-15; D. G. Thompson, System of
Psychology, part ix, and Mind, vi. 62. Also 3ain, Senses and Intellect,
938-44 , Emotions and Will. 436.

WILL, 559

iiig ; is a title which covers not only the pleasant and the
painful, but also the morbidly fascinating, the tediously
haunting, and even the simply habitual, inasmuch as the
attention usually travels on habitual lines, and what-we-at-
tend-to and what-interests-us are synonymous terms. It
seems as if we ought to look for the secret of an idea's im
pulsiveness, not in any peculiar relations which it may have
with paths of motor discharge, — for all ideas have relations
with some such paths, — but rather in a preliminary phe
nomenon, the urgency, namely, with which it is able to compel
attention and dominate in consciousness. Let it once so dom
inate, let no other ideas succeed in displacing it, and what
ever motor effects belong to it by nature will inevitably
occur — its impulsion, in short, will be given to boot, and will
manifest itself as a matter of course. This is what we have
seen in instinct, in emotion, in common ideo-motor action,
in hypnotic suggestion, in morbid impulsion, and in voluntas
invita, — the impelling idea is simply the one which possesses
the attention. It is the same where pleasure and pain are
the motor spurs — they drive other thoughts from con
sciousness at the same time that they instigate their own
characteristic 'volitional' effects. And this is also what
happens at the moment of the fiat, in all the five types of
'decision' which we have described. In short, one does not
see any case in which the steadfast occupancy of conscious
ness does not appear to be the prime condition of impulsive
power. It is still more obviously the prime condition of
inhibitive power. What checks our impulses is the mere
thinking of reasons to the contrary — it is their bare presence
to the mind which gives the veto, and makes acts, otherwise
seductive, impossible to perform. If we could only forget
our scruples, our doubts, our fears, what exultant energy
we should for a while display !

WILL IS A KELATION BETWEEN THE MIND AND ITS
* IDEAS.3

In closing in, therefore, after all these preliminaries,
upon the more intimate nature of the volitional process, we
find ourselves driven more and more exclusively to con
sider the conditions which make ideas prevail in the mind.

560 P8YCHOLOG T.

With the prevalence, once there as a fact, of the motive
idea the psychology of volition properly stops. The move
ments which ensue are exclusively physiological phenomena,
following according to physiological laws upon the neural
events to which the idea corresponds. The willing termi
nates with the prevalence of the idea ; and whether the act
then follows or not is a matter quite immaterial, so far as the
willing itself goes. I will to write, and the act follows. I
will to sneeze, and it does not. I will that the distant table
slide over the floor towards me ; it also does not. My willing
representation can no more instigate my sneezing-centre
than it can instigate the table to activity. But in both cases
it is as true and good willing as it was when I willed to
write. * In a word, volition is a psychic or moral fact pure
and simple, and is absolutely completed when the stable
state of the idea is there. The supervention of motion is a
supernumerary phenomenon depending on executive gan
glia whose function lies outside the mind.

In St. Vitus' dance, in locomotor ataxy, the representa
tion of a movement and the consent to it take place nor
mally. But the inferior executive centres are deranged, and
although the ideas discharge them, they do not discharge
them so as to reproduce the precise sensations anticipated.
In aphasia the patient has an image of certain words which
he wishes to utter, but when he opens his mouth he hears
himself making quite unintended sounds. This may fill
him with rage and despair— which passions only show how

* This sentence is written from the author's own consciousness. But
many persons say that where they disbelieve in the effects ensuing, as in
the case of the table, they cannot will it. They " cannot exert a volition
that a table should move." This personal difference may be partly verbal.
Different people may attach different connotations to the word 'will.'
But I incline to think that we differ psychologically as well. When one
knows that he has no power, one's desire of a thing is called a wish and
not a will. The sense of impotence inhibits the volition. Only by abstract
ing from the thought of the impossibility am I able to imagine strongly
the table sliding over the floor, to make the bodily ' effort ' which I do, and
to will it to come towards me. It may be that some people are unable
to perform this abstraction, and that the image of the table stationary
on the floor inhibits the contradictory image of its moving, which is the
object to be willed.

WILL. 561

intact his will remains. Paralysis only goes a step farther.
The associated mechanism is not only deranged but al
together broken through. The volition occurs, but the
hand remains as still as the table. The paralytic is made
aware of this by the absence of the expected change in his
afferent sensations. He tries harder, i.e., he mentally
frames the sensation of muscular * effort,' with consent that
it shall occur. It does so : he frowns, he heaves his chest,
he clinches his other fist, but the palsied arm lies passive
as before.*

We thus find that we reach the heart of our inquiry into
volition when we ask by ivhat process it is that the thought of
any given object comes to prevail stably in the mind. Where
thoughts prevail without effort, we have sufficiently studied
in the several chapters on sensation, association, and at
tention, the laws of their advent before consciousness and of
their stay. We will not go over that ground again, for we
know that interest and association are the words, let their
worth be what it may, on which our explanations must per
force rely. Where, on the other hand, the prevalence of
the thought is accompanied by the phenomenon of effort,
the case is much less clear. Already in the chapter on at
tention we postponed the final consideration of voluntary
attention with effort to a later place. We have now
brought things to a point at which we see that attention
with effort is all that any case of volition implies. The
essential achievement of the will, in short, when it is most * vol
untary,' is to ATTEND to a difficult object and hold it fast before
the mind. The so-doing is ihejiat ; and it is a mere physio
logical incident that when the object is thus attended to,
immediate motor consequences should ensue. A resolve,
whose contemplated motor consequences are not to ensue
until some possibly far distant future condition shall have
been fulfilled, involves all the psychic elements of a motor
fiat except the word * now /' and it is the same with many of

* A normal palsy occurs during sleep. We will all sorts of motions in
our dreams, but seldom perform any of them. In nightmare we become
conscious of the non-performance, and make a muscular ' effort.' This
eeems then to occur in a restricted way, limiting itself to the occlusion of
the glottis and producing the respiratory anxiety which wakes us up.

562 PSYCHOLOGY.

our purely theoretic beliefs. We saw in effect in the ap
propriate chapter, how in the last resort belief means only
a peculiar sort of occupancy of the mind, and relation to
the self felt in the thing believed ; and we know in the case
of many beliefs how constant an effort of the attention is
required to keep them in this situation and protect them
from displacement by contradictory ideas.* (Compare

above, p. 321.)

Effort of attention is thus the essential phenomenon of
iwll.-t Every reader must know by his own experience that
this is so, for every reader must have felt some fiery pas
sion's grasp. What constitutes the difficulty for a man
laboring under an unwise passion of acting as if the passion

* Both resolves and beliefs have of course immediate motor conse
quences of a quasi-emotional sort, changes of breathing, of attitude, in
ternal speech movements, etc,; but these movements are not the objects
resolved on or believed. The movements in common volition are the ob
jects willed.

f This volitional effort pure and simple must be carefully distinguished
from the muscular effort with which it is usually confounded. The latter
consists of all those peripheral feelings to which a muscular ' exertion '
may give rise. These feelings, whenever they are massive and the body is
not ' fresh, ' are rather disagreeable, especially when accompanied by stopped
breath, congested head, bruised skin of fingers, toes, or shoulders, and
strained joints. And it is only as thus disagreeable that the mind must
make its volitional effort in stably representing their reality and conse
quently bringing it about. That they happen to be made real by muscular
activity is a purely accidental circumstance. A soldier standing still to be
fired at expects disagreeable sensations from his muscular passivity. The
action of his will, in sustaining the expectation, is identical with that
required for a painful muscular effort. What is hard for both is facing an

idea as real.

Where much muscular effort is not needed or where the 'freshness is
very great, the volitional effort is not required to sustain the idea of move
ment which comes then and stays in virtue of association's simpler laws.
More' commonly, however, muscular effort involves volitional effort as
well Exhausted with fatigue and wet and watching, the sailor on a
wreck throws himself down to rest. But hardly are his limbs fairly
relaxed when the order ' To the pumps ! ' again sounds in his ears. Shall
he can he obey it ? Is it not better just to let his aching body lie, and let
the ship go down if she will? So he lies on, till, with a desperate heave
of the will, at last he staggers to his legs, and to his task again. Again,
there are instances where the fiat demands great volitional effort though
the muscular exertion be insignificant, e.g., the getting out of bed and
bathing one's self on a cold morning.

WILL. 563

were unwise ? Certainly there is no physical difficulty. It
is as easy physically to avoid a fight as to begin one, to
pocket one's money as to squander it on one's cupidities, to
walk away from as towards a coquette's door. The difficulty
is mental ; it is that of getting the idea of the wise action
to stay before our mind at all. When any strong emotional
state whatever is upon us the tendency is for no images but
such as are congruous with it to come up. If others by
chance offer themselves, they are instantly smothered and
crowded out. If we be joyous, we cannot keep thinking of
those uncertainties and risks of failure which abound upon
our path ; if lugubrious, we cannot think of new triumphs,
travels, loves, and joys ; nor if vengeful, of our oppressor's
community of nature with ourselves. The cooling advice
which we get from others when the fever-fit is on us is the
most jarring and exasperating thing in life. Reply we can
not, so we get angry ; for by a sort of self-preserving in
stinct which our passion has, it feels that these chill objects,
if they once but gain a lodgment, will work and work
until they have frozen the very vital spark from out of all
our mood and brought our airy castles in ruin to the ground.
Such is the inevitable effect of reasonable ideas over others
—if they can once get a quiet hearing ; and passion's cue
accordingly is always and everywhere to prevent their still
small voice from being heard at all. " Let me not think of
that ! Don't speak to me of that !" This is the sudden cry
of all those who in a passion perceive some sobering con
siderations about to check them in mid-career. " Ha>c tibi
erit janua leti" we feel. There is something so icy in this
cold-water bath, something which seems so hostile to the
movement of our life, so purely negative, in Eeason, when
she lays her corpse-like finger on our heart and says, " Halt!
give up ! leave off! go back ! sit down !" that it is no wonder
that to most men the steadying influence seems, for the
time being, a very minister of death.

The strong-willed man, however, is the man who hears
the still small voice unflinchingly, and who, when the
death-bringing consideration comes, looks at its face, con
sents to its presence, clings to it, affirms it, and holds it
fast, in spite of the host of exciting mental images which

564 PSYCHOLOGY.

rise in revolt against it and would expel it from the mind.
Sustained in this way by a resolute effort of attention, the
difficult object erelong begins to call up its own congeners
and associates and ends by changing the disposition of the
man's consciousness altogether. And with his conscious
ness, his action changes, for the new object, once stably in
possesion of the field of his thoughts, infallibly produces
its own motor effects. The difficulty lies in the gaining
possession of that field. Though the spontaneous drift of
thought is all the other way, the attention must be kept
strained on that one object until at last it grows, so as to
maintain itself before the mind with ease. This strain of
the attention is the fundamental act of will. And the will's
work is in most cases practically ended when the bare pres
ence to our thought of the naturally unwelcome object has
been secured. For the mysterious tie between the^thought
and the motor centres next comes into play, and, in a way
which we cannot even guess at, the obedience of the bodily
organs follows as a matter of course.

In all this one sees how the immediate point of appli
cation of the volitional effort lies exclusively in the mental
world. The whole drama is a mental drama. The whole
difficulty is a mental difficulty, a difficulty with an object of
our thought. If I may use the word idea without suggest
ing associationist or Herbartian fables, I will say that it is
an idea to which our will applies itself, an idea which if wa
let it go would slip away, but which we will not let go.
Consent to the idea's undivided presence, this is effort's
sole achievement. Its only function is to get this feeling of
consent into the mind. And for this there is but one way.
The idea to be consented to must be kept from flickering
and going out. It must be held steadily before the mind
until \ifiUs the mind. Such filling of the mind by an idea,
with its congruous associates, is consent to the idea and to
the fact which the idea represents. If the idea be that, or
include that, of a bodily movement of our own, then we call
the consent thus laboriously gained a motor volition. For
Nature here ' backs ' us instantaneously and follows up our
inward willingness by outward changes on her own part.
She does this in no other instance. Pity she should not

WILL. 565

have been more generous, nor made a world whose other
parts were as immediately subject to our will !

On page 531, in describing the ' reasonable type ' of de
cision, it was said that it usually came when the right con
ception of the case was found. Where, however, the right
conception is an anti-inpulsive one, the whole intellectual
ingenuity of the man usually goes to work to crowd it out
of sight, and to find names for the emergency, by the help
of which the dispositions of the moment may sound sancti
fied, and sloth or passion may reign unchecked. How many
excuses does the drunkard find when each new temptation
comes ! It is a new brand of liquor which the interests of
intellectual culture in such matters oblige him to test ;
moreover it is poured out and it is sin to waste it ; or others
are drinking and it would be churlishness to refuse ; or it is
but to enable him to sleep, or just to get through this job of
work ; or it isn't drinking, it is because he feels so cold ;
or it is Christmas-day ; or it is a means of stimulating him
to make a more powerful resolution in favor of abstinence
than any he has hitherto made ; or it is just this once, and
once doesn't count, etc., etc., ad libitum — it is, in fact, any
thing you like except being a drunkard. That is the concep
tion that will not stay before the poor soul's attention. But
if he once gets able to pick out that way of conceiving, from
all the other possible ways of conceiving the various op
portunities which occur, if through thick and thin he holds
to it that this is being a drunkard and is nothing else, he
is not likely to remain one long. The effort by which he
succeeds in keeping the right name unwaveringly present
to his mind proves to be his saving moral act*

Everywhere then the function of the effort is the same:
to keep affirming and adopting a thought which, if left to
itself, would slip away. It may be cold and flat when the
spontaneous mental drift is towards excitement, or great
and arduous when the spontaneous drift is towards repose.
In the one case the effort has to inhibit an explosive, in the

* Of. Aristotle's Nichomachasan Ethics, vn. 3 ; also a discussion of the
doctrine of ' The Practical Syllogism ' in Sir A. Grant's edition of thig
work, 2d ed. vol. i. p. 212 ff.

666 PSYCHOLOGY.

other to arouse an obstructed will. The exhausted sailor
on a wreck has a will which is obstructed. One of his
ideas is that of his sore hands, of the nameless exhaustion
of his whole frame which the act of farther pumping in
volves, and of the deliciousness of sinking into sleep. The
other is that of the hungry sea ingulfing him. " Eathei
the aching toil !" he says ; and it becomes reality then, in
spite of the inhibiting influence of the relatively luxurious .
sensations which he gets from lying still. But exactly
similar in form would be his consent to lie and sleep. Often
it is the thought of sleep and what leads to it which is the
hard one to keep before the mind. If a patient afflicted
with insomnia can only control the whirling chase of his
thoughts so far as to think of nothing at all (which can be
done), or so far as to imagine one letter after another of a
verse of scripture or poetry spelt slowly and monotonously
out, it is almost certain that here, too, specific bodily effects
will follow, and that sleep will come. The trouble is to keep
the mind upon a train of objects naturally so insipid. To
sustain a representation, to think, is, in short, the only moral
0<3t, for the impulsive and the obstructed, for sane and
lunatics alike. Most maniacs know their thoughts to be
crazy, but find them too pressing to be withstood. Com
pared with them the sane truths are so deadly sober, so
cadaverous, that the lunatic cannot bear to look them in
the face and say, "Let these alone be my reality !" But
with sufficient effort, as Dr. Wigan says,

" Such a man can for a time wind himself up, as it were, and deter
mine that the notions of the disordered brain shall not be manifested.
Many instances are on record similar to that told by Pinel, where an
inmate of the Bicetre, having stood a long cross-examination, and
given every mark of restored reason, signed his name to the paper
authorizing his discharge • Jesus Christ, ' and then went off into all the
vagaries connected with that delusion. In the phraseology of the
gentleman whose case is related in an early part of this [Wigan's] work
he had ' held himself tight ' during the examination in order to attain
his object; this once accomplished he ' let himself down ' again, and,
if even conscious of his delusion, could not control it. I have observed
with such persons that it requires a considerable time to wind them
selves up to the pitch of complete self-control, that the effort is a pain
ful tension of the mind. . . . When thrown off their guard by any
accidental remark or worn out by the length of the examination, thej

WILL. 567

let themselves go, and cannot gather themselves up again without prep
aration. Lord Erskine relates the story of a man who brought an
action against Dr. Munro for confining him without cause. He under
went the most rigid examination by the counsel for the defendant with
out discovering any appearance of insanity, till a gentleman asked him
about a princess with whom he corresponded in cherry-juice, and he
became instantly insane."*

To sum it all up in a word, the terminus of the psychologi
cal process in volition, the point to which the will is directly ap
plied, is alivays an idea. There are at all times some ideas
*vom which we shy away like frightened horses the moment
we get a glimpse of their forbidding profile upon the
threshold of our thought. The only resistance which our
tvill can possibly experience is the resistance which such an idea
offers to being attended to at all. To attend to it is the voli
tional act, and the only inward volitional act which we ever
perform.

I have put the thing in this ultra-simple way because I
want more than anything else to emphasize the fact that
volition is primarily a relation, not between our Self and

* The Duality of the Mind, pp. 141-2. Another case from the same
book (p 123): " A gentleman of respectable birth, excellent education,
And ample fortune, engaged in one of the highest departments of trade,
. . . and being induced to embark in one of the plausible speculations of
the day . . . was utterly ruined. Like other men he could bear a sudden
overwhelming reverse better than a long succession of petty misfortunes,
and the way in which he conducted himself on the occasion met with un
bounded admiration from his friends. He withdrew, however, into rigid
seclusion, and being no longer able to exercise the generosity and indulge
the benevolent feelings which had formed the happiness of his life, made
himself a substitute for them by daydreams, gradually fell into a state of
irritable despondency, from which he only gradually recovered with the
loss of reason. He now fancied himself possessed of immense wealth, and
gave without stint his imaginary riches. He has ever since been under
gentle restraint, and leads a life not merely of happiness, but of bliss ; con
verses rationally, reads the newspapers, where every tale of distress attracts
his notice, and being furnished with an abundant supply of blank checks,
he tills up one of them with a munificent sum, sends it off to the sufferer,
and sits down to his dinner with a happy conviction that he has earned the
right to a little indulgence in the pleasures of the table ; and yet, on a
serious conversation with one of his old friends, he is quite conscious of
his real position, but the conviction is so exquisitely painful th&theunU
not let himself believe it."

568 PSYCHOLOGY.

extra-mental matter (as many philosophers still maintain),
but between our Self and our own states of mind. But
when, a short while ago, I spoke of the filling of the mind
with an idea as being equivalent to consent to the idea's
object, I said something which the reader doubtless ques
tioned at the time, and which certainly now demands some
qualification ere we pass beyond.

It is unqualifiedly true that if any thought do fill the
mind exclusively, such filling is consent. The thought, for
that time at any rate, carries the man and his will with it.
But it is not true that the thought need fill the mind ex
clusively for consent to be there ; for we often consent to
things whilst thinking of other things, even of hostile
things ; and we saw in fact that precisely what distinguishes
our ' fifth type ' of decision from the other types (see p. 534)
is just this coexistence with the triumphant thought of
other thoughts which would inhibit it but for the effort
which makes it prevail. The effort to attend is therefore
only a part of what the word ' will ' covers ; it covers also
the effort to consent to something to which our attention is
not quite complete. Often, when an object has gained our
attention exclusively, and its motor results are just on the
point of setting in, it seems as if the sense of their immi
nent irrevocability were enough of itself to start up the in
hibitory ideas and to make us pause. Then we need a new
stroke of effort to break down the sudden hesitation which
seizes upon us, and to persevere. So that although atten
tion is the first and fundamental thing in volition, express
consent to the reality of what is attended to is often an ad
ditional and quite distinct phenomenon involved.

The reader's own consciousness tells him of course just
what these words of mine denote. And I freely confess
that I am impotent to carry the analysis of the matter any
farther, or to explain in other terms of what this consent
consists. It seems a subjective experience sui generis, which
we can designate but not define. We stand here exactly
where we did in the case of belief. When an idea stings us
in a certain way, makes as it were a certain electric connec
tion with our self, we believe that it is a reality. When it
stings us in another way, makes another connection with

WILL. 569

our Self, we say, let it be a reality. To the word 'is ' and
to the words ' let it be ' there correspond peculiar attitudes
of consciousness which it is vain to seek to explain. The
indicative and the imperative moods are as much ultimate
categories of thinking as they are of grammar. The ' qual
ity of reality ' which these moods attach to things is not
like other qualities. It is a relation to our life. It means
our adoption of the things, our caring for them, our stand
ing by them. This at least is what it practically means for
us ; what it may mean beyond that we do not know.
And the transition from merely considering an object as
possible, to deciding or willing it to be real ; the change
from the fluctuating to the stable personal attitude concern
ing it ; from the ' don't care ' state of mind to that in which
4 we mean business,' is one of the most familiar things in
life. We can partly enumerate its conditions ; and we can
partly trace its consequences, especially the momentous
one that when the mental object' is a movement of our own
body, it realizes itself outwardly when the mental change
in question has occurred. But the change itself as a sub
jective phenomenon is something which we can translate
into no simpler terms.

THE QUESTION OF 'FREE-WILL.'

Especially must we, when talking about it, rid our mind
of the fabulous warfare of separate agents called ' ideas.'
The brain-processes may be agents, and the thought as such
may be an agent. But what the ordinary psychologies
call ' ideas ' are nothing but parts of the total object of
representation. All that is before the mind at once, no
matter how complex a system of things and relations it may
be, is one object for the thought. Thus, ' A-and-B-and-their-
mutual - incompatibility - and - the - fact - that-only -one- can -
be-true-or-can - become- real-notwithstanding -the-probabil-
ity-or-desirability-of-both ' may be such a complex object ;
and where the thought is deliberative its object has always
some such form as this. When, now, we pass from delib
eration to decision, that total object undergoes a change.
We either dismiss A altogether and its relations to B, and
think of B exclusively ; or after thinking of both as possi-

570 PSYCHOLOGY.

bilities, we next think that A is impossible, and that B is
or forthwith shall be real. In either case a new object is
before our thought ; and where effort exists, it is where
the change from the first object to the second one is hard.
Our thought seems to turn in this case like a heavy door
on rusty hinges ; only, so far as the effort feels spontaneous,
it turns, not as if by some one helping, but as if by an
inward activity, born for the occasion, of its own.

The psychologists who discussed ' the muscular sense '
at the international congress at Paris in 1889 agreed at the
end that they needed to come to a better understanding
in regard to this appearance of internal activity at the
moment when a decision is made. M. Fouillee, in an article
which I find more interesting and suggestive than coherent
or conclusive,* seems to resolve our sense of activity into
that of our very existence as thinking entities. At least so
I translate his words, t But we saw in Chapter X how hard
it is to lay a verifying finger plainly upon the thinking
process as such, and to distinguish it from certain objects
of the stream. M. Fouillee admits this ; but I do not think
he fully realizes how strong would be the position of a man
who should suggest (see Yol. I. p. 301) that the feeling of
moral activity itself which accompanies the advent of cer
tain « objects ' before the mind is nothing but certain other
objects, — constrictions, namely, in the brows, eyes, throat,
and breathing apparatus, present then, but absent from
other pulses of subjective change. Were this the truth,
then a part, at any rate, of the activity of which we become
aware in effort would seem merely to be that of our body ;
and many thinkers would probably thereupon conclude
that this ' settles the claims ' of inner activity, and dismisses
the whole notion of such a thing as a superfluity in psy
chological science.

I cannot see my way to so extreme a view ; even al
though I must repeat the confession made on pp. 296-7 of
Yol. I, that I do not fully understand how we come to our
unshakable belief that thinking exists as a special kind of

* ' Le Sentiment de 1'Effort, et la Conscience de 1'Action,' in Revue
Philosophique, xxvm. 561. t ?• 577

WILL. 571

immaterial process alongside of the material processes of the
world. It is certain, however, that only by postulating such
thinking do we make things currently intelligible ; and it is
certain that no psychologist has as yet denied the fact of
thinking, the utmost that has been denied being its dynamic
power. But if we postulate the fact of the thinking at all,
I believe that we must postulate its power as well ; nor do
I see how we can rightly equalize its power with its mere
existence, and say (as M. Fouillee seems to say) that for the
thought-process to go on at all is an activity, and an activity
everywhere the same ; for certain steps forward in this
process seem prima facie to be passive, and other steps
(as where an object comes with effort) seem prima facie to
be active in a supreme degree. If we admit, therefore, that
our thoughts exist, we ought to admit that they exist after
the fashion in which they appear, as things, namely, that
supervene upon each other, sometimes with effort and some
times with ease ; the only questions being, is the effort
where it exists a fixed function of the object, which the latter
imposes on the thought? or is it such an independent
1 variable' that with a constant object more or less of it
may be made ?

It certainly appears to us indeterminate, and as if, even
with an unchanging object, we might make more or less, as
we choose. If it be really indeterminate, our future acts are
ambiguous or unpredestinate : in common parlance, our
ivills are free. If the amount of effort be not indeterminate,
but be related in a fixed manner to the objects themselves,
in such wise that whatever object at any time fills our
consciousness was from eternity bound to fill it then and
there, and compel from us the exact effort, neither more nor
less, which we bestow upon it, — then our wills are not free,
and all our acts are foreordained. The question of fact in
the free-will controversy is thus extremely simple. It relates
solely to the amount of effort of attention or consent which
we can at any time put forth. Are the duration and intensity
of this effort fixed functions of the object, or are they not ?
Now, as I just said, it seems as if the effort were an inde
pendent variable, as if we might exert more or less of it in
any given case. When a man has let his thoughts go for

572 PSYCHOLOGY.

days and weeks until at last they culminate in some par
ticularly dirty or cowardly or cruel act, it is hard to per
suade him, in the midst of his remorse, that he might not
have reined them in ; hard to make him believe that this
whole goodly universe (which his act so jars upon) required
and exacted it of him at that fatal moment, and from eternity
made aught else impossible. But, on the other hand, there
is the certainty that all his effortless volitions are resultants
of interests and associations whose strength and sequence are
mechanically determined by the structure of that physical
mass, his brain ; and the general continuity of things and
the monistic conception of the world may lead one irresist
ibly to postulate that a little fact like effort can form no
real exception to the overwhelming reign of deterministic
law. Even in effortless volition we have the consciousness
of the alternative being also possible. This is surely a de
lusion here ; why is it not a delusion everywhere ?

My own belief is that the question of free-will is in
soluble on strictly psychologic grounds. After a certain
amount of effort of attention has been given to an idea, it
is manifestly impossible to tell whether either more or less
of it might have been given or not. To tell that, we should
have to ascend to the antecedents of the effort, and denn
ing them with mathematical exactitude, prove, by laws of
which we have not at present even an inkling, that the
only amount of sequent effort which could possibly comport
with them was the precise amount which actually came.
Measurements, whether of psychic or of neural quantities,
and deductive reasonings such as this method of proof im
plies, will surely be forever beyond human reach. No seri
ous psychologist or physiologist will venture even to sug
gest a notion of how they might be practically made. We
are thrown back therefore upon the crude evidences of in
trospection on the one hand, with all its liabilities to de
ception, and, on the other hand, upon a priori postulates
and probabilities. He who loves to balance nice doubts
need be in no hurry to decide the point. Like Mephis-
topheles to Faust, he can say to himself, " dazu hast du noch
eine lange Frist," for from generation to generation the
reasons adduced on both sides will grow more voluminous,

WILL. 573

and the discussion more refined. But if our speculative
delight be less keen, if the love of a parti pris outweighs
that of keeping questions open, or if, as a French philoso
pher of genius says, " V amour de la vie qui s'indigne de tant
de discours" awakens in us, craving the sense of either
peace or power, — then, taking the risk of error on our head,
we must project upon one of the alternative views the
attribute of reality for us ; we must so fill our mind with
the idea of it that it becomes our settled creed. The
present writer does this for the alternative of freedom, but
since the grounds of his opinion are ethical rather than
psychological, he prefers to exclude them from the present
book.*

A few words, however, may be permitted about the
logic of the question. The most that any argument can do
for determinism is to make it a clear and seductive concep
tion, which a man is foolish not to espouse, so long as he
stands by the great scientific postulate that the world must
be one unbroken fact, and that prediction of all things
without exception must be ideally, even if not actually,
possible. It is a moral postulate about the Universe, the
postulate that what ought to be can be, and that bad acts
cannot be fated, but that good ones must be possible in their
place, which would lead one to espouse the contrary
view. But when scientific and moral postulates war thus
with each other and objective proof is not to be had, the
only course is voluntary choice, for scepticism itself, if sys
tematic, is also voluntary choice. If, meanwhile, the will
be undetermined, it would seem only fitting that the belief
in its indetermination should be voluntarily chosen from
amongst other possible beliefs. Freedom's first deed should
be to affirm itself. We ought never to hope for any other
method of getting at the truth if indeterminism be a fact.
Doubt of this particular truth will therefore probably be
open to us to the end of time, and the utmost that a

*They will be found indicated, in somewhat popular form, in a lecture
on 'The Dilemma of Determinism,' published in the Unitarian Review
(of Boston) for September 1884 (vol. xxn. p. 193).

574 PSYCHOLOGY.

believer in free-will can ever do will be to show that the
deterministic arguments are not coercive. That they are
seductive, I am the last to deny ; nor do I deny that effort
may be needed to keep the faith in freedom, when they
press upon it, upright in the mind.

There is a fatalistic argument for determinism, however,
which is radically vicious. When a man has let himself
go time after time, he easily becomes impressed with the
enormously preponderating influence of circumstances,
hereditary habits, and temporary bodily dispositions over
what might seem a spontaneity born for the occasion.
" All is fate," he then says ; " all is resultant of what pre
exists. Even if the moment seems original, it is but the
instable molecules passively tumbling in their preappointed
way. It is hopeless to resist the drift, vain to look for any
new force coming in ; and less, perhaps, than anywhere else
under the sun is there anything really mine in the decisions
which I make/' This is really no argument for simple
determinism. There runs throughout it the sense of a force
which might make things otherwise from one moment to
another, if it were only strong enough to breast the tide. A
person who feels the impotence of free effort in this way has
the acutest notion of what is meant by it, and of its possible
independent power. How else could he be so conscious of
its absence and of that of its effects ? But genuine deter
minism occupies a totally different ground ; not the impo
tence but the unthinkability of free-will is what it affirms.
It admits something phenomenal called free effort, which
seems to breast the tide, but it claims this as a portion of the
tide. The variations of the effort cannot be independent, it
says ; they cannot originate ex nihilo, or come from a fourth
dimension; they are mathematically fixed functions of the
ideas themselves, which are the tide. Fatalism, which
conceives of effort clearly enough as an independent varia
ble that might come from a fourth dimension if it would
come, but that does not come, is a very dubious ally for
determinism. It strongly imagines that very possibility
which determinism denies.

But what, quite as much as the inconceivability of
absolutely independent variables, persuades modern men

WILL. 675

of science that their efforts must be predetermined, is the
continuity of the latter with other phenomena whose pre
determination no one doubts. Decisions with effort merge
so gradually into those without it that it is not easy to say
where the limit lies. Decisions without effort merge again
into ideo-motor, and these into reflex acts ; so that the
temptation is almost irresistible to throw the formula
which covers so many cases over absolutely all. Where
there is effort just as where there is none, the ideas them
selves which furnish the matter of deliberation are brought
before the mind by the machinery of association. And
this machinery is essentially a system of arcs and path&,
a reflex system, whether effort be amongst its incidents or
not. The reflex way is, after all, the universal way of
conceiving the business. The feeling of ease is a passive
result of the way in which the thoughts unwind themselves.
Why is not the feeling of effort the same? Professor
Lipps, in his admirably clear deterministic statement, so
far from admitting that the feeling of effort testifies to an
increment of force exerted, explains it as a sign that force
is lost. We speak of effort, according to him, whenever a
force expends itself (wholly or partly) in neutralizing
another force, and so fails of its own possible outward
effect. The outward effect of the antagonistic force, how
ever, also fails in corresponding measure, " so that there is
no effort without counter-effort, . . . and effort and coun
ter-effort signify only that causes are mutually robbing
each other of effectiveness." Where the forces are ideas,
both sets of them, strictly speaking, are the seat of effort —
both those which tend to explode, and those which tend to
check them. We, however, call the more abundant mass
of ideas ourselves; and, talking of its effort as our effort, and
of that of the smaller mass of ideas as the resistance^ we
say that our effort sometimes overcomes the resistances
offered by the inertias of an obstructed, and sometimes

* See Grundtatsachen des Seelenlebens, pp. 594-5 ; and compare the
conclusion of our own chapter on Attention, Vol. I. pp. 448-454.

f Thus at least 1 interpret Prof. Lipps's words: " Wir wissen tins natur-
gemass iu jedeiii tttreben umsomehr aktiv, je mehr uuser gauzes Ich bei
dem Striibr.n belheiligt 1st," u. s. w. (p. 601).

670 PSYCHOLOGY.

those presented by the impulsions of an explosive, wilL
Pteally both effort and resistance are ours, and the identifi
cation of our self with one of these factors is an illusion
and a trick of speech. I do not see how anyone can fail
(especially when the mythologic dynamism of separate
1 ideas,' which Professor Lipps cleaves to, is translated into
that of brain-processes) to recognize the fascinating sim
plicity of some such view as his. Nor do I see why
for scientific purposes one need give it up even if indeter
minate amounts of effort really do occur. Before their inde-
terminism, science simply stops. She can abstract from it
altogether, then ; for in the impulses and inhibitions with
which the effort has to cope there is already a larger field
of uniformity than she can ever practically cultivate. Her
prevision will never foretell, even if the effort be completely
predestinate, the actual way in which each individual emer
gency is resolved. Psychology will be Psychology,* and
Science Science, as much as ever (as much and no more)
in this world, whether free-will be true in it or not. Science,
however, must be constantly reminded that her purposes
are not the only purposes, and that the order of uniform
causation which she has use for, and is therefore right in
postulating, may be enveloped in a wider order, on which
she has no claims at all.

We can therefore leave the free-will question altogether
out of our account. As we said in Chapter YI (p. 453),
the operation of free effort, if it existed, could only be to
hold some one ideal object, or part of an object, a little
longer or a little more intensely before the mind. Amongst
the alternatives which present themselves as genuine possi-

* Such ejaculations as Mr. Spencer's : " Psychical changes either
conform to law or they do not. If they do not, this work, in common with
all works on the subject, is sheer nonsense: no science of Psychology is
possible " (Principles of Psychology, i. 503),— are beneath criticism. Mr.
Spencer's work, like all the other 'works on the subject,' treats of those
general conditions of possible conduct within which ari our real decisions
must fall no matter whether their effort be small or great. However
closely psychical changes may conform to law, it is safe to say that indi
vidual histories and biographies will never be written in advance no matter
how ' evolved ' psychology may become.

WILL. 577

bles, it would thus make one effective.* And although such
quickening of one idea might be morally and historically
momentous, yet, if considered dynamically, it would be an
operation amongst those physiological infinitesimals which
calculation must forever neglect.

But whilst eliminating the question about the amount of

* Caricatures of the kind of supposition which free will demands abound
in deterministic literature. The following passage from John Fiske's Cos
mic Philosophy (pt. n. chap, xvn) is an example: "If volitions arise
without cause, it necessarily follows that we cannot infer from them the
character of the antecedent states of feeling. If, therefore, a murder has
been committed, we have a priori no better reason for suspecting the worst
enemy than the best friend of the murdered man. If we see a man jump
from a fourth-story window, we must beware of too hastily inferring his
insanity, since he may be merely exercising his free-will ; the intense love
of life implanted in the human breast being, as it seems, unconnected
with attempts at suicide or at self-preservation. We can thus frame no
theory of human actions whatever. The countless empirical maxims of
every-day life, the embodiment as they are of the inherited and organized
sagacity of many generations, become wholly incompetent to guide us ;
and nothing which any one may do ought ever to occasion surprise. The
mother may strangle her first-born child, the miser may cast his long-
treasured gold into the sea, the sculptor may break in pieces his lately-
finished statue, in the presence of no other feelings than those which
before led them to chersish, to hoard, and to create.

" To state these conclusions is to refute their premise. Probably no
defender of the doctrine of free-will could be induced to accept them, even
to save the theorem with which they are inseparably wrapped up. Yet the
dilemma cannot be avoided. Volitions are either caused or they are not. If
they are not caused, an inexorable logic brings us to the absurdities just
mentioned. If they are caused, the free-will doctrine is annihilated.
In truth, the immediate corollaries of the free-will doctrine are so shock
ing, not only to philosophy but to common-sense, that were not accurate
thinking a somewhat rare phenomenon, it would be inexplicable how any
credit should ever have been given to such a dogma. This is but one of
the many instances in which by the force of words alone men have been
held subject to chronic delusion. . . . Attempting, as the free-will phi
losophers do, to destroy the science of history, they are compelled by an
inexorable logic to pull down with it the cardinal principles of ethics,
politics, and jurisprudence. Political economy, if rigidly dealt with on
their theory, would fare little better ; and psychology would become
chaotic jargon. . . . The denial of causation is the affirmation of chance,
and ' between the theory of Chance and the theory of Law there can be
no compromise, no reciprocity, no borrowing and lending.' To write
history on any method furnished by the free-will doctrine would be utterly
impossible."— All this comes from Mr. Fiske's not distinguishing between
the possibles which really tempt a man and those which tempt him not at
all. Free-will, like psychology, deals with the former possibles exclusively,

578 PSYCHOLOGY.

our effort as one which psychology will never have a prac
tical call to decide, I must say one word about the extra
ordinarily intimate and important character which the
phenomenon of effort assumes in our own eyes as individ
ual men. Of course we measure ourselves by many stand
ards. Our strength and our intelligence, our wealth and
even our good luck, are things which warm our heart and
make us feel ourselves a match for life. But deeper than
all such things, and able to suffice unto itself without them,
is the sense of the amount of effort which we can put forth.
Those are, after all, but effects, products, and reflections
of the outer world within. But the effort seems to belong
to an altogether different realm, as if it were the substantive
thing which we are, and those were but externals which we
carry. If the ' searching of our heart and reins ' be the
purpose of this human drama, then what is sought seems
to be what effort we can make. He who can make none is
but a shadow ; he who can make much is a hero. The huge
world that girdles us about puts all sorts of questions to
us, and tests us in all sorts of ways. Some of the tests we
meet by actions that are easy, and some of the questions
we answer in articulately formulated words. But the
deepest question that is ever asked admits of no reply but
the dumb turning of the will and tightening 01 our heart
strings as we say, " Yes, I will even have it so!" When
a dreadful object is presented, or when life as a whole
turns up its dark abysses to our view, then the worth
less ones among us lose their hold on the situation alto
gether, and either escape from its difficulties by averting
their attention, or if they cannot do that, collapse into
yielding masses of plaintiveness and fear. The effort
required for facing and consenting to such objects is be
yond their power to make. But the heroic mind does
differently. To it, too, the objects are sinister and dread
ful, unwelcome, incompatible with wished-for things. But
it can face them if necessary, without for that losing its
hold upon the rest of life. The world thus finds in the
heroic man its worthy match and mate ; and the effort
which he is able to put forth to hold himself erect and
keep his heart unshaken is the direct measure of his worth

WILL. 679

and function in the game of human life. He can stand this
Universe. He can meet it and keep up his faith in it in
presence of those same features which lay his weaker breth
ren low. He can still find a zest in it, not by ' ostrich-like
forge tfulness,' but by pure inward willingness to face the
world with those deterrent objects there. And hereby he
becomes one of the masters and the lords of life. He must
be counted with henceforth ; he forms a part of human
destiny. Neither in the theoretic nor in the practical
sphere do we care for, or go for help to, those who have
no head for risks, or sense for living on the perilous edge.
Our religious life lies more, our practical life lies less, than
it used to, on the perilous edge. But just as our courage
.is so often a reflex of another's courage, so our faith is apt
to be, as Max Miiller somewhere says, a faith in some one
else's faith. We draw new life from the heroic example.
The prophet has drunk more deeply than anyone of the cup
of bitterness, but his countenance is so unshaken and he
speaks such mighty words of cheer that his will becomes
our will, and our life is kindled at his own.

Thus not only our morality but our religion, so far as
the latter is deliberate, depend on the effort which we can
make. " Will you or won't you have it so ? " is the most prob
ing question we are ever asked ; we are asked it every hour
of the day, and about the largest as well as the smallest,
the most theoretical as well as the most practical, things.
We answer by consents or non-consents and not by words.
What wonder that these dumb responses should seem our
deepest organs of communication with the nature of things !
What wonder if the effort demanded by them be the meas
ure of our worth as men ! What wonder if the amount
which we accord of it bo the one strictly underived and
original contribution which we make to the world !

THE EDUCATION" OF THE WILL.

The education of the will may be taken in a broader or a
narrower sense. In the broader sense, it means the whole
of one's training to moral and prudential conduct, and of
one's learning to adapt means to ends, involving the ' asso
ciation of ideas,' in all its varieties and complications, to-

580 PSYCHOLOGY.

gether with the power of inhibiting impulses irrelevant to
the ends desired, and of initiating movements contributory
thereto. It is the acquisition of these latter powers which
I mean by the education of the will in the narrower sense.
And it is in this sense alone that it is worth while to treat
the matter here.*

Since a willed movement is a movement preceded by an
idea of itself, the problem of the will's education is the prob
lem of how the idea of a movement can arouse the move
ment itself. This, as we have seen, is a secondary kind of
process ; for framed as we are, we can have no a priori idea
of a movement, no idea of a movement which we have not
already performed. Before the idea can be generated, the
movement must have occurred in a blind, unexpected way,
And left its idea behind. Reflex, instinctive, or random exe
cution of a movement must, in other words, precede its vol
untary execution. Reflex and instinctive movements have
Already been considered sufficiently for the purposes of this
book. ' Random ' movements are mentioned so as to in
clude quasi - accidental reflexes from inner causes, or
movements possibly arising from such overflow of nutri
tion in special centres as Prof. Bain postulates in his ex
planation of those ' spontaneous discharges ' by which he
sets such great store in his derivation of the voluntary
life.f

Now how can the sensory process which a movement has
previously produced, discharge, when excited again, into the
centre for the movement itself? On the movement's original
occurrence the motor discharge came first and the sensory
process second ; now in the voluntary repetition the sen
sory process (excited in weak or ' ideational * form) comes
first, and the motor discharge comes second. To tell how
this comes to pass would be to answer the problem of the
education of the will in physiological terms. Evidently the
problem is that of the formation of new paths; and the

*On the education of the Will from a pedagogic point of view, see an
article by G. Stanley Hall in the Princeton Review for November 1882.
and some bibliographic references there contained.

f See his Emotions and Will, ' The Will,' chap. i. I take the name of
random movements from Sully, Outlines of Psychology, p. 593.

WILL. 581

only thing to do is to make hypotheses, till we find some
which seem to cover all the facts.

How is a fresh path ever formed ? All paths are paths
of discharge, and the discharge always takes place in the
direction of least resistance, whether the cell which dis
charges be * motor ' or * sensory.' The connate paths of least
resistance are the paths of instinctive reaction ; and I sub
mit as my first hypothesis that these paths aU run one way,
that is from 'sensory ' cells into 'motor' cells and, from motor
cells into muscles, without ever taking the reverse direction. A
motor cell, for example, never awakens a sensory cell di
rectly, but only through the incoming current caused by
the bodily movements to which its discharge gives rise.
And a sensory cell always discharges or normally tends to
discharge towards the motor region. Let this direction be
called the ' forward ' direction. I call the law an hypothe
sis, but really it is an indubitable truth. No impression
or idea of eye, ear, or skin comes to us without occasioning
a movement, even though the movement be no more than
the accommodation of the sense-organ ; and all our trains
of sensation and sensational imagery have their terms
alternated and interpenetrated with motor processes, of most
of which we practically are unconscious. Another way of
stating the rule is to say that, primarily or connately, all
currents through the brain run towards the Kolandic re
gion, and that there they run out, and never return upon
themselves. From this point of view the distinction of
sensory and motor cells has no fundamental significance.
All cells are motor ; we simply call those of the Kolandic
region, those nearest the mouth of the funnel, the motor
cells par excellence.

A corollary of this law is that ' sensory ' cells do not
awaken each other connately ; that is, that no one sensi
ble property of things has any tendency, in advance of
experience, to awaken in us the idea of any other sen
sible properties which in the nature of things may go
with it. There is no a priori calling up of one l idea ' by an
other ; the only a priori couplings are of ideas with move
ments. All suggestions of one sensible fact by another

582 PSYCHOLOGY.

take place by secondary paths which experience has
formed.

The diagram (Fig. 87) shows what happens in a nervous
system ideally reduced to the fewest possible terms. A
stimulus reaching the sense-organ awakens the sensory cell,
S ; this by the connate or instinctive path discharges the
motor cell, M, which makes the muscle contract; and
the contraction arouses the second sensory cell, K, which

Motor Cell f >^ ^( sfe__. Sensory Cell

- Kineesthetic Cell

/\— Sense-organ
Muscle -^\^^x*

FIG. 87.*

may be the organ either of a * resident ' or ' kinaesthetic,'
or of a ' remote,' sensation. (See above, p. 488.) This
cell K again discharges into M. If this were the entire
nervous mechanism, the movement, once begun, would
be self -maintaining, and would stop only when the parts were
exhausted. And this, according to M. Pierre Janet, is what
actually happens in catalepsy. A cataleptic patient is an
aesthetic, speechless, motionless. Consciousness, so far as
we can judge, is abolished. Nevertheless the limbs will
retain whatever position is impressed upon them from
without, and retain it so long that if it be a strained and
unnatural position, the phenomenon is regarded by Char-
cot as one of the few conclusive tests against hypnotic
subjects shamming, since hypnotics can be made catalep-

* This figure and the following ones are purely schematic, and must
not be supposed to involve any theory about protoplasmatic and axis-cylin
der processes. The latter, according to Golgi and others, emerge from the
base of the cell, and each cell has but one. They alone form a nervous
network. The reader will of course also understand that none of the
hypothetical constructions which I make from now to the end of the chap
ter are proposed as definite accounts of whnt linppens. All I aim at is to
make it clear in some more or less symbolic fashion that the formation of
new paths, the learning of habits, etc., is in some mechanical way con
ceivable. Compare what was said in Vol. I. p. 81, note.

WILL. 583

tic, and then keep their limbs outstretched for a length of
time quite unattainable by the waking will. M. Janet
thinks that in all these cases the outlying ideational
processes in the brain are temporarily thrown out of
gear. The kinsesthetic sensation of the raised arm, for
example, is produced in the patient when the operator
raises the arm, this sensation discharges into the motor cell,
which through the muscle reproduces the sensation, etc.,
the currents running in this closed circle until they grow
so weak, by exhaustion of the parts, that the member slow
ly drops. We may call this circle from the muscle to K,
from K to M, and from M to the muscle again, the * motor
circle.' We should all be cataleptics and never stop a mus
cular contraction once begun, were it not that other processes
simultaneously going on inhibit the contraction. Inhibition is
therefore not an occasional accident; it is an essential and unre
mitting element of our cerebral life. It is interesting to note
that Dr. Mercier, by a different path of reasoning, is also
led to conclude that we owe to outside inhibitions exclu
sively our power to arrest a movement once begun.*

One great inhibiter of the discharge of K into M seems
to be the painful or otherwise displeasing quality of the
sensation itself of K ; and conversely, when this sensation
is distinctly pleasant, that fact tends to further K's dis
charge into M, and to keep the primordial motor circle
agoing. Tremendous as the part is which pleasure and
pain play in our psychic life, we must confess that absolute
ly nothing is known of their cerebral conditions. It is hard
to imagine them as having special centres ; it is harder still
to invent peculiar forms of process in each and every centre,
to which these feelings may be due. And let one try as
one will to represent the cerebral activity in exclusively
mechanical terms, I, for one, find it quite impossible to
enumerate what seem to be the facts and yet to make no
mention of the psychic side which they possess. However
it be with other drainage currents and discharges, the drain
age currents and discharges of the brain are not purely
physical facts. They are psycho-physical facts, and the

* The Nervous System and the Mind (1888), pp. 75-6.

f>;U PSYCHOLOGY.

spiritual quality of them seems a codeterminant of their
mechanical effectiveness. If the mechanical activities in a
cell, as they increase, give pleasure, they seem to increase
all the more rapidly for that fact ; if they give displeasure,
the displeasure seems to damp the activities. The psychic
side of the phenomenon thus seems, somewhat like the ap
plause or hissing at a spectacle, to be an encouraging or ad
verse comment on what the machinery brings forth. The soul
presents nothing herself ; creates nothing ; is at the mercy
of the material forces for all possibilities; but amongst
these possibilities she selects; and by reinforcing one and
checking others, she figures not as an ' epiphenomenon,'
but as something from which the play gets moral support.
I shall therefore never hesitate to invoke the efficacy of the
conscious comment, where no strictly mechanical reason
appears why a current escaping from a cell should take
one path rather than another.* But the existence of the
current, and its tendency towards either path, I feel bound
to account for by mechanical laws.

Having now considered a nervous system reduced to its
lowest possible terms, in which all the paths are connate,
and the possibilities of inhibition not extrinsic, but due
solely to the agreeableness or disagreeableness of the feeling
aroused, let us turn to the conditions under which new paths
may be formed. Potentialities of new paths are furnished
by the fibres which connect the sensory cells amongst
themselves ; but these fibres are not originally pervious,
and have to be made so by a process which I proceed hy-
pothetically to state as follows : Each discharge from a sen
sory cell in the forward direction-^ tends to drain the cells lying
behind the discharging one of ivhatever tension they may possess.
The drainage from the rearward cells is what for the first time
makes the fibres pervious. The result is a new-formed 'path,'
running from the cells which were ' rearward ' to the cell which
was ' forward ' on that occasion ; which path, if on future occa
sions the rearward cells are independently excited, will tend to
carry off their activity in the same direction so as to excite the

* Compare Vol. I. pp. 137, 142.

f That is, the direction towards the motor cells.

WILL. 585

forward cell, and will deepen itself more and more every time it
is used.

Now the ' rearward cells,' so far, stand for all the sen
sory cells of the brain other than the one which is discharg
ing ; but such an indefinitely broad path would practically
be no better than no path, so here I make a third hypoth
esis, which, taken together with the others, seems to me
to cover all the facts. It is that the deepest paths are formed
from the w,ost drainable to the most draining cells; that the
most drainable cells are those tvhich have just been discharging ,
and that the most draining cells are those which are now dis
charging or in which the tension is rising towards the point of
discharge.* Another diagram, Fig. 88, will make the matter
clear. Take the operation represented
by the previous diagram at the
moment when, the muscular contrac
tion having occurred, the cell K is
discharging forward into M. Through
the dotted line p it will, according to
our third hypothesis, drain S (which,
in the supposed case, has just dis
charged into M by the connate path P, and caused the mus
cular contraction), and the result is that p will now remain
as a new path open from S to K. When next S is excited
from without it will tend not only to discharge into M,
but into K as well. K thus gets excited directly by S before
it gets excited by the incoming current from the muscle ;
or, translated into psychic terms : when a sensation has
once produced a movement in us, the next time we have the sen
sation, it tends to suggest the idea of the movement, even before
the movement occurs.^

* This brain-scheme seems oddly enough to give a certain basis of reality
to those hideously fabulous performances of the Herbartian Vorstellungen.
Herbart says that when one idea is inhibited by another it fuses with that
other and thereafter helps it to ascend into consciousness. Inhibition is
thus the basis of association in both schemes, for the ' draining ' of which
the text speaks is tantamount to an inhibition of the activity of the cells
which are drained, which inhibition makes the inhibited revive the in-
hibiter on later occasions.

f See the luminous passage in Mtinsterberg : Die Willenshandlung, pp.
144-5.

\

PSYCHOLOGY.

The same principles also apply to the relations of K
and M. M, lying in the forward direction, drains K, and the
path KM, even though it be no primary or connate path,
becomes a secondary or habitual one. Hereafter K may be
aroused in any way whatsoever (not as before from S or
from without) and still it will tend to discharge into M ; or,
to express it again in psychic terms, the idea of the move
ment M's sensory effects will have become an immediately ante
cedent condition to the production of the movement itself.

Here, then, we have the answer to our original question
of how a sensory process which, the first time it occurred,
was the effect of a movement, can later figure as the move
ment's cause.

It is obvious on this scheme that the cell which we have
marked K may stand for the seat of either a resident or
a remote sensation occasioned by the motor discharge.
It may indifferently be a tactile, a visual, or an auditory cell.
The idea of how the arm feels when raised may cause it to
rise ; but no less may the idea of some sound which it makes
in rising, or of some optical impression which it produces.
Thus we see that the ' mental cue ' may belong to either of
various senses ; and that what our diagrams lead us to
infer is what really happens ; namely, that in our move- '
ments, such as that of speech, for example, in some of us
it is the tactile, in others the acoustic, Effeetsbfld, or memory-
image, which seems most concerned in starting the articula
tion (Vol. I. pp. 54-5). The primitive ' starters,' however, of
all our movements are not EffectsUlder at all, but sensations
and objects, i*nd subsequently ideas derived therefrom.

Let us now turn to the more complex and serially con
catenated movements which oftenest meet us in real life.
The object of our will is seldom a single muscular contrac
tion ; it is almost always an orderly sequence of contractions,
ending with a sensation which tells us that the goal is
reached. But the several contractions of the sequence are
not each distinctly willed ; each earlier one seems rather,
by the sensation it produces, to call its follower up, after
the fashion described in Chapter VI, where we spoke of

WILL. 587

habitual concatenated movements being due to a series of
secondarily organized reflex arcs (Vol. I. p. 116). The first
contraction is the one distinctly willed, and after willing it
we let the rest of the chain rattle off of its own accord.
How now is such an orderly concatenation of movements
Originally learned? or in other words, how are paths
formed for the first time between one motor centre and an
other, so that the discharge of the first centre makes the
others discharge in due order all along the line ?

The phenomenon involves a rapid alternation of motor
discharges and resultant afferent impressions, for as long a
time as it lasts. They must be associated in one definite
order ; and the order must once have been learned, i.e., it
must have been picked out and held to more and more
exclusively out of the many other random orders which
first presented themselves. The random afferent impres
sions fell out, those that felt right were selected and grew
together in the chain. A chain which we actively teach
ourselves by stringing a lot of right-feeling impressions
together differs in no essential respect from a chain which
we passively learn from someone else who gives us im
pressions in a certain order. So to make our ideas more
precise, let us take a particular concatenated movement for
an example, and let it be the recitation of the alphabet,
which someone in our childhood taught us to say by heart.

What we have seen so far is how the idea of the sound
or articulatory feeling of A may make us say * A,' that of B,
' B,' and so on. But what we now want to see is why the
sensation that A is uttered should make us say l B, why the sen
sation that B is uttered should make us say l (7,' and so on.

To understand this we must recall what happened when
we first learned the letters in their order. Someone re
peated A, B, C, D to us over and over again, and we imi
tated the sounds. Sensory cells corresponding to each
letter were awakened in succession in such wise that each
one of them (by virtue of our second law) must have
' drained ' the cell just previously excited and left a path by
which that cell tended ever afterwards to discharge into the
cell that drained it. Let Sa, S6, Sc in figure 89 stand for
three of these cells. Each later one of them, as it discharges

588

PSYCHOLOGY.

motorwards, draws a current from the previous one, Sb from
Ba, and S° from Sb. Cell Sb having thus drained Sa, if Sa
ever gets excited again, it tends to discharge into Sb; whilst

FIG.

Sc having drained Sb, Sb later discharges into S°, etc., etc.
— all through the dotted lines. Let now the idea of the
letter A arise in the mind, or, in other words, let Sa be
aroused : what happens ? A current runs from Sa not only
into the motor cell Ma for pronouncing that letter, but also
into the cell Sb. When, a moment later, the effect of Ma's
discharge comes back by the afferent nerve and re-excites
Sa, this latter cell is inhibited from discharging again into
Ma and reproducing the 'primordial motor circle' (which

FIG. 90.

in this case would be the continued utterance of the letter
A), by the fact that the process in S6, already under head
way and tending to discharge into its own motor associate
Mb, is, under the existing conditions, the stronger drainage-
channel for Sa's excitement. The result is that Mb dis
charges and the letter B is pronounced ; whilst at the same
time Sc receives some of Sb's overflow ; and, a moment later

WILL. 589

when the sound of B enters the ear, discharges into the
motor cell for pronouncing C, by a repetition of the same
mechanism as before ; and so on ad libitum. Figure 90
represents the entire set of processes involved.

The only thing that one does not immediately see is the
reason why ' under the existing conditions ' the path from
Sa to S& should be the stronger drainage-channel for Sa's
excitement. If the cells and fibres in the figure constituted
the entire brain we might suppose either a mechanical or a
psychical reason. The mechanical reason might lie in a
general law that cells like Sb and M6, whose excitement is in
a rising phase, are stronger drainers than cells like Ma,
which have just discharged ; or it might lie in the fact
that an irradiation of the current beyond Sb into Sc and
Mc has already begun also ; and in a still farther law
that drainage tends in the direction of the widest irra
diations. Either of these suppositions would be a suffi
cient mechanical reason why, having once said A, we
should not say it again. But we must not forget that
the process has a psychical side, nor close our eyes to the
possibility that the sort of feeling aroused by incipient
currents may be the reason why certain of them are in
stantly inhibited and others helped to flow. There is no
doubt that before we have uttered a single letter, the gen
eral intention to recite the alphabet is already there ; nor is
there any doubt that to that intention corresponds a wide
spread premonitory rising of tensions along the entire
system of cells and fibres which are later to be aroused. So
long as this rise of tensions feds good, so long every current
which increases it is furthered, and every current which
diminishes it is checked; and this may be the chief one of
the 'existing conditions' which make the drainage-channel
from Sa to S6 temporarily so strong.*

The new paths between the sensory cells of which we
have studied the formation are paths of ' association,' and
we now see why associations run always in the forward

* L. Lange's and Miinsterberg's experiments with 'shortened ' or ' mus
cular' reaction -time (see Vol. I. p. 432) show how potent a fact dynami
cally this anticipatory preparation of a whole set of possible drainage-
channels is.

590

PSYCHOLOGY.

direction ; why, for example, we cannot say the alphabet
backward, and why, although S6 discharges into Sc, there
is no tendency for Sc to discharge into S&, or at least no
more than for it to discharge into Sa.* The first-formed
paths had, according to the principles which we invoked,
to run from cells that had just discharged to those that
were discharging ; and now, to get currents to run the other
way, we must go through a new learning of our letters with
their order reversed. There will then be two sets of asso
ciation-pathways, either of them possible, between the sen
sible cells. I represent them in Fig. 91, leaving out the
motor features for simplicity's sake. The dotted lines are
the paths in the backward direction, newly organized from

FIG. 91.

the reception by the ear of the letters in the order C B A.
The same principles will explain the formation of new
paths successively concatenated to no matter how great an
extent, but it would obviously be folly to pretend to illus
trate by more intricate examples. I will therefore only
bring back the case of the child and flame (Vol. I. p. 25), to
show how easily it admits of explanation as a ' purely cortical
transaction ' (ibid. p. 80). The sight of the flame stimu
lates the cortical centre S1 which discharges by an instinc
tive reflex path into the centre M1 for the grasping-move-

* Even as the proofs of these pages are passing through my hands, I
receive Heft 2 of the Zeitschrift fiir Psychologic u. Physiologic der Sin-
nesorgane, in which the irrepressible young Munsterberg publishes experi
ments to show that there is no association between successive ideas,
apart from intervening movements. As my explanations have assumed that
an earlier excited sensory cell drains a later one, his experiments and infer
ences would, if sound, upset all my hypotheses. I therefore can (at this
late moment) only refer the reader to Herr M. 's article, hoping to review
the subject again myself in another place.

WILL.

591

ment. This movement produces the feeling of burn, as its
effects come back to the centre S2 ; and this centre by a

FIG. 92.

second connate path discharges into Ma, the centre for
withdrawing the hand. The movement of withdrawal
stimulates the centre S3, and this, as far as we are concerned,
is the last thing that happens. Now the next time the child
sees the candle, the cortex is in possession of the secondary
paths which the first experience left behind. S2, having been
stimulated immediately after S1, drained the latter, and now
S1 discharges into S2 before the discharge of M1 has had time
to occur ; in other words, the sight of the flame suggests the
idea of the burn before it produces its own natural reflex ef
fects. The result is an inhibition of M1, or an overtaking
of it before it is completed, by M*. — The characteristic phy
siological feature in all these acquired systems of paths lies
in the fact that the new-formed sensory irradiations
keep draining things for ward, and so breaking up the ' motor
circles ' which would otherwise accrue. But, even apart from
catalepsy, we see the ' motor circle ' every now and then
come back. An infant learning to execute a simple move
ment at will, without regard to other movements beyond it,
keeps repeating it till tired. How reiteratively they
babble each new-learned word ! And we adults often catch
ourselves reiterating some meaningless word over and over
again, if by chance we once begin to utter it ' absent-mind
edly,' that is, without thinking of any ulterior train of words
to which it may belong.

One more observation before closing these already too
protracted physiological speculations. Already (Yol. I. p. 71)
I have tried to shadow forth a reason why collateral inner-

592

PSYCHOLOGY.

vation should establish itself after loss of brain-tissue,
and why incoming stimuli should find their way out again,
after an interval, by their former paths. I can now explain
this a little better. Let S1 be the dog's hearing-centre when
he receives the command ' Give your paw.' This used to
discharge into the motor centre M1, of whose discharge S2
represents the kinsesthetic effect ; but now M1 has been de
stroyed by an operation, so that S1 discharges as it can, into
other movements of the body, whimpering, raising the
wrong paw, etc. The kinsesthetic centre S2 meanwhile has

M*

FIG. 93.

been awakened by the order S1, and the poor animal's mind
tingles with expectation and desire of certain incoming sen
sations which are entirely at variance with those which the
really executed movements give. None of the latter sensa
tions arouse a ' motor circle,' for they are displeasing and
inhibitory. But when, by random accident, S1 and S2 do
discharge into a path leading through M2, by which the paw is
again given, and S2 is excited at last from without as well as
from within, there are no inhibitions and the ' motor circle '
is formed : S1 discharges into M2 over and over again, and
the path from the one spot to the other is so much deepened
that at last it becomes organized as the regular channel of
efflux when S1 is aroused. No other path has a chance of
being organized in like degree.

CHAPTEE XXVII.

HYPNOTISM.
MODES OF OPEBATING, AND SUSCEPTIBILITY.

THE ' hypnotic,' ' mesmeric,' or * magnetic ' trance can
be induced in various ways, each operator having his pet
method. The simplest one is to leave the subject seated
<by himself, telling him that if he close his eyes and relax
jhis muscles and, as far as possible, think of vacancy, in a
(few minutes he will * go off/ On returning in ten minutes
you may find him effectually hypnotized. Braid used to
make his subjects look at a bright button held near their
forehead until their eyes spontaneously closed. The older
mesmerists made ' passes ' in a downward direction over
the face and body, but without contact. Stroking the skin
of the head, face, arms and hands, especially that of the
region round the brows and eyes, will have the same effect.
Staring into the eyes of the subject until the latter droop ,
making him listen to a watch's ticking ; or simply making
him close his eyes for a minute whilst you describe to him
the feeling of falling into sleep, ' talk sleep' to him, are
equally efficacious methods in the hands of some operators ;
whilst with trained subjects any method whatever from
which they have been led by previous suggestion to expect
results will be successful.* The touching of an object

* It should be said that the methods of leaving the patient to himself, and
that of the simple verbal suggestion of sleep (the so-called Nancy method
introduced by Liebeault of that place), seem, wherever applicable, to be
the best, as they entail none of the after-inconveniences which occasionally
follow upon straining his eyes. A new patient should not be put through
a great variety of different suggestions in immediate succession. He should
be waked up from time to time, and then rehypnotized to avoid mental
confusion and excitement. Before finally waking a subject you should
undo wnatever delusive suggestions you may have implanted in him,by tell
ing him that they are all gone, etc., and that you are now going to restore
him to his natural state. Headache, languor, etc., which sometimes fol-

593

594 PSYCHOLOGY.

which they are told has been ' magnetized,' the drinking of
' magnetized ' water, the reception of a letter ordering them
to sleep, etc., are means which have been frequently em
ployed. Recently M. Liegeois has hypnotized some of his
subjects at a distance of l£ kilometres by giving them an
intimation to that effect through a telephone. With some
subjects, if you tell them in advance that at a certain hour
of a certain day they will become entranced, the prophecy
is fulfilled. Certain hysterical patients are immediately
thrown into hypnotic catalepsy by any violent sensation,
such as a blow on a gong or the flashing of an intense
light in their eyes. Pressure on certain parts of the body
(called zones hypnogenes by M. Pitres) rapidly produces
hypnotic sleep in some hysterics. These regions, which
differ in different subjects, are oftenest found on the fore
head and about the root of the thumbs. Finally, persons
in ordinary sleep may be transferred into the hypnotic con
dition by verbal intimation or contact, performed so gently
as not to wake them up.

Some operators appear to be more successful than others
in getting control of their subjects. I am informed that Mr.
Gurney (who made valuable contributions to the theory of
hypnotism) was never able himself to hypnotize, and had to
use for his observations the subjects of others. On the other
hand, Dr. Liebeault claims that he hypnotizes 92$ of all
comers, and Wetterstrand in Stockholm says that amongst
718 persons there proved to be only 18 whom he failed to
influence. Some of this disparity is unquestionably due to
differences in the personal ' authority ' of the operator, for
the prime condition of success is that the subject should
confidently expect to be entranced. Much also depends on
the operator's tact in interpreting the physiognomy of his
subjects, so as to give the right commands, and * crowd it
on ' to the subject, at just the propitious moments. These
conditions account for the fact that operators grow more

low the first trance or two, must be banished at the outset, by the operator
strongly assuring the subject that such things never come from hypnotism,
that the subject must not have them, etc.

HYPNOTISM. 595

successful the more they operate. Bernheim says that
whoever does not hypnotize 80 per cent of the persons
whom he tries has not yet learned to operate as he should.
Whether certain operators have over and above this a
peculiar ' magnetic power ' is a question which I leave
at present undecided.* Children under three or four, and
insane persons, especially idiots, are unusually hard to
hypnotize. This seems due to the impossibility of getting
them to fix their attention continuously on the idea of the
coming trance. All ages above infancy are probably
equally hypnotizable, as are all races and both sexes. A
certain amount of mental training, sufficient to aid concen
tration of the attention, seems a favorable condition, and so
does a certain momentary indifference or passivity as to the
result. Native strength or weakness of ' will ' have abso
lutely nothing to do with the matter. Frequent trances
enormously increase the susceptibility of a subject, and
many who resist at first succumb after several trials. Dr.
Moll says he has more than once succeeded after forty
fruitless attempts. Some experts are of the opinion that
every one is hypnotizable essentially, the only difficulty
being the more habitual presence in some individuals of
hindering mental preoccupations, which, however, may sud
denly at some moment be removed.

The trance may be dispelled instantaneously by saying
in a rousing voice, 'All right, wake up ! ' or words of similar
purport. At the Salpetriere they awaken subjects by blow
ing on their eyelids. Upward passes have an awakening
effect ; sprinkling cold water ditto. Anything will awaken
a patient who expects to be awakened by that thing. Tell
him that he will wake after counting five, and he will do
so. Tell him to waken in five minutes, and he is very likely
to do so punctually, even though he interrupt thereby some
exciting histrionic performance which you may have sug*-
g3sted. — As Dr. Moll says, any theory which pretends to

* Certain facts would seem to point that way, Cf., e.g., the case of the
man described by P. Despine, Etude Scientifique sur le Somnambuiisme,
p. 286 ff .

596 PSYCHOLOGY.

explain the physiology of the hypnotic state must keep
account of the fact that so simple a thing as hearing the
word ' wake ! ' will end it.

THEORIES ABOUT THE HYPNOTIC STATE.

The intimate nature of the hypnotic condition, when once
induced, can hardly be said to be understood. Without
entering into details of controversy, one may say that three
main opinions have been held concerning it, which we may
call respectively the theories of

^\ 1. Animal magnetism ;

2. of Neurosis ; and finally of

3. Suggestion.

According to the animal-magnetism theory there is a
direct passage of force from the operator to the subject,
whereby the latter becomes the former's puppet. This
theory is nowadays given up as regards all the ordinary
hypnotic phenomena, and is only held to by some persons
as an explanation of a few effects exceptionally met with.

According to the neurosis-theory, the hypnotic state is-
a peculiar pathological condition into which certain pre
disposed patients fall, and in which special physical agents
have the power of provoking special symptoms, quite apart
from the subjects mentally expecting the effect. Professor
Charcot and his colleagues at the Salpetriere hospital admit
that this condition is rarely found in typical form. They call
it then le grand hypnotisme, and say that it accompanies the
disease hystero-epilepsy. If a patient subject to this sort
of hypnotism hear a sudden loud noise, or look at a bright
light unexpectedly, she falls into the cataleptic trance. Her
limbs and body offer no resistance to movements communi
cated to them, but retain permanently the attitudes im
pressed. The eyes are staring, there is insensibility to
pain, etc., etc. If the eyelids be forcibly closed, the cata
leptic gives place to the lethargic condition, characterized
by apparent abolition of consciousness, and absolute mus
cular relaxation except where the muscles are kneaded or
the tendons struck by the operator's hand, or certain nerve-

HYPNOTISM. 597

trunks are pressed upon. Then the muscles in question,
or those supplied by the same nerve-trunk enter into a more
or less steadfast tonic contraction. Charcot calls this symp
tom by the name of neuro-muscular hyperexcitability. The
lethargic state may be primarily brought on by fixedly
looking at anything, or by pressure on the closed eyeballs.
Friction on the top of the head will make the patient pass
from either of the two preceding conditions into the som-
nambulic state, in which she is alert, talkative, and suscep
tible to all the suggestions of the operator. The somnambu-
lic state may also be induced primarily, by fixedly looking
at a small object. In this state the accurately limited
muscular contractions characteristic of lethargy do not
follow upon the above-described manipulations, but instead
of them there is a tendency to rigidity of entire regions of
the body, which may upon occasion develop into general
tetanus, and which is brought about by gently touching the
skin or blowing upon it. M. Charcot calls this by the
name of cutaneo-muscular hyperexcitability.

Many other symptoms, supposed by their observers to
be independent of mental expectation, are described, of
which I only will mention the more interesting. Opening the
eyes of a patient in lethargy causes her to pass into catalepsy.
If one eye only be opened, the corresponding half of the body
becomes cataleptic, whilst the other half remains in leth
argy. Similarly, rubbing one side of the head may result
in a patient becoming hemilethar'gic or hemicataleptic and
hemisomnambulic. The approach of a magnet (or certain
metals) to the skin causes these half-states (and many others)
to be transferred to the opposite sides. Automatic repetition
of every sound heard (' echolalia ') is said to be produced by
pressure on the lower cervical vertebrae or on the epigas
trium. Aphasia is brought about by rubbing the head over
the region of the speech-centre. Pressure behind t'he occiput
determines movements of imitation. Heidenhain describes a
number of curious automatic tendencies to movement, which
are brought about by stroking various portions of the ver
tebral column. Certain other symptoms have been fre
quently noticed, such as a flushed face and cold hands,
brilliant and congested eyes, dilated pupils. Dilated reti-

598 PSYCHOLOGY.

nal vessels and spasm of the accommodation are also re
ported.

The theory of Suggestion denies that there is any special
hypnotic state worthy of the name of trance or neurosis.
All the symptoms above described, as well as those to be
described hereafter, are results of that mental suscepti
bility which we all to some degree possess, of yielding
assent to outward suggestion, of affirming what we strongly
conceive, and of acting in accordance with what we are
made to expect. The bodily symptoms of the Salpetriere
patients are all of them results of expectation and training.
The first patients accidentally did certain things which
their doctors thought typical and caused to be repeated.
The subsequent subjects ' caught on ' and followed the
established tradition. In proof of this the fact is urged
that the classical three stages and their grouped symptoms
have only been reported as spontaneously occurring, so far,
at the Salpetriere, though they may be superinduced by
deliberate suggestion, in patients anywhere found. The
ocular symptoms, the flushed face, accelerated breathing,
etc., are said not to be symptoms of the passage into the
hypnotic state as such, but merely consequences of the
strain on the eyes when the method of looking at a bright
object is used. They are absent in the subjects at Nancy,
where simple verbal suggestion is employed. The various
reflex effects (aphasia, echolalia, imitation, etc.) are but
habits induced by the influence of the operator, who uncon
sciously urges the subject into the direction in which he
would prefer to have him go. The influence of the magnet,
the opposite effects of upward and downward passes, etc.,
are similarly explained. Even that sleepy and inert condi
tion, the advent of which seems to be the prime condition of
farther symptoms being developed, is said to be merely due
to the fact that the mind expects it to come ; whilst its influ
ence on the other symptoms is not physiological, so to speak,
but psychical, its own easy realization by suggestion simply
encouraging the subject to expect that ulterior suggestions
will be realized with equal ease. The radical defenders of
the suggestion-theory are thus led to deny the very exist-

HYPNOTISM. 599

ence of the hypnotic state, in the sense of a peculiar trance-
like condition which deprives the patient of spontaneity
and makes him passive to suggestion from without. The
trance itself is only one of the suggestions, and many sub
jects in fact can be made to exhibit the other hypnotic
phenomena without the preliminary induction of this one.

The theory of suggestion may be said to be quite tri
umphant at the present day over the neurosis-theory as held
at the Salpetriere, with its three states, and its definite
symptoms supposed to be produced by physical agents
apart from co-operation of the subject's mind. But it
is one thing to say this, and it is quite another thing to
say that there is no peculiar physiological condition what
ever worthy of the name of hypnotic trance, no peculiar
state of nervous equilibrium, ' hypotaxy,' ' dissociation,' or
whatever you please to call it, during which the subject's
susceptibility to outward suggestion is greater than at ordi
nary times. All the facts seem to prove that, until this
trance-like state is assumed by the patient, suggestion pro
duces very insignificant results, but that, when it is once
assumed, there are no limits to suggestion's power. The
state in question has many affinities with ordinary sleep.
It is probable, in fact, that we all pass through it tran
siently whenever we fall asleep ; and one might most natu
rally describe the usual relation of operator and subject by
saying that the former keeps the latter suspended between
waking and sleeping by talking to him enough to keep his
slumber from growing profound, and yet not in such a way
as to wake him up. A hynotized patient, left to himself, will
either fall sound asleep or wake up entirely. The diffi
culty in hypnotizing refractory persons is that of catching
them at the right moment of transition and making it per
manent. Fixing the eyes and relaxing the muscles of the
body produce the hypnotic state just as they facilitate the
advent of sleep. The first stages of ordinary sleep are char
acterized by a peculiar dispersed attitude of the attention.
Images come before consciousness which are entirely in
congruous with our ordinary beliefs and habits of thought.
The latter either vanish altogether or withdraw, as it were,

600 PSYCHOLOGY.

inertly into the background of the mind, and let the incon
gruous images reign alone. These images acquire, more
over, an exceptional vivacity ; they become first ' hypnagogic
hallucinations,' and then, as the sleep grows deeper, dreams.
Now the * mono-ideism,' or else the impotency and failure
to ' rally ' on the part of the background-ideas, which thus
characterize somnolescence, are unquestionably the result
of a special physiological change occurring in the brain at
that time. Just so that similar mono-ideism, or dissocia
tion of the reigning fancy from those other thoughts which
might possibly act as its 'reductives,' which characterize
the hypnotic consciousness, must equally be due to a
special cerebral change. The term 'hypnotic trance,' which
I employ, tells us nothing of what the change is, but it
marks the fact that it exists, and is consequently a useful
expression. The great vivacity of the hypnotic images (as
gauged by their motor effects), the oblivion of them when
normal life is resumed, the abrupt awakening, the recollec
tion of them again in subsequent trances, the anaesthesia
and hypersesthesia which are so frequent, all point away
from our simple waking credulity and ' suggestibility ' as
the type by which the phenomena are to be interpreted,
and make us look rather towards sleep and dreaming, or
towards those dee^er_alterations of the^ersonajity known
as automatism, double consciousness, or ' second ' person-
ality for the true analogues of the hypn ntujjyra.n P,P. * Even
the best hypnotic subjects pass through life without any
one suspecting them to possess such a remarkable suscep
tibility, until by deliberate experiment it is made manifest.
The operator fixes their eyes or their attention a short time
to develop the propitious phase, holds them in it by his
talk, and the state being there, makes them the puppets of all
his suggestions. But no ordinary suggestions of waking life
ever took such control of their mind.

* The state is not identical with sleep, however analogous in certain
respects. The lighter stages of it, particularly, differ from sleep and
dreaming, inasmuch as they are characterized almost exclusively by mus
cular inabilities and compulsions, which are not noted in ordinary somno
lescence, and the mind, which is confused in somnolescence, may be quite
clearly conscious, in the lighter state of trance, of all that is going on.

HYPNOTISM. 601

The suggestion-theory may therefore be approved as correct,
provided ive grant the trance-state as its prerequisite. The
three states of Charcot, the strange reflexes of Heiden-
hain, and all the other bodily phenomena which have been
called direct consequences of the trance-state itself, are not
such. They are products of suggestion, the trance-state
having no particular outward symptoms of its own ; but
without the trance-state there, those particular suggestions
could never have been successfully made.*

THE SYMPTOMS OF THE TKANCE.

This accounts for the altogether indefinite array of symp
toms which have been gathered together as characteristic
of the hypnotic state. The law of habit dominates hypnotic
subjects even more than it does waking ones. Any sort of
personal peculiarity, any trick accidentally fallen into in
the first instance by some one subject, may, by attracting
attention, become stereotyped, serve as a pattern for imi
tation, and figure as the type of a school. The first sub
ject trains the operator, the operator trains the succeeding
subjects, all of them in perfect good faith conspiring to
gether to evolve a perfectly arbitrary result. With the ex
traordinary perspicacity and subtlety of perception which
subjects often display for all that concerns the operator
with whom they are en rapport, it is hard to keep them
ignorant of anything which he expects. Thus it happens
that one easily verifies on new subjects what one has
already seen on old ones, or any desired symptom of which
one may have heard or read.

The symptoms earliest observed by writers were all
thought to be typical. But with the multiplication of ob-

* The word ' suggestion ' has been bandied about too much as if it ex
plained all mysteries: When the subject obeys it is by reason of the 'ope
rator's suggestion ' ; when he proves refractory it is in consequence of an
'auto-suggestion ' which he has made to himself, etc., etc. What explains
everything explains nothing ; and it must be remembered that what needs
explanation here is the fact that in a certain condition of the subject sug
gestions operate as they do at no other time; that through them functions
are affected which ordinarily elude the action of the waking will ; and that
usually all this happens in a condition of which no after-memory remains.

602 PSYCHOLOGY.

served phenomena, the importance of most particular symp
toms as marks of the state has diminished. This lightens
very much our own immediate task. Proceeding to enu
merate the symptoms of the hypnotic trance, I may confine
myself to those which are intrinsically interesting, or which
differ considerably from the normal functions of man.

First of all comes amnesia. In the earlier stages of hyp
notism the patient remembers what has happened, but with
successive sittings he sinks into a deeper condition, which
is commonly followed by complete loss of memory. He
may have been led through the liveliest hallucinations and
dramatic performances, and have exhibited the intensest ap
parent emotion, but on waking he can recall nothing at all.
The same thing happens on waking from sleep in the midst
of a dream — it quickly eludes recall. But just as we may be
reminded of it, or of parts of it, by meeting persons or ob
jects which figured therein, so on being adroitly prompted,
the hypnotic patient will often remember what happened in
his trance. One cause of the forgetfulness seems to be
the disconnection of the trance performances with the sys
tem of waking ideas. Memory requires a continuous train
of association. M. Delbceuf, reasoning in this way, woke
his subjects in the midst of an action begun during trance
(washing the hands, e.g.), and found that they then remem
bered the trance. The act in question bridged over the two
states. But one can often make them remember by merely
telling them during the trance that they shall remember.
Acts of one trance, moreover, are usually recalled, either
spontaneously or at command, during another trance, pro
vided that the contents of the two trances be not mutually
incompatible.

Suggestibility. The patient believes everything which
his hypnotizer tells him, and does everything which the
latter commands. I?ven results over which the will has
normally no control, such as sneezing, secretion, reddening
and growing pale, alterations of temperature and heart
beat, menstruation, action of the bowels, etc., may take
place in consequence of the operator's firm assertions dur
ing the hypnotic trance, and the resulting conviction on the

HYPNOTISM. 603

part of the subject, that the effects will occur. Since almost
flll the phenomena yet to be described are effects of this
heightened suggestibility, I will say no more under the
general head, but proceed to illustrate the peculiarity in
detail.

Effects on the voluntary muscles seem to be those most
easily got ; and the ordinary routine of hypnotizing con
sists in provoking them first. Tell the patient that he can
not open his eyes or his mouth, cannot unclasp his hands
or lower his raised arm, cannot rise from his seat, or pick
up a certain object from the floor, and he will be immedi
ately smitten with absolute impotence in these regards.
The effect here is generally due to the involuntary contrac
tion of antagonizing muscles. But one can equally well
suggest paralysis, of an arm for example, in which case it
will hang perfectly placid by the subject's side. Cataleptic
and tetanic rigidity are easily produced by suggestion,
aided by handling the parts. One of the favorite shows at
public exhibitions is that of a subject stretched stiff as a
board with his head on one chair and his heels on another.
The cataleptic retention of impressed attitudes differs from
voluntary assumption of the same attitude. An arm volun
tarily held out straight will drop from fatigue after a
quarter of an hour at the utmost, and before it falls the
agent's distress will be made manifest by oscillations in the
arm, disturbances in the breathing, etc. But Charcot has
shown that an arm held out in hypnotic catalepsy, though
it may as soon descend, yet does so slowly and with no ac
companying vibration, whilst the breathing remains entirely
calm. He rightly points out that this shows a profound
physiological change, and is proof positive against simula
tion, as far as this symptom is concerned. A cataleptic
attitude, moreover, may be held for many hours. — Some
times an expressive attitude, clinching of the fist, contrac
tion of the brows, will gradually set up a sympathetic
action of the other muscles of the body, so that at last a
tableau vivant of fear, anger, disdain, prayer, or other emo
tional condition, is produced with rare perfection. This
effect would seem to be due to the suggestion of the men
tal state by the first contraction. Stammering, aphasia, or

604 PSYCHOLOGY.

inability to utter certain words, pronounce certain letters,
are readily producible by suggestion.

Hallucinations of all the senses and delusions of every
conceivable kind can be easily suggested to good subjects.
The emotional effects are then often so lively, and the pan
tomimic display so expressive, that it is hard not to believe
in a certain ' psychic hyper-excitability,' as one of the con
comitants of the hypnotic condition. You can make the
subject think that he is freezing or burning, itching or
covered with dirt, or wet ; you can make him eat a potato
for a peach, or drink a cup of vinegar for a glass of cham
pagne ; * ammonia will smell to him like cologne water ; a
chair will be a lion, a broom-stick a beautiful woman, a
noise in the street will be an orchestral music, etc., etc.,
with no limit except your powers of invention and the
patience of the lookers on.f Illusions and hallucinations
form the pieces de resistance at public exhibitions. The
comic effect is at its climax when it is successfully sug
gested to the subject that his personality is changed into
that of a baby, of a street boy, of a young lady dressing
ior a party, of a stump orator, or of Napoleon the Great.
He may even be transformed into a beast, or an inanimate
thing like a chair or a carpet, and in every case will act
out all the details of the part with a sincerity and inten
sity seldom seen at the theatre. The excellence of the
performance is in these cases the best reply to the suspicion
that the subject may be shamming — so skilful a shammer
must long since have found his true function in life upon
the stage. Hallucinations and histrionic delusions gener
ally go with a certain depth of the trance, and are followed

* A complete fit of drunkenness may be the consequence of the sug
gested champagne. It is even said that real drunkenness has been cured
by suggestion.

fThe suggested hallucination may be followed by a negative after
image, just as if it were a real object. This can be very easily verified
with the suggested hallucination of a colored cross on a sheet of white
paper. The subject, on turning to another sheet of paper, will see a cross
of the complementary color. Hallucinations have been shown by MM.
Binet and Fere to be doubled by a prism or mirror, magnified by a lens,
and in many other ways to behave optically like real objects. These
points have been discussed already on p. 128 if.

HYPNOTISM. 605

by complete forgetfulness. The subject awakens from
them at the command of the operator with a sudden start
of surprise, and may seem for a while a little dazed.

Subjects in this condition will receive and execute sug
gestions of crime, and act out a theft, forgery, arson, or
murder. A girl will believe that she is married to her
hypnotizer, etc. It is unfair, however, to say that in these
cases the subject is a pure puppet with 110 spontaneity.
His spontaneity is certainly not in abeyance so far as
things go which are harmoniously associated with the sug
gestion given him. He takes the text from his operator ;
but he may amplify and develop it enormously as he acts
it out. His spontaneity is lost only for those systems of
ideas which conflict with the suggested delusion. The latter
is thus ' systematized ' ; the rest of consciousness is shut
off, excluded, dissociated from it. In extreme cases the
rest of the mind would seem to be actually abolished and
the hypnotic subject to be literally a changed personality,
a being in one of those * second ' states which we studied
in Chapter X. But the reign of the delusion is often
not as absolute as this. If the thing suggested be too in
timately repugnant, the subject may strenuously resist and
get nervously excited in consequence, even to the point of
having an hysterical attack. The conflicting ideas slumber
in the background and merely permit those in the fore
ground to have their way until a real emergency arises ;
then they assert their rights. As M. Delbceuf says, the
subject surrenders himself good-naturedly to the perform
ance, stabs with the pasteboard dagger you give him be
cause he knows what it is, and fires off the pistol because he
knows it has no ball ; but for a real murder he would not
be your man. It is undoubtedly true that subjects are
often well aware that they are acting a part. They know
that what they do is absurd. They know that the halluci
nation which they see, describe, and act upon, is not really
there. They may laugh at themselves ; and they always
recognize the abnormality of their state when asked about
it, and call it ' sleep.' One often notices a sort of mocking
smile upon them, as if they were playing a comedy, and
they may even say on ' coming to ' that they were sham-

606 PSYCHOLOGY.

ming all the while. These facts have misled ultra-skepti
cal people so far as to make them doubt the genuineness
of any hypnotic phenomena at all. But, save the con
sciousness of ' sleep,' they do not occur in the deeper con
ditions ; and when they do occur they are only a natural
consequence of the fact that the ' monoideism ' is incom
plete. The background-thoughts still exist, and have the
power of comment on the suggestions, but no power to in
hibit their motor and associative effects. A similar condi
tion is frequent enough in the waking state, when an
impulse carries us away and our ' will ' looks on wonder-
ingly like an impotent spectator. These * shammers ' con
tinue to sham in just the same way, every new time you
hypnotize them, until at last they are forced to admit that
if shamming there be, it is something very different from
the free voluntary shamming of waking hours.

Real sensations may be abolished as well as false ones
suggested. Legs and breasts may be amputated, children
born, teeth extracted, in short the most painful experi
ences undergone, with no other anaesthetic than the hypno-
tizer's assurance that no pain shall be felt. Similarly
morbid pains may be annihilated, neuralgias, toothaches,
rheumatisms cured. The sensation of hunger has thus
been abolished, so that a patient took no nourishment for
fourteen ^days. The most interesting of these suggested
anaesthesias are those limited to certain objects of percep
tion. Thus a subject may be made blind to a certain per
son and to him alone, or deaf to certain words but to no
others.* In this case the anaesthesia (or negative hallucina
tion, as it has been called) is apt to become systematized.
Other things related to the person to whom one has
been made blind may also be shut out of consciousness.
What he says is not heard, his contact is not felt, objects
which he takes from his pocket are not seen, etc. Objects
which he screens are seen as if he were transparent. Facts
about him are forgotten, his name is not recognized when
pronounced. Of course there is great variety in the com-

*M. Liegeois explains the common exhibition-trick of making the sub-
ject unable to get his arms into his coat-sleeves again after he has taken
his coat off, by an anaesthesia to the necessary parts of the coat.

HYPNOTISM. 607

pleteness of this systematic extension of the suggested
anaesthesia, but one may say that some tendency to it always
exists. When one of the subjects' own limbs is made anaes
thetic, for example, memories as well as sensations of its
movements often seem to depart. An interesting degree of
the phenomenon is found in the case related by .M. Binet
of a subject to whom it was suggested that a certain M. C.
was invisible. She still saw M. C., but saw him as a
stranger, having lost the memory of his name and his exist
ence. — Nothing is easier than to make subjects forget their
own name and condition in life. It is one of the sugges
tions which most promptly succeed, even with quite fresh
ones. A systematized amnesia of certain periods of one's
life may also be suggested, the subject placed, for instance,
where he was a decade ago with the intervening years ob
literated from his mind.

The mental condition which accompanies these system
atized anaesthesias and amnesias is a very curious one.
The anaesthesia is not a genuine sensorial one, for if you
make a real red cross (say) on a sheet of white paper in
visible to an hypnotic subject, and yet cause him to look
fixedly at a dot on the paper on or near the cross, he will,
on transferring his eye to a blank sheet, see a bluish-green
after-image of the cross. This proves that it has impressed
his sensibility. He has felt it, but not perceived it. He
had actively ignored it, refused to recognize it, as it were.
Another experiment proves that he must distinguish it first
in order thus to ignore it. Make a stroke on paper or
blackboard, and tell the subject it is not there, and he will
see nothing but the clean paper or board. Next, he not
looking, surround the original stroke with other strokes
exactly like it, and ask him what he sees. He will point
out one by one all the new strokes and omit the original
one every time, no matter how numerous the new strokes
may be, or in what order they are arranged. Similarly, if
the original single stroke to which he is blind be doubled
by a prism of sixteen degrees placed before one of his eyes
(both being kept open), he will say that he now sees one
stroke, and point in the direction in which the image seen
through the prism lies.

608 PSYCHOLOGY.

Obviously, then, lie is not blind to the kind of stroke in
the least. He is blind only to one individual stroke of
that kind in a particular position on the board or paper.—
that is, to a particular complex object ; and, paradoxical as
it may seem to say so, he must distinguish it with great
accuracy from others like it, in order to remain blind
to it when the others are brought near. He ' apperceives '
it, as a preliminary to not seeing it at all ! How to con
ceive of this state of mind is not easy. It would be much
simpler to understand the process, if adding new strokes
made the first one visible. There would then be two dif
ferent objects apperceived as totals, — paper with one
stroke, paper with two strokes ; and, blind to the former,,
he would see all that was in the latter, because he would
have apperceived it as a different total in the first instance.

A process of this sort occurs sometimes (not always)
when the new strokes, instead of being mere repetitions of
the original one, are lines which combine with it into a
total object, say a human face. The subject of the trance
then may regain his sight of the line to which he had pre
viously been blind, by seeing it as part of the face.

When by a prism before one eye a previously invisible
line has been made visible to that eye, and the other eye is
closed or screened, its closure makes no difference ; the
line still remains visible. But if then the prism is removed,,
the line will disappear even to the eye which a moment
ago saw it, and both eyes will revert to their original blind
state.

We have, then, to deal in these cases neither with a
sensorial anaesthesia, nor with a mere failure to notice,
but with something much more complex ; namely, an
active counting out and positive exclusion of certain ob
jects. It is as when one ' cuts ' an acquaintance, ' ignores '
a claim, or ' refuses to be influenced ' by a consideration of
whose existence one remains aware. Thus a lover of Na
ture in America finds himself able to overlook and ignore
entirely the board- and rail-fencer> and general roadside
raggedness, and revel in the beauty and picturesqueness of
the other elements of the landscape, whilst to a newly-

HYPNOTISM.

arrived European the fences are so aggressively present as
to spoil enjoyment.

Messrs. Gurney, Janet, and Binet have shown that the
ignored elements are preserved in a split-off portion of the
subjects' consciousness which can be tapped in certain ways,
and made to give an account of itself (see Vol. I. p. 209).

Hypercesthesia of the senses is as common a symptom as.
anesthesia. On the skin two points can be discriminated
at less than the normal distance. The sense of touch is so
delicate that (as M. Delbceuf informs me) a subject after
simply poising on her finger-tips a blank card drawn from
a pack of similar ones can pick it out from the pack again
by its ' weight.' We approach here the line where, to many
persons, it seems as if something more than the ordinary
senses, however sharpened, were required in explanation.
I have seen a coin from the operator's pocket repeatedly
picked out by ths subject from a heap of twenty others,'3*'
by its greater 'weight' in the subject's language. — Audi
tory hypersesthesia may enable a subject to hear a watch
tick, or his operator speak, in a distant room. — One of the
most extraordinary examples of visual hyperaesthesia is
that reported by Bergson, in which a subject who seemed
to be reading through the back of a book held and looked
at by the operator, was really proved to be reading the im
age of the page reflected on the latter's cornea. The same
subject was able to discriminate with the naked eye details
in a microscopic preparation. Such cases of ' hypersesthe
sia of vision ' as that reported by Taguet and Sauvaire,
where subjects could see things mirrored by non-reflecting
bodies, or through opaque pasteboard, would seem rather
to belong to ' psychical research ' than to the present cate
gory. — The ordinary test of visual hypera^ateness in hyp
notism is the favorite trick of giving a subject the hallu
cination of a picture on a blank sheet oi card-board, and
then mixing the latter with a lot of other similar sheets.
The subject will always find the picture on the original
sheet again, and recognize infallibly if it has been turned

* Precautions being taken against differences of temperature and other
grounds of suggestion.

610 PSYCHOLOGY.

over, or upside down, although the bystanders have to re
sort to artifice to identify it again. The Subject notes pe
culiarities on the card, too small for waking observation to
detect* If it be said that the spectators guide him by
their manner, their breathing, etc., that is only another
proof of his hypersesthesia ; for he undoubtedly is con
scious of subtler personal indications (of his operator's
mental states especially) than he could notice in his waking
state. Examples of this are. found in the so-called 'mag
netic rapport: This is a name for the fact that in deep
trance, or in lighter trance whenever the suggestion is
made, the subject is deaf and blind to everyone but the
operator or those spectators to whom the latter expressly
awakens his senses. The most violent appeals from any
one else are for him as if non-existent, whilst he obeys the
faintest signals on the part of his hypnotizer. If in cata
lepsy, his limbs will retain their attitude only when the
operator moves them ; when others move them they fall
down, etc. A more remarkable fact still is that the patient
will often answer anyone whom his operator touches, or at
whom he even points his finger, in however concealed a
manner. All which is rationally explicable by expectation
and suggestion, if only it be farther admitted that his
senses are acutely sharpened for all the operator's move-
ments.f He often shows great anxiety and restlessness if
the latter is out of the room. A favorite experiment of
Mr. E. Gurney's was to put the subject's hands through an
opaque screen, and cause the operator to point at one
finger. That finger presently grew insensible or rigid. A
bystander pointing simultaneously at another finger, never
made that insensible or rigid. Of course the elective rap-
port with their operator had been developed in these

* It should be said, however, that the bystander's ability to discrimi
nate unmarked cards and sheets of paper from each other is much greater
than one would naturally suppose.

f I must repeat, however, that we are here on the verge of possibly un
known forces and modes of communication. Hypnotization at a distance,
with no grounds for expectation on the subject's part that it was to be
tried, seems pretty well established in certain very rare cases. See in
general, for information on these matters, the Proceedings of the Soc. for
Psych. Research, passim.

HYPNOTISM. 611

trained subjects during the hypnotic state, but the phe
nomenon then occurred in some of them during the waking
state, even when their consciousness was absorbed in ani
mated conversation with a fourth party.* I confess that
when I saw these experiments I was impressed with the
necessity for admitting between the emanations from differ
ent people differences for which we have no name, and a
discriminative sensibility for them of the nature of which
we can form no clear conception, but which seems to be
developed in certain subjects by the hypnotic trance. — The
enigmatic reports of the effect of magnets and metals, even
if they be due, as many contend, to unintentional sugges
tion on the operator's part, certainly involve hyperaesthetic
perception, for the operator seeks as well as possible to
conceal the moment when the magnet is brought into play,
and yet the subject not only finds it out that moment in a
way difficult to understand, but may develop effects which
(in the first instance certainly) the operator did not expect to
find. Unilateral contractures, movements, paralyses, hallu
cinations, etc., are made to pass to the other side of the
body, hallucinations to disappear, or to change to the com
plementary color, suggested emotions to pass into their
opposites, etc. Many Italian observations agree with the
French ones, and the upshot is that if unconscious sugges
tion lie at the bottom of this matter, the patients show an
enormously exalted power of divining what it is they are
expected to do. This hypersesthetic perception is what
concerns us now.f its modus cannot yet be said to be de
fined.

* Here again the perception in question must take place below the
threshold of ordinary consciousness, possibly in one of those split-off selves
or ' second ' states whose existence we have so often to recognize.

t I myself verified many of the above effects of the magnet on a blind
folded subject on whom I was trying them for the first time, and whom I
believe to have never heard of them before. The moment, however, an
opaque screen was added to the blindfolding, the effects ceased to coincide
with the approximation of the magnet, so that it looks as if visual percep
tion had been instrumental in producing them. The subject passed from
my observation, so that I never could clear up the mystery. Of course I
gave him consciously no hint of what I was looking for.

612 PSYCHOLOGY.

Changes in the nutrition of the tissues may be produced by
suggestion. These effects lead into therapeutics — a subject
which I do not propose to treat of here. But I may say
that there seems no reasonable ground for doubting that in
certain chosen subjects the suggestion of a congestion, a
burn, a blister, a raised papule, or a bleeding from the nose
or skin, may produce the effect. Messrs. Beaunis, Berjon,
Bernheim, Bourru, Burot, Charcot, Delbceuf, Dumontpal-
Her, Focachon, Forel, Jendrassik, Krafft-Ebing, Liebault,
Liegeois, Lipp, Mabille, and others have recently vouched
for one or other of these effects. Messrs. Delboeuf ancl
Liegeois have annulled by suggestion, one the effects of a
burn, the other of a blister. Delbceuf was led to his experi
ments after seeing a burn on the skin produced by suggestion,
at the Salpetriere, by reasoning that if the idea of a pain
could produce inflammation it must be because pain was
itself an inflammatory irritant, and that the abolition of it
from a real burn ought therefore to entail the absence of
inflammation. He applied the actual cautery (as well as vesi
cants) to symmetrical places on the skin, affirming that no
pain should be felt on one of the sides. The result was a
dry scorch on that side, with (as he assures me) no after-
mark, but on the other side a regular blister with suppura
tion and a subsequent scar. This explains the innocuity of
certain assaults made on subjects during trance. To test
simulation, recourse is often had to sticking pins under their
finger-nails or through their tongue, to inhalations of strong
ammonia, and the like. These irritations, when not felt by
the subject, seem to leave no after-consequences. One is
reminded of the reported non-inflammatory character of the
wounds made on themselves by dervishes in their pious or
gies. On the other hand, the reddenings and bleedings of the
skin along certain lines, suggested by tracing lines or press
ing objects thereupon, put the accounts handed down to us of
the stigmata of the cross appearing on the hands, feet, sides,
and forehead of certain Catholic mystics in a new light.
As so often happens, a fact is denied until a welcome inter
pretation comes with it. Then it is admitted readily enough;
and evidence judged quite insufficient to back a claim, so
long as the church had an interest in making it, proves to

HYPNOTISM. 613

be quite sufficient for modern scientific enlightenment, the
moment it appears that a reputed saint can thereby be
•classed as 'a case of hystero-epilepsy.'

There remain two other topics, viz., post-hypnotic effects
of suggestion, and effects of suggestion in the waking
state.

Post-hypnotic, or deferred, suggestions are such as are
given to the patients during trance, to take effect after wak
ing. They succeed with a certain number of patients even
when the execution is named for a remote period — months
or even a year, in one case reported by M. Liegeois. In
this way one can make the patient feel a pain, or be para
lyzed, or be hungry or thirsty, or have an hallucination,
positive or negative, or perform some fantastic action after
emerging from his trance. The effect in question may be
ordered to take place not immediately, but after an interval
of time has elapsed, and the interval may be left to the
subject to measure, or may be marked by a certain signal.
The moment the signal occurs, or the time is run out, the
subject, who until then seems in a perfectly normal waking
condition, will experience the suggested effect. In many
instances, whilst thus obedient to the suggestion, he
seems to fall into the hypnotic condition again. This is
proved by the fact that the moment the hallucination or sug
gested performance is over he forgets it, denies all knowl
edge of it, and so forth ; and by the further fact that he is
' suggestible ' during its performance, that is, will receive
new hallucinations, etc., at command. A moment later and
this suggestibility has disappeared. It cannot be said, how
ever, that relapse into the trance is an absolutely necessary
condition for the post-hypnotic carrying out of commands,
for the subject may be neither suggestible nor amnesic, and
may struggle with all the strength of his will against the
absurdity of this impulse which he feels rising in him, he
knows not why. In these cases, as in most cases, he forgets
the circumstance o-f the impulse having been suggested to
him in •,. previous trance ; regards it as arising within him
self ; and often improvises, as he yields to it, some more or
less plausible or ingenious motive by which to justify it to

PSYCHOLOGY.

the lookers-on. He acts, in short, with his usual sense of per-
sonal spontaneity and freedom ; and the disbelievers in the
freedom of the will have naturally made much of these cases
in their attempts to show it to be an illusion.

The only really mysterious feature of these deferred sug
gestions is the patient's absolute ignorance during the inter
val preceding their execution that they have been deposited
in his mind. They will often surge up at the preappointed
time, even though you have vainly tried a while before to
make him recall the circumstances of their production. The
most important class of post-hypnotic suggestions are, of
course, those relative to the patient's health— bowels, sleep,
and other bodily functions. Among the most interesting
(apart from the hallucinations) are those relative to future
trances. One can determine the hour and minute, or the
signal, at which the patient will of his own accord lapse into
trance again. One can make him susceptible in future to
another operator who may have been unsuccessful with him
in the past. Or more important still in certain cases, one
can, by suggesting that certain persons shall never be able
hereafter to put him to sleep, remove him for all future time
from hypnotic influences which might be dangerous. This,
indeed, is the simple and natural safeguard against those
' dangers of hypnotism ' of which uninstructed persons talk
so vaguely. A subject who knows himself to be ultra-sus
ceptible should never allow himself to be entranced by an
operator in whose moral delicacy he lacks complete confi
dence ; and he can use a trusted operator's suggestions to
protect himself against liberties which others, knowing his
weakness, might be tempted to take with him.

The mechanism by which the command is retained until
the moment for its execution arrives is a mystery which has
given rise to much discussion. The experiments of Gurney
and the observations of M. Pierre Janet and others on cer
tain hysterical somnabulists seem to prove that it is stored
up in consciousness ; not simply organically registered, but
that the consciousness which thus retains it is split off, dissociated
from the rest of the subject's mind. We have here, in short, an
experimental production of one of those 'second' states of the
personality of which we have spoken so often. Only here the

HYPNOTISM. 615

second state coexists as well as alternates with the first.
Gurney had the brilliant idea of tapping this second con
sciousness by means of the planchette. He found that
certain persons, who were both hypnotic subjects and auto
matic writers, would if their hands were placed on a plan
chette (after being wakened from a trance in which they had
received ths suggestion of something to be done at a later
time) write ^ut unconsciously the order, or something con
nected with it. This shows that something inside of them,
which could express itself through the hand alone, was
continuing to think of the order, and possibly of it alone.
These researches have opened a new vista of possible ex
perimental investigations into the so-called ' second ' states
of the personality.

Some subjects seem almost as obedient to suggestion in
the waking state as in sleep, or even more so, according to
certain observers. Not only muscular phenomena, but
changes of personality and hallucinations are recorded as
the result of simple affirmation on the operator's part, with
out the previous ceremony of ' magnetizing ' or putting into
the ' mesmeric sleep.' These are all trained subjects, how
ever, so far as I know, and the affirmation must apparently
be accompanied by the patient concentrating his attention
and gazing, however briefly, into the "eyes of the operator.
It is probable therefore that an extremely rapidly induced
condition of trance is a prerequisite for success in these
experiments.

I have now made mention of all the more important
phenomena of the hypnotic trance. Of their therapeutic
or forensic bearings this is not the proper place to speak.
The recent literature of the subject is quite voluminous, but
much of it consists in repetition. The best compendious
work on the subject is ' Der Hypnotism us,' by Dr. A. Moll
(Berlin, 1889 ; and just translated into English, N. T., 1890),
which is extraordinarily complete and judicious. The other
writings most recommendable are subjoined in the note.*

*Binetand Fere, ' Animal Magnetism,' in the International Scientific
Series ; A. Bernheim, ' Suggestive Therapeutics ' (N.T., 1889); J. Liegeois,

616 PSYCHOLOGY.

Most of them contain a historical sketch and much bib
liography. A complete bibliography has been published
by M. Dessoir (Berlin, 1888).

' De la Suggestion ' (1889) ; E. Gurney, two articles in Mind, vol. ix. — la
the recent revival of interest in the history of this subject, it seems a pity
that the admirably critical and scientific work of Dr. John Kearsley
Mitchell of Philadelphia should remain relatively so unknown. It is quite
worthy to rank with Braid's investigations. See "Five Essays" by the
above author, edited by S. Weir Mitchell, Philadelphia, 1859, pp. 141-274

CHAPTEK XXVIII.

jtfECESSARY TRUTHS AND THE EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE.

IN this final chapter I shall treat of what has sometimes
"been called psychogenesis, and try to ascertain just how far
the connections of things in the outward environment can
account for our tendency to think of, and to react upon,
certain things in certain ways and in no others, even though
personally we have had of the things in question no ex
perience, or almost no experience, at all. It is a familiar
truth that some propositions are necessary. We must attach
the predicate ' equal ' to the subject ' opposite sides of a
parallelogram ' if we think those terms together at all,
whereas we need not in any such way attach the predicate
' rainy,' for example, to the subject « to-morrow.' The dubious
sort of coupling of terms is universally admitted to be due
to ' experience '; the certain sort is ascribed to the ' organic
structure ' of the mind. This structure is in turn supposed
by the so-called apriorists to be of transcendental origin, or
at any rate not to be explicable by experience ; whilst by
evolutionary empiricists it is supposed to be also due to ex
perience, only not to the experience of the individual, but
to that of his ancestors as far back as one may please to
go. Our emotional and instinctive tendencies, our irresist
ible impulses to couple certain movements with the percep
tion or thought of certain things, are also features of our
•connate mental structure, and like the necessary judgments,
are interpreted by the apriorists and the empiricists in the
same warring ways.

I shall try in the course of the chapter to make plain
three things :

1) That, taking the word experience as it is universally
understood, the experience of the race can no more account

617

618 PSYCHOLOGY.

for our necessary or a priori judgments than the experience
of the individual can ;

2) That there is no good evidence for the belief that
our instinctive reactions are fruits of our ancestors' edu
cation in the midst of the same environment, transmitted to
us at birth.

3) That the features of our organic mental structure
cannot be explained at all by our conscious intercourse
with the outer environment, but must rather be understood
as congenital variations, ' accidental ' * in the first instance,
but then transmitted as fixed features of the race.

On the whole, then, the account which the apriorists
give of the facts is that which I defend ; although I should
contend (as will hereafter appear) for a naturalistic view
of their cause.

The first thing I have to say is that all schools (however
they otherwise differ) must allow that the elementary
qualities of cold, heat, pleasure, pain, red, blue, sound,
silence, etc., are original, innate, or a priori properties of our
subjective nature, even though they should require the touch
of experience to waken them into actual consciousness,
and should slumber, to all eternity, without it.

This is so on either of the two Irypotheses we may
make concerning the relation of the feelings to the
realities at whose touch they become alive. For in the
first place, if a feeling do not mirror the reality which
wakens it and to which we say it corresponds, if it mirror
no reality whatever outside of the mind, it of course is a
purely mental product. By its very definition it can be
nothing else. But in the second place, even if it do mirror
the reality exactly, stil] it is not that reality itself, it is a
duplication of it, the result of a mental reaction. And that
the mind should have the power of reacting in just that
duplicate way can only be stated as a harmony between its
nature and the nature of the truth outside of it, a harmony
whereby it follows that the qualities of both parties match.

* ' Accidental ' in the Darwinian sense, as belonging to a cycle of cau
sation inaccessible to tlie present order of research.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 619

The originality of these elements is not, then, a question
for dispute. The warfare of philosophers is exclusively rela
tive to their FORMS OF COMBINATION. The empiricist main
tains that these forms can only follow the order of com
bination in which the elements were originally awakened
by the impressions of the external world ; the apriorists
insist, on the contrary, that some modes of combination, at
any rate, follow from the natures of the elements them
selves, and that no amount of experience can modify this
result.

WHAT IS MEANT BY EXPEHIENCE P

The phrase ' organic mental structure ' names the mat
ter in dispute. Has the mind such a structure or not ?
Are its contents arranged from the start, or is the arrange
ment they may possess simply due to the shuffling of them
by experience in an absolutely plastic bed ? Now the first
thing to make sure of is that when we talk of 'experience,'
we attach a definite meaning to the word. Experience means
experience of something foreign supposed to impress m, whether
spontaneously or in consequence of our own exertions and
acts. Impressions, as we well know, affect certain orders of
sequence and coexistence, and the mind's habits copy the
habits of the impressions, so that our images of things
assume a time- and space-arrangement which resembles
the time- and space-arrangements outside. To uniform
outer coexistences and sequences correspond constant con
junctions of ideas, to fortuitous coexistences and sequences
casual conjunctions of ideas. We are sure that fire Avill
burn and water wet us, less sure that thunder will come
after lightning, not at all sure whether a strange dog will
bark at us or let us go by. In these ways experience
moulds us every hour, and makes of our minds a mirror of
the time- and space-connections between the things in the
world. The principle of habit within us so fixes the copy
at last that we find it difficult even to imagine how the out
ward order could possibly be different from what it is, and
we continually divine from the present what the future is
to be. These habits of transition, from one thought to
another, are features of mental structure which were lack-

620 PSYCHOLOGY.

ing in us at birth ; we can see their growth under experi
ence's moulding finger, and we can see how often experience
undoes her own work, and for an earlier order substitutes
a new one. ' The order of experience,' in this matter of the
time- and space-conjunctions of things, is thus an indis
putably vera causa of our forms of thought. It is our edu
cator, our sovereign helper and friend ; and its name,
standing for something with so real and definite a use,
ought to be kept sacred and encumbered with no vaguer
meaning.

If all the connections among ideas in the mind could
be interpreted as so many combinations of sense-data
wrought into fixity in this way from without, then experi
ence in the common and legitimate sense of the word would
be the sole fashioner of the mind.

The empirical school in psychology has in the main
contended that they can be so interpreted. Before our
generation, it was the experience of the individual only
which was meant. But when one nowadays says that the
human mind owes its present shape to experience, he means
the experience of ancestors as well. Mr. Spencer's state
ment of this is the earliest emphatic one, and deserves
quotation in full : *

" The supposition that the inner cohesions are adjusted to the outer
persistences by accumulated experience of those outer persistences is in
harmony with all our actual knowledge of mental phenomena. Though
in so far as reflex actions and instincts are concerned, the experience-
hypothesis seems insufficient; yet its seeming insufficiency occurs only
where the evidence is beyond our reach. Nay, even here such few facts
as we can get point to the conclusion that automatic psychical connec
tions result from the registration of experiences continued for number
less generations.

4 ' In brief, the case stands thus : It is agreed that all psychical
relations, save the absolutely indissoluble, are determined by experiences.
Their various strengths are admitted, other things equal, to be propor
tionate to the multiplication of experiences. It is an unavoidable

* The passage is in § 207 of the Principles of Psychology, at the end of
the chapter entitled 'Reason.' I italicize certain words in order to show
that the essence of this explanation is to demand numerically frequent ex
periences. The bearing of this remark will later appear. (Cf. pp 641-2,
infra.}

NECESSARY TRUTRT— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 621

corollary that an infinity of experiences will produce a psychical relation
that is indissoluble. Though such infinity of experiences cannot be
received by a single individual, yet it may be received by the succession
of individuals forming a race. And if there is a transmission of induced
tendencies in the nervous system, it is inferrible that all psychical rela
tions whatever, from the necessary to the fortuitous, result from the
experiences of the corresponding external relations ; and are so brought
into harmony with them.

"Thus, the experience-hypothesis furnishes an adequate solution.
The genesis of instinct, the development of memory and reason out of
it, and the consolidation of rational actions and inferences into in
stinctive ones, are alike explicable on the single principle that the
cohesion between psychical states is proportionate to the frequency with
which the relation between the answering external phenomena has been
repeated in experience.

" The universal law that, other things equal, the cohesion of psy
chical states is proportionate to the frequency with which they have
followed one another in experience, supplies an explanation of the so- •
called ' forms of thought,' as soon as it is supplemented by the law that
habitual psychical successions entail some hereditary tendency to such
successions, which, under persistent conditions, will become cumulative
in generation after generation. We saw that the establishment of those
compound reflex actions called instincts is comprehensible on the prin
ciple that inner relations are, by perpetual repetition, organized into
correspondence with outer relations. We have now to observe that the
establishment of those consolidated, those indissoluble, those instinctive
mental relations constituting our ideas of Space and Time is compre
hensible on the same principle. For if even to external relations
that are often experienced during the life of a single organism, answer
ing internal relations are established that become next to automatic —
if such a combination of psychical changes as that which guides a savage
in hitting a bird with an arrow becomes, by constant repetition, so or
ganized as to be performed almost without thought of the processes of
adjustment gone through— and if skill of this kind is so far transmissible
that particular races of men become characterized by particular apti
tudes, which are nothing else than partially-organized psychical connec
tions ; then, if there exist certain external relations which are
experienced by all organisms at all instants of their waking lives —
relations which are absolutely constant, absolutely universal — there will
be established answering internal relations that are absolutely constant,
absolutely universal. Such relations we have in those of Space and
Time. The organization of subjective relations adjusted to these objec
tive relations has been cumulative, not in each race of creatures only,
but throughout successive races of creatures ; and such subjective rela
tions have, therefore, become more consolidated than all others. Being
experienced in every perception and every action of each creature, these
connections among outer existences must, for this reason too, ba

622 PSYCHOLOCY.

responded to by connections among inner feelings, that are, above all
others, indissoluble. As the substrata of all other relations in the non-
ego, they must be responded to by conceptions that are the substrata of
all other relations in the ego. Being the constant and infinitely-
repeated elements of thought, they must become the automatic elements
of thought— the elements of thought which it is impossible to get rid of
— the ' forms of intuition. '

" Such, it seems to me, is the only possible reconciliation between the
experience-hypothesis and the hypothesis of the transcendentalists ;
neither of which is tenable by itself. Insurmountable difficulties are
presented by the Kantian doctrine (as we shall hereafter see) ; and the
antagonist doctrine, taken alone, presents difficulties that are equally
insurmountable. To rest with the unqualified assertion that, antece
dent to experience, the mind is a blank, is to ignore the questions— whence
comes the power of organizing experiences ? whence arise the different
degrees of that power possessed by different races of organisms, and
different individuals of the same race ? If, at birth, there exists noth
ing but a passive receptivity of impressions, why is not a horse as
educable as a man ? Should it be said that language makes the differ
ence, then why do not the cat and the dog, reared in the same house
hold, arrive at equal degrees and kinds of intelligence ? Understood in
its current form, the experience-hypothesis implies that the presence of
a definitely-organized nervous system is a circumstance of no moment
— a fact not needing to be taken into account ! Yet it is the all-impor
tant fact — the fact to which, in one sense, the criticisms of Leibnitz and
others pointed— the fact without which an assimilation of experiences
is inexplicable. Throughout the animal kingdom in general, the

actions are dependent on the nervous structure. The physiologist shows
us that each reflex movement implies the agency of certain nerves and
ganglia ; that a development of complicated instincts is accompanied by
complication of the nervous centres and their commissural connections ;
that the same creature in different stages, as larva and imago for
example, changes its instincts as its nervous structure changes ; and
that as we advance to creatures of high intelligence, a vast increase in
the size and in the complexity of the nervous system takes place. What
is the obvious inference ? It is that the ability to co-ordinate impres
sions and to perform the appropriate actions always implies the pre-
existence of certain nerves arranged in a certain way. What is the
meaning of the human brain ? It is that the many established relations
among its parts stand for so many established relations among the psy
chical changes. Each of the constant connections among the fibres of
tlie cerebral masses answers to some constant connection of phenomena
in the experiences of the race. Just as the organized arrangement sub
sisting between the sensory nerves of the nostrils and the motor nerves
of the respiratory muscles not only makes possible a sneeze, but also,
in the newly-born infant, implies sneezings to be hereafter performed ;
so, all the organized arrangements subsisting among the nerves of the

NECESSARY TRUTHS -EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 623

infant's brain not only make possible certain combinations of impres
sions, but also imply that such combinations will hereafter be made—
imply that there are answering combinations in the outer world — imply
a preparedness to cognize these combinations — imply faculties of com
prehending them. It is true that the resulting compound psychical
changes do not take place with the same readiness and automatic pre
cision as the simple reflex action instanced — it is true that some indi
vidual experiences seem required to establish them. But while this is
partly due to the fact that these combinations are highly involved,
extremely varied in their modes of occurrence, made up therefore of
psychical relations less completely coherent, and hence need further
repetitions to perfect them ; it is in a much greater degree due to the
fact that at birth the organization of the brain is incomplete, and does
not cease its spontaneous progress for twenty or thirty years afterwards.
Those who contend that knowledge results wholly from the experiences
of the individual, ignoring as they do the mental evolution which
accompanies the autogenous development of the nervous system, fall into
an error as great as if they were to ascribe all bodily growth and struc
ture to exercise, forgetting the innate tendency to assume the adult
form. Were the infant born with a full-sized and completely-constructed
brain, their position would be less untenable. But, as the case stands,
the gradually-increasing intelligence displayed throughout childhood
and youth is more attributable to the completion of the cerebral organ
ization than to the individual experiences— a truth proved by the fact
that in adult life there is sometimes displayed a high endowment of
some faculty which, during education, was never brought into play.
Doubtless, experiences received by the individual furnish the concrete
materials for all thought. Doubtless, the organized and semi-organized
arrangements existing among the cerebral nerves can give no knowledge
until there has been a presentation of the external relations to which
they correspond. And doubtless the child's daily observations and
reasonings aid the formation of those involved nervous connections that
are in process of spontaneous evolution ; just as its daily gambols aid
the development of its limbs. But saying this is quite a different thing
from saying that its intelligence is wholly produced by its experiences.
That is an utterly inadmissible doctrine— a doctrine which makes the
presence of a brain meaningless — a doctrine which makes idiotcy unac
countable.

44 In the sense, then, that there exist in the nervous system certain
pre-established relations answering to relations in the environment,
there is truth in the doctrine of ' forms of intuition '—not the truth
which its defenders suppose, but a parallel truth. Corresponding to
absolute external relations, there are established in the structure of the
nervous system absolute internal relations — relations that are potentially
present before birth in the shape of definite nervous connections ; that
are antecedent to, and independent of, individual experiences ; and
that are automatically disclosed along with the first cognitions. And,

624 PSYCHOLOGY.

as here understood, it is not only these fundamental relations which
are thus predetermined, but also hosts of other relations of a more or
less constant kind, which are congenitally represented by more or less
complete nervous connections. But these predetermined internal

relations, though independent of the experiences of the individual, are
not independent of experiences in general : they have been determined
by the experiences of preceding organisms. The corollary here drawn
from the general argument is that the human brain is an organized
register of infinitely-numerous experiences received during the evolution
of life, or rather during the evolution of that series of organisms
through which the human organism has been reached. The effects of
the most uniform and frequent of these experiences have been succes
sively bequeathed, principal and interest ; and have slowly amounted
to that high intelligence which lies latent in the brain of the infant—
which the infant in after-life exercises and perhaps strengthens or fur
ther complicates— and which, with minute additions, it bequeaths tc
future generations. And thus it happens that the European inherits
from twenty to thirty cubic inches more brain than the Papuan. Thub
it happens that faculties, as of music, which scarcely exist in somb
inferior human races, become congenital in superior ones. Thus it hap
pens that out of savages unable to count up to the number of their fin
gers, and speaking a language containing only nouns and verbs, arise
at length our Newtons and Shakspeares. "

This is a brilliant and seductive statement, and it
doubtless includes a good deal of truth. Unfortunately it
fails to go into details ; and when the details are scrutinized,
as they soon must be by us, many of them will be seen to
be inexplicable in this simple way, and the choice will then
remain to us either of denying the experiential origin of
certain of our judgments, or of enlarging the meaning of the
word experience so as to include these cases among its
effects.

TWO MODES OP ORIGIN OF BRAIN STRUCTURE.

If we adopt the former course we meet with a contro
versial difficulty. The ' experience-philosophy ' has from
time immemorial been the opponent of theological modes
of thought. The word experience has a halo of anti-super-
naturalism about it ; so that if anyone express dissatisfac
tion with any function claimed for it, he is liable to be
treated as if he could only be animated by loyalty to the

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 625

catechism, or in some way have the interests of obscuran
tism at heart. I am entirely certain that, on this ground
alone, what I have erelong to say will make this a sealed
chapter to many of my readers. " He denies experience ! "
they will exclaim, "denies science; believes the mind created
by miracle; is a regular old partisan of innate ideas ! That is
enough ! we'll listen to such antediluvian twaddle no more."
Regrettable as is the loss of readers capable of such
wholesale discipleship, I feel that a definite meaning for the
word experience is even more important than their company.
* Experience ' does not mean every natural, as opposed to
every supernatural, cause. It means a particular sort of
natural agency, alongside of which other more recondite
natural agencies may perfectly well exist. With the scien
tific animus of anti-supernaturalism we ought to agree, but
we ought to free ourselves from its verbal idols and
bugbears.

Nature has many methods of producing the same effect
She may make a * born ' draughtsman or singer by tipping
in a certain direction at an opportune moment the mole
cules of some human ovum ; or she may bring forth a
child ungifted and make him spend laborious but successful
years at school. She may make our ears ring by the sound
of a bell, or by a dose of quinine ; make us see yellow by
spreading a field of buttercups before our eyes, or by
mixing a little santonine powder with our food ; fill us with
terror of certain surroundings by making them really dan
gerous, or by a blow which produces a pathological altera
tion of our brain. It is obvious that we need two words
to designate these two modes of operating. In the one case
the natural agents produce perceptions which take cognizance of
the agents themselves ; in the other case, they produce percep
tions which take cognizance of something else. What is taught
to the mind by the ' experience,' in the first case, is the
order of the experience itself — the ' inner relation ' (in
Spencer's phrase) ' corresponds ' to the ' outer relation *
wkich produced it, by remembering and knowing the latter.
But in the case of the other sort of natural agency, what is
taught to the mind has nothing to do with the agency

626 PSYCHOLOGY.

itself, but with some different outer relation altogether. A
diagram will express the alternatives. B stands for our
human brain in the midst of the world. All the little o's

FIG

with arrows proceeding from them are natural objects (like
sunsets, etc.), which impress it through the senses, and in
the strict sense of the word give it experience, teaching it by
habit and association what is the order of their ways. AU
the little a?'s inside the brain and all the little x's outside
of it are other natural objects and processes (in the ovum,
in the blood, etc.), which equally modify the brain, but
mould it to no cognition of themselves. The tinnitus aurium
discloses no properties of the quinine ; the musical endow
ment teaches no embryology ; the morbid dread (of solitude,
perhaps) no brain-pathology ; but the way in which a dirty
sunset and a rainy morrow hang together in the mind copies
and teaches the sequences of sunsets and rainfall in the
outer world.

In zoological evolution we have two modes in which an
animal race may grow to be a better match for its environ
ment.

First, the so-called way of ' adaptation,* in which the
environment may itself modify its inhabitant by exercis
ing, hardening, and habituating him to certain sequences,
and these habits may, it is often maintained, become hered
itary.

Second, the way of ' accidental variation,' as Mr. Darwin
termed it, in which certain young are born with peculiarities
that help them and their progeny to survive. That varia
tions of this sort tend to become hereditary, no one doubts.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 627

The first mode is called by Mr. Spencer direct, the
second indirect, equilibration. Both equilibrations must
of course be natural and physical processes, but they
belong to entirely different physical spheres. The direct
influences are obvious and accessible things. The causes
of variation in the young are, on the other hand, molecular
and hidden. The direct influences are the animal's 'ex
periences,' in the widest sense of the term. Where what
is influenced by them is the mental organism, they are con
scious experiences, and become the objects as well as the
causes of their effects. That is, the effect consists in a ten
dency of the experience itself to be remembered, or to have
its elements thereafter coupled in imagination just as they
were coupled in the experience. In the diagram these ex
periences are represented by the o's exclusively. The #'s,
on the other hand, stand for the indirect causes of mental
modification — causes of which we are not immediately con
scious as such, and which are not the direct objects of the
effects they produce. Some of them are molecular acci
dents before birth ; some of them are collateral and remote
combinations, unintended combinations, one might say, of
more direct effects wrought in the unstable and intricate
brain-tissue. Such a result is unquestionably the suscepti
bility to music, which some individuals possess at the pres
ent day. It has no zoological utility ; it corresponds to no
object in the natural environment ; it is a pure incident of
having a hearing organ, an incident depending on such in-
stable and inessential conditions that one brother may have
it and another brother not. Just so with the susceptibility
to sea-sickness, which, so far from being engendered by
long experience of its ' object ' (if a heaving deck can be
called its object) is erelong annulled thereby. Our higher
aesthetic, moral, and intellectual life seems made up of
affections of this collateral and incidental sort, which have
entered the mind by the back stairs, as it were, or rather
have not entered the mind at all, but got surreptitiously born
in the house. No one can successfully treat of psychogene-
sis, or the factors of mental evolution, without distinguish
ing between these two ways in which the mind is assailed.

628 PSYCHOLOGY.

The way of ' experience ' proper is the front door, the door
of the five senses. The agents which affect the brain in
this way immediately become the mind's objects. The other
agents do not. It would be simply silly to say of two men
with perhaps equal effective skill in drawing, one an un
taught natural genius, the other a mere obstinate plodder
in the studio, that both alike owe their skill to their ' ex
perience.' The reasons of their several skills lie in wholly
disparate natural cycles of causation.*

/ will then, with the reader's permission, restrict the
word ' experience ' to processes which influence the mind by
the front-door-way of .simple habits and association. What
the back-door-effects may be will probably grow clearer

* Principles of Biology, part in. chaps, xi, xn. — Goltz and Loeb have
found that dogs become mild in character when their occipital, and fierce
when their frontal, brain-lobes are cut off. "A dog which originally was
sross in an extreme degree, never suffering himself to be touched, and
5-ren refusing, after two days' fasting, to take a piece of bread from my
hand, became, after a bilateral operation on the occipital lobes, perfectly
trustful and harmless. He underwent five operations on these parts. . . .
Each one of them made him more good-natured; so that at last (just as
Goltz observed of his dogs) he would let other dogs take away the very
bones which he was gnawing " (Loeb, Pfliiger's Archiv, xxxix. 300). A
course of kind treatment and training might have had a similar effect.
But how absurd to call two such different causes by the same name, and
to say both times that the beast's ' experience of outer relations ' is what
educates him to good-nature. This, however, is virtually what all writers
do who ignore the distinction between the ' front-door ' and the ' back
door ' manners of producing mental change.

One of the most striking of these back-door affections is susceptibility
to tlie charm of drunkenness. This (taking drunkenness in the broadest
sense, as teetotalers use the word) is one of the deepest functions of human
nature. Half of both the poetry and the tragedy of human life would
vanish if alcohol were taken away. As it is, the thirst for it is such that
in the United States the cash-value of its sales amounts to that of the sales'
of meat and of bread put together. And yet what ancestral 'outer rela
tion ' is responsible for this peculiar reaction of ours? The only ' outer
relation ' could be the alcohol itself, which, comparatively speaking, came
into the environment but yesterday, and which, so far from creating, is
tending to eradicate, the love of itself from our mental structure, by letting
only those families of men survive in whom it is not strong. The love of
drunkenness is a purely accidental susceptibility of a brain, evolved for
entirely different uses, and its causes are to be sought in the molecular
realm, rather than in any possible order of ' outer relations. '

NECESSARY TRUTHS -EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 629

as we proceed ; so I will pass right on to a scrutiny of the
actual mental structure which we find.

THE GENESIS OF THE ELEMENTARY MENTAL CATEGORIES.

We find : 1. Elementary sorts of sensation, and feelings
of personal activity ;

2. Emotions ; desires ; instincts ; ideas of worth ; aes
thetic ideas ;

3. Ideas of time and space and number ;

4. Ideas of difference and resemblance, and of their de
grees.

5. Ideas of causal dependence among events; of end
and means ; of subject and attribute.

6. Judgments affirming, denying, doubting, supposing
any of the above ideas.

7. Judgments that the former judgments logically in-
yolve, exclude, or are indifferent to, each other.

Now we may postulate at the outset that all these
forms of thought have a natural origin, if we could only get
at it. That assumption must be made at the outset of every
scientific investigation, or there is no temptation to pro
ceed. But the first account of their origin which we are
likely to hit upon is a snare. All these mental affections
are ways of knowing objects. Most psychologists nowa
days believe that the objects first, in some natural way, en
gendered a brain from out of their midst, and then imprinted
these various cognitive affections upon it. But how ? The
ordinary evolutionist answer to this question is exceedingly
simple-minded. The idea of most speculators seems to be
that, since it suffices now for us to become acquainted with
a complex object, that it should be simply present to us
often enough, so it must be fair to assume universally
that, with time enough given, the mere presence of the
various objects and relations to be known must end by
bringing about the latter's cognition, and that in this way
all mental structure was from first to last evolved. Any
ordinary Spencerite will tell you that just as the experience
of blue objects wrought into our mind the color blue, and
hard objects got it to feel hardness, so the presence of
large and small objects in the world gave it the notion of

630 PSYCHOLOGY.

size, moving objects made it aware of motion, and objective
successions taught it time. Similarly in a world with dif
ferent impressing things, the mind had to acquire a sense
of difference, whilst the like parts of the world as they fell
upon it kindled in it the perception of similarity. Outward
sequences which sometimes held good, and sometimes
failed, naturally engendered in it doubtful and uncertain
forms of expectation, and ultimately gave rise to the dis
junctive forms of judgment; whilst the hypothetic form,
'if a, then &,' was sure to ensue from sequences that were
invariable in the outer world. On this view, if the outer
order suddenly were to change its elements and modes, we
should have no faculties to cognize the new order by. At
most we should feel a sort of frustration and confusion.
But little by little the new presence would work on us as
the old one did ; and in course of time another set of
psychic categories would arise, fitted to take cognizance of
the altered world.

This notion of the outer world inevitably building up a
sort of mental duplicate of itself if we only give it time, is
so easy and natural in its vagueness that one hardly knows
how to start to criticise it. One thing, however, is obvious,
namely that the manner in which we now become acquainted
with complex objects need not in the least resemble the man
ner in which the original elements of our consciousness grew i<p.
Now, it is true, a new sort of animal need only be present
to me, to impress its image permanently on my mind ; but
this is because I am already in possession of categories for
knowing each and all of its several attributes, and of a
memory for retracing the order of their conjunction. I
now have preformed categories for all possible objects.
The objects need only awaken these from their slumber.
But it is a very different matter to account for the categories
themselves. I think we must admit that the origin of the
various elementary feelings is a recondite history, even
after some sort of neural tissue is there for the outer world
to begin its work on. The mere existence of things to be
known is even now not, as a rule, sufficient to bring about
a knowledge of them. Our abstract and general discover
ies usually come to us as lucky fancies ; and it is only apres

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 631

coup tliat we find that they correspond to some reality.
What immediately produced them were previous thoughts,
with which, and with the brain-processes of which, that
reality had naught to do.

Why may it not have been so of the original ele
ments of consciousness, sensation, time, space, resemblance,
difference, and other relations ? Why may they not have
come into being by the back-door method, by such
physical processes as lie more in the sphere of morpho
logical accident, of inward summation .of effects, than in
that of the * sensible presence' of objects'? Why may they
not, in short, be pure idiosyncrasies, spontaneous variations,
fitted by good luck (those of them which have survived)
to take cognizance of objects (that is, to steer us in our
active dealings with them), without being in any intelligible
sense immediate derivatives from them ? I think we shall
find this view gain more and more plausibility as we pro
ceed.*

All these elements are subjective duplicates of outer
objects. They are not the outer objects. The secondary
qualities among them are not supposed by any educated
person even to resemble the objects. Their nature depends
more on the reacting brain than on the stimuli which
touch it off. This is even more palpably true of the natures
of pleasure and pain, effort, desire and aversion, and of such
feelings as those of cause and substance, of denial and of

* Mr. Grant Allen, in a brilliant article entitled Idiosyncrasy (Mind,
viii. 493), seeks to show that accidental morphological changes in the
brain cannot possibly be imagined to result in any meutal change of a sort
which would Jit the animal to its environment. If spontaneous variation
ever works on the brain, its product, says Mr. Allen, ought to be an idiot
or a raving madman, not a minister and interpreter of Nature. Only the
environment can change us in the direction of accommodation to itself.
But 1 think we ought to know a little better just what the molecular
changes in the brain are on which thought depends, before we talk so con
fidently about what the effect can be of their possible variations. Mr.
Allen, it should be said, has made a laudable effort to conceive them dis
tinctly. To me his conception remains too purely anatomical. Meanwhile
this essay and another by the same author in the Atlantic Monthly are
probably as serious attempts as any that have been made towards applying
the Spencerian theory in a radical way to the facts of human history.

632 PSYCHOLOGY.

doubt. Here then is a native wealth of inner forms whose
origin is shrouded in mystery, and which at any rate were
not simply ' impressed ' from without, in any intelligible
sense of the verb ( to impress.'

Their time- o/nd space-relations, however, are impressed
from without — for two outer things at least the evolution
ary psychologist must believe to resemble our thoughts of
them, these are the time and space in which the objects lie.
The time- and space-relations between things do stamp copies
of themselves within. Things juxtaposed in space impress us,
continue to be thought of as thus juxtaposed. Things se
quent in time impress their sequence on our memory. And
thus, through experience in the legitimate sense of the word,
there can be truly explained an immense number of our
mental habitudes, many of our abstract beliefs, and all our
ideas of concrete things, and of their ways of behavior.
Such truths as that fire burns and water wets, that glass
refracts, heat melts snow, fishes live in water and die on
land, and the like, form no small part of the most refined
education, and are the all-in-all of education amongst the
brutes and lowest men. Here the mind is passive and
tributary, a servile copy, fatally and unresistingly fashioned
from without. It is the merit of the associationist school
to have seen the wide scope of these effects of neighbor
hood in time and space ; and their exaggerated applications
of the principle of mere neighborhood ought not to blind
us to the excellent service it has done to Psychology in
their hands. As far as a large part of our thinking goes,
then, it can intelligibly be formulated as a mere lot of habits
impressed upon us from without. The degree of cohesion
of our inner relations, is, in this part of our thinking, pro
portionate, in Mr. Spencer's phrase, to the degree of cohe
sion of the outer relations ; the causes and the objects of
our thought are one ; and we are, in so far forth, what the
materialistic evolutionists would have us altogether, mere
offshoots and creatures of our environment, and naught
besides.*

* In my own previous chapters on habit, memory, association, and
perception, justice has been done to all these facts.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 633

But now the plot thickens, for the images impressed
-upon our memory by the outer stimuli are not restricted to
ihe mere time- and space-relations, in which they originally
came, but revive in various manners (dependent on the in
tricacy of the brain-paths and the instability of the tissue
thereof), and form secondary combinations such as the
forms of judgment, which, taken per se, are not congruent
either with the forms in which reality exists or in those in
which experiences befall us, but which may nevertheless
be explained by the way in which experiences befall in a,
mind gifted with memory, expectation, and the possibility
of feeling doubt, curiosity, belief, and denial. The con
junctions of experience befall more or less invariably, vari
ably, or never. The idea of one term will then engender a
fixed, a wavering, or a negative expectation of another, giv
ing affirmative, the hypothetical, disjunctive, interrogative,
and negative judgments, and judgments of actuality and
possibility about certain things. The separation of attribute
from subject in all judgments (which violates the way in
which nature exists) may be similarly explained by the
piecemeal order in which our perceptions come to us, a
vague nucleus growing gradually more detailed as we attend
to it more and more. These particular secondary mental
forms have had ample justice done them by associationists
from Hume downwards.

Associationists have also sought to account for discrim
ination, abstraction, and generalization by the rates of fre
quency in which attributes come to us conjoined. With
much less success, I think. In the chapter on Discrimina
tion, I have, under the " law of dissociation by varying con
comitants," sought to explain as much as possible by the
passive order of experience. But the reader saw how much
was left for active interest and unknown forces to do. In
the chapter on Imagination I have similarly striven to do
justice to the ' blended image ' theory of generalization and
abstraction. So I need say no more of these matters here.

THE GENESIS OF THE NATURAL SCIENCES.

Our ' scientific ' ways of thinking the outer reality are
highly abstract ways. The essence of things for science is

634 PSYCHOLOGY.

not to be what they seem, but to be atoms and molecules
moving to and from each other according tc strange laws.
Nowhere does the account of inner relations produced by
outer ones in proportion to the frequency with which the
latter have been met, more egregiously break down than in
the case of scientific conceptions. The order of scientific
thought b quite Incongruent either with the way in which
reality exists or with the way in which it comes before us.
Scientific thought goes by selection and emphasis exclu
sively. We break the solid plenitude of fact into separate
essences, conceive generally what only exists particularly,
and by our classifications leave nothing in its natural
neighborhood, but separate the contiguous, and join what
the poles divorce. The reality exists as a plenum. All its
parts are contemporaneous, each is as real as any other, and
each as essential for making the whole just what it is and
nothing else. Bat we can neither experience nor think
this plenum. What we experience, what comes before us, is
a chaos of fragmentary impressions interrupting each
other ; * what we think is an abstract system of hypothet
ical data and laws.f

* ' ' The order of nature, as perceived at a first glance, presents at every
instant a chaos followed by another chaos. We must decompose each
chaos into single facts. We must learn to see in the chaotic antecedent a
multitude of distinct antecedents, in the chaotic consequent [a multitude
of distinct consequents. This, supposing it done, will not of itself tell us
On which of the antecedents each consequent is invariably attendant. To
determine that point, we musi endeavor to effect a separation of the facts
from one another, not in our minds only, but in nature. The mental anal
ysis, however, must take place first. And every one knows that in the
mode of performing it, one intellect differs immensely from another."
(J. S. Mill. Logic, bk. m. chap. vn. § 1.)

f I quote from an address entitled 'Reflex Action and Theism/ pub
lished in the ' Unitarian Review ' for November 1881, and translated in
,he Critiqiie Philosophique for January and February 1882. "The con
niving or theorizing faculty works exclusively for tlie sake of ends that
dc not exist at all in the world of the impressions received by way of our
Besses, but ars set by our emotional and practical subjectivity. It is a
transformer oi the world of our impressions into a totally different world,
.he world of our conception; and the transformation is effected in the
Interests of our volitional nature, and for no other purpose whatsoever.
Destroy the volitional nature, the definite subjective purposes, preferences,
fondness for certain effects, forms, orders, and not the slightest motive
would remain for the brute order of our experience to be remodelled at all.
But, as we have the elaborate volitional constitution we do have, the re-

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 635

This sort of scientific algebra, little as it immediately
resembles the reality given to us, turns out (strangely

modelling must be effected, there is no escape. The world's contents are
given to each of us in an order so foreign to our subjective interests that we
can hardly by an effort of the imagination picture to ourselves what it is
like. We have to break that order altogether, and by picking out from it
the items that concern us, and connecting them with others far away,
which we say ' belong ' with them, we are able to make out detiuite threads
of sequence and tendency, to foresee particular liabilities and get ready for
them, to enjoy simplicity and harmony in the place of what was chaos.
Is not the sum of your actual experience taken at this moment and impar
tially added together an utter chaos ? The strains of my voice, the lights
and shades inside the room and out, the murmur of the wind, the ticking
of the clock, the various organic feelings you may happen individually to
possess, do these make a whole at all ? Is it not the only condition of your
mental sanity in the midst of them that most of them should become non
existent for you. and that a few others— the sounds, I hope, which 1 am
uttering— should evoke from places in your memory, that have nothing to
d<> with this scene, associates fitted to combine with them in what we call
a .-.-itional train of thought ? — rational because it leads to a conclusion we
li.ive some organ to appreciate. We have no organ or faculty to appreciate
the simply given order. The real world as it is given at this moment is
the sum total of all its beings and events now. But can we think of such
a sum ? Can we realize for an instant what a cross- section of all existence
at a deiinite point of time would be? While I talk nod the flies buzz, a
sea gull catches a fish at the mouth of the Amazon, a tree falls in the
Adirondack wilderness, a man sneezes in Germany, a horse dies in Tartary,
and twins are born in France. What does that mean ? Does the contem
poraneity of these events with each other and with a million more as dis
jointed as they form a rational bond between them, and unite them into
anything that means for us a world ? Yet just such a collateral contem
poraneity, and nothing else, is the real order of the world. It is an order
with which we have nothing to do but to get away from it as fast as pos
sible. As I said, we break it : we break it into histories, and we break it
into arts, and we break it into sciences ; and then we begin to feel at home.
We make ten thousand separate serial orders of it. On any one of these,
we may react as if the rest did not exist. We discover among its parts re
lations that were never given to sense at all, — mathematical relations, tan
gents, squares, and roots and logarithmic functions, — and out of an infinite
number of these we call certain ones essential and lawgiving, and ignore
the rest. Essential these relations are, but only/or our purpose, the other
relations being just as real and present as they ; and our purpose is to con
ceive simply and to foresee Are not simple conception and prevision subject
ive ends, pure and simple ? They are the ends of what we call science ;
and the miracle of miracles, a miracle not yet exhaustively cleared up by
any philosophy, is that the given order lends itself to the remodelling. It
shows itself plastic to many of our scientific, to many of our aesthetic, to
many of our practical purposes and ends." Cf. also Hodgson : Philos. of
Kefl., ch. v ; Lotze : Logik, §§ 342-351 ; Sigwart : Logik, §§ 60-63, 105.

636 PSYCHOLOGY.

enough) applicable to it. That is, it yields expressions
which, at given places and times, can be translated into
real values, or interpreted as definite portions of the chaos
that falls upon our sense. It becomes thus a practical
guide to our expectations as well as a theoretic delight.
But I do not see how any one with a sense for the facts can
possibly call our systems immediate results of ' experience '
in the ordinary sense. Every scientific conception is in the
first instance a * spontaneous variation ' in some one's brain.*
Tor one that proves useful and applicable there are a thou
sand that perish through their worthlessness. Their gene
sis is strictly akin to that of the flashes of poetry and sallies
of wit to which the instable brain-paths equally give rise.
But whereas the poetry and wit (like the science of the
ancients) are their l own excuse for being,' and have to run
the gauntlet of no farther test, the 'scientific' conceptions
must prove their worth by being 'verified.' This test, how
ever, is the cause of their preservation, not tha.t of their pro
duction ; and one might as well account for the origin of
Artemus Ward's jokes by the 'cohesion' of subjects with
predicates in proportion to the 'persistence of the outer
relations ' to which they ' correspond ' as to treat the genesis
of scientific conceptions in the same ponderously unreal
way.

The most persistent outer relations which science be
lieves in are never matters of experience at all, but have to
be disengaged from under experience by a process of elimi
nation, that is, by ignoring conditions which are always
present. The elementary laws of mechanics, physics, and
chemistry are all of this sort. The principle of uniformity
in nature is of this sort ; it has to be sought under and in
spite of the most rebellious appearances ; and our convic-

* In an article entitled ' Great Men, Great Thoughts, and the Environ
ment,' published in the Atlantic Monthly for October 1880, the reader
•will find some ampler illustrations of these remarks. I have there tried to
show that both mental and social evolution are to be conceived after the
Darwinian fashion, and that the function of the environment properly so
called is much more that of selecting forms, produced by invisible forces,
than producing of such forms,— producing being the only function thought
of by the pre-Darwinian evolutionists, and the only one on which stress is
laid by such contemporary ones as Mr. Spencer and Mr. Allen.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 637

tion of its truth is far more like a religious faitli than like
assent to a demonstration. The only cohesions which ex
perience in the literal sense of the word produces in our
mind are, as we contended some time back, the proximate
laws of nature, and habitudes of concrete things, that heat
melts ice, that salt preserves meat, that fish die out of
water, and the like.* Such ' empirical truths ' as these we

* " It is perfectly true that our world of experience begins with such
associations as lead us to expect that what has happened to us will happen
again. These associations lead the babe to look for milk from its nurse
and not from its father, the child to believe that the apple he sees will
taste good; and whilst they make him wish for it, they make him fear the
bottle which contains his bitter medicine. But whereas a part of these
associations grows confirmed by frequent repetition, another part is de
stroyed by contradictory experiences; and the world becomes divided for
us into two provinces, one in which we are at home and anticipate with
confidence always the same sequences; another filled with alternating,
variable, accidental occurrences.

"... Accident is, in a wide sphere, such an every-day matter that we
need not be surprised if it sometimes invades the territory where order is
the rule. And one personification or another of the capricious power of
chance easily helps us over the difficulties which further reflection might
find in the exceptions. Yes, indeed, Exception has a peculiar fascination;
it is a subject of astonishment, a Qavjua, and the credulity with which in
this first stage of pure association we adopt our supposed rules is matched
by the equal credulity with which we adopt the miracles that interfere with
them.

" The whole history of popular beliefs about nature refutes the notion
that the thought of an universal physical order can possibly have arisen
through the purely passive reception and association of particular percep
tions. Indubitable as it is that all men infer from known cases to unknown,
it is equally certain that this procedure, if restricted to the phenomenal
materials that spontaneously offer themselves, would never have led to
the belief in a general uniformity, but only to the belief that law and law
lessness rule the world in motley alternation. From the point of view of
strict empiricism nothing exists but the sum of particular perceptions with
their coincidences on the one hand, their contradictions on the other.

" That there is more order in the world than appears at first sight is not
discovered till the order is looked for. The first impulse to look for it pro
ceeds from practical needs: where ends must be attained, we must know
Trustworthy means which infallibly possess a property or produce a result.
But the practical need is only the first occasion for our reflection on the
conditions of a true knowledge; even were there no such need, motives
would still be present to carry us beyond the stage of mere association.
For not with an equal interest, or rather with an equal lack of interest,
does man contemplate those natural processes in which like is joined to
like, and those in which like and unlike are joined; the former processes

638 PSYCHOLOGY.

admitted to form an enormous part of human wisdom. The
1 scientific ' truths have to harmonize with these truths, or
be given up as useless ; but they arise in the mind in no
such passive associative way as that in which the simpler
truths arise. Even those experiences which are used to
prove a scientific truth are for the most part artificial expe
riences of the laboratory gained after the truth itself has
been conjectured. Instead of experiences engendering the
4 inner relations,' the inner relations are what engender the
experiences here.

What happens in the brain after experience has done its
utmost is what happens in every material mass which has
been fashioned by an outward force, — in every pudding or
mortar, for example, which I may make with my hands.
The fashioning from without brings the elements into collo
cations which set new internal forces free to exert their
effects in turn. And the random irradiations and resettle
ments of our ideas, which supervene upon experience, and
constitute our free mental play, are due entirely to these
secondary internal processes, which vary enormously from
brain to brain, even though the brains be exposed to
exactly the same ' outer relations.' The higher thought-
processes owe their being to causes which correspond far
more to the sourings and fermentations of dough, the setting
of mortar, or the subsidence of sediments in mixtures, than
to the manipulations by which these physical aggregates
came to be compounded. Our study of similar association
and reasoning taught us that the whole superiority of man
depended on the facility with which in his brain the paths
worn by the most frequent outer cohesions could be rup
tured. The causes of the instability, the reasons why now
this point and now that become in him the seat of rupture,

harmonize with the conditions of his thinking, the latter do not; in the
former his concepts, judgments, inferences apply to realities, in the
latter they have no such application. And thus the intellectual satisfac
lion which at first comes to him without reflection, at last excites in him
the conscious wish to rind realized throughout the entire phenomenal world
those rational continuities, uniformities, and necessities which are the fun
damental element and guiding principle of his own thought." (C. Sigwart:
Logik, ii 380-2.)

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 639

we saw to be entirely obscure. (Vol. I. p. 580 ; Yol. II. p.
364.) The only clear thing about the peculiarity seems to
be its interstitial character, and the certainty that no mere
appeal to man's ' experience ' suffices to explain it.

When we pass from scientific to aesthetic and ethical
systems, every one readily admits that, although the ele
ments are matters of experience, the peculiar forms of
relation into which they are woven are incongruent with
the order of passively received experience. The world of
aesthetics and ethics is an ideal world, a Utopia, a world
which the outer relations persist in contradicting, but which
we as stubbornly persist in striving to make actual. Why
do we thus invincibly crave to alter the given order of
nature ? Simply because other relations among things are far
more interesting to us and more charming than the mere
rates of frequency of their time- and space-conjunctions.
These other relations are all secondary and brain-born,
* spontaneous variations ' most of them, of our sensibility,
whereby certain elements of experience, and certain arrange
ments in time and space, have acquired an agreeableness
which otherwise would not have been felt. It is true that
habitual arrangements may also become agreeable. But this
agreeableness of the merely habitual is felt to be a mere
ape and counterfeit of real inward fitness ; and one sign of
intelligence is never to mistake the one for the other.

There are then ideal and inward relations amongst th# o5-
jects of our thought which can in no intelligible sense whatever
be interpreted as reproductions of the order of outer experi
ence. In the aesthetic and ethical realms they conflict with
its order — the early Christian with his kingdom of heaven,
and the contemporary anarchist with his abstract dream of
justice, will tell you that the existing order must perish,
root and branch, ere the true order can come. Now the
peculiarity of those relations among the objects of our
thought which are dubbed ' scientific * is this, that although
they no. more are inward reproductions of the outer order
thfiii the ethical and aesthetic relations are, yet they do not
conflict with that order, but, once having sprung up by the
play of the inward forces, are found — some of them at least,
namely the only ones which have survived long enough to

640 PSYCHOLOGY.

be matters of record — to be congruent with the time- and
space-relations which our impressions affect.

In other words, though nature's materials lend them
selves slowly and discouragingly to our translation of them
into ethical forms, but more readily into aesthetic forms ;
to translation into scientific forms they lend themselves with
relative ease and completeness. The translation, it is true,
will probably never be ended. The perceptive order does
not give way, nor the right conceptive substitute for it arise,
at our bare word of command.* It is often a deadly fight •
and many a man of science can say, like Johannes Miiller'
after an investigation, ' Es klebt Blut an der Arbeit.' But
victory after victory makes us sure that the essential doom
of our enemy is defeat.f

* Cf. Hodgson : Philosophy of Reflection, book n, chap. v.

f The aspiration to be ' scientific ' is such an idol of the tribe to the
present generation, is so sucked in with his mother's milk by every one of
us, that we find it hard to conceive of a creature who should not feel it,
and harder still to treat it freely as the altogether peculiar and one-sided
subjective interest which it is. But as a matter of fact, few even of the
cultivated members of the race have shared it ; it was invented but a gen
eration or two ago. In the middle ages it meant only impious magic ; and
the way in which it even now strikes orientals is charmingly shown in the
letter of a Turkish cadi to an English traveller asking him for statistical
information, which Sir A. Layard prints at the end of his ' Nineveh and
Babylon. ' The document is too full of edification not to be given in full.
It runs thus :

• My Illustrious Friend, and Joy of my Liver!

"The thing you ask of me is both difficult and useless. Although I
fiave passed all my days in this place, I have neither counted the houses
aor inquired into the number of the inhabitants; and as to what one person
loads on his mules and the other stows away in the bottom of his ship, that
is no business of mine. But, above all, as to the previous history of this
city, God only knows the amount of dirt and confusion that the infidels
may have eaten before the coming of the sword of Islam. It were un
profitable for us to inquire into it.

"O my soul 1 O my lamb ! seek not after the things which concern
thee not. Thou earnest unto us and we welcomed thee : go in peace.

" Of a truth thou hast spoken many words ; and there is no harm done,
< r>r the speaker is one and the listener is another. After the fashion of thy
people thou hast wandered from one place to another, until thou art happy
*nd content in none. We (praise be to God) were born here, and never
Desire to quit it. Is it possible, then, that the idea of a general intercourse

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 041

THE GENESIS OF THE PURE SCIENCEb.

I have now stated in general terms the relation of the
natural sciences to experience strictly so called, and shall
complete what I have to say by reverting to the subject on ,
a later page. At present I will pass to the so-called pure!
or a priori sciences of Classification, Logic, and Mathematics/
My thesis concerning these is that they are even less than
the natural sciences effects of the order of the world as it
comes to our experience. THE PURE SCIENCES EXPRESS RESULTS
OF COMPARISON exclusively ; comparison is not a conceivable
effect of the order in which outer impressions are experienced —
it is one of the house-born (p. 627) portions of our mental
structure; t tier ef ore the pure sciences form a body of proposi
tions with whose genesis experience has nothing to do.

First, consider the nature of comparison. The relations
of resemblance and difference among things have nothing to
do with the time- and space-order in which we may experience
the latter. Suppose a hundred beings created by God
and gifted with the faculties of memory and comparison.
Suppose that upon each of them the same lot of sensa
tions are imprinted, but in different orders. Let some

between mankind should make any impression on our understandings ?
God forbid !

"Listen, O my son ! There is no wisdom equal unto the belief in God I
He created the world, and shall we liken ourselves unto Him in seeking to
penetrate into the mysteries of His creation ? Shall we say, Behold this
star spinneth round that star, and this other star with a tail goeth and
cometh in so many years ! Let it go ! He from whose hand it came will
guide and direct it.

' • But thou wilt say unto me, Stand aside, O man, for I am more
learned than thou art, and have seen more things. If thou thinkest that
thou art in this respect better than I am, thou art welcome. I praise God
that I seek not that which I require not, Thou art learned in the things I
care not for ; and as for that which thou hast seen, I spit upon it. Wil]
much knowledge create thee a double belly, or wilt thou seek Paradise
with thine eyes ?

" O my friend ! if thou wilt be happy, say, There is no God but
God ! Do no evil, and thus wilt thou fear neither man nor death ; for
surely thine hour will come !

" The meek in spirit (El Fakir)

ALI ZADI."

642 PSYCHOLOGY.

of them have no single sensation more than once. Let
some have this one and others that one repeated. Let
every conceivable permutation prevail. And then let the
magic-lantern show die out, and keep the creatures in a
void eternity, with naught but their memories to muse upon.
Inevitably in their long leisure they will begin to play with
the items of their experience and rearrange them, make
classificatory series of them, place gray between white and
black, orange between red and yellow, and trace all other
degrees of resemblance and difference. And this new con
struction will be absolutely identical in all the hundred
creatures, the diversity of the sequence of the original ex
periences having no effect as regards this rearrangement.
Any and every form of sequence will give the same result,
because the result expresses the relation between the inward
natures of the sensations ; and to that the question of their
outward succession is quite irrelevant. Black will differ
from white just as much in a world in which they always
come close together as in one in which they always come
far apart ; just as much in one in which they appear rarely
as in one in which they appear all the time.

But the advocate of ' persistent outer relations ' may still
return to the charge : These are what make us so sure that
white and black differ, he may say ; for in a world where
sometimes black resembled white and sometimes differed
from it, we could never be so sure. It is because in this
world black and white have always differed that the sense
of their difference has become a necessary form of thought.
The pair of colors on the one hand and the sense of differ
ence on the other, inseparably experienced, not only by our
selves but by our ancestors, have become inseparably con
nected in the mind. Not through any essential structure
of the mind, which made difference the only possible feel
ing which they could arouse ; no, but because they simply
did differ so often that at last they begat in us an impotency
to imagine them doing anything else, and made us accept
such a fabulous account as that just presented, of creatures
to whom a single experience would suffice to make us
feel the necessity of this relation.

NECESSARY TRUTHS- EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 643

I know not whether Mr. Spencer would subscribe to
this or not ; — nor do I care, for there are mysteries which
press more for solution than the meaning of this vague
writer's words. But to me such an explanation of our
difference-judgment is absolutely unintelligible. We now
find black and white different, the explanation says, be
cause we have always have so found them. But why should
we always have so found them ? Why should difference
have popped into our heads so invariably with the thought
of them ? There must have been either a subjective or an
objective reason. The subjective reason can only be that
our minds were so constructed that a sense of difference
was the only sort of conscious transition possible between
black and white; the objective reason can only be that
difference was always there, with these colors, outside the
mind as an objective fact. The subjective reason explains
outer frequency by inward structure, not inward structure
by outer frequency ; and so surrenders the experience-
theory. The objective reason simply says that if an outer
difference is there the mind must needs know it — which is
no explanation at all, but a mere appeal to the fact that
somehow the mind does know what is there.

The only clear thing to do is to give up the sham of a
pretended explanation, and to fall back on the fact that
the sense of difference has arisen, in some natural manner
doubtless, but in a manner which we do not understand.
It was by the back-stairs way, at all events ; and, from the
very first, happened to be the only mode of reaction by
which consciousness could feel the transition from one term
to another of what (in consequence of this very reaction) we
now call a contrasted pair.

In noticing the differences and resemblances of things,
and their degrees, the mind feels its own activity, and has
given the name of comparison thereto. It need not compare
its materials, but if once roused to do so, it can compare
them with but one result, and this a fixed consequence of
the nature of the materials themselves. Difference and re
semblance are thus relations between ideal objects, or con
ceptions as such. To learn whether black and white differ,

644 PSYCHOLOGY.

I need not consult the world of experience at all ; the mere
ideas suffice. What I mean by black differs from what 1
mean by white, whether such colors exist extra mentem meam
or not. If they ever do so exist, they will differ. White
things may blacken, but the black of them will differ from
the white of them, so long as I mean anything definite bj
these three words.*

/ shall now in what follows call aU propositions ivhich ex
press time- and space-relations empirical propositions ; and 1
shall give the name of rational propositions to all propositions
which express the results of a comparison. The latter denomi
nation is in a sense arbitrary, for resemblance and differ
ence are not usually held to be the only rational relations
between things. I will next proceed to show, however,
how many other rational relations commonly supposed dis
tinct can be resolved into these, so that my definition of
rational propositions will end, I trust, by proving less arbi
trary than it now appears to be.

SERIES OF EVEN DIFFERENCE AND MEDIATE COMPARISON.

In Chapter XII we saw that the mind can at successive
moments mean the same, and that it gradually comes into
possession of a stock of permanent and fixed meanings,
ideal objects, or conceptions, some of which are universal
qualities, like the black and white of oui example, and some,
individual things. We now see that not only are the objects
permanent mental possessions, but the results of their com
parison are permanent too. The objects and their differ
ences together form an immutable system. The same ob
jects, compared in the same way, always give the same results ;

" Though a man in a fever should from sugar have a bitter taste which
at another time would produce a sweet one, yet the idea of bitter in that
man's mind would be as clear and distinct from the idea of sweet as if he
had tasted only gall. Nor does it make any more confusion between the
two ideas of sweet and bitter that the same sort of body produces at one
time one and at another time another idea by the taste, than it makes a
confusion in two ideas of white and sweet, or white and round, that the
same piece of sugar produces them both in the mind at the same time. *
Locke's Essay, bk. n. ch. xi. § 3.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE, 645

if the result be not the same, then the objects are not those
originally meant.

This last principle, which we may call the axiom of con-
stant result, holds good throughout all our mental opera
tions, not only when we compare, but when we add, divide,
class, or infer a given matter in any conceivable way.
Its most general expression would be " the Same operated
on in the same way gives the Same." In mathematics it
takes the form of " equals added to, or subtracted from,
equals give equals," and the like. We shall meet with it
again.

The next thing which we observe is that tlie operation
of comparing may be repeated on its own results ; in other
words, that we can think of the various resemblances and
differences which we find and compare them with each
other, making differences and resemblances of a higher
order. The mind thus becomes aware of sets of similar differ
ences, and forms series of terms with the same kind and amount
of difference between them, terms which, as they succeed each
other, maintain a constant direction of serial increase. This
sense of constant direction in a series of operations we saw
in Chapter XIII (p. 490) to be a cardinal mental fact.
"A differs from B differs from C differs from D, etc.,"
makes a series only when the differences are in the same
direction. In any such difference-series all terms differ
in just the same way from their predecessors. The num
bers 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ... the notes of the chromatic scale in
music, are familiar examples. As soon as the mind grasps
such a series as a whole, it perceives that two terms taken
far apart differ more than two terms taken near together,
and that any one term differs more from a remote than
from a near successor, and this no matter what the terms
may be, or what the sort of difference may be, provided it
is always the same sort.

This PRINCIPLE OF MEDIATE COMPARISON might be briefly
(though obscurely) expressed by the formula "more than
the more is more than the less " — the words more and less
standing simply for degrees of increase along a constant
direction of differences. Such a formula would cover all
possible cases, as, earlier than early is earlier than late,

646 PSYCHOLOGY

worse than bad is worse than good, east of east is east of
west ; etc., etc., ad libitum.* Symbolically, we might write
itasa<&<c<d.... and say that any number of
intermediaries may be expunged without obliging us to
alter anything in what remains written.

The principle of mediate comparison is only one form
of a law which holds in many series of homogeneously
related terms, the law that skipping intermediary terms
leaves relations the same. This AXIOM OF SKIPPED INTERMEDI
ARIES or of TRANSFERRED RELATIONS OCCUrS, as W6 SOOn shall

see, in logic as the fundamental principle of inference, in
arithmetic as the fundamental property of the number-
series, in geometry as that of the straight line, the plane
and the parallel. It seems to be on the whole the broadest and
deepest law of man's thought.

In certain lists of terms the result of comparison may
be to find no-difference, or equality in place of difference.
Here also intermediaries may be skipped, and mediate com
parison be carried on with the general result expressed by
the axiom of mediate equality, " equals of equals are equal,"
which is the great principle of the mathematical sciences.
This too as a result of the mind's mere acuteness, and in
utter independence of the order in which experiences come
associated together. Symbolically, again : a — b = c — d . . ,
with the same consequence as regards expunging terms
which we saw before.

CLASSIFICATOKY SEBIES.

Thus we have a rather intricate system of necessa/y and
immutable ideal truths of comparison, a system applicable to
terms experienced in any order of sequence or frequency, or
even to terms never experienced or to be experienced, such
as the mind's imaginary constructions would be. These
truths of comparison result in Classifications. It is, for some
unknown reason, a great aesthetic delight for the mind to
break the order of experience, and class its materials in serial
orders, proceeding from step to step of difference, and to
contemplate untiringly the crossings and inosculations of the

*Cf. Bradley, Logic, p. 226.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 647

series among themselves. The first steps in most of the
sciences are purely classificatory. Where facts fall easily
into rich and intricate series (as plants and animals and
chemical compounds do), the mere sight of the series fills
the mind with a satisfaction sui generis ; and a world whose
reed materials naturally lend themselves to serial classifi
cation is pro tanto a more rational world, a world with
which the mind will feel more intimate, than with a world
in which they do not. By the pre-evolutionary naturalists,
whose generation has hardly passed away, classifications
were supposed to be ultimate insights into God's mind,
filling us with adoration of his ways. The fact that
Nature lets us make them was a proof of the presence of
his Thought in her bosom. So far as the facts of expe
rience can not be serially classified, therefore, so far ex
perience fails to be rational in one of the ways, at least,
which we crave.

THE LOGIC-SERIES.

Closely akin to the function of comparison is that of
judging, predicating, or subsuming. In fact, these elemen-
tarv intellectual functions run into each other so, that it
is often only a question of practical convenience whether
we shall call a given mental operation by the name of
one or of the other. Comparisons result in groups
of like things ; and presently (through discrimination and
abstraction) in conceptions of the respects in which the
likenesses obtain. The groups are genera or classes, the
respects are characters or attributes. The attributes again
may be compared, forming genera of higher orders, and
their characters singled out ; so that we have a new sort
of series, that of predication, or of kind including kind. Thus
horses are quadrupeds, quadrupeds animals, animals
machines, machines liable to wear out, etc. In such a
series as this the several couplings of terms may have
been made out originally at widely different times and
under different circumstances. But memory may bring
them together afterwards ; and whenever it does so, our
faculty of apprehending serial increase makes us conscious

648 PSYCHOLOGY.

of them as a single system of successive terms united by
the same relation.*

Now whenever we become thus conscious, we may be
come aware of an additional relation which is of the highest
intellectual importance, inasmuch as upon it the whole
structure of logic is reared. The principle of mediate predi
cation or subsumption is only the axiom of skipped inter
mediaries applied to a series of successive predications. It
expresses the fact that any earlier term in the series stands
to any later term in the same relation in which it stands
to any intermediate term ; in other words, that whatever
has an attribute has all the attributes of that attribute • or more
briefly still, that whatever is of a kind is of that kind's kind.
A little explanation of this statement will bring out all
that it involves.

We learned in the chapter on Seasoning what our
great motive is for abstracting attributes and predicating
them. It is that our varying practical purposes require
us to lay hold of different angles of the reality at different
times. But for these we should be satisfied to ' see it
whole,' and always alike. The purpose, however, makes
one aspect essential ; so, to avoid dispersion of the atten-
tioD, we treat the reality as if for the time being it were
nothing but that aspect, and we let its supernumerary de
terminations go. In short, we substitute the aspect for
the whole real thing. For our purpose the aspect can be
substituted for the whole, and the two treated as the same ;
and the word is (which couples the whole with its aspect
or attribute in the categoric judgment) expresses (among
other things) the identifying operation performed. The
predication-series a is b, b is c, c is c?, . . . . closely resembles
for certain practical purposes the equation-series a = b,
b — c, c = d, etc.

But what is our purpose in predicating ? Ultimately,
it may be anything we please ; but proximately and im
mediately, it is always the gratification of a certain curi-

* This apprehension of them as forming a single system is what Mr.
Bradley means by the act of construction which underlies all reasoning.
The awareness, which then supervenes, of the additional relation of which
I speak in the next paragraph of my text, is what this author calls the
act of inspection. Cf. Principles of Logic, bk, n. pt. i. chap. ni.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 649

osity as to whether the object in hand is or is not of a kind
connected with that ultimate purpose. Usually the con
nection is not obvious, and we only find that the object S
is of a kind connected with P, after first finding that it is
of a kind M, which itself is connected with P. Thus, to
fix our ideas by an example, we have a curiosity (our ulti
mate purpose being conquest over nature) as to how Sirius
may move. It is not obvious whether Sirius is a kind of
thing which moves in the line of sight or not. When,
however, we find it to be a kind of thing in whose spectrum
the hydrogen-line is shifted, and when we reflect that that
kind of thing is a kind of thing which moves in the line
of sight ; we conclude that Sirius does so move. Whatever
Sirius's attribute is, Sirius is ; its adjective's adjective can
supersede its own adjective in our thinking, and this with
no loss to our knowledge, so long as we stick to the definite
purpose in view.

Now please note that this elimination of intermediary
kinds and transfer of is's along the line, results from our
insight into the very meaning of the word is, and into the
constitution of any series of terms connected by that rela
tion. It has naught to do with what any particular thing is
or is not ; but, whatever any given thing may be, we see
that it also is whatever that is, indefinitely. To grasp in
one view a succession of is's is to apprehend this relation
between the terms which they connect ; just as to grasp a
list of successive equals is to apprehend their mutual equal
ity throughout. The principle of mediate subsumption
thus expresses relations of ideal objects as such. It can be
discovered by a mind left at leisure with any set of mean
ings (however originally obtained), of which some are pred-
icable of others. The moment we string them in a serial
line, that moment we see that we can drop intermediaries,
treat remote terms just like near ones, and put a genus in
the place of a species. This shows that the principle of
mediate subsumption has nothing to do ivith the particular
order of our experiences, or with the outer coexistences and
sequences of terms. Were it a mere outgrowth of habit
and association, we should be forced to regard it as having
no universal validity ; for every hour ot the day we meet

650 PSYCHOLOGY.

things which we consider to be of this kind or of that, but
later learn that they have none of the kind's properties, that
they do not belong to the kind's kind. Instead, however, of
correcting the principle by these cases, we correct the cases
by the principle. We say that if the thing we named an M
has not M's properties, then we were either mistaken in call
ing it an M, or mistaken about M's properties ; or else that it
is no longer M, but has changed. But we never say that it
is an M without M's properties ; for by conceiving a thing as
of the kind M I mean that it shall have M's properties, be of
M's kind, even though I should never be able to find in the
real world anything which is an M. The principle emanates
from my perception of what a lot of successive is's mean.
This perception can no more be confirmed by one set, or
weakened by another set, of outer facts, than the perception
that black is not white can be confirmed by the fact that
snow never blackens, or weakened by the fact that photog
rapher's paper blackens as soon as you lay it in the sun.

The abstract scheme of successive predications, extended
indefinitely, with all the possibilities of substitution which
it involves, is thus an immutable system of truth which
flows from the very structure and form of our thinking.
If any real terms ever do fit into such a scheme, they
will obey its laws; tvhether they do is a question as to
nature's facts, the answer to which can only be empiri
cally ascertained. Formal logic is the name of the Science
which traces in skeleton form all the remote relations
of terms connected by successive zVs with each other,
and enumerates their possibilities of mutual substitution.
To our principle of mediate subsumption she has given
various formulations, of which the best is perhaps this
broad expression, that the same can be substituted for the same
in any mental operation.*

The ordinary logical series contains but three terms

* Realities fall under this only so far as they prove to be the same. So
far as they cannot be substituted for each other, for the purpose in hand,
so far they are not the same ; though for other purposes and in other
respects they might be substituted, and then be treated as the same. Apart
from purpose, of course, no realities ever are absolutely and exactly the

same.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 651

— "Socrates, man, mortal." But we also have * Sorites '
— Sociates, man, animal, machine, run down, mortal, etc.—
and it violates psychology to represent these as syllogisms
with terms suppressed. The ground of there being any
logic at all is our power to grasp any series as a whole,
and the more terms it holds the better. This synthetic
consciousness of an uniform direction of advance through
a multiplicity of terms is, apparently, what the brutes and
lower men cannot accomplish, and what gives to us our
extraordinary power of ratiocinative thought. The mind
which can grasp a string of tVs as a whole — the objects
linked by them may be ideal or real, physical, mental, or
symbolic, indifferently — can also apply to it the principle
of skipped intermediaries. The logic-list is thus in its origin
and essential nature just like those graded classiftcatory lists
which we ereivhile described. The ' rational proposition' which
lies at the basis of all reasoning, the dictum de omni et nullo
in all the various forms in which it may be expressed,
the fundamental law of thought, is thus only the result of
the function of comparison in a mind which has come by
some lucky, variation to apprehend a series of more than
two terms at once.* So far, then, both Systematic Classifi
cation and Logic are seen to be incidental results of the mere
capacity for discerning difference and likeness, which capacity
is a thing with which the order of experience, properly so
styled, has absolutely nothing to do.

But how comes it (it may next be asked) when sys
tematic classifications have so little ultimate theoretic im
portance — for the conceiving of things according to their
mere degrees of resemblance always yields to other modes
of conceiving when these can be obtained — that the logical
relations among things should form such a mighty engine
for dealing with the facts of life ?

Chapter XXII already gave the reason (see p. 335,
above). This world might be a world in which all things
differed, and in which what properties there were were

* A mind, in other words, which has got beyond the merely dichotomic
style of thought which Wundt alleges to be the essential form of human
thinking (Physiol. Psych., 11. 312).

652 PSYCHOLOGY.

ultimate and had no farther predicates. In such a world
there would be as many kinds as there were separate things.
We could never subsume a new thing under an old kind ;
or if we could, no consequences would follow. Or, again,
this might be a world in which innumerable things were
of a kind, but in which no concrete thing remained of the
same kind long, but all objects were in a flux. Here again,
though we could subsume and infer, our logic would be of
no practical use to us, for the subjects of our propositions
would have changed whilst we were talking. In such worlds,
logical relations would obtain, and be known (doubtless) as
they are now, but they would form a merely theoretic
scheme and be of no use for the conduct of life. But our
world is no such world. It is a very peculiar world, and
plays right into logic's hands. Some of the things, at least,
which it contains are of the same kind as other things ; some
of them remain always of the kind of which they once were ;
and some of the properties of them cohere indissolubly and
are always found together. Which things these latter things
are we learn by experience in the strict sense of the word,
and the results of the experience are embodied in 'empirical
propositions.' Whenever such a thing is met with by us
now, our sagacity notes it to be of a certain kind ; our
learning immediately recalls that kind's kind, and then that
kind's kind, and so on ; so that a moment's thinking may
make us aware that the thing is of a kind so remote that
we could never have directly perceived the connection.
The flight to this last kind over the heads of the intermedia-
riesis the essential feature of the intellectual operation here.
Evidently it is a pure outcome of our sense for apprehend
ing serial increase ; and, unlike the several propositions
themselves which make up the series (and which may all
be empirical), it has nothing to do with the time- and space'
order in which the things have been experienced.

MATHEMATICAL BELATIONS.

So much for the a priori necessities called systematic
classification and logical inference. The other couplings
of data which pass for a priori necessities of thought are
the mathematical judgments, and certain metaphysical prop-

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 653

ositions. These latter we shall consider farther on. As
regards the mathematical judgments, they are all ' rational
propositions ' in the sense defined on p. 644, for they express
results of comparison and nothing more. The mathemati
cal sciences deal with similarities and equalities exclusively,
and not with coexistences and sequences. Hence they have,
in the first instance, no connection with the order of ex
perience. The comparisons of mathematics are between
numbers and extensive magnitudes, giving rise to arith
metic and geometry respectively.

Number seems to signify primarily the strokes of our
attention in discriminating things. These strokes remain
in the memory in groups, large or small, and the groups can
be compared. The discrimination is, as we know, psycho
logically facilitated by the mobility of the thing as a total
(p. 173). But within each thing we discriminate parts ; so
that the number of things which any one given phenome
non may be depends in the last instance on our way of
taking it. A globe is one, if undivided ; two, if composed
of hemispheres. A sand-heap is one thing, or twenty
thousand things, as we may choose to count it. We amuse
ourselves by the counting of mere strokes, to form rhythms,
and these we compare and name. Little by little in our
minds the number-series is formed. This, like all lists of
terms in which there is a direction of serial increase, car
ries with it the sense of those mediate relations between its
terms which we expressed by the axiom " the more than the
more is more than the less." That axiom seems, in fact,
only a way of stating that the terms do form an increasing
series. But, in addition to this, we are aware of certain
other relations among our strokes of counting. We may
interrupt them where we like, and go on again. All the
while we feel that the interruption does not alter the strokes
themselves. We may count 12 straight through ; or count
7 and pause, and then count 5, but still the strokes will be
the same. We thus distinguish between our acts of count
ing and those of interrupting or grouping, as between an
unchanged matter and an operation of mere shuffling per
formed on it. The matter is the original units or strokes ;

654 PSYCHOLOGY.

which all modes of grouping or combining simply give
us back unchanged. In short, combinations of numbers
are combinations of their units, which is the fundamental
axiom of arithmetic,* leading to such consequences as that
7 _|_ 5 — 8 + 4 because both = 12. The general axiom of
mediate equality, that equals of equals are equal, comes in
here.f The principle of constancy in our meanings, when
applied to strokes of counting, also gives rise to the axiom
that the same number, operated on (interrupted, grouped)
in the same way will always give the same result or be the
same. How shouldn't it ? Nothing is supposed changed.
Arithmetic and its fundamental principles are thus in
dependent of our experiences or of the order of the world.
The matter of arithmetic is mental matter; its principles flow
from the fact that the matter forms a series, which can be cut
into by us wherever we like without the matter changing.
The empiricist school has strangely tried to interpret the
truths of number as results of coexistences among out
ward things. John Mill calls number a physical property
of things. ' One,' according to Mill, means one sort of
passive sensation which we receive, ' two ' another, ' three '
a third. The same things, however, can give us different
number-sensations. Three things arranged thus, 0 0 0 , for
example, impress us differently from three things arranged
thus, °0°. But experience tells us that every real object-group
which can be arranged in one of these ways can always be
arranged in the other also, and that 2 + 1 and 3 are thus
modes of numbering things which * coexist ' invariably with
each other. The indefeasibility of our belief in their ' co
existence ' (which is Mill's word for their equivalence) is
due solely to the enormous amount of experience we have
of it. For all things, whatever other sensations they may
give us, give us at any rate number-sensations. Those
number-sensations which the same thing may be suc
cessively made to arouse are the numbers which we deem

* Said to be expressed by Grassman in the fundamental Axiom of
Arithmetic (a + 6)+l =a+(6+l).

f Compare Helmholtz's more technically expressed Essay 'Zahlen u.
Messen,'in the Philosophische Aufsatze, Ed. Zeller gewidmet (Leipzig,
1887), p. 17.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 655

equal to each other ; those which the same thing refuses to
arouse are those which we deem unequal.

This is as clear a restatement as I can make of Mill's
doctrine.* And Its failure is written upon its front. Woe to
arithmetic, were such the only grounds for its validity!
The same real things are countable in numberless ways,
and pass from one numerical form, not only to its equiva
lent (as Mill implies), but to its other, as the sport of
physical accidents or of our mode of attending may de
cide. How could our notion that one and one are eternally
and necessarily two ever maintain itself in a world where
every time we add one drop of water to another we get not
two but one again ? in a world where every time we add a
drop to a crumb of quicklime we get a dozen or more ? —
had it no better warrant than such experiences ? At most
we could then say that one and one are usually two.
Our arithmetical propositions would never have the con
fident tone which they now possess. That confident
tone is due to the fact that they deal with abstract and ideal
numbers exclusively. What we mean by one plus one
is two ; we make two out of it ; and it would mean two
still even in a world where physically (according to a
conceit of Mill's) a third thing was engendered every time
one thing came together with another. "We are mas
ters of our meanings, and discriminate between the things
we mean and our ways of taking them, between our strokes
of numeration themselves, and our bundlings and separat-
ings thereof.

Mill ought not only to have said, " All things are num
bered." He ought, in order to prove his point, to have
shown that they are unequivocally numbered, which they no
toriously are not. Only the abstract numbers themselves are
unequivocal, only those which we create mentally and hold
fast to as ideal objects always the same. A concrete natural
thing can always be numbered in a great variety of ways.
" We need only conceive a thing divided into four equal
parts (and all things may be conceived as so divided)," as

* For the original statements, cf. J. S. Mill's Logic, bk. n. chap. VL
* °>, 3 ; and bk. in. chap. xxiv. § 5.

PS YCHOL OOT.

Mill is himself compelled to say, to find the number four
in it, and so on.

The relation of numbers to experience is just like that
of < kinds ' in logic. So long as an experience will keep its
kind we can handle it by logic. So long as it will keep its
number we can deal with it by arithmetic. Sensibly, how
ever, things are constantly changing their numbers, just as
they are changing their kinds. They are forever breaking
apart and fusing. Compounds and their elements are never
numerically identical, for the elements are sensibly many
and the compounds sensibly one. Unless our arithmetic
is to remain without application to life, we must somehow
make more numerical continuity than we spontaneously find.
Accordingly Lavoisier discovers his weight-units which re
main the same in compounds and elements, though volume-
units and quality-units all have changed. A great discovery !
And modern science outdoes it by denying that compounds
exist at all. There is no such thing as 'water' for
'science;' that is only a handy name for H2 and O when
they have got into the position H-O-H, and then affect
our senses in a novel way. The modern theories of atoms,
of heat, and of gases are, in fact, only intensely artificial
devices for gaining that constancy in the numbers of
things which sensible experience will not show. " Sensible
things are not the things for me," says Science, "because
in their changes they will not keep their numbers the same.
Sensible qualities are not the qualities for me, because they
can with difficulty be numbered at all. These hypothetic
atoms, however, are the things, these hypothetic masses
and velocities are the qualities for me ; they will stay num
bered all the time."

By such elaborate inventions, and at such a cost to the
imagination, do men succeed in making for themselves a
world in which real things shall be coerced per fas aut
nefas under arithmetical law.

The other branch of mathematics is geometry. Its ob
jects are also ideal creations. Whether nature contain
circles or not, I can know what I mean by a circle and
can stick to my meaning ; and when I mean two circles I

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 657

mean two things of an identical kind. The axiom of con
stant results (see above, p. 645) holds in geometry. The
same forms^ treated in the same way (added, subtracted,
or compared), give the same results — how shouldn't they ?
The axioms of mediate comparison (p. 645), of logic (p. 648),
and of number (p. 654) all apply to the forms which we
imagine in space, inasmuch as these resemble or differ
from each other, form kinds, and are numerable things.
But in addition to these general principles, which are true
of space-forms only as they are of other mental conceptions,
there are certain axioms relative to space-forms exclusively,
which we must briefly consider.

Three of them give marks of identity among straight
lines, planes, and parallels. Straight lines which have two
points, planes which have three points, parallels to a given
line which have one point, in common, coalesce throughout.
Some say that the certainty of our belief in these axioms
is due to repeated experiences of their truth ; others that
it is due to an intuitive acquaintance with the properties
of space. It is neither. We experience lines enough which
pass through two points only to separate again, only we
won't call them straight. Similarly of planes and parallels,
We have a definite idea of what we mean by each of these
words ; and when something different is offered us, we see
the difference. Straight lines, planes, and parallels, as they
figure in geometry, are mere inventions of our faculty for
apprehending serial increase. The farther continuations
of these forms, we say, shall bear the same relation to their
last visible parts which these did to still earlier parts. It
thus follows (from that axiom of skipped intermediaries
which obtains in all regular series) that parts of these
figures separated by other parts must agree in direction,
just as contiguous parts do. This uniformity of direction
throughout is, in fact, all that makes us care for these
forms, gives them their beauty, and stamps them into fixed
conceptions in our mind. But obviously if two lines, or
two planes, with a common segment, were to part company
beyond the segment, it could only be because the direction
of at least one of them had changed. Parting company in
lines and planes means changing direction, means assuming

658 PSYCHOLOGY.

a new relation to the parts that pre-exist ; and assuming a
new relation means ceasing to be straight or plane. If we
mean by a parallel a line that will never meet a second
line ; and if we have one such line drawn through a point,
any new line drawn through that point which does not
coalesce with the first must be inclined to it, and if inclined
to it must approach the second, i.e., cease to be parallel
with it. No properties of outlying space need come in
here : only a definite conception of uniform direction, and
constancy in sticking to one's point.

The other two axioms peculiar to geometry are that
figures can be moved in space without change, and that no
variation in the way of subdividing a given amount of space
alters its total quantity.* This last axiom is similar to
what we found to obtain in numbers. ' The whole is equal
to its parts ' is an abridged way of expressing it. A man is
not the same biological whole if we cut him in two at the
neck as if we divide him at the ankles ; but geometrically
he is the same whole, no matter in which place we cut him.
The axiom about figures being movable in space is rather
a postulate than an axiom. So far as they are so movable,
then certain fixed equalities and differences obtain between
forms, 710 matter ivhere placed. But if translation through
space warped or magnified forms, then the relations of
equality, etc., would always have to be expressed with a
position-qualification added. A geometry as absolutely
certain as ours could be invented on the supposition of
such a space, if the laws of its warping and deformation
were fixed. It would, however, be much more complicated
than our geometry, which makes the simplest possible sup
position ; and finds, luckily enough, that it is a supposition
with which the space of our experience seems to agree.

By means of these principles, all playing into each
other's hands, the mutual equivalences of an immense num
ber of forms can be traced, even of such as at first sight
bear hardly any resemblance to each other. We move and

* The subdivision itself consumes none of the space. In all practical
experience our subdivisions do consume space. They consume it in our
geometrical figures. But for simplicity's sake, in geometry we postulate
subdivisions which violate experience and consume none of it.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 659

turn them mentally, and find that parts of them will super
pose. We add imaginary lines which subdivide or enlarge
them, and find that the new figures resemble each other in
ways which show us that the old ones are equivalent too.
We thus end by expressing all sorts of forms in terms of
other forms, enlarging our knowledge of the kinds of things
which certain other kinds of things are, or to which they
are equivalent.

The result is a new system of mental objects which can
be treated as identical for certain purposes, a new series of
iVs almost indefinitely prolonged, just like the series of
equivalencies among numbers, part of which the multipli
cation-table expresses. And all this is in the first instance
regardless of the coexistences and sequences of nature,
and regardless of whether the figures we speak of have ever
been outwardly experienced or not.

CONSCIOUSNESS OF SEKIES IS THE BASIS OF KATIONALITY.

Classification, logic, and mathematics all result, then,
from the mere play of the mind comparing its conceptions,
no matter whence the latter may have come. The essential
condition for the formation of all these sciences is that we
should have grown capable of apprehending series as such,
and of distinguishing them as homogeneous or hetero
geneous, and as possessing definite directions of what I have
called 'increase.' This consciousness of series is a human
perfection which has been gradually evolved, and which
varies greatly from man to man. There is no accounting
for it as a result of habitual associations among outward
impressions, so we must simply ascribe it to the factors,
whatever they be, of inward cerebral growth. Once this
consciousness attained to, however, mediate thought be
comes possible ; with our very awareness of a series may
go an awareness that dropping terms out of it will leave
identical relations between the terms that remain ; and
thus arises a perception of relations between things so
naturally separate that we should otherwise never have
compared them together at all.

The axiom of skipped intermediaries applies, however,
only to certain particular series, and among them to those

660 PSYCHOLOGY.

which we have considered, in which the recurring relation
is either of difference, of likeness, of kind, of numerical ad
dition, or of prolongation in the same linear or plane direc
tion. It is therefore not a purely formal law of thinking,,
but flows from the nature of the matters thought about. It
will not do to say universally that in all series of homo
geneously related terms the remote members are related to
each other as the near ones are ; for that will often be
untrue. The series A is not B is not C is not D . . . does
not permit the relation to be traced between remote terms.
From two negations no inference can be drawn. Nor, to
become more concrete, does the lover of a woman generally
love her beloved, or the contradictor of a contradictor con
tradict whomever he contradicts. The slayer of a slayer
does not slay the latter's victim ; the acquaintances or ene
mies of a man need not be each other's acquaintances or
enemies ; nor are two things which are on top of a third
thing necessarily on top of each other.

All skipping of intermediaries and transfer of relations
occurs within homogeneous series. But not all homoge
neous series allow of intermediaries being skipped and re
lations transferred. It depends on which series they are,
on what relations they contain.* Let it not be said that it
is a mere matter of verbal association, due to the fact that
language sometimes permits us to transfer the name of a
relation over skipped intermediaries, and sometimes does
not ; as where we call men ' progenitors ' of their remote as
well as of their immediate posterity, but refuse to call them
* fathers ' thereof. There are relations which are intrinsi
cally transferable, whilst others are not. The relation of
condition, e.g., is intrinsically transferable. What conditions
a condition conditions what it conditions — " cause of cause
is cause of effect." The relations of negation and frustration,
on the other hand, are not transferable : what frustrates a
frustration does not frustrate what it frustrates. No
changes of terminology would annul the intimate difference
between these two cases.

* Cf . A. de Morgan : Syllabus of a proposed System of Logic (1860), pp,
46-56.

NECESSARY TRUTHS-EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 661

Nothing but the clear sight of the ideas themselves
shows whether the axiom of skipped intermediaries applies
to them or not. Their connections, immediate and remote,
flow from their inward natures. We try to consider them
in certain ways, to bring them into certain relations, and
we find that sometimes we can and sometimes we cannot.
The question whether there are or are not inward and essential
connections between conceived objects as such, really is the same
thing as the question whether we can get any new perception
from mentally coupling them together, or pass from one to
another by a mental operation which gives a result. In the
case of some ideas and operations we get a result ; but no
result in the case of others. Where a result comes, it is
due exclusively to the nature of the ideas and of the opera
tion. Take blueness and yellowness, for example. We can
operate on them in some ways, but not in other ways. We
can compare them ; but we cannot add one to or subtract
it from the other. We can refer them to a common kind,
color ; but we cannot make one a kind of the other, or infer
one from the other. This has nothing to do with experience.
For we can add blue pigment to yellow pigment, and sub^
tract it again, and get a result both times. Only we know
perfectly that this is no addition or subtraction of the blue
-and yellow qualities or natures themselves.*

There is thus no denying the fact that the mind is filed
with necessary and eternal relations ivhich it finds betiveen cer
tain of its ideal conceptions, and, ivhich form a determinate
system, independent of the order of frequency in which experience
may have associated the conception's originals in time and space.

Shall we continue to call these sciences 'intuitive,' 'in
nate,' or ' a priori ' bodies of truth, or not ?f Personally

* Cf. Locke's Essay, bk. n. chap. xvn. § 6.

f Some readers may expect me to plunge into the old debate as to
whether the a priori truths are ' analytic ' or ' synthetic.' It seems to me
that the distinction is one of Kant's most unhappy legacies, for the reason
that it is impossible to make it sharp. No one will say that such analytic
judgments as " equidistant lines can nowhere meet " are pure tautologies.
The predicate is a somewhat new way of conceiving as well as of naming
the subject. There is something ' ampliative ' in our greatest truisms, our
state of mind is richer after than before we have uttered them. This

662 PSYCHOLOGY.

I should like to do so. But I hesitate to use the terms,
on account of the odium which controversial history has
made the whole of their connotation for many worthy per
sons. The most politic way not to alienate these readers
is to flourish the name of the immortal Locke. For in truth
I have done nothing more in the previous pages than to
make a little more explicit the teachings of Locke's fourth
book :

k'The immutability of the same relations between the same im
mutable things is now the idea that shows him that if the three angles of
a triangle were once equal to two right angles, they will always be
equal to two right ones. And hence he comes to be certain that what
was once true in the case is always true ; what ideas once agreed will
always agree . . . Upon this ground it is that particular demonstrations
in mathematics afford general knowledge. If, then, the perception
that the same ideas will eternally have the same habitudes and relations
be not a sufficient ground of knowledge, there could be no knowledge
of general propositions in mathematics. ... All general knowledge
lies only in our own thoughts, and consists barely in the contemplation of
our abstract ideas. Wherever we perceive any agreement or disagree
ment amongst them, there we have general knowledge ; and by putting
the names of those ideas together accordingly in propositions, can with
certainty pronounce general truths. . . . What is once known of such
ideas will be perpetually and forever true. So that, as to all general
knowledge, we must search and find it only in our own minds and it is
only the examining of our own ideas that furnisheth us with that.
Truths belonging to essences of things (that is, to abstract ideas) are

being the case, the question "at what point does the new state of mind
cease to be implicit in the old ? " is too vague to be answered. The only
sharp way of denning synthetic propositions would be to say that they ex
press a relation between two data at least. But it is hard to find any prop
osition which cannot be construed as doing this. Even verbal definitions
do it. Such painstaking attempts as that latest one by Mr. D. G. Thomp
son to prove all necessary judgments to be analytic (System of Psychology,
ii. pp. 232 ff.) seem accordingly but nugce difficiles, and little better than
wastes of ink and paper. All philosophic interest vanishes from the
question, the moment one ceases to ascribe to any a priori truths
(whether analytic or synthetic) that " legislative character for all possible
experience " which Kant believed in. We ourselves have denied such
legislative character, and contended that it was for experience itself to
prove whether its data can or cannot be assimilated to those ideal terms
between which a priori relations obtain. The analytic-synthetic debate is
thus for us devoid of all significance. On the whole, the best recent treat
ment of the question known to me is in one of A. Spir's works, his Denkeu
und Wirklichkeit, I think, but 1 cannot now find the page.

NECESSARY TRUTHS-EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 663

eternal, and are to be found out only by the contemplation of those
essences. . . . Knowledge is the consequence of the ideas (be they what
they will) that are in our minds, producing there certain general proposi
tions. . . . Such propositions are therefore called 'eternal truths,' . . .
because, being once made about abstract ideas so as to be true, they
will, whenever they can be supposed to be made again, at anytime past
or to come, by a mind having those ideas, always actually be true. For
names being supposed to stand perpetually for the same ideas, and the
same ideas having immutably the same habitudes one to another, prop
ositions concerning any abstract ideas that are once true must needs
be eternal verities.'1

But what are these eternal verities, these * agreements,'
which the mind discovers by barely considering its own
fixed meanings, except what I have said ? — relations of like
ness and difference, immediate or mediate, between the
terms of certain series. Classification is serial comparison,
logic mediate subsumption, arithmetic mediate equality of
different bundles of attention-strokes, geometry mediate
equality of different ways of carving space. None of these
eternal verities has anything to say about facts, about what
is or is not in the world. Logic does not say whether Soc
rates, men, mortals or immortals exist; arithmetic does
not tell us where her 7's, 5's, and 12's are to be found; ge
ometry affirms not that circles and rectangles are real. All
that these sciences make us sure of is, that if these things
are anywhere to be found, the eternal verities will obtain
of them. Locke accordingly never tires of telling us that the

" universal propositions of whose truth or falsehood we can have cer
tain knowledge, concern not existence. . . . These universal and self-
evident principles, being only our constant, clear, and distinct knowl
edge of our own ideas more general or comprehensive, can assure us of
nothing that passes without the mind; their certainty is founded only
upon the knowledge of each idea by itself, and of its distinction from
others ; about which we cannot be mistaken whilst they are in our
minds. . . . The mathematician considers the truth and properties
belonging to a rectangle or circle only as they are in idea in his own
mind. For it is possible he never found either of them existing mathe
matically, i.e., precisely true, in his life. But yet the knowledge he
has of any truths or properties belonging to a circle, or any other math
ematical figure, are nevertheless true and certain even of real things
existing; because real things are no farther concerned nor intended to
be meant by any such propositions, than as things really agree to those
archetypes in his mind. Is it true of the idea of a triangle, that its

664 PSYCHOLOGY.

three angles are equal to two right ones ? It is true also of a triangle
wherever it really exists. Whatever other figure exists that is not ex
actly answerable to that idea in his mind is not at all concerned in that
proposition. And therefore he is certain all his knowledge concerning
such ideas is real knowledge: because, intending things no farther than
they agree with those his ideas, he is sure what he knows concerning
those figures when they have barely an ideal existence in his mind will
hold true of them also when they have a real existence in matter. " But
"that any or what bodies do exist, that we are left to our senses to
discover to us as far as they can." *

Locke accordingly distinguishes between ' mental truth '
and 'real truth.' t The former is intuitively certain; the
latter dependent on experience. Only hy pathetically can we
affirm intuitive truths of real things — by supposing, namely,
that real things exist which correspond exactly with the
ideal subjects of the intuitive propositions.

If our senses corroborate the supposition all goes well.
But note the strange descent in Locke's hands of the dig
nity of a priori propositions. By the ancients they were
considered, without farther question, to reveal the constitu
tion of Keality. Archetypal things existed, it was assumed,
in the relations in which we had to think them. The mind's
necessities were a warrant for those of Being ; and it was not
till Descartes' time that scepticism had so advanced (in ' dog
matic ' circles) that the warrant must itself be warranted,
and the veracity of the Deity invoked as a reason for hold
ing fast to our natural beliefs.

But the intuitive propositions of Locke leave us as re
gards outer reality none the better for their possession.
We still have to "go to our senses" to find what the
reality is. The vindication of the intuitionist position
is thus a barren victory. The eternal verities which
the very structure of our mind lays hold of do not neces
sarily themselves lay hold on extra-mental being, nor have
they, as Kant pretended later,:): a legislating character even

* Book iv. chaps, ix. § 1; vn. 14.

t Chap. v. §§ 6, 8.

£ Kant, by the way, made a strange tactical blunder in his way of
showing that the forms of our necessary thought are underived from ex
perience. He insisted on thought-forms with which experience largely
agrees, forgetting that the only forms which could not by any possibility

NECESSARY TRUTHS-EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE, 665

lor all possible experience. They are primarily interesting
only as subjective facts. They stand waiting in the mind,
forming a beautiful ideal network ; and the most we can
say is that we hope to discover outer realities over which the
network may be flung so that ideal and real may coincide.

And this brings us back to ' science ' from which we di-
Terted our attention so long ago (see p. 640). Science thinka
that she has discovered the outer realities in question,
Atoms and ether, with no properties but masses and veloc
ities expressible by numbers, and paths expressible by an
alytic formulas, these at last are things over which the
mathematico-logical network may be flung, and by suppos
ing which instead of sensible phenomena science becomes
yearly more able to manufacture for herself a world about
which rational propositions may be framed. Sensible phe
nomena are pure delusions for the mechanical philosophy.
The * things ' and qualities we instinctively believe in dc
not exist. The only realities are swarming solids in ever-
lasting motion, undulatory or continued, whose expression
less and meaningless changes of position form the history
of the world, and are deducible from initial collocations
and habits of movement hypothetically assumed. Thous
ands of years ago men started to cast the chaos of nature's
sequences and juxtapositions into a form that might seem
intelligible. Many were their ideal prototypes of rational
order : teleological and aesthetic ties between things, causal
and substantial bonds, as well as logical and mathematical
relations. The most promising of these ideal systems at first
were of course the richer ones, the sentimental ones. The
baldest and least promising were the mathematical ones; but
the history of the latter's application is a history of steadily
advancing successes, whilst that of the sentimentally richer

be the results of experience would be such as experience violated. The
first thing a Kantian ought to do is to discover forms of judgment to which
no order in ' things ' runs parallel. These would indeed be features native
to the mind. 1 owe this remark to Herr A. Spir, in whose 'Denken und
Wirklichkeit ' it is somewhere contained. I have myself already to some
extent proceeded, and in the pages which follow shall proceed still farther,
to show the originality of the mind's structure In this way.

666 PSYCHOLOGY.

systems is one of relative sterility and failure.* Take those
aspects of phenomena which interest you as a human being
most, and class the phenomena as perfect and imperfect, as
-ends and means to ends, as high and low, beautiful and ugly,
positive and negative, harmonious and discordant, fit and
unfit, natural and unnatural, etc., and barren are all your
results. In the ideal world the kind * precious ' has char
acteristic properties. What is precious should be pre
served ; unworthy things should be sacrificed for its sake ;
exceptions made on its account ; its preciousness is a rea
son for other things' actions, and the like. But none of
these things need happen to your ' precious ' object in the
real world. Call the things of nature as much as you like
by sentimental, moral, and aesthetic names, no natural
consequences follow from the naming. They may be of
the kinds you allege, but they are not of l the kind's Jcind':
and the last great system-maker of this sort, Hegel, was
obliged explicitly to repudiate logic in order to make any
inferences at all from the names he called things by.

But when you give things mathematical and mechanical
names and call them just so many solids in just such posi
tions, describing just such paths with just such velocities,
all is changed. Your sagacity finds its reward in the veri
fication by nature of all the deductions which you may next
proceed to make. Your ' things ' realize all the consequences
of the names by which you classed them. The modern
mechanico-physical philosophy of which we are all so
proud, because it includes the nebular cosmogony, the
conservation of energy, the kinetic theory of heat and

* Yet even so late as Berkeley's time one could write : " As in reading
other books a wise man will choose to fix his thoughts on the sense and
apply it to use, rather than lay them out in grammatical remarks on the
language : so in perusing the volume of nature methinks it is beneath the
dignity of the mind to affect an exactness in reducing each particular phe
nomenon to general rules, or showing how it follows from them. We
should propose to ourselves nobler views, namely, to recreate and exalt the
mind with a prospect of the beauty, order, extent, and variety of natural
things : hence, by proper inferences, to enlarge our notions of the grau-
deur, wisdom, and beneficence of the Creator," etc. , etc., etc. (Principles
of Human Knowledge, § 109.)

NECESSARY TRUTHS-EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 667

gases, etc., etc., begins by saying that the only facts are
collocations and motions of primordial solids, and the only
laws the changes of motion which changes in collocation
bring. The ideal which this philosophy strives after is a
mathematical world-formula, by which, if all the colloca
tions and motions at a given moment were known, it would
be possible to reckon those of any wished-for future mo
ment, by simply considering the necessary geometrical,
arithmetical, and logical implications. Once we have the
world in this bare shape, we can fling our net of a priori
relations over all its terms, and pass from one of its phases
to another by inward thought-necessity. Of course it is a
world with a very minimum of rational sfuff. The senti
mental facts and relations are butchered at a blow. But
the rationality yielded is so superbly complete inform that
to many minds this atones for the loss, and reconciles the
thinker to the notion of a purposeless universe, in which
all the things and qualities men love, dulcissima mundi
nomina, are but illusions of our fancy attached to accidental
clouds of dust which will be dissipated by the eternal
cosmic weather as carelessly as they were formed.

The popular notion that ' Science ' is forced on the mind
ab extra, and that our interests have nothing to do with its
constructions, is utterly absurd. The craving to believe
that the things of the world belong to kinds which are rela
ted by inward rationality together, is the parent of Science
as well as of sentimental philosophy; and the original in
vestigator always preserves a healthy sense of how plastic
the materials are in his hands.

" Once for all," says Helmholtz in beginning that little work of his
which laid the foundations of the 'conservation of energy,' "it is the
task of the physical sciences to seek for laws by which particular pro
cesses in nature may be referred to general rules, and deduced from
such again. Such rules (for example the laws of reflection or refrac
tion of light, or that of Mariotte and Gay-Lussac for gas- volumes) are
evidently nothing but generic-concepts for embracing whole classes of
phenomena. The search for them is the business of the experimental
division of our Science. Its theoretic division, on the other hand,
tries to discover the unknown causes of processes from their visible
effects ; tries to understand them by the law of causality. . . . The
ultimate goal of theoretic physics is to find the last unchanging causes

668 PSYCHOLOGY.

of the processes in Nature. Whether all processes be really ascribable
to such causes, whether, in other words, nature be completely intelligible,
or whether there be changes which would elude the law of a necessary
causality, and fall into a realm of spontaneity or freedom, is not here
the place to determine ; but at any rate it is clear that the Science
whose aim it is to make nature appear intelligible [die Natur zu,
begreifen] must start with the assumption of her intelligibility, and
draw consequences in conformity with this assumption, until irrefu
table facts show the limitations of this method. . . . The postulate that
natural phenomena must be reduced to changeless ultimate causes next
shapes itself so that forces unchanged by time must be found to be
these causes. Now in Science we have already found portions of mat
ter with changeless forces (indestructible qualities), and called them
(chemical) elements. If, then, we imagine the world composed of ele
ments with inalterable qualities, the only changes that can remain
possible in such a world are spatial changes, i.e. movements, and the
only outer relations which can modify the action of the forces are
spatial too . or, in other words, the forces are motor forces dependent
for their effect only on spatial relations. More exactly still : The phe
nomena of nature must be reduced to [zuruckgefuhrt, conceived as,
classed as] motions of material points with inalterable motor forces
acting according to space-relations alone. . . . But points have no
mutual space-relations except their distance, . . . and a motor force
which they exert upon each other can cause nothing but a change of
distance — i.e. be an attractive or a repulsive force. . . . And its inten
sity can only depend on distance. So that at last the task of Physics
resolves itself into this, to refer phenomena to inalterable attractive
and repulsive forces whose intensity varies with distance. The solu
tion of this task would at the same time be. the condition of Nature's
complete intelligibility."*

The subjective interest leading to the assumption could
not be more candidly expressed. What makes the assump
tion ' scientific ' and not merely poetic, what makes a Helm-
holtz and his kin discoverers, is that the things of Nature
turn out to act as if they were of the kind assumed. They
behave as such mere drawing and driving atoms would be
have ; and so far as they have been distinctly enough trans
lated into molecular terms to test the point, so far a certain
fantastically ideal object, namely, the mathematical sum
containing their mutual distances and velocities, is found to
be constant throughout all their movements. This sum is
called the total energy of the molecules considered. Its con-

*Die Erhaltung der Kraft (1847), pp. 2-6.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 669

stancy or ' conservation ' gives the name to the hypothesis
of molecules and central forces from which it was logically
deduced.

Take any other mathematico-mechanical theory and it
is the same. They are all translations of sensible experi
ences into other forms, substitutions of items between which
ideal relations of kind, number, form, equality, etc., obtain,
for items between which no such relations obtain ; coupled
with declarations that the experienced form is false and the
ideal form true, declarations which are justified by the ap
pearance of new sensible experiences at just those times
and places at which we logically infer that their ideal cor
relates ought to be. Wave-hypotheses thus make us pre
dict rings of darkness and color, distortions, dispersions,
changes of pitch in sonorous bodies moving from us,
etc. ; molecule-hypotheses lead to predictions of vapor-
density, freezing point, etc., — all which predictions fall true.

Thus the world grows more orderly and rational to the
mind, which passes from one feature of it to another by de
ductive necessity, as soon as it conceives it as made up of
so few and so simple phenomena as bodies with no proper
ties but number and movement to and fro.

METAPHYSICAL AXIOMS.

But alongside of these ideal relations between terms
which the world verifies, there are other ideal relations not
as yet so verified. I refer to those propositions (no longer
expressing mere results of comparison) which are formu
lated in such metaphysical and aesthetic axioms as " The
Principle of things is one ; " " The quantity of existence is
unchanged ; " " Nature is simple and invariable ; " " Nature
acts by the shortest ways ; " " Ex nihilo nihil fit ; " " Noth
ing can be evolved which was not involved ; " " Whatever
is in the effect must be in the cause ; " "A thing can only
work where it is ; " " A thing can only affect another of its
own kind ; " " Cessante causa, cessat et effectus ; " " Nature
makes no leaps ; " " Things belong to discrete and perma
nent kinds ; " " Nothing is or happens without a reason ; "
" The world is throughout rationally intelligible ; " etc.,

670 PSYCHOLOGY.

etc., etc. Such principles as these, which might be multi
plied to satiety,* are properly to be called postulates of
rationality, not propositions of fact. If nature did obey
them, she would be pro tanto more intelligible ; and we seek
meanwhile so to conceive her phenomena as to show that
she does obey them. To a certain extent we succeed. For
example, instead of the ' quantity of existence ' so vaguely
postulated as unchanged, Nature allows us to suppose that
curious sum of distances and velocities which for want of
a better term we call ' energy.' For the effect being 'con
tained in the cause/ nature lets us substitute ' the effect is
the cause,' so soon as she lets us conceive both effect and
cause as the same molecules, in two successive positions.—
But all around these incipient successes (as all around the
molecular world, so soon as we add to it as its ' effects ' those
illusory ' things ' of common-sense which we had to butcher
for its sake), there still spreads a vast field of irrationalized
fact whose items simply are together, and from one to
another of which we can pass by no ideally ' rational ' way.
It is not that these more metaphysical postulates of
rationality are absolutely barren — though barren enough
they were when used, as the scholastics used them, as
immediate propositions of fact.f They have a fertility as

* Perhaps the most influential of all these postulates is that the nature
of the world must be such that sweeping statements may be made about it.

f Consider, e.g., the use of the axioms 'nemo potest supra seipsum,' and
' nemo dat quod non Jiabet,' in this refutation of 'Darwinism,' which I take
from the much-used scholastic compendium of Logic and Metaphysics of
Liberatore, 3d ed. (Rome, 1880): " Haec hypothesis . . . aperte contra-
dicit principiis Metaphysicae, quae docent essentias rerum esse immuta-
biles, et effectum non posse superare causam. Et sane, quando, juxta
Darwin, species inferior se evolvit in superiorem, unde trahit muiorcm illam
nobilitatem? Ex ejus careutia. At nihil dat quod non habet ; et minus
gignere nequit plus, aut negatio positionem. Praeterea in transformation e
quae fingitur, natura prioris speciei, servatur aut destruitur? Si primum,
mutatio erit tantum accidentalis, qualem reapse videmus in diversis stirpi-
bus animantium. Sin alterum asseritur, ut reapse fert hypothesis darwin-
iana, res tenderet ad seipsam destruendam ; cum contra omnia naturaliter
tendant ad sui conservation em. et nonnisi per actionem contrarii agentis
corruant." It is merely a question of fact whether these ideally proper
relations do or do not obtain between animal and vegetable ancestors and
descendants. If they do not, what happens? simply this, that we cannot
continue to class animal and vegetal facts under the kinds between which

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 671

ideals, and keep us uneasy and striving always to recast
the world of sense until its lines become more congruent
with theirs. Take for example the principle that * nothing
can happen without a cause.' We have no definite idea of
what we mean by cause, or of what causality consists in. But
the principle expresses a demand for some deeper sort of
inward connection between phenomena than their merely
habitual time-sequence seems to us to be. The word ' cause '
is, in short, an altar to an unknown god ; an empty pedes
tal still marking the place of a hoped-for statue. Any
really inward belonging-together of the sequent terms, if
discovered, would be accepted as what the word cause was
meant to stand for. So we seek, and seek ; and in the
molecular systems we find a sort of inward belonging in
the notion of identity of matter with change of collocation.
Perhaps by still seeking we may find other sorts of inward
belonging, even between the molecules and those * secondary
qualities,' etc., which they produce upon our minds.

It cannot be too often repeated that the triumphant
application of any one of our ideal systems of rational rela
tions to the real world justifies our hope that other sys
tems may be found also applicable. Metaphysics should
take heart from the example of physics, simply confessing
that hers is the longer task. Nature may be remodelled,
nay, certainly will be remodelled, far beyond the point at
present reached. Just how far ? — is a question which only
the whole future history of Science and Philosophy can
answer.* Our task being Psychology, we cannot even
cross the threshold of that larger problem.

Besides the mental structure which results in such

those ideal relations obtain. Thus, we can no longer call animal breeds by
the name of 'species '; cannot call generating a kind of 'giving,' or treat a
descendant as an ' effect ' of his ancestor. The ideal scheme of terms and
relations can remain, if you like ; but it must remain purely mental, and
without application to life, which 'gangs its aiu gait' regardless of ideal
schemes. Most of us, however, would prefer to doubt whether such abstract
axioms as that ' a thing cannot tend to its own destruction ' express ideal
relations of an important sort at all.

* Compare A. Riehl: Der Philosophische Kriticismus, Bd. n. Thl. i.
Abschn. i. Cap. in. § 6.

672 PSYCHOLOGY.

metaphysical principles as those just considered, there is
a mental structure which expresses itself in

ESTHETIC AND MORAL PRINCIPLES.

The aesthetic principles are at bottom such axioms as
that a note sounds good with its third and fifth, or that
potatoes need salt. We are once for all so made that when
certain impressions come before our mind, one of them will
seem to call for or repel the others as its companions. To
a certain extent the principle of habit will explain these
aesthetic connections. When a conjunction is repeatedly
experienced, the cohesion of its terms grows grateful, or at
least their disruption grows unpleasant. But to explain all
aesthetic judgments in this way would be absurd ; for it is
notorious how seldom natural experiences come up to our
aesthetic demands. Many of the so-called metaphysical
principles are at bottom only expressions of aesthetic feel
ing. Nature is simple and invariable ; makes no leaps, or
makes nothing but leaps ; is rationally intelligible ; neither
increases nor diminishes in quantity ; flows from one prin
ciple, etc., etc., — what do all such principles express save
our sense of how pleasantly our intellect would feel if it
had a Nature of that sort to deal with ? The subjectivity
of which feeling is of course quite compatible with Nature
also turning out objectively to be of that sort, later on.

The moral principles which our mental structure en
genders are quite as little explicable in toto by habitual
experiences having bred inner cohesions. Eightness is not
mere usualness, wrongness not mere oddity, however numer
ous the facts which might be invoked to prove such identity.
Nor are the moral judgments those most invariably and
emphatically impressed on us by public opinion. The
most characteristically and peculiarly moral judgments
that a man is ever called on to make are in unprece
dented cases and lonely emergencies, where no popular
rhetorical maxims can avail, and the hidden oracle alone
can speak ; and it speaks often in favor of conduct
quite unusual, and suicidal as far as gaining popular
approbation goes. The forces which conspire to this
resultant are subtle harmonies and discords between the

NECESSARY TRUTHS- EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 673

elementary ideas which form the data of the case. Some of
these harmonies, no doubt, have to do with habit ; but
in respect to most of them our sensibility must assuredly
be a phenomenon of supernumerary order, correlated with
a brain-function quite as secondary as that which takes,
cognizance of the diverse excellence of elaborate musical
compositions. No more than the higher musical sensibili
ty can the higher moral sensibility be accounted for by the
frequency with which outer relations have cohered.* Take
judgments of justice or equity, for example. Instinctively,
one judges everything differently, according as it pertains
to one's self or to some one else. Empirically one notices
that everybody else does the same. But little by little
there dawns in one the judgment " nothing can be right for
me which would not be right for another similarly placed ;"
or " the fulfilment of my desires is intrinsically no more im
perative than that of anyone else's ; " or " what it is reason
able that another should do for me, it is also reasonable
that I should do for him ; " t and forthwith the whole mass
of the habitual gets overturned. It gets seriously over
turned only in a few fanatical heads. But its overturning
is due to a back-door and not to a front-door process.
Some minds are preternaturally sensitive to logical con
sistency and inconsistency. When they have ranked a
thing under a kind, they must treat it as of that kind's
kind, or feel all out of tune. In many respects we do class
ourselves with other men, and call them and ourselves by
a common name. They agree with us in having the same
Heavenly Father, in not being consulted about their birth,

* As one example out of a thousand of exceptionally delicate idiosyn
crasy in this regard, take this: "I must quit society. I would rather un
dergo twice the danger from beasts and ten times the danger from rocks.
It is not pain, it is not death, that I dread,— it is the hatred of a man; there
is something in it so shocking that I would rather submit to any injury

than incur or increase the hatred of a man by revenging it Another

sufficient reason for suicide is that I was this morning out of temper with
Mrs. Douglas (for no fault of hers). I did not betray myself in the least,
but I reflected that to be exposed to the possibility of such an event once a
year, was evil enough to render life intolerable. The disgrace of using an
impatient word is to me overpowering." (Elton Hammond, quoted in
Henry Crabb Robinson's Diary, vol. i. p. 424.)

f Compare H. Sidgwick, Methods of Ethics, bk. in. chap. xm. § 3.

674 PSYCHOLOGY.

in not being themselves to thank or blame for their natural
gifts, in having the same desires and pains and pleasures,
in short in a host of fundamental relations. Hence, if these
things be our essence, we should be substitutable for other
men, and they for us, in any proposition in which either
of us is involved. The more fundamental and common
the essence chosen, and the more simple the reasoning,*
the more mildly radical and unconditional will the justice
be which is aspired to. Life is one long struggle between
conclusions based on abstract ways of conceiving cases, and
opposite conclusions prompted by our instinctive percep
tion of them as individual facts. The logical stickler
for justice always seems pedantic and mechanical to
the man who goes by tact and the particular instance,
and who usually makes a poor show at argument. Some
times the abstract conceiver's way is better, sometimes that
of the man of instinct. But just as in our study of reason
ing we found it impossible to lay down any mark whereby
to distinguish right conception cf a concrete case from con-
fusion (see pp. 336, 350), so here we can give no general
rule for deciding when it is morally useful to treat a con
crete case as sui generis, and when to lump it with others
in an abstract class.f

* A gentleman told me that he had a conclusive argument for opening
the Harvard Medical School to women. It was this: "Are not women
human ?"— which major premise of course had to be granted. " Then are
they not entitled to all the rights of humanity ?" My friend said that he
had never met anyone who could successfully meet this reasoning.

f You reach the Mephistophelian point of view as well as the point of
view of justice by treating cases as if they belonged rigorously to abstract
classes. Pure rationalism, complete immunity from prejudice, consists in re
fusing to see that the case before one is absolutely unique. It is always possi
ble to treat the country of one's nativity, the house of one's fathers, the bed
in which one's mother died, nay, the mother herself if need be, on a naked
equality with all other specimens of so many respective genera. It shows
the world in a clear frosty light from which all fuliginous mists of affec
tion, all swamp-lights of sentimentality, are absent. Straight and immedi
ate action becomes easy then — witness a Napoleon's or a Frederick's career.
But the question always remains, "Are not the mists and vapors worth re
taining?" The illogical refusal to treat certain concretes by the mere law
of their genus has made the drama of human history. The obstinate insist
ing that tweedledum is not tweedledee is the bone and marrow of life
Look at 'he Jews and the Scots, with their miserable factions and sec-

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 675

An adequate treatment of the way in which we come by
our aesthetic and moral judgments would require a separate
chapter, which I cannot conveniently include in this book.
Suffice it that these judgments express inner harmonies
and discords between objects of thought ; and that whilst
outer cohesions frequently repeated will often seem har
monious, all harmonies are not thus engendered, but our
feeling of many of them is a secondary and incidental func
tion of the mind. Where harmonies are asserted of the
real world, they are obviously mere postulates of ration
ality, so far as they transcend experience. Such postulates
are exemplified by the ethical propositions that the indi
vidual and universal good are one, and that happiness and
goodness are bound to coalesce in the same subject.

SUMMABY OF WHAT PRECEDES.

I will now sum up our progress so far by a short sum
mary of the most important conclusions which we have
reached.

tarian disputes, their loyalties and patriotisms and exclusions, — their an
nals now become a classic heritage, because men of genius took part and
sang in them. A thing is important if any one think it important. The
process of history consists iu certain folks becoming possessed of the mania
that certain special things are important infinitely, whilst other folks can
not agree in the belief. The Shah of Persia refused to be taken to the
Derby Day, saying " It is already known to me that one horse can run faster
than another." He made the question "which horse?" immaterial. Any
question can be made immaterial by subsuming all its answers under a
common head. Imagine what college ball-games and races would be if the
teams were to forget the absolute distinctness of Harvard from Yale and
think of both as One in the higher genus College. The sovereign road to
indifference, whether to evils or to goods, lies in the thought of the higher
genus. "When we have meat before us," says Marcus Aurelius, seeking
indifference to that kind of good, "we must receive the impression that
tbis is the dead body of a fish, and this is the dead body of a bird or of a
pig- and again that this Falernian is only a little grape- juice, and this pur
ple robe some sheep's wool dyed with the blood of a shell-fish. Such, then,
are these impressions, and they reach the things themselves and penetrate
them, and we see what kind of things they are. Just in the same way
ought we to act through life, and where there are things which appear
most worthy of our approbation, we ought to lay them bare and look at
their worthlessness and strip them of all the words by which they are ex
alted." (Long's Translation, vi. 13.)

676 PSYCHOLOGY.

The mind has a native structure in this sense, that cer
tain of its objects, if considered together in certain ways,
give definite results ; and that no other ways of consider
ing, and no other results, are possible if the same objects
be taken.

The results are ' relations ' which are all expressed by
judgments of subsumption and of comparison.

The judgments of subsumption are themselves sub
sumed under the laivs of logic.

Those of comparison are expressed in classifications, and
in the sciences of arithmetic and geometry.

Mr. Spencer's opinion that our consciousness of classifi-
catory, logical, and mathematical relations between ideas is
due to the frequency with which the corresponding ' outer
relations ' have impressed our minds, is unintelligible.

Our consciousness of these relations, no doubt, has a

natural genesis. But it is to be sought rather in the inner

» forces which have made the brain grow, thanin any mere

i paths of ' frequent ' association which outer stimuli may

I have ploughed in that organ.

But let our sense for these relations have arisen as it
may, the relations themselves form a fixed system of lines
of cleavage, so to speak, in the mind, by which we naturally
pass from one object to another ; and the objects connected
by these lines of cleavage are often not connected by any
regular time- and space-associations. We distinguish,
therefore, between the empirical order of things, and this
their rational order of comparison ; and, so far as possible,
we seek to translate the former into the latter, as being the
more congenial of the two to our intellect.

Any classification of things into kinds (especially if the
kinds form series, or if they successively involve each
other) is a more rational way of conceiving the things than
is that mere juxtaposition or separation of them as indi
viduals in time and space which is the order of their crude
perception. Any assimilation of things to terms between
which such classificatory relations, with their remote and
mediate transactions, obtain, is a way of bringing the things
into a more rational scheme.

Solids in motion are such terms ; and the mechanical

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 677

philosophy is only a way of conceiving nature so as to
arrange its items along some of the more natural lines of
cleavage of our mental structure.

Other natural lines are the moral and aesthetic relations.
Philosophy is still seeking to conceive things so that these
relations also may seem to obtain between them.

As long as things have not successfully been so con
ceived, the moral and aesthetic relations obtain only between
entia rationis, terms in the mind ; and the moral and aesthetic
principles remain but postulates, not propositions, with
regard to the real world outside.

There is thus a large body of a priori or intuitively
necessary truths. As a rule, these are truths of comparison
-only, and in the first instance they express relations be
tween merely mental terms. Nature, however, acts as if
some of her realities were identical with these mental
terms. So far as she does this, we can make a priori propo
sitions concerning natural fact. The aim of both science
and philosophy is to make the identifiable terms more
numerous. So far it has proved easier to identify nature's
things with mental terms of the mechanical than with men
tal terms of the sentimental order.

The widest postulate of rationality is that the world is
rationally intelligible throughout, after the pattern of some
ideal system. The whole war of the philosophies is over
that point of faith. Some say they can see their way
already to the rationality; others that it is hopeless in any
other but the mechanical way. To some the very fact that
there is a world at all seems irrational. Nonentity would be
a more natural thing than existence, for these minds. One
philosopher at least says that the relatedness of things to
each other is irrational anyhow, and that a world of rela
tions can never be made intelligible.*

With this I may be assumed to have completed the
programme which I announced at the beginning of the chap
ter, so far as the theoretic part of our organic mental struc-

* " An sich, in seinem eignen Wesen, ist jedes reale Object mit sich selbst
identisch und unbedingt "—that is, the " a llgemeinste Einsicht a priori," and
the " allgemeinste aus Erfahrung" is " Alles erkennbare ist bedingt."
(A. Spir : Denken und Wirklichkeit. Compare also Herbart and Hegel.)

678 PSYCHOLOGY.

ture goes. It can be due neither to our own nor to our an
cestors' experience. I now pass to those practical parts of
our organic mental structure. Things are a little different
here ; and our conclusion, though it lies in the same direc
tion, can be by no means as confidently expressed.

To be as short and simple as possible, I will take the
case of instincts, and, supposing the reader to be familiar
with Chapter XXIY, I will plunge in medias res.

THE ORIGIN OF INSTINCTS.

Instincts must have been either

1) Each specially created in complete form, or

2) Gradually evolved.

As the first alternative is nowadays obsolete, I proceed
directly to the second. The two most prominent sugges
tions as to the way in which instincts may have been evolved
are associated with the names of Lamarck and Darwin.

Lamarck's statement is that animals have wants, and
contract, to satisfy them, habits which transform themselves
gradually into so many propensities which they can neither
resist nor change. These propensities, once acquired, prop
agate themselves by way of transmission to the young, so
that they come to exist in new individuals, anteriorly to all
exercise. Thus are the same emotions, the same habits,
the same instincts, perpetuated without variation from one
generation to another, so long as the outward conditions
of existence remain the same.* Mr. Lewes calls this the
theory of 'lapsed intelligence.' Mr. Spencer's words are
clearer than Lamarck's, so that I will quote from him : f

* Philosophic Zoologique, 3me partie, chap, v., 'de 1'Instinct.'
f It should be said that Mr. Spencer's most formal utterance about in
stinct is in his Principles of Psychology, in the chapter under that name.
Dr. Romanes has reformulated and criticised the doctrine of this chapter
in his Mental Evolution in Animals, chapter xvn. I must confess my in
ability to state its vagueness in intelligible terms. It treats instincts as a
further development of reflex actions, and as forerunners of intelligence, —
which is probably true of many. But when it ascribes their formation to
the mere 'multiplication of experiences,' which, at first simple, mould
the nervous system to 'correspond to outer relations' by simple reflex
actions, and, afterwards complex, make it ' correspond ' by ' compound
reflex actions,' it becomes too mysterious to follow without more of a key
than is given. The whole thing becomes perfectly simple if we suppose
the reflex actions to be accidental inborn idiosyncrasies preserved.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 679

"Setting out with the unquestionable assumption, that every new
form of emotion making its appearance in the individual or the race is
a modification of some pre-existing emotion, or a compounding of
several pre-existing emotions, we should be greatly aided by knowing
what always are the pre-existing emotions. When, for example, we
find that very fewT, if any, of the lower animals show any love of accu
mulation, and that this feeling is absent in infancy ; when we see that
an infant in arms exhibits anger, fear, wonder, while yet it manifests
no desire of permanent possession ; and that a brute which has no ac
quisitive emotion can nevertheless feel attachment, jealousy, love of ap
probation, — we may suspect that the feeling which property satisfies is
compounded out of simpler and deeper feelings. We may conclude
that as when a dog hides a bone there must exist in him a prospective
gratification of hunger, so there must similarly, at first, in all cases
where anything is secured or taken possession of, exist an ideal excite
ment of the feeling which that thing will gratify. WTe may further con
clude that when the intelligence is such that a variety of objects come to
be utilized for different purposes ; when, as among savages, divers wants
are satisfied through the articles appropriated for weapons, shelter,
clothing, ornament, — the act of appropriating comes to be one con
stantly involving agreeable associations, and one which is therefore
pleasurable, irrespective of the end subserved. And when, as in civ
ilized life, the property acquired is of a kind not conducing to one order
of gratifications, but is capable of ministering to all gratifications, the
pleasure of acquiring property grows more distinct from each of the
\arious pleasures subserved — is more completely differentiated into a'
separate emotion.* It is wrell known that on newly-discovered islands
not inhabited by man, birds are so devoid of fear as to allow them
selves to be knocked over with sticks, but that in the course of genera-

* This account of acquisitiveness differs from our own. Without de
nying the associationist account to be a true description of a great deal of
our proprietary feeling, we admitted in addition an entirely primitive form
of desire. (See above, p. 420 ff .) The reader must decide as to the plausibili
ties of the case. Certainly appearances are in favor of there being in us some
cupidities quite disconnected with the ulterior uses of the things appro
priated. The source of their fascination lies in their appeal to our aesthetic
sense, and we wish thereupon simply to own them. Glittering, hard,
metallic, odd, pretty things ; curious things especially ; natural objects that
look as if they were artificial, or that mimic other objects, — these form a
class of things which human beings snatch at as magpies snatch rags. They
simply fascinate us. What house does not contain some drawer or cup
board full of senseless odds and ends of this sort, \vith which nobody knows
what to do, but which a blind instinct saves from the ash-barrel ? Witness
people returning from a walk on the sea-shore or in the woods, each
carrying some lusus natures in the shape of stone or shell, or strip of bark
or odd-shaped fungus, which litter the house and grow daily more unsightly,
until at last reason triumphs over blind propensity and sweeps them away.

680 PSYCHOLOGY.

tions they acquire such a dread of man as to fly on his approach, and
that this dread is manifested by young as well as old. Now unless this
change be ascribed to the killing off of the least fearful, and the preser
vation and multiplication of the more fearful, which, considering the
small number killed by man, is an inadequate cause, it must be ascribed
to accumulated experiences, and each experience must be held to have
a share in producing it. We must conclude that in each bird that es
capes with injuries inflicted by man, or is alarmed by the outcries of
•other members of the flock, . . . there is established an association of
ideas between the human aspect and the pains, direct and indirect, suf
fered from human agency. And we must further conclude that the
state of consciousness which impels the bird to take flight is at first
nothing more than an ideal reproduction of those painful impressions
which before followed man's approach ; that such ideal reproduction
becomes more vivid and more massive as the painful experiences, direct
or sympathetic, increase ; and that thus the emotion, in its incipient
state, is nothing else than an aggregation of the revived pains before
experienced. As, in the course of generations, the young birds of this
race begin to display a fear of man before they have been injured by
him, it is an unavoidable inference that the nervous system of the race
has been organically modified by these experiences ; we have no choice
but to conclude that when a young bird is thus led to fly, it is because
the impression produced on its senses by the approaching man entails,
through an incipiently reflex action, a partial excitement of all those
nerves which, in its ancestors, had been excited under the like con
ditions ; that this partial excitement has its accompanying painful con
sciousness ; and that the vague painful consciousness thus arising con
stitutes emotion proper— emotion undecomposable into specific experi
ences, and therefore seemingly homogeneous. If such be the expla
nation of the fact in this case, then it is in all cases. If the emotion
is so generated here, then it is so generated throughout. If so, we must
perforce conclude that the emotional modifications displayed by dif
ferent nations, and those higher emotions by which civilized are dis
tinguished from savage, are to be accounted for on the same principle.
And, concluding this, we are led strongly to suspect that the emotions
in general have severally thus originated." *

Obviously the word ' emotion ' here means instinct as
well, — the actions we call instinctive are expressions or
manifestations of the emotions whose genesis Mr. Spencer
describes. Now if habit could thus bear fruit outside the
individual life, and if the modifications so painfully ac
quired by the parents' nervous systems could be found
ready-made at birth in those of the young, it would be hard

* Review of Bain in H. Spencer: Illustrations of Universal Progress
{New York, 1864), pp. 311, 315.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 681

to overestimate the importance, both practical and theo
retical, of such an extension of its sway. In principle, in
stincts would then be assimilated to ' secondarily-automatic '
habits, and the origin of many of them out of tentative ex
periments made during ancestral lives, perfected by repe
tition, addition, and association through successive genera
tions, would be a comparatively simple thing to understand.

Contemporary students of instinct have accordingly
been alert to discover all the facts which would seem to
establish the possibility of such an explanation. The list
is not very long, considering what a burden of conclusions
it has to bear. Let acquisitiveness and fear of man, as just
argued for by Spencer, lead it off. Other cases of the latter
sort are the increased shyness of the woodcock noticed to
have occurred within sixty years' observation by Mr. T. A.
Knight, and the greater shyness everywhere shown by large
than by small birds, to which Darwin has called attention.
Then we may add —

The propensities of * pointing,' < retrieving,' etc., in
sporting dogs, which seem partly, at any rate, to be due to
training, but which in well-bred stock are all but innate.
It is in these breeds considered bad for a litter of young if
its sire or dam have not been trained in the field.

Docility of domestic breeds of horses and cattle.

Tameness of young of tame rabbit — young wild rabbits
being invincibly timid.

Young foxes are most wary in those places where they
are most severely hunted.

Wild ducks, hatched out by tame ones, fly off. But if
kept close for some generations, the young are said to be
come tame.*

Young savages at a certain age will revert to the woods.

English greyhounds taken to the high plateau of Mexico
could not at first run well, on account of rarefied air. Their
whelps entirely got over the difficulty.

Mr. Lewes somewhere t tells of a terrier pup whose
parents had been taught to ' beg,' and who constantly

* Ribot : De 1'Heredite, 2me ed. p. 26.

f Quoted (without reference) in Spencer's Biology, vol. i. p. 247.

682 PSYCHOLOGY.

threw himself spontaneously into the begging attitude.
Darwin tells of a French orphan- child, brought up out of
France, yet shrugging like his ancestors.*

Musical ability often increases from generation to gen
eration in the families of musicians.

The hereditarily epileptic guinea-pigs of Brown-Se-
quard, whose parents had become epileptic through surgical
operations on the spinal cord or sciatic nerve. The adults
often lose some of their hind toes, and the young, in addi
tion to being epileptic, are frequently born with the corre
sponding toes lacking. The offspring of guinea-pigs whose
cervical sympathetic nerve has been cut on one side will
have the ear larger, the eyeball smaller, etc., just like their
parents after the operation. Puncture of the ' restif orm
body ' of the medulla will, in the same animal, congest and
enlarge one eye, and cause gangrene of one ear. In the
young of such parents the same symptoms occur.

Physical refinement, delicate hands and feet, etc., ap
pear in families well-bred and rich for several generations.

The * nervous ' temperament also develops in the de
scendants of sedentary brain-working people.

Inebriates produce offspring in various ways degener
ate.

Nearsightedness is produced by indoor occupation for
generations. It has been found in Europe much more fre
quent among schoolchildren in towns than among children
of the same age in the country.

These latter cases are of the inheritance of structural
rather than of functional peculiarities. But as structure
gives rise to function it may be said that the principle is
the same. Amongst other inheritances of adaptivef struc
tural change may be mentioned :

The * Yankee ' type.

Scrofula, rickets, and other diseases of bad conditions
of life.

* Expression of Emotions (N. Y.), p. 287.

f ' Adaptive ' changes are those produced by the direct effect of out
ward conditions on an organ or organism. Sunburned complexion, horny
hands, muscular toughness, are illustrations.

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 683

The udders and permanent milk of the domestic breeds
of cow.

The 'fancy' rabbit's ears, drooping through lack of
need to erect them. Dog's, ass's, etc., in some breeds
ditto.

The obsolete eyes of mole and various cave-dwelling
animals.

The diminished size of the wing-bones of domesticated
ducks, due to ancestral disuse of flight.*

These are about all the facts which, by one author or
another, have been invoked as evidence in favor of the
' lapsed intelligence ' theory of the origin of instincts.

Mr. Darwin's theory is that of the natural selection of
accidentally produced tendencies to action.

"It would," says he, " be the most serious error to suppose that the
greater number of instincts have been acquired by habit in one genera
tion, and then transmitted by inheritance in succeeding generations.
It can clearly be shown that the most wonderful instincts with which
we are acquainted, namely, those of the hive-bee and of many ants,
could not possibly have been thus acquired, f It will be universally ad
mitted that instincts are as important as corporeal structure for the wel
fare of each species, under its present conditions of life. Under changed
conditions of life, it is at least possible that slight modifications of in
stinct might be profitable to a species ; and if it can be shown that in
stincts do vary ever so little, then I can see no difficulty in natural
selection preserving and continually accumulating variations of instinct
to any extent that may be profitable. It is thus, as I believe, that all
the most complex and wonderful instincts have arisen. ... I believe
that the effects of habit are of quite subordinate importance to the effects
of the natural selection of what may be called accidental variations of
instincts ;— that is, of variations produced by the same unknown causes
which produce slight deviations of bodily structure." \

* For these and other facts cf. Th. Ribot : De l'Heredit6 ; W B Car
penter : Contemporary Review, vol. 21, p. 295, 779, 867; H Spencer-
Princ. of Biol. pt. n. ch. v, vm, ix, x ; pt. m. ch. xi, xii ; C. Darwin'
Animals and Plants under Domestication, ch. xii, xm, xiv ; Sam'l But
ler : Life and Habit; T. A. Knight: Philos. Trans. 1887; B Dupuy
Popular Science Monthly, vol. xi. p. 332 ; F. Papfflon : Nature and Life'
p. 330 ; Crothers, in Pop. Sci. M., Jan. (or Feb.) 1889.

f [Because, being exhibited by neuter insects, the effects of mere prac-
tice cannot accumulate from one generation to another.— W. J.l

\ Origin of Species, chap. vn.

684 PSYCHOLOGY.

The evidence for Mr. Darwin's view is too complex to
be given in this place. To my own mind it is quite con vine-
ing. If, with the Darwinian theory in mind, one re-reads
the list of examples given in favor of the Lamarckian theory,
one finds that many of the cases are irrelevant, and that
some make for one side as well as for the other. This is
so obvious in many of the cases that it is needless to point
it out in detail. The shrugging child and the begging pup,
e.g., prove somewhat too much. They are examples so
unique as to suggest spontaneous variation rather than in
herited habit. In other cases the observations much need
corroboration, e.g., the effects of not training for a generation
in sporting dogs and race-horses, the difference between
young wild rabbits born in captivity and young tame ones,
the cumulative effect of many generations of captivity on
wild ducks, etc.

Similarly, the increased wariness of the large birds, of
those on islands frequented by men, of the woodcock, of
the foxes, may be due to the fact that the bolder families
have been killed off, and left none but the naturally timid
behind, or simply to the individual experience of older
birds being imparted by example to the young so that a
new educational tradition has occurred. — The cases of phy
sical refinement, nervous temperament, Yankee type, etc.,
also need much more discriminating treatment than they
have yet received from the Lamarckians. There is no real
evidence that physical refinement and nervosity tend to ac
cumulate from generation to generation in aristocratic or
intellectual families ; nor is there any that the change in
that direction which Europeans transplanted to America
undergo is not all completed in the first generation of
children bred on our soil. To my mind, the facts all point
that way. Similarly the better breathing of the grey
hounds born in Mexico was surely due to a post-natal
adaptation of the pups' thorax to the rarer ail.

Distinct neurotic degeneration may undoubtedly accumu
late from parent to child, and as the parent usually in this
case grows worse by his own irregular habits of life, the
temptation lies near to ascribe the child's deterioration to
this cause. This, again, is a hasty conclusion. For neurotic

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 685

degeneration is unquestionably a disease whose original
causes are unknown ; and like other ' accidental variations '
it is hereditary. But it ultimately ends in sterility ; and it
seems to me quite unfair to draw any conclusions from its
natural history in favor of the transmission of acquired
peculiarities. Nor does the degeneration of the children of
alcoholics prove anything in favor of their having inherited
the shattered nervous system which the alcohol has induced
in their parents : because the poison usually has a chance
to directly affect their own bodies before birth, by acting
on the germinal matter from which they are formed whilst
it is still nourished by the alcoholized blood of the parent.
In many cases, moreover, the parental alcoholics are them
selves degenerates neurotically, and the drink-habit is only
a symptom of their disease, which in some form or other
they also propagate to their children.

There remain the inherited mutilations of the guinea-
pig. But these are such startling exceptions to the ordinary
rule with animals that they should hardly be used as ex
amples of a typical process. The docility of domestic
cattle is certainly in part due to man's selection, etc., etc.
In a word, the proofs form rather a beggarly array.

Add to this that the writers who have tried to carry out
the theory of transmitted habit with any detail are always
obliged somewhere to admit inexplicable variation. Thus
Spencer allows that

" Sociality can begin only where, through some slight variation, there
is less tendency than usual for the individuals to disperse. . . . That
slight variations of mental nature, sufficient to initiate this process, may
be fairly assumed, all our domestic animals show us: differences in their
characters and likings are conspicuous. Sociality having thus commenced,
and survival of the fittest tending ever to maintain and increase it, it
will be further strengthened by the inherited effects of habit.' * Again,
in writing of the pleasure of pity, Mr. Spencer says : " This feeling is
not one that has arisen through the inherited effects of experiences, but
belongs to a quite different group, traceable to the survival of the fittest
simply— to the natural selection of incidental variations. In this group
are included all the bodily appetites, together with those simpler in
stincts, sexual and parental, by which every race is maintained ; and
which must exist before the higher processes of mental evolution can
commence." t

*Princ. of Psychol., n. 561. f Ibid. p. 623.

686 PSYCHOLOGY.

The inheritance of tricks of manner and trifling peculi
arities, such as handwriting, certain odd gestures when
pleased, peculiar movements during sleep, etc., have also
been quoted in favor of the theory of transmission of ac
quired habits. Strangely enough ; for of all things in the
world these tricks seem most like idiosyncratic variations.
They are usually defects or oddities which the education
of the individual, the pressure of what is really acquired
by him, would counteract, but which are too native to be
repressed, and breaks through all artificial barriers, in his
children as well as in himself.

I leave my text practically just as it was written in 1885.
I proceeded at that time to draw a tentative conclusion to
the effect that the origin of most of our instincts must cer
tainly be deemed fruits of the back-door method of genesis,
and not of ancestral experience in the proper meaning of
the term. Whether acquired ancestral habits played any
part at all in their production was still an open question in
which it would be as rash to affirm as to deny. Already
before that time, however, Professor Weismann of Freiburg
had begun a very serious attack upon the Lamarckian
theory,* and his polemic has at last excited such a widespread
interest among naturalists that the whilom almost unhes
itatingly accepted theory seems almost on the point of
being abandoned.

I will therefore add some of Weismann's criticisms of the
supposed evidence to my own. In the first place, he has a
captivating theory of descent of his own,f which makes him
think it a priori impossible that any peculiarity acquired
during lifetime by the parent should be transmitted to the
germ. Into the nature of that theory this is not the place
to go. Suffice to say that it has made him a keener critic
of Lamarck's and Spencer's theory than he otherwise might
have been. The only way in which the germinal products
can be influenced whilst in the body of the parent is, accord-

* Ueber die Vererbung (Jena, 1883). Prof. Weismanu's Essays on
Heredity have recently (1889) been published in English in a collected
form.

f Best expressed in the Essay on the Continuitat des Keimplasmas (1885)

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 687

ing to Weismann, by good or bad nutrition. Through this
they may degenerate in various ways or lose vitality alto
gether. They may also be infected through the blood by
small-pox, syphilis, or other virulent diseases, and other
wise be poisoned. But peculiarities of neural structure and
habit in the parents ivhich the parents themselves ivere not
born with, they can never acquire unless perhaps accident
ally through some coincidental variation of their own.
Accidental variations develop of course into idiosyncrasies
which tend to pass to later generations in virtue of the
well-known law which no one doubts.

Keferriug to the often-heard assertion that the increase
of talent found in certain families from one generation to
another is due to the transmitted effects of exercise of the
faculty concerned (the Bachs, the Bernoullis, Mozart, etc.),
he sensibly remarks, that the talent being kept in exercise,
it ought to have gone on growing for an indefinite number
of generations. As a matter of fact, it quickly reaches a
maximum, and then we hear no more of it, which is what
happens always when an idiosyncrasy is exposed to the ef
fects of miscellaneous intermarriage.

The hereditary epilepsy and other degenerations of the
operated guinea-pigs are explained by Professor Weis
mann as results of infection of the young by the parent's
blood. The latter he supposes to undergo a pathologic
change in consequence of the original traumatic injury. The
obsolescence of disused organs he explains very satisfactor
ily, without invoking any transmission of the direct effects of
disuse, by his theory of panmixy, for which I must refer to
his own writings. Finally, he criticises searchingly the
stories we occasionally hear of inherited mutilations in
animals (dogs' ears and tails, etc.), and cites a prolonged
series of experiments of his own on mice, which he bred for
many generations, cutting off both parental tails each time,
without interfering in the least with the length of tail with
which the young continued to be born.

The strongest argument, after all, in favor of the La-
marckian theory remains the a priori one urged by Spencer
in his little work (much the solidest thing, by the way, which
he has ever written) ' The Factors of Organic Evolution.'

688 PSYCHOLOGY.

Since, says Mr. Spencer, the accidental variations of all
parts of the body are independent of each other, if the
entire organization of animals were due to such accidental
variations alone, the amount of mutual adaptation and har
mony that we now find there could hardly possibly have
come about in any finite time. We must rather suppose that
the divers varying parts brought the other parts into har
mony with themselves by exercising them ad hoc, and that
the effects of the exercise remained and were passed on to
the young. This forms, of course, a great presumption against
the all-sufficiency of the view of selection of accidental
variations exclusively. But it must be admitted that in
favor of the contrary view, that adaptive changes are in
herited, we have as yet perhaps not one single unequivocal
item of positive proof.

I must therefore end this chapter on the genesis of our
mental structure by reaffirming my conviction that the so-
called Experience-philosophy has failed to prove its point.
No more if we take ancestral experiences into account than
if we limit ourselves to those of the individual after birth,
can we believe that the couplings of terms within the mind
are simple copies of corresponding couplings impressed
upon it by the environment. This indeed is true of a small
part of our cognitions. But so far as logical and mathe
matical, ethical, sesthetical, and metaphysical propositions
go, such an assertion is not only untrue but altogether
unintelligible; for these propositions say nothing about
the time- and space-order of things, and it is hard to un
derstand how such shallow and vague accounts of them as
Mill's and Spencer's could ever have been given by think
ing men.

The causes of our mental structure are doubtless natural,
and connected, like all our other peculiarities, with those of
our nervous structure. Our interests, our tendencies of at
tention, our motor impulses, the aesthetic, moral, and
theoretic combinations we delight in, the extent of our
power of apprehending schemes of i elation, just like the
elementary relations themselves, time, space, difference and
similarity, and the elementary kinds of feeling, have all

NECESSARY TRUTHS— EFFECTS OF EXPERIENCE. 689

grown up in ways of which at present we can give no ac
count. Even in the clearest parts of Psychology our insight
is insignificant enough. And the more sincerely one seeks
to trace the actual course of psychogenesis, the steps by
which as a race we may have come by the peculiar mental
attributes which we possess, the more clearly one per
ceives " the slowly gathering twilight close in utter night."

TEE END.

!

INDEX.

Authors the titles only of whose works are cited are not, as a rule, referred to in
this index.

ABBOTT, T. K., II. 221

Abstract ideas, I. 468, 508; II. 48

Abstract qualities, II. 329-37, 340

Abstraction, I. 505; II. 346 ff. See
distraction

Accommodation, feeling of, II. 93,
235

Acquaintance, I. 220

Acquired characters, see inheritance

Acquisitiveness, II. 422, 679

Actors, their emotions whilst play
ing, II. 464

Adaptation of mind to environment
results in our knowing the im
pressing circumstances, 625 ff.

^Esthetic principles, II. 639, 672

After-images, I. 645-7; II. 67, 200,
604

Agoraphobia, II. 421

Agraphia, I. 40, 62

ALFIERI, II. 543

ALLEN, G., I. 144; II. 631

Alteration of one impression by
another one simultaneously tak
ing place, II. 28 ff., 201

Alternating personality, I. 379 ff.

Ambiguity of optical sensations, II.
231-7

AMIDON, I. 100

Amnesia in hysterical disease, 1. 384
ff. ; accompanies anaesthesia, 386,
682; in hypnotic trance, II. 602.
See forgetting

Amputated limbs, feeling of, II. j
38-9, 105

Anaesthesia, in hysterics, I. 203 ff.;
involves correlated amnesia, 386;
movements executed during, II.
105,489-92, 520-1: and emotion,
455-6; in hypnotism, 606-9

Analogies, the perception of, I. 530

Analysis, I. 502; II. 344

Anger, II. 409, 460, 478

Aphasia, motor, I. 37, 62; sensory,
I. 53-4-5; optical, I. 60; amnesia
in, 640, 684; II. 58

Apperception, II. 107 ff.

Apperception, transcendental Unity
of, I. 362

Appropriateness, characterizes men
tal acts, I. 13

Apraxia, I. 52

A priori connections exist only be
tween objects of perception and
"movements, not between sensory
ideas, II. 581. A priori ideas and
experience, Chapter XXVIII. A
•priori propositions, II. 661-5

ARCHER, W., II. 464

Arithmetic, II. 654.

Articular sensibility, II. 189 ff.

Association, Chapter XIV: is not
of ideas, but of things thought of,

I. 554; examples of, 555 ff. ; its
rapidity, 557 ff.; by contiguity,
561; elementary law of,566;'mixed'
association, 571; conditions of,
575 ff.; by similarity, 578; three
kinds of association compared,
580; in voluntary thought, 583; by
contrast, 593; history of the doc
trine of, 594; association the means
of localization, II. 158 ff. ; connec
tion .of association by similarity
with reasoning, 345 ff.

Associationism, I. 161
Associationist theory of the self, I.
342, 350 ff.; of space-perception,

II. 271 ff.
Asymbolia, I. 52

Attention, Chapter XI — to how
many things possible, I. 405 ff.;
to simultaneous sight and sound,
411 ff.; its varieties, 416; pas
sive, 417; voluntary, 42 ff.; its
effects, 424 ff . ; its influence on re-
691

692

INDEX.

action-time, 427-34; accompa
nied by feelings of tension due to
adaptation of sense-organs, 434-8;
involves imagination or preper-
ception of object, 438-44; con
ceivable as a mere effect, 448 ff .
AUBERT, H., II. 235
' Ausfallserscheinungen,' I. 75
Auditory centre in brain, I. 52-6
Auditory type of imagination, II.

60

Automatic writing, I. 393 ff.
AUSTEN, JANE, I. 571
Automaton-Theory, Chapter V:
postulated rather than proved, I.
134-8; reasons against it, 138-144;
applied to attention, 448

disregarded in this book, II.

583
AZAM, Dr., I. 380.

Babe and caudle, scheme of, I. 25
Baby's first perception, II. 8, 34; his

early instinctive movements, 404

ff.

BAER, VON, I. 639
BAGEHOT, W., I. 582; II, 283, 308
BAIN, on series conscious of itself,

I. 162; on self-esteem, 313; on
self-love, 328, 354; on attention,
444; on association, 485. 530, 561,
589, 601, 653; II. 6, 12, 69, 186,
271, 282, 296, 319, 322, 372-3, 463,
466, 551, 554-5

BALLARD, I. 266

BALZAC, I. 374

B ARTELS, I. 432

BASTIAN, H. C.. II. 488

BAUMANN, II. 409

BAXT, I. 648

BEAUNIS, E., II. 492

BECHTEREW, I. 407

Belief, Chapter XXI: in sensations,

II. 299 ff.; in objects of emotion,
306 ff.; in theories, 311 ff.; and
will, 319. See

BELL, C., II. 483, 492

BERGSON, J., II. 609

BERKELEY, I. 254, 469, 476; II. 43,

49, 77, 212, 240, 666
BERNHARDT, II. 502
BERNHEIM. I. 206
BERTRAND, A., II. 518
BESSEL, I. 413
BINET, A., I. 203 ff.; II. 71, 74, 128

ff., 130, 167, 491, 520
BLACK, R. W., II. 339
BLEEK, II. 358
Blind, the, their space-perception,

II. 202 ff.; after restoration to

sight, 211-2; hallucination of a
blind man, 323; dreams of the,
44

Blindness, mental, I. 41, 50, 66. See
ISigJit, Hemiopia, etc.

BLIX, II. 170

BLOCK, II. 515

Blood, its exciting effect on the
nerves, II. 412-3

BLOOD, B. P., II. 284

Blood-supply to brain, I. 97

BOURNE, A., I. 391

BOURRU, Dr.. I. 388

BOWDITCH, H. P., his reaction-
timer, I. 87; on contrast in seen
motion, II. 247; on knee-jerk,
380; comparison of touch and
sight, 520

BOWEN, F., 214

BOWNE, B. P., on knowledge, I. 219

BRADLEY, F. H., I. 452, 474, 604;
II. 7, 9, 284, 648

Brain, its functions, Chapter II: of
frog, I. 14; of dog, 33; of monkey,
34; of man, 36; lower centres
compared with hemispheres, 9-10,
75; circulation in, 97; instability,
139; its connection with Mind,
176; 'entire' brain not a real
physical fact, 176; its changes as
subtle as those of thought, 234;
its dying vibrations operative in
producing consciousness, 242

Influence of environment upon

it, 626 ff.

Brain-process, see neural process

Brain-structure, the two modes of
its genesis, II. 624

BRENTANO, I. 187, 547

BRIDGEMAN, LAURA, II. 62, 358,
420

Broca's convolution, I. 39, 54

BRODHUN, I. 542

BROWN, THOS., I. 248, 277, 371; II.
271

BROWN-SEQUARD, I. 43, 67, 69; II

695

Brutes, the intellect of, II. 348 ff.
BUCKE, R. M., II. 460
BUBNOPF. I. 82
BURKE, II. 464.
BURNHAM, W. H., I. 689
BUROT, Dr., I. 388

CAIRD, E., I. 366, 469, 471 IL ff.
CALMEIL, A., II. 524
CAMPANELLA, II. 464
CAMPBELL, G., I. 261
CARDAILLAC, I. 247
CARLYLE, T., I. 311

INDEX.

693

CARPENTER, W. B., on formation
of habits, I. 110; ethical remarks
on habit, 120 : mistakes in speech,
257 ; lapses of memory, 374; on
not feeling pain, 419; on ideo-
motor action, II. 522
CARVILLE, I. 69
Catalepsy, I. 229; II. 583
CATTELL, on reaction-time, I. 92,
432; 524; on recognition, 407,
648; on attention, 420; on asso
ciation-time, 558 ff.
Cause, consciousness a, I. 137 ; II.

583, 592

Centres, cortical, I. 30 ff.; motor,
31; visual, 41 ; auditory, 52; olfac
tory, 57; gustatory, 58; tactile, 58
Cerebral process, see neural pro
cess

Cerebrum, see Brain, Hemispheres
CHADBOURNE, PA., II. 383
Characters, general, II. 329 ff.
CHARCOT, I. 54-5; II. 58, 596
Chloroform, I. 531
Choice, see selection, interest
Circulation in brain, I. 97; effects
of sensory stimuli upon, II. 374
ff. ; in grief, 443-4
Classic and romantic, II. 469
Classifications, II. 646
CLAY, E. C. R., I. 609
Cleanliness, II. 434
Clearness, I. 426
CLIFFORD, I. 130-2
CLOUSTON, II. 114, 284-5, 537, 539
COBBE, F. P., I. 374
Cochlea, theory of its action, II.

169

Cognition, see knowing
COHEN, H., I. 365
COLERIDGE, S. T., I. 572, 681
Collateral innervation, see vicarious

function

Comparison, Chapter XIII: rela
tions discovered by comparison
have nothing to do with the time
and space order of their terms,
II. 641; mediate, 489, 644; see
difference, likeness
Composition, of Mind out of its
elements, see Mind-Stuff theory;
differences due to, I. 491
COMTE, A., I. 187
Conceivability, I. 463
Conceptions, Chapter XII: defined,
. 461;— their permanence, 464
ff.; do not develop of them
selves, 466 ff.; abstract, 468; uni
versal, 473; essentially teleologi-
cal, II. 332

Conceptual order different from

perceptual, I. 482

Concomitants, law of varying, I 506
Confusion, II. 352
Consciousness, its seat, I. 65; its
distribution, 142-3; its function of
selection, 139-41; is personal in
form, 225; is continuous, 237,
488; of lack. 251; of self not
essential, 273; of object comes
first, 274; always partial and se
lective, 284 ff., see Selection; of
the process of thinking, 300 ff •
the span of, 405

Consent, in willing, II. 568

Considerations, I. 20

Constructiveness, II. 426

Contiguity, association by, I. 561

Continuity of object of conscious
ness, I. 488

Contrast, of colors, II. 13-27; of
temperatures, 14; two theories of,
17 ff., 245; of movements, 245 ff.,
250

Convolutions, motor, I. 41

Cortex, of brain, experiments on,
I. 31 ff.

Cramming, I. 663

Credulity, our primitive, II. 319

CUDWORTH, R., II. 9

' Cue, 'the mental, II. 497, 518

CUMBERLAND, S., II. 525

Curiosity, II. 429

CZERMAK, II. 170, 175

-

Darwinism, scholastic refutation

of, II. 670

Data, the, of psychology, I. 184
DAVIDSON, T., I. 474 *
Deaf-mute's thought in infancv I

266
Deafness, mental, I. 50, 55-6. See

hearing

DEAN, S., I. 394
Decision, five types of, II. 531
Degenerations, descending in nerve-

centres, I. 37, 52
DELABARRE, E., II. 13-27, 71
DELBCEUF, J., 1. 455, 531 541

542, 548-9; II. 100, 189* 249*

264, 605. 609, 612
Deliberation, II. 528 ff.
Delusions, insane, I. 375; II. 114 ff.
Depth, see third dimension
DESCARTES, I. 130, 200, 214, 344
DESTTJTT DE TRACY, I 247
Determinism must be postulated by

psychology, II. 576

INDEX.

DEWEY, J., I 473

Dichotomy in thinking, II. 654

DICKENS, C., I. 374

DIETZE, I. 407, 617

Difference, not resolvable into com
position, I. 490 ; noticed most
between species of a genus, 529 ;
the magnitude of, 531; least dis
cernible, !>37 if.; methods for
ascertaining. 540 ff.

local, II. 167 ff.; genesis of

our perception of, 642

Diffusion of movements, the law of,
II. 372

Dimension, third, II. 134 ff., 212
ff., 220

Dipsomania, II. 543

Disbelief, II. 284

Discrimination, Chapter XIII;
conditions which favor it, I. 494;
improves by practice, 508; spatial,
II. 167 ff. See difference

Dissociation, I. 486-7; law of, by
varying concomitants, 506

, ditto, II. 345, 359

of one part of the mind from

another, see Janet, Pierre

Distance, between terms of a series,
I. 530

in space, see third dimension^

Distraction, I. 404. See inattention

Dizziness, see vertigo

Dog's cortical centres, after Ferrier,
I. 33; after Munk, I. 44-5; after
Luciani, I. 46, 53, 58, 60; for special
muscles, 64; hemispheres ablated,
70

DONALDSON, II. 170

DONDERS, II. 235

Double images, II. 225-30; 252

Doubt, II. 284, 318 ff.; the mania of,
545

DOUGAL, J. D., II. 222

Drainage of one brain-cell by an
other, II. 583 ff .

Dreams, II. 294

DROBISCH, I. 632. 660

Drunkard, II. 565

Drunkenness, I. 144; II. 543, 565,
628

Dualism of object and knower, I.
218, 220

Duality, of Brain, I. 390, 399

DUDLEY, A. T., on mental qualities
of a^i athlete, II. 539

DUPOUR, II. 211

DUNAN, Ch., II. 176, 206, 208-9

Duration, the primitive object in
time-perception, I. 609; our esti
mate of short, 611 ff.

'Dynamogeny,' II. 379 ff., 491

EBBINGHAUS, H., I. 548, 676

Eccentric projection of sensations,
II. 31 ff., 195 ff.

Education of hemispheres, I. 76
See pedagogic remarks

Effort, II. 534-7. Muscular effort,
562. Moral effort, 549, 561, 578-9

EGGER, V., I. 280-1-2; II. 256

Ego, Empirical, I. 291 ff. ; pure, 342
ff.; 'transcendental,' 362; criti
cised, 364

Elementary factors of mind, see
Units of consciousness

ELSAS, 1. 548

EMERSON, R. W., I. 582, II. 307

Emotion, Chapter XXV: continuous
with instinct, II. 442; description
of typical emotions, 443-9; results
from reflex effects of stimulus
upon organism, 449 ff.; their class
ification, 454; in anaesthetic sub
jects, 455; in the absence of nor
mal stimulus, 458-60; effects of
expressing, 463 ff . ; of repressing,
466; the subtler, 469 ff.; the neu
ral process in, 472; differences
in individuals, 474; evolution of
special emotions, 477 ff.

Empirical ego, I. 290

Empirical propositions, II. 644

Emulation, II. 409

Ennui, I. 626

Entoptic sensations, I. 515 ff.

Equation, personal, I. 413

' Equilibration,' direct and indirect,
627

Essences, their meaning, II. 329 ff. ;
sentimental and mechanical, 665

Essential qualities, see essences

ESTEL, I. 613, 618

Evolutionism demands a ' mind-
dust,' 146

EXNER, on human cortical centres
I. 36; on ' circumvallation ' of
centres, 65; his psychodometer,
87; on reaction-time, 91; on per-
ception of rapid succession, 409;
on attention, 439; on time-percep
tion, 615, 638, 646; on feeling of
motion, II. 172

Experience, I. 402, 487. Relation
of experience to necessary judg
ments. Chapter XXVIII. Experi-
ence defined, II. 619 ff., 628

Experimentation in psychology, I.
192

Extradition of sensations, II. 31 ff.,
J95 ff

INDEX.

Fallacy, the Psychologist's, I. 196,

278, 153; II. 281

Familiarity, sense of, see recognition
Fatalism, II. 574

Fatigue, diminishes span of con
sciousness, I. 640
Fear, instinct of, II. 396, 415; the

symptoms of, 446; morbid, 460;

origin of, 478
FECUNER, I. 435-6, 533, 539 ff., 549,

616, 645; II. 50, 70, 137 ff., 178,

464
Feeling, synonym for consciousness

in general in this book, I. 186;

feelings of relation, 243
FELIDA X. , I. 380-4
FERE, CH., II. 68, 378 ff.
FERRIER, D., I. 31, 46-7-8, 53, 57-

8-9, 445; II. 503
FERRIER, JAS., I. 274, 475
Fiat, of the will, II. 501, 526, 561,

564; 568. See decision
FICHTE, I. 365
FICK, I. 150
FISKE, J., II. 577
Fixed ideas. See insistent ideas
FLECHSIG'S Pyrarnidenbahn, I. 37
FLINT, R., II. 425
FLOURENS, P., I. 30
Force, supposed sense of, II. 518
Forgetting, I. 679 ff. ; II. 370-1. See

amnesia

FOUILLEE, A., II. 500, 570
FRANCOIS- FRANCE, I. 70
FRANKLIN, Mrs. C. L., II. 94
FRANZ, Dr., II. 62
Freedom, of the will, II. 569 ff.
1 Fringe ' of object, I. 258, 281-2,

471-2, 478

Frog's nerve-centres, I. 14
Fusion of feelings unintelligible,

I. 157-62; II. 2. See Mind-stuff

theory

Fusion of impressions into one ob
ject, I. 484, 502; II. 103, 183

GALTON, F., I. 254, 265, 685; on
mental imagery, II. 51-7; on gre-
gariousness, 430

General propositions, what they in
volve, II. 337 ff. See universal
conceptions

Genesis of brain-structure, its two
modes, II. 624

Genius, I. 423, 530; II. 110, 352,
360

Gentleman, the mind of the, II. 370

Geometry, II. 658

Giddiness, see vertigo

GILMAN, B. I., I. 95

GLEY, E., II. 514-5, 525
GOLDSCHEIDER, II. 170, 192 ff. 200
GOLTZ, I. 9, 31, 33, 34, 45, 46, 58,

62, 67, 69, 70, 74, 77
Gorilla, II. 416
GRAEFE, A., II. 507, 510
GRASHEY, I. 640
GRASSMAN, R., II. 654
Gregariousuess, II. 430
GREEN, T, H., I. 247, 274, 366-8; II.

4, 10, 11

Grief, II. 443, 480
GRIESINGER, W., II. 298
GRUBELSUCHT, II. 284
Guiiiea-pigs, epileptic, etc., II. 682-7
GUISLAIN, II. 546
GURNEY, E., I. 209; II. 117, 130, 469,

GUYAU, II. 414, 469

Habit, Chapter IV: due to plasticity
of brain-matter, 1. 105; depends on
paths in nerve-centres, 107; origi
nation of, 109-13; mechanism of
concatenated habits, 114-8; they
demand some sensation, 118; ethi
cal and pedagogic maxims, 121-7;
is the ground of association, 566;
of memory, 655

Habits may inhibit instincts, II. 394.
Habit accounts for one large part
of our knowledge, 632

HALL, G. S., I. 96-7, 558, 614, 616:
II. 155, 247, 281, 423

Hallucination, sensation a veridical,
II. 33; of lost limbs, 38, 105; of
emotional feeling, 459

Hallucinations, II. 114 ff. ; hypna-
gogic, 124; the brain-process in,
122 ff.; hypnotic, 604

HAMILTON, W., I. 214, 215, 274, 406,
419, 569, 578, 682; II. 113

HAMMOND, E , II. 673

Haploscopic method, II. 226

HARLESS, II. 497

HARTLEY, I. 553, 561, 564, 600

HARTMANN, R., II. 416

Hasheesh-delirium, II. 121

Hearing, its cortical centre, I. 52

Heat, of mental work, I. 100

HECKER. II. 480

HEGEL, I. 163, 265, 366, 369, 666

HEIDENHAIN, I. 82

HELMHOLTZ, H., I. 285; on atten
tion, 422, 437, 441; on discrimi
nation, 504, 516-21; time as a
category, 627-8; after- images, 645,
648; on color-contrast, II. 17 ff.; on
sensation, 33; on cochlea, 170; on
convergence of eyes, 200; vision

INDEX.

with inverted head, 213; on what
marks a sensation, 218 11'., 243-4;
on eutoptic objects, 241-2; on
contrast in seen movement, 247;
on relief, 257; on measurement of
the field of view, 266 fi. ; on theo
ry of space-perception, 279; on
feeling of innervation, 493, 507,
510 ; on conservation of energy, 667
Heiniamblyopia, I. 44
Hemianopsia, I. 41, 44; II. 73
Hemispheres, their distinction from
lower centres, I. 20; their educa
tion, 24, 67; localization of func
tion in, 30; the exclusive seat of
consciousness, 65; effects of de
privation of, on frogs, 17, 72-3;
on fishes, 73; on birds, 74, 77; on
rodents, 74; on dogs, 70, 74; on
primates, 75; not devoid of con
nate paths, 76; their evolution
from lower centres, 79
HENLE, J., II. 445, 461, 481
HERBART, I. 353, 418, 603, 608, 626
Hereditary transmission of acquired

characters, see inheritance
HERING, E., on attention, I. 438,
449; on comparing weights, 544;
on pure sensation, II. 4 ; on
color-contrast, 20 ff . ; on roomy
character of sensations, 136 ff. ; on
after-images and convergence, 200;
on distance of double images, 230;
on stereoscopy, 252; on reproduc
tion in vision, 260 ff.; on move
ments of closed eye, 510
HERZEN, I. 58; on reaction-time
from a corn, 96; on cerebral ther-
mometry, 100; on swooning, 273

HlTZIG, I, 31

HOBBES, T., I. 573, 587, 594 ff.

HODGSON, R., I. 374, 398

HODGSON, S. H., on inertness of
consciousness, I. 129-30, 133; on
self, 341, 347; on conceptual order,
482; on association, 572 ff., 603; on
voluntary redintegration, 588-9;
on the ' present ' in time, 607

HOFFDING, H., I. 674; II. 455

HOLBROOK, M. H., I. 665

HOLMES, O. W., I. 88, 405, 582

HOLTEI, VON, I. 624

Horopter, II. 226

HORSLEY, V., I. 35, 59, 63

HORWICZ, I. 314, 325-7

HOWE, S. G., II. 358

Human intellect, compared with
that of brute, II. 348 ff.; depends
on association by similarity,
353 ff.; various orders of, 360;

what brain-peculiarity it depends
on, 366, 638

HUME, I. 254; on personal identity,
351-3, 360; association, 597; due
to brain -laws, 564; on mental im
ages, II. 45-6; on belief, 295-6,
302; on pleasure and will, 558
Hunting instinct, II. 411
HUXLEY, I. 130-1, 254; II. 46
HYATT, A., II. 102
Hylozoism, see Mind-stuff theory
Hypera3Sthesia,iu hypnotism,!!. 609
Hypnotism, I. 407; H. 128, 351; gen
eral account of, Chapter XXVII:
methods, II. 593; theories of, 596;
symptoms of trance, 602 ff. ; post-
hypnotic suggestion, 613
Hysterics, their so-called ansesthe-
sias, and unconsciousness, 1.202 ff.

Ideal objects, eternal and necessary
relations between, II. 639, 661.
See conception

'Ideas, 'the theory of, I. 230; con
founded with objects, 231, 276,
278, 399, 521; they do not exist as
parts of our thought, 279, 405, 553;
platonic, 462; abstract, 468 ff.;
universal, 473 ff.; never come
twice the same; 480-1

Ideation, no distinct centres for, I.
764; II. 73

Identity, sense of, I. 459; three prin
ciples of, 460; not the foundation
of likeness, 492

Identity, personal, I. 238, 330 ff.;
based on ordinary judgment of
sameness,334; due to resemblance
and continuity of our feelings,
336; Lotzeon, 350; only relatively
true, 372

Ideo-motor action the type of all
volition, II. 522

Idiosyncrasy, II. 631

'Idomenians,' II. 214

Illusions, II. 85 ff., 129, 232 ff., 243-
66. See hallucination

Images, double, in vision, II, 225-30

Images, mental, not lost in mental
blindness, etc., I. 50, 66; II. 73

, are usually vague, II. 45; vis
ual, 51 ff.; auditory, 160; motor,
61; tactile, 165; between sleep and
waking, 124-6

Imagination, Chapter XVIII: it
differs in individuals, II. 51 ff. ;
sometimes leaves an after-image,
67; the cerebral process of, 68 ff.;
not locally distinct from that of
sensation, 73; is figured, 82

INDEX.

697

Imitation, II. 408

Immortality, I. 348-9

Impulses, morbid, II. 542 ff. See
instincts

Impulsiveness of all consciousness,
II. 526 ff.

Inattention, I. 404, 455 ff.

Increase, serial, I. 490

Indeterminism, II. 509 ff.

INGEHSOLL, It., II. 469

Inheritance of acquired characters,
II. 367, 678 ff.

Inhibition, I. 43, 67. 404; II. 126,
373; of instincts, 391, 394; of one
cortical process by another, 583

Innervation, feeling of, II. 236, 493;
it is unnecessary, 494 ff.; no evi
dence for it. 499, 518

, collateral, see vicarious func-

t'ion

Insane delusions, I. 375; II. 113

Insistent ideas, II. 545

Instinct, Chapter XXIV.; defined,
II. 384; is a retlex impulse, 385
ff. ; is neither blind uor invari
able, 389; contrary instincts in
same animal, 392; man has more
than other mammals, 393, 441;
their transitoriness, 398; special
instincts, 404-441; the origin of
instincts, 678

4 Integration ' of feelings, Spencer's
theory of, I. 151 ff.

Intelligence, the test of its presence,

I. 8; of lower brain-centres, 78 ff.
Intention to speak, I. 253
Interest, I. 140, 284 ff., 402-3, 482,

515 ff., 572, 594; II. 312 ff., 344-5,
634
Intermediaries, the axiom of skipped,

II. 646
Introspection, 1. 185

Inverted head, vision with, II. 213

JACKSON, HUGHLINGS, I. 29, 64, 400;

II. 125-6
JANKT. J.. I. 385
JANET, PAUL, I. 625; II. 40-1
JAIIBT, PIERRE, 1.203 ff., 227, 884 ff.,

682; II. 456, 614
JASTHOW, 1. 88, 543, 545; II. 44,

135. 180

JKVONS, W. S., I. 406
Joints, their sensibility, II. 189 ff.
Judgments, existential, II. 290
Justice, II. 673

KANDINSKY, V., II. 70, 110
KANT, I. 274, 331, 344, 347; his
' transcendental ' deduction of the

categories. 360; his paralogisms,
362; criticised, 363-6; on time,
642; on symmetrical figures, II.
150; on space, 273 ff. ; on the real,
296; on synthetic judgments a
priori, 661, and their relation to
experience, 664

Kinaesthetic feelings, II. 488 ff., 493

* Kleptomania,' II. 425

Knee-jerk, II. 380

Knowing, I. 216 ff. ; psychology as
sumes it, 218; not reducible to
any other relation, 219, 471, 688

Knowledge, two kinds o", I. 221; of
Self not essential to, 274; the ic!:>-
tivity of, II. 9 ff. ; the genesis of,
630 ff.

Knowledge-afowtf, I. 221

KONIG, I. 542

KKIES, VON, I. 96, 547; II. 253

KRISHABER, I. 377

KUSSMAUL, A., I. 684

LADD, G. T., I., 687; II. 3, 311

LAMARCK, II. 678

LANDRY, II. 490, 492

LANGE, A., I. 29, 284

LANGE, G\, II. 443, 449, 455, 457,
460, 462

LANGE, K., II. Ill

LANGE, L., on reaction-time, mus
cular and sensorial, I. 92

LANGE, N., on muscular element in
imagination, I. 444

Language, as a human function, II.
356-8

LAROMIGUEIRE, I. 247

Laughter, II. 480

LAZARUS, I. 624, 626; II. 84, 97,
369, 429

LE CONTE, JOSEPH, II. 228, 252,
265

LEONIE, M. Janet's trance-subject,
I. 201, 387 ff

LEVY, W. H., II. 204

LEWES, on frog's sp. cord, I. 9, 78,
134; on thought as a sort of alge
bra, 270; on ' preperception,' 439,
442; on muscular feeling, II. 199;
on begging in pup, 400; on lapsed
intelligence, 678

LEWINSKI, II. 192

LIBERATORS, II. 670

LIEBMAN, O. , on brain as a machine,
I. 10; II. 34

LTEGEOIS, J., II. 594, 606

Light, effects of, on movement, II.
379

Likeness, I. 528

LINDSAY, T. L. , II. 421

698

INDEX.

LIPPS, on ' unconscious ' sensations,
I. 175; on theory of ideas, 603;
linie-perceptiou, 632; on muscular
feeling, II. 200; on distance, 221;
on visual illusions, 251, 264; on
space-perception, 280; on reality,
297; on effort, 575

LlSSAUER, I. 50

Local signs, II. 155 ff., 167

Localization, in hemispheres, 1.30 ff.

Localization, II. 153 ff.; of one sen
sible object in another; II. 31 if.,
183 ff., I95ff.

LOCKE, J., I. 200, 230, 247, 349,
390, 462, 483, 553, 563, 679; II.
210, 306, 644, 662-4

'LocksleyHall/I. 567

Locomotion, instinct of, II. 405

LOEB, I. 33, 44; II. 255, 516, 628

Logic, II. 647

LOMBARD, J. S., I. 99

LOMBARD, W., II. 380

LOTZE, I. 214; on immortality, 349;
on personal identity, 350; on at
tention, 442-3; on fusion and dis
crimination of sensations, 522;
on local signs, II. 157, 495; on
volition, 523-4

Louis V., I. 388

Love, sexual, II. 437, 543; parental,
439; Bain's explanation of, 5ol

LOWELL, J. R., I. 582

LUCIANI, I. 44-5-6-7, 53, 60.

McCosn, I. 501

MACH, E., on attention, I. 436; on
space-feeling, 449; on time feel
ing, 616, 635; on motion-contrast,
II. 247; on optical inversion. 255;
on probability, 258; on feeling of
in nervation, 509, 511

Magnitude of differences, I. 530 ff.

MALEBRANCHE, II. 9

MANOUVRIER, II. 496

Mania, transitory. II. 460

Man's intellectual distinction from
brutes, II. 348 ff.

MANSEL, H. L .. I. 274

MANTEGAZZA, P., II. 447, 479, 481

MARCUS AURELIUS, I. 313. 317; II.
67">

MARILLIER, L.. I. 445; II. 514

MARIQUE, I. 65

MARTIN, II. N., 99; II. 3

MARTINEAU, J., I. 484 ff., 506; II. 9

MAUDSLEY, H., I. 113, 656

MAURY, A., II. 83, 124, 127

Mechanical philosophv, the. II
666 ff . ,

Mechanism vs. intelligence, I. 8-14

Mediate comparison, I. 489

Mediumship, I. 228, 393 ff.

MEHNER, I. 618

Memory, Chapter XVI : it depends
on material conditions, I. 2; the
essential function of the hemi
spheres, 20; lapses of, 373 ff., in
hysterics, 384 ff.; favored by at
tention, 427; primary, 638, 643;
analysis of the phenomenon of
Memory, 648; the return of a
mental image is not memory. 649;
memory's causes, 653 ff . ; the re
sult of association, 654; conditions
of good memory, 659; brute re-
tentiveness, 660; multiple associa
tions, 662; improvement of mem
ory, 667 ff . ; its usefulness depends
on forgetting much, 680; its decay,
683; metaphysical explanations of
it, 687 ff.

Mentality, the mark of its presence,
I. 8

Mental operations, simultaneous, I.
408

MERCIER, C., on inertness of con
sciousness, 135; on inhibition, II.
583

MERKEL, I. 542-3-4

Metaphysical principles, II. 669 ff.

Metaphysics, I. 137, 401

Meyer's experiment on color-con
trast, II. 21

MEYER, G. H., II. 66, 97-8

MEYNERT, T., his brain-scheme, I.
85, 64, 72

MILL, JAMES, I. 277, 355, 470, 476,
485, 499, 597, 651, 653
II. 77

MILL, J. S., I. 189; on unity of
self, 356-9; on abstract ideas, 470;
methods of inquiry, 590; on in
finitude and association, 600; on
space, II. 271; on belief, 285, 322;
on reasoning, 331; on the order
of Nature, 634; on arithmetical
propositions. 654

MILLS, C. K., I. 60

Mimicry, its effects on emotion, II.
463-6

Mind, depends on brain-conditions,
I. 4, 553; the mark of its pres
ence, 8; difficulty of stating its
connection with brain, 176;
what psychology means by it,
183, 216

Mind-Stuff theory, Chapter VI: a
postulate of evolution, I. 146, 176;
some proofs of it, 148; author's
interpretation of them, 154; feel-

INDEX.

ings cannot mix, 157 ff. , II. 2,
103

Miser, association ist explanation of
the, II. 423 if.

MITCHELL, J. K., II. 616

MITCHELL, S. W., I. 381; II. 38-9,
380

Modesty, II. 435

MOLL, A., II. 616

M LYNEUX, II. 210

Monadism, I. 179

Monism, I. 366-7

Monkey's cortical centres, I. 34-5,
46, 59

MONTGOMERY, E., I. 158

M«ral principles, II. 639, 672

Moiutis, G. S.,1. 365

Mosso, on blood-supply to brain, I.
97-9

, plethysmographic researches,

II. 378; on fear, 419, 483

Motor centres, I. 31 if.

'Motor circle,' II. 583

Motor 'strands, I. 38; for special
muscles, I. 64

Motor type of imagination, II. 61

Movement, perception of, by sen
sory surfaces, II. 171 if.; part
played by, in vision, 197.203,234-7;
the, Production of, Chap. XXII;
requires guiding sensations, 490;
illusory perception of, during an
aesthesia, 489; results from every
kind of consciousness, 526

MOZAHT, I. 255

MULLER, G. E., I. 445, 456-8; II.
198, 280, 491, 502. 508 517

MULLER, J., I. 68; II. 640

MULLER, J. J., II. 213

MULLER, MAX, I. 269

MUNK, II., I. 41-3-4-5-6, 57-8-9, 63

MUNSTERBERG, on Meynert's
scheme, I. 77; on reaction times
with intellectual operation, 432 :
on association, 562; on time-per
ception, 6^0, 637; on imagination,
II. 74; on muscular sensibility,
189; on volition, 505; on feel
ing of innervation, 514; on asso
ciation, 590

Muscles, how represented in nerve-
centres, I. 19

Muscle reading, II. 525

Muscular sense, its cortical centre,
I. 61; its existence, II. 189 if., 197
if.; its insignificance in space-per
ception. 197-203, 234-7

Music, its accidental genesis, II.
627; 687

MUSSEY II. 543

Mutilations, inherited, II. 627
MYKKN. F. YV JI., I. 400; II. 133
Mysophobia, II. 435, 545

NATUKK, the order of, its incogru
ence with that of our thought, J I
634 if.

NAUNYN, I. 55.

Necessary truths are all truths of
comparison, II. 641 if., 651, <;<>:>.
See experience, a priori connections,
etc.

NEIGLICK, I. 543

Neural process, in perception, I. 78
ff. ; in habit, 105 if. ; in association.
566; in memory, 655; in imagin
ation, II. 68 if.; in perception, 82
if , 103 if.; in hallucination, 122
if.; in space-perception, 143; in
emotion, 474; in volition, 580 if.;
in association, 587 if.

Nitrous oxide intoxication, II. 284

Nonsense, how it escapes detection,
I. 261

Normal position in vision, II. 238

NOTIINAGUL, I. 51, 60-1

Number, II. 653

OBERSTEINER, I. 87, 445

Object, use of the word, I. 275, 471;

confusion of, with thought that

knows it, 278
Objective world, known before self,

I. 273: its primitive unity, 487-8;
ditto, II. 8

Objects versus ideas, I. 230, 278
Old-fogyism, II. 110

OUCIIANSKY, I. 95

' Overtone ' (psychic), I. 258, 281-2

Pain, I. 143, its relations to the

will, II. 549 if., 583-4
PANETII, I. 64, 05
Parallelism, theory of, between

mental and cerebral phenomena,

see Automaton-theory
Paresis of external rectus muscle,

II. 236, 507
PARINAUD, II. 7 1

Partiality of mind, see interest, tele
ology, intelligence, selection, es
sences

Past time, known in a present feel
ing, I. (VJT: the immediate past
is a portion of the present dura
tion-block, 608 ff.

Patellar reilex, II. 380

Paths throuirh cortex, I. 71; their
formation, 107-12; II. 584 if.;
association depends on them, 56?

700

INDEX.

ff.; memory depends on them,

655 ff., 661, 686
PAULHAN, F., I. 250; 408; 670; II.

64; 476
Pedagogic remarks: I. 121-7; II.

110, 401-2, 409, 463, 466
Perception, Chapter XIX ; com
pared with sensation, II. 1, 76;

involves reproductive processes,

78; is of probable objects, 82 If.;

not an unconscious inference, 111

ff. ; rapidity of, 131
Perception-time, II. 131
PEREZ, B., I. 446; II. 416
Personal equation, I. 413
Personality, alterations of, I. 373 ff.
PPLUGER, on frog's spinal cord, I.

9, 134

Philosophies, their test, II. 312
Phosphorus and thought, I. 101
Phrenology, I. 27
PICK, E., I. 669
PITRES, I. 206
Planchette-writing, I. 208-9 ; 393

ff.
Plasticity, as basis of habit, defined,

I. 105

PLATNER, II. 208
PLATO, I. 462
Play, II. 427

Pleasure, as related to will, I. 143;

II. 549; 583-4

Points, identical, theory of, II. 222

Possession, Spirit-, I. 393 ff.
Post-hypnotic suggestion, II. 613
Practical interests, their effects on

discrimination, I. 515 ff.
Prayer, I. 316
' Preperception,' I. 439
Present, the present moment, I. 606

ff.

PREYER, II. 403
Probability determines what object

shall be perceived, II. 82, 104,

258, 260-3

Problematic conceptions, I. 463
Problems, the process of solution

of, I. 584
Projection of sensations, eccentric,

II. 31 if.

Projection, theory of, II. 228
Psychologist's fallacy, the, see Fal
lacy

Psycho-physic law, I. 539
Pugnacity, II. 409
Pure Ego, I. 342
PUTNAM, J. J., I. 61

Questioning mania, II. 284

RABIER, I. 470, 604

Rational propositions, II. 644

Rationality is based on apprehension
of series, II. 659

Rationality, postulates of, 670, 677

Rationality, sense of, I. 26U-4; II.
647

Reaction-time, I. 87; simple, 88;
what it measures is not conscious
thought, 90; Lange'g distinction,
between muscular and seusorial,
92; its variations, 94-7; influenced
by expectant attention, 427 11'.;
after intellectual process, 482; after
discrimination, 523; after associa
tion, 557; after perception, II. 131

Real size and shape of visual ob
jects, II. 179, 237 if.

Reality, the Perception of, Chapter
XXI; not a distinct content of
consciousness, 286; various orders
of, 287 ff. ; every object has some
kind of reality, 291 ff . ; the choice
of, 290; practical, 293 ff.; means
relation to the self, 295-8; relation
of sensations to, 299; of emotions,
306

Reason, I. 551. See Logic

Reasoning, Chapter XXII; its defi
nition, II. 325; involves the pick,
ing out of essences, or sagacity,
329, and abstraction, 332; its
utility depends on the peculiar
constitution of this world, 337 ff.,
651; depends on association by
similarity, 345

Recall, I. 578, 654

'Recepts,' II. 827, 349, 351

Recognition, 673

Recollection, voluntary. 585 ff.

REDINTEGRATION, I, 569

'Reductives/II 125, 291

Reflex acts, I. 12; reaction-time
measures one, 90; concatenated
habits are constituted by a chain
of, 116

REID, THOMAS, I. 609, 78; II. 214,
216, 218, 240, 309

Relating principle, I. 687-8

Relation, feelings of, I. 243 fl
space relations, II. 148 ff.

Relations, inward, between ideas, II.
639, 642, 661, 671; the principle of
transferred, 646

Relief, II. 254-7. See third dimen
sion.

RENOUVIER, CH., I. 551; II. 309

Reproduction in memory, I. 574 ff ,
654; voluntary. 585 ff.

Resemblance, I. 52.8

INDEX.

701

Respiration, effects of sensory stim
uli upon, II. 376

Restitution of function, I. 67 ff.

Restoration of function, I. 67 ff.

Retention in memory, 653 if.

Retentiveness, organic, I. 659 ff.; it
is unchangeable, 663 ff.

Retinal image, II. 92

Retinal sensibility, see vision, space,
identical points, third dime?isio?i,
projection, etc.

Revival in memory, I. 574 ff., 654

REYNOLDS, MARY, I. 381.

RIBOT, TH., I. 375; on attention,
444, 446, 680, 682

RICHET, OH., I. 638, 644-6-7

RIEHL, A., II. 32

ROBERTSON, G. C., I. 461; II. 86

ROMANES, G. J. II. 95, 132 327-9
349, 351, 355, 397

Romantic and classic, II. 469

ROSENTHAL, 79

Ross, J., I. 56-7

ROYCE, J., I. 374; II. 316-7

ROYER-COLLARD, I. 609

RUTHERFORD, II. 170

Sagacity, II. 331, 343

Sameness, I. 272, 459, 480, II. 650

SCIIAEFER, W., I. 35, 53, 59, 63

SCHIFF, M., I. 58, 78, 100

SCHMID, I. 683

SCHMIDT, H. D., II. 399-400

SCHNEIDER, G. H., on Habits, I.
112, 118-20; on perception of
motion, II. 173; on evolution of
movements, 380; on instincts,
387-8, 411, 418, 439

SCHOPENEIAUER, II. 33, 273
SCHRADER, I. 72 ff.

Science, the genesis of, II. 665-9

Sea-sickness, susceptibility to, an
accident, II. 627

Seat of consciousness, I. 65; of Soul,
214; of sensations, no original,
II. 34

Sciences, the natural, the factors of
their production, II. 633 ff.; a
Turkish cadi upon, 640 ; pos
tulate things with unchangeable
properties, 656

Sciences, the pure, they express re
sults of comparison 'exclusively,
II. 641; classifications, 646; logic,
647; mathematics, 653

Secretiveness, II. 432

SEQUTN, I. 48, 75

Selection, a cardinal function of
consciousness, 284 ff., 40'J 591;
11 584; of visual reality. II. 177

ff., 237; of reality in general, 290,
294; of essential quality, 333, 370,
634

Self, consciousness of. Chap. X.
not primary, I. 273; the empirical
self, I. 291; its constituents, 292;
the material self, 292; the social
self, 293; the spiritual self, 296:
resolvable into feelings localized
in head, 300 ff.; consciousness ».l
personal identity, 330 ff.; its ul
terations, 373 ff.
Self-feeling, I. 305 ff.
Self-love, I. 317; the name for ac
tive impulses and emotions to
wards certain objects; we do not
love our bare principle of iudi
viduality, 323
Self-seeking, I. 307 ff.
Selves, their rivalry, I. 309 ff.
Semi-reflex acts, I. 13
Sensation, does attention increase
its strength? I. 425; terminus of
thought, 471

Chapter 1XVII; distinguished

from perception, II. 1, 76; its cog
nitivc function, 3; pure sensation
an abstraction, 3; the terminus ol
thought, 7

Sensations, are not compounds, I.
158 ff.; II. 2; their supposed com
bination by a higher principle
1. 687; II. 27-30; their iutiu
ence on each other, II. 28-30-
their eccentric projection, 31 ff.,
195 ff.; their localization inside of
one another, 183 ff. ; their relation
to reality, 299 ff.; to emotions.
453; their fusion, see Mirid-stt/J}
tlwory

Sensationalism, I. 243; criticised
by spiritualism, 687

ditto, II. 5: in the field of

space-perception, criticised, 216
ff. ; its difficulties, 231-7; defended
237 ff., 517

SERGI, II. 34

Serial increase, I. 490; II. 644

Series, II. 644-51, 659 ff.

SETH, A., II. 4

Sexual function, I. 22

Shadows, colored. II. 25

Shame. II. 435

oKMAKKR, Dr., I. 273

Shyness, II. 430

Sight, its cortical centre, f . 41 ff .
66

Sign-making, a differentia cf a;an,

Signs, loca1. II. 155 II.

702

INDEX.

SIGWART, C., II. 634-6

SIKORSKY, II. 405

Similarity, I. 528

Similarity, association by, I. 578;
II. 345, 353

Skin, discrimination of points on,
1.512

Sleep, partial consciousness during,
I. 213

Sociability, II. 430

Somnambulism, see hypnotism,
hysterics

Soul, theory of the, I. 180; inac
cessibility of, 187; its essence is
to think (according to Descartes),
200; seat of, 214; arguments for
its existence, 343 if.; an unneces
sary hypothesis for psychology,
350; compared with transcenden
tal Ego, 365; a relating principle,
499

Space, the perception of, Chapter
XX; primitive extensity in three
dimensions, II. 134-9; spatial
order, 145; space-relations, 148;
localization in, 153 il. ; how real
.%pace is mentally constructed, 166
if. ; part played by movement in,
171-6; measurement of exten
sions, 177 if.; synthesis of origi
nally chaotic sensations of exten
sion, 181 ff . ; part played by
articular surfaces in, 189 ff. ; by
muscles, 197 If.; how the blind
perceive space, 203 if.; visual
ipace, 211-268; theory of identical
points, 222; of projection, 228;
difficulties of sensation-theory
expounded and replied to, 231-
268; historical sketch of opinion,
270 ff .

SPALDING, D. A., II. 396, 398, 400,
406

Span of consciousness, I. 405, 640

Bpeech, the ' centre ' of, I. 55; its
misleading influence in psychol
ogy, I. 194; thought possible
without it, 269. See Aphasia,
Phrenology

SPENCER, his formula of 'adjust
ment/ I. 6; on formation of paths
in nerve-centres, 109; on chasm
between mind and matter, 147; on
origin of consciousness, 148; on
'integration' of nervous shocks,
151-3; on feelings of relation, 247;
on unity of self, 354; on con-
ceivability, 464; on abstraction,
506; on association, 600; on time
perception, 622, 639; on memory,

649; on recognition, 673; on feel
ing and perception, II. 113, 180;
on space-perception, 272, 282; on
genesis of emotions, 47>S ff.; on
free-will, 576; on inheritance of
acquired peculiarities, 620 ff., 679;
on ' equilibration,' 627; on genesis
of cognition, 643; on that of so
ciality and pity, 685

SPINOZA, II. 288

SPIR, A., II. 665, 677

'Spirit-control/ I. 228

Spiritualist theory 'of the self, I.
342; II. 5

Spiritualists, I. 161

STANLEY, HENRY M., II. 310

STARR, A., I, 54. 56

Statistical method in psychology,
1. 194

STEINER, I. 72-3

STEINTIIAL, I. 604; II. 107-9

STEPANOFF, II. 170

Stereoscope, II. 87

Stereoscopy, II. 223, 252. See third
dimension

STERNBERG, II. 105, 515

STEVENS, I. 617

STEVENS, E. W., I. 397

STORY, JEAN, I. 263

Stream of Thought, Chapter IX:
schematic representations of, I.
279-82

STRICKER, S., II. 62 ff.

STRUMPELL, A., I. 376, 445, 489,
491

STRUMPELL, Prof , II. 353

STTJART, D., I. 406, 427

STUMPF. C., on attention, I. 426 s
on difference, 493; on fusion of
impressions, 522, 530-3; on strong
and weak sensations, 547; on re
lativity of knowledge, II. 11; on
sensations of extent, 219, 221

Subjective sensations, I. 516 ff.

Substance, spiritual, I. 345

Substantive states of mind, I. 243

Substitution of parts for wholes iu
reasoning, II. 330; of the same
for the same, 650

Subsumption, the principle of medi
ate. II. 648

Succession, not known by succes
sive feelings, I. 628; vs. duration,
609

Suggestion, in hypnotism, II. 598-
(501; post-hypnotic, 613

Suicide, I. 317

SULLY, J., I. 191; II. 79, 221, 272,
281, 322, 425

Summation of stimuli, 1. 82; of el^

INDEX.

703

ments of feeling. 151; the lattei

is inadmissible, 158
Superposition, in space-measure

merits, II. 177, 266 If.
Symbols as substitutes for reality,

II. 305

Sympathy, II. 410
Synthetic judgments a priori, II

601-2
Systems, philosophic, sentimental

and mechanical, II. 665-7

Tactile centre, I. 58

Tactile images, II. 65

Tactile sensibility, its cortical cen
tre, I. 34. 61, 6'3

TAINH:, H., on unity of self, I. 355;
on alterations of ditto, 376; on
recollecting, 658, 670. On projec
tion of sensations, II 83; on
images, 48, and their 'reduction/
125-6; on reality, 291

TAKACS, II. 490

TARDE, G., I. 263

TAYLOR, C. F., II. 99

Tedium. I. 626

Teleology, created by consciousness,

I. 140-1; essence of intelligence,
482

involved in the fact of essences,

II. 335; its barrenness in the
natural sciences, 665

Tendency, feelings of, I. 250-4

THACKERAY, W. M. , II. 434

Thermometry, cerebral, I 99

' Thing,' II. 184, 259

Thinking, the consciousness of, I.
300 ff.

Thinking principle, I. 342

Third dimension of space, II. 134 ff.,
212 ff., 220

THOMPSON, D. G., I. 354; II. 662

THOMSON, ALLEN, I. 84

Thought, synonym for con scions-
ness at large, I. 186; the stream of.
Chapter IX: it tends to personal
form, 225; same thought never
comes twice, 231 ff.; sense in
which it is continuous, 237; can
be carried on in any terms, 260-8;
what constitutes its rational char
acter, 269; is cognitive, 271; not
made up of parts, 276 ff., JL 79
ff. ; always partial to some of its ob
jects, I. 284 ff. ; the consciousness
of it as a process, 300 ff . ; the pres
ent thought is the thinker, 369,
401; depends on material condi
tions. 553

Thought reading,' II. 525

Time, occupied by neural and mental
processes, see reaction-time
— unconscious registration of, 201

Time, the perception of, Chapter
XV; begins with duration, I. 609;
compared with perception of
space, 610 ff. ; empty time not
perceived, 619; its discrete flow,
621, 637; long intervals conceived
symbolically. 622 ff. ; variations
in our estimate of its length, 628
ff.; cerebral process underlying,

TISCHER, I. 524, 527

Touch, cortical centre for, I. 58

Trance, see hypnotism

Transcendentalist theory of the Self
I. 342, 360 ff . ; criticised, 363 ff.

Transitive states of mind, I. 243 ff.

TSCHISCH, VON, I. 414, 560

TUKE, D. H.. II. 130, 413

TAYLOR, E. B.. II. 304

Tympanic membrane, its tacti)e sen
sibility, II. 140

TYNDALL, I. 147-8

UEBERWEG, I. 187

Unconscious states of Mind, preofs
of their existence, I. 164 ff." Ob
jections, 164 ff.

Unconsciousness, I. 199 ff. ; in hys
terics, 202 ff.; of useless sensa
tions, 517 ff.

Understanding of a sentence, I. 281

Units, psychic, I. 151

Unity of original object, I. 487-8- II.
8; 183 ff.

Universal conceptions, I. 473. See

Unreality, the feeling of, II. 298

VALENTIN, I. 557

Varying concomitants, law of disso
ciation by, I. 506

VENNTJM, LURANCY, I. 397

Ventriloquism, II. 184

VERDON, R., I. 685

Vertigo, II. 89. Mental vertigo,
309; optical, 506

Vicarious function of brain-parts, I
69, 142; II. 592

VIERORDT, I. 616 if.; II. 154, 172

VlNTSCHGAU, I. 95-6

Vision with head upside down, II.

Visual centre in brain, I. 41 ff.
Visual space, II. 211 ff.
Visualizing power, II. 51-60
Vocalization, II. 407
Volition, see Will

704

INDEX.

VOLKMANN, A. W., II. 198, 252 ff

YOLKMANN, W. VON VoLKMAK, I.

627, 629, 631. II. 276

Voluminousness, primitive, of sensa
tions, II. 134

Voluntary thinking, I. 583

Vulgarity of mind, II. 370

VULPIAN, I. 73

WAHLE, I. 493

WAITZ, TH., I. 405, 632; II. 436

Walking, in child, II. 405

WALTER, J. E., I. 214

WARD, J., I. 162, 454, 548, 562,

629, 633; II. 282
WARREN, J. W., 1. 97
WAYLAND, I. 347
WEBER, E. H., his ' law,' I. 537 ff.

On space-perception on skin, II.

141-2; on muscular feeling, 198
WEED, T., I. 665
WEISMANN, A., II. 684 if.
Wernicke's convolution, I. 89, 54-5
' WHEATSTONE'S experiment,' II.

226-7
WIGAN, Dr., I. 390, 675; II. 566-7

WlLBRAND, I. 50-1

Will, Chapter XXVI; involves
memory of past acts, and nothing
else but consent that they shall
occur again, II. 487-518; the

• memory may involve images of
either resident or remote effects of
the movement, 518-22; ideo-mo-
tor action, 522-8; action after de
liberation, 528; decision, 531;
effort, 535; the explosive will, 537;

the obstructed will, 546; relation
of will to pleasure and pain, 549 if.
to attention, 561; terminates in an
'idea', 567; the question of its
indeterminism, 569; psychology
must assume determinism, 576;
neural processes concerned in
education of the will, 579 if.

Will, relations of, to Belief, II. 320

WILLS, JAS., I. 241

Witchcraft, II. 309

WOLFE, H. K., I. 674, 679

WOLFF, CHR., I. 409, 651

World, the peculiar constitution of
the, II. 337, 647, 651-2

Writing, automatic, I 393 if.

WUNDT, on frontal lobes, I. 64; on
reaction-time, 89-94, 96, 427 ff.,
525; on introspective method, 189;
on self -consciousness, 303; on per
ception of strokes of sound, 407;
on perception of simultaneous
events, 411 ft' ; on Weber's law,
534 if. ; association-time, 557, 560;
on time-perception, 608, 612 ff.,
620, 634. On local signs, II. 155-
7; on eyeball-muscles, 200; on
sensations, 219; on paresis of ext.
rectus, 236: on contrast, 250; on
certain illusions, 264; on feeling
of innervation, 266,493; on space
as synthesis, 276; on emotions,
481; on dichotomic form of
thought, 654

Zollner's pattern, II. 232

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The principles of
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